September, 2001 web edition

Federal appeals court strikes down an employment agreement that required the arbitration of discrimination claims, because it mandated that all costs were to be split between the employer and employee.

     The Civil Rights Acts of 1964-1976 (Title VII) allow applicants and employees to sue for discriminatory practices, and if successful, to recover all costs and attorney's fees; 42 U.S. Code §1988 (1976).

     An airport security firm required all new employees to sign an agreement giving up the right to sue and to take their claims to arbitration.  The agreement further provided that all costs were to be split among the parties.

     A former security officer sued the employer for gender discrimination, and the firm tried to enforce the arbitral agreement.  The District Court found that such agreements are unenforceable if the employee is required to forego the attorney fee provision of the civil rights act.

     The employer then asked the court to sever that clause, and enforce the remainder of the agreement.  It refused to do so, and a three-judge appeals panel has affirmed, saying:

To sever the costs and fees provision and force the employee to arbitrate a Title VII claim ... would reward the employer for its actions and fail to deter similar conduct by others ...  If an employer could rely on the courts to sever an unlawful provision and compel the employee to arbitrate, the employer would have an incentive to include unlawful provisions in its arbitration agreements.

     The panel said that such clauses might deter an employee from initiating arbitration, even if they are unenforceable.  Perez v. Globe Airport Security, #00-13489, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 12394 (11th Cir.).

Text: laws.findlaw.com/11th/0013489opn.html

»  Research Note: The Supreme Court has warned that “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute.”  Rather, the agreement only submits the dispute to an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.  Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler, 473 U.S. 614 /at 628 (1985).

Text: laws.findlaw.com/us/473/614.html

California Supreme Court allows plaintiff’s counsel to collect the larger of a pre-agreed contingency fee or the statutory fees awarded by the court.

     Attorneys for a former CHP officer agreed to handle her sexual harassment claim for 40% of the net jury award.  A jury awarded her $250,000 and the court granted statutory awarded attorneys' fees of $1,088,231.  California's civil rights laws follow the federal version and allow legal fees to the “prevailing party.”

     Five of six California Supreme Court justices said the 100% of the $1 million-plus should go to the lawyers, and not 40% of the total sums recovered.  That means in state court litigation, California attorneys have a win-win situation -- they get the larger of the pre-agreed percentage of the total damages plus fees, or the fees awarded by the court.

     The ruling boosted her lawyers’ fees from $535,292 to $1,088,231. The majority said their holding would “encourage representation of legitimate [civil rights] claimants and discourage nonmeritorious suits” and defenses.  Flannery v. Prentice, #S080150, 2001 Cal. Lexis 5256, 01 C.D.O.S. 6991.

Text: www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/archive/S080150.PDF

»  Editor's Note: Under the federal civil rights attorney's fees act, 42 U.S. Code §1988 (1976) a prevailing plaintiff is obligated to pay his attorney a pre-agreed percentage under a contingency agreement, even it is more than the statutory fees awarded by the court.

     The U.S. Supreme Court has stressed that “it is the party, rather than the lawyer”, who recovers the judgment and legal fees, but is bound by any sharing agreement with counsel. Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82/ at 87, 110 S.Ct. 1679 (1990).

Arbitrator holds that firefighters were not required to maintain the lawns of adjacent property acquired by the fire dept., even though the fire prevention office occupied part of the additions.

     In an Ohio community, firefighters were required under the bargaining agreement to maintain the lawn around “fire stations.”  The fire dept. took over the ownership of two other buildings, contiguous to the main fire station.  The fire prevention office took occupancy of part of the buildings.

     Two firefighters volunteered to cut the grass, and the union grieved, claiming an “expansion” of duties.  Management disagreed and said that the township only enlarged the main facility, although another governmental unit occupies some of the acquired property.

     The arbitrator upheld the grievance.  Although the fire dept. owned the structures, only part was used for the fire prevention office -- and that function is not a traditional part of a “fire station.”  Boardman Twp. and IAFF L-1176, FMCS #01/01427, 115 LA (BNA) 1021 (Lalka, 2001).

Arbitrator upholds firing of a security officer who called his sergeant a dumb son of a bitch.

     This incident began when the Grievant, a civilian guard at a military installation, made a “discourteous, smart mouthed answer” to his Sergeant on the radio where all employees could hear.  When confronted, words were exchanged between the two.  The officer was fired and filed a grievance.

     An independent arbitrator said that even if the sergeant responded with profanity, “the proper response of the grievant to the sergeant’s words, whether they contained profanity or not, was ‘yes, sir’.”  Calling a superior “a dumb son of a bitch" was a serious violation of the chain of command.  Given the paramilitary nature of security functions, “disrespect ... rises, ... to the level of insubordination to a superior,” he ruled.

     The very nature of the employer's business, to guard a government facility, required that the chain of command be respected. The grievance was denied.  S.P.I., Inc. and Int. Union, Security, Police & Fire Prof. L-796, FMCS #00/032908327-8, 115 LA (BNA) 1403 (Rivera, 2001).

Seventh Circuit holds that a school board's policy of providing health insurance benefits to cohabitating domestic partners of same-gender employees, but not to unmarried heterosexual employees, does not violate equal protection rights.

     The Chicago school board extended benefits to the domestic partners of employees who are the same gender as the employee, if the two are unrelated, over 18 years old, and are responsible for each other's common welfare.

     They also must satisfy two of four conditions: (1) have lived together for a year; (2) jointly own a home; (3) jointly own other specified property; or (4) the domestic partner is the primary beneficiary under the employee's will.

     The beneficiaries need not be gay; proof of sexual orientation is not required. Only 9 of 45,000 employees sought the benefits.  The Seventh Circuit noted that because of the widespread existence of opposite-sex cohabitation today, extending domestic partner benefits to heterosexual couples would greatly increase the expense of the program.

     The appellate panel accepted the board’s argument, with some moral reservations, that it was desirable to attract homosexual teachers to provide support for its homosexual students and that same-gender marriage is not possible in Illinois.  Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, #00-3216, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 9249; 85 FEP Cases (BNA) 1169, 69 L.W. 1732 (7th Cir. 2001).

Text: laws.findlaw.com/7th/003216.html

Federal court in Chicago holds that a law firm that investigates employee misconduct is not credit reporting agency, and that an employee under investigation for misconduct is not entitled to receive a copy of the report.

     In Illinois, a park district employee alleged that her superior had engaged in improper practices with public funds, and so testified at a grand jury.  Following that testimony, the park district retained a law firm to conduct an investigation; the worker ultimately was fired.

     She filed a lawsuit alleging infringement of her First Amendment rights and the state's Whistleblower Protection Act.  She also sought the contents of the written report prepared by the law firm for the park board.  She claimed:

1. The document was a “consumer report” as defined in the Fair Retail Credit Act (FCRA) and that she was denied a copy.

2. The investigation violated the FCRA because neither management or the law firm advised her that she was under investigation or sought her consent.

     The FCRA defines a consumer report as information prepared by a consumer reporting agency bearing on “credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living” ... “for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for ... employment.” 15 U.S.C. §1681a(d)(1).

     The court said that "Nothing in the complaint indicates that [the] investigation and its report concerned [her] credit history, her character, her general reputation, or her personal characteristics or mode of living."

     The investigation and report concerned the worker's dealings with the employer, and therefore did not fall within the scope of FCRA.  In so holding, the judge rejected the so-called Vail Opinion.  Vail is an FTC Advisory Opinion that outside law firms or lawyers that assist employers in employment or disciplinary matters are "Consumer Reporting Agencies" and that an unedited copy of all reports must be furnished the employee.  See FTC Adv. Opin. to Judi A. Vail (5 Apr. 1999), as discussed in our prior article at 1999 FP 83.

     The judge wrote that “there is nothing in the FCRA or its history that indicates that Congress intended to abrogate the attorney-client or work-product privileges”.  Even if a report is prepared by an outside law firm about an employee, it is a “report containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person making the report” within the meaning of the exception of §1681a(d)(2)(A)(i),

     The court said that an attorney is not a third party like a credit bureau or a detective agency.  A lawyer has a “relationship of trust, confidence, and confidentiality” with the employer:

When an attorney conducts for an employer/client an investigation of an employee’s dealings with the employer, he is acting as the client, just as would be the case if the employer had one of its employees conduct the investigation. This is qualitatively different from the situation that exists when an employer contracts with an outside entity lacking a fiduciary and agency relationship like that of attorney and client.

Hartman v. Lisle Park Dist., #01C1904, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12414 (N.D. Ill.

Text: www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/RACER2/index.html

Then seek case No: 1:01-cv-1904

»  Research Note: Two other federal courts also have rejected the FTC's Vail Opinion: Johnson v. Federal Express, 147 F.Supp.2d 1268 at 1273-74, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8558 (M.D. Ala. 2001) and  Robinson v. Time Warner, 187 F.R.D. 144 at 148 n.2, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14304 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

     The FTC issued a second Advisory Opinion which said that an employee’s consent to the procurement of a consumer report can be routinely obtained at the start of employment, thereby relieving the employer of the awkward prospect of having to ask a suspected wrongdoer for permission to allow a third party to provide an investigative (or other) consumer report to the employer. FTC Adv. Opin. to Susan R. Meisinger (31 Aug. 1999).

Text: www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra/meisinger.htm

Federal court in Philadelphia allows a local governmental employer to order a confirming exam for a worker returning from FMLA leave.  There was a history of requiring such exams, and the bargaining agreement perpetuated recognized past practices.

     A 23 year veteran civil service employee was fired for refusing to take a confirming exam, after returning from a two month FMLA leave. Her physician had provided certification that she was fit to resume her employment, but she was to avoid drafts and stressful working conditions

     The court dismissed her FMLA based suit for reinstatement.  Federal law generally requires employers to consult the employee's physician, rather than to seek a confirming examination. 29 C.F.R. §825.310(c). The court in this case said there is an exception where the return-to-work procedures are established or preserved in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).

     The FMLA allows a CBA to establish its own procedures for an employee’s return to work, and these procedures can supersede those of the FMLA. 29 U.S. Code §2614(a)(4). The Supreme Court has held that the parties' past practices are implied terms of a CBA.  Conrail v. Railway Labor Exec. Assn., 491 U.S. 299, at 311- 12 (1989).

     Management believed her medical certification was unclear and confusing. Township officials consistently applied the same independent examination procedure in 26 prior situations where an employee's medical certification was unclear or confusing. That history became a part of the CBA.

     Although the FMLA's substantive protections cannot be undermined by a CBA, the judge noted that the FMLA simply entitles an employee to resume her employment. “It does not, however, ensure a particular administrative procedure for returning to work.”  Conroy v. Township of Lower Merion, #00-CV-3528, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11460 (E.D. Pa.).

Text: www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/01D0641P.HTM

Arbitrator orders lost pay for police officers who were not called back for a special assignment; city relied on auxiliary and housing authority officers, in violation of the contract.

     During a prior visit of Vice-President Gore, an Ohio city called in six housing authority officers and six unsworn auxiliary officers to supplement the patrol force.  The 12 city officers lost call-in overtime assignments, at the pay rates specified in the bargaining agreement.

     The arbitrator sustained the complaint and ordered the city to pay the grievants their lost pay.  Warren (City of) and Ohio PBA, FMCS #01/099-490, 115 LA (BNA) 1486 (Lalka, 2001).

Maryland fire dept. agrees to allow a Muslim firefighter to wear a religious scarf, but she must wear hood and helmet when responding to fires.

     The 29-year-old woman firefighter converted to Islam, after meeting her husband, a Muslim paramedic. She began wearing a “hijab,” a scarf that covers her head.  To accommodate her religious beliefs, the firefighter can wear the scarf at work, but must replace it with a fire-resistant hood and helmet when fighting fires.  In re Stacy Tobing and Montgomery Co., Md. “Muslim Firefighter May Wear Scarf,” Wash. Post, Jul. 13, 2001, p. B05; www.washingtonpost.com/

»  Research Note:  The EEOC has consistently advocated against appearance regulations that interfere with religious beliefs.  In an early EEOC decision, an employer was found to have violated Title VII by forbidding a revenue clerk from wearing a high neckline dresses which substantially covered her legs and arms. The attire was required by her religious beliefs as a member of the Black Muslim faith. EEOC Decision No. 71-2620, 1975 EEOC Lexis 61 (1975), relying on Welsh v. U.S., 90 S.Ct. 1792 at 1796 (1970).

Federal appeals court finds that punitive damages are available for injuries sustained by a paraplegic prisoner who was transported in a van without wheelchair restraints. Jury awarded $1,034,817 in actual and $1,200,000 in punitive damages.

     We previously reported [1998 FP 166] that a paraplegic man was arrested for misdemeanor trespass.  When the police van arrived it lacked wheelchair locks, which would have permitted the man's transportation in his wheelchair.

     He swayed and fell to the van floor, exploding his urine bag. After arriving at the station, the man was booked and released. He was subsequently convicted of the minor offense.

     After these events, the arrestee suffered a bladder infection from urine backing up into his system and serious lower back pain. His injuries left him unable to work a full day; he suffers frequent pain, uncontrollable spasms in his paralyzed areas, and permanent shoulder problems.

     He sued the chief of police and others, under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S. Code 794) and Title II of the ADA (42 U.S. Code 12132).  A jury found the defendants liable and awarded the man actual damages of $1,034,817 and punitive damages of $1,200,000. This appeal followed.

     For a third time, the 8th Circuit upheld the judgment, and specifically found that punitive damages are available, if the defendant's conduct was motivated by evil motive or intent, or there was a reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.

     The three-judge panel remanded the action for a determination whether punitive damages were warranted and whether the verdict was for an appropriate amount.  Gorman v. Easley, #00-1029 and 1030, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 12827 (8th Cir.).

Text: www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/06/001029P.pdf

»  Research Note: A federal court in N.Y. refused to dismiss a suit brought by a paraplegic inmate, under the ADA, against officers for transporting him in a van that was not wheelchair accessible.  Candelaria v. Greifinger, 1997 U.S.Dist. Lexis 4616, 4617 & 16146 [3 opinions and orders] (N.D.N.Y.).

     In Connecticut, a superior court refused to dismiss a suit brought by a paraplegic inmate, under the ADA, against a sheriff and others for transporting him in a van that was not wheelchair accessible.  Davis v. Mak, 1997 WL 133410 (Conn. Super. 1997).

Ninth Circuit upholds discrimination claims of injured personnel on light duty status.  Disabled officers may not be denied promotions or preferred assignments.

     Of the 1,000 San Jose Police officers below the rank of sergeant, most work in uniform beat cars.  More desirable special assignments may be held for three years, after which officers must return to patrol duties. In the year immediately prior to receiving a specialized assignment, an officer must have worked as a beat-patrol officer.

     About 30 officers with injuries to their back, neck or other areas were assigned to "Modified Duty" assignments that were allocated among disabled officers on the basis of seniority.  These positions are considered to be undesirable.

     Light duty officers were forced to work disadvantageous shifts, and were given the least desirable days off. Able bodied officers sometimes referred to officers on light duty as “lame, lazy, fakers, snivelers, whiners, and pussies.”  Although disputed by management, light duty officers claimed that status impeded promotions.

     The city sought to defend the assignment policy because it was recognized in the bargaining agreement. The appellate court responded that qualifications that screen-out disabled persons are discriminatory and unenforceable.

     Although some of the desirable special assignments might require the ability to make forcible arrests, not all of the staff positions have that attribute.  “The ADA ... requires every type of employer [to] find ways to bring the disabled into its ranks, even when doing so imposes some costs and burdens.”

     The appellate panel noted that accommodations for disable persons “is a small price to pay for the benefits of living in a society in which the disabled may realize equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency.”  Cripe v. City of San Jose, #99-15253, 261 F.3d 877, 12 AD Cases (BNA) 225, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 18534, 01 C.D.O.S. 7163 (9th Cir.).

Text: caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/9915253p.pdf

Federal appeals court upholds $25,000 punitive damage award against a supervisor who wrote a negative evaluation of a subordinate with whom she had religious disagreements.

     A State of Missouri social worker and his superior disagreed about the propriety of placing children in the care of foster parents with alternative lifestyles, such as unmarried couples, persons involved in extramarital affairs and homosexuals.

     Despite previous favorable evaluations, he received a 53-page evaluation that criticized virtually every aspect of his job performance.  It contained extensive corrective action plans and remedial training.  He avoided the consequences by transferring to another office.

     He sued his former superior in federal court, alleging religious discrimination.  The jury awarded $1,500 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages.  A three- judge appeals panel affirmed, rejecting the defendant's claim that her subordinate did not suffer any adverse personnel action.

     The panel said that actions short of termination or decrease in pay may still constitute adverse employment actions, including negative personnel reports, and employer-required remedial training.  The fact that the defendant’s recommended corrective action plans were never implemented “is of no moment” because the plaintiff sought a transfer to avoid her criticism of his religious beliefs.  Phillips v. Collings, #00-2176, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 16000, 86 FEP Cases (BNA) 411 (8th Cir. 2001).

Text: www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/01/07/002176P.pdf

Singling out a woman officer for scrutiny during a uniform inspection was not actionable gender bias, nor was it retaliatory behavior because she previously had complained about his touching her back.

     During a uniform inspection, the supervising lieutenant told a subordinate woman officer that her uniform looked snug.  He directed her to raise her arms. He also instructed her to unbutton and open her uniform to inspect the items on her gun belt.

     The woman filed a sexual harassment lawsuit against the city, claiming that the procedure was ordered because of her gender. In court, she testified that the inspection was demeaning and that it caused tears to form in her eyes.  She claimed that he made the requests to embarrass and humiliate her because she previously had complained about his touching her back.

     Her physician testified that she was extremely distressed and felt that she was unable to return to work under the present circumstances.  A psychologist hired by the city also found evidence of emotional distress, headaches, nervousness, crying, and sleep problems. He concluded that the plaintiff was suffering from symptoms of adjustment disorder and emotional distress.

     The city defended the procedure, noting that in the past, the lieutenant had instructed both men and women officers to raise their arms during uniform inspections.  Other supervisory personnel also have asked officers to raise their arms during uniform inspections to see if their clothes fit.

     The judge agreed that the plaintiff subjectively perceived her working environment to be hostile.  However, a plaintiff cannot recover unless she can show that a reasonable person would have found the work environment to be sufficiently hostile.

     He ruled that she did not meet the necessary burden of proof for workplace hostility complaints.  Even if the lieutenant did not ask male officers to raise their arms, one improper incident of picking the plaintiff out for close scrutiny was not actionable conduct, even when viewed in conjunction with the prior touching incidents.

     The judge said that “While a close inspection of one's clothes, including the chest area, might be objectionable in some jobs, the same cannot be said of a police organization with firm uniform rules and mandatory uniform inspections.”  Hilt-Dyson v. Chicago, #99-C-6307, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5346, 39 (1914) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 655 (N.D.Ill., 2001). Text: <www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/>.

Federal court in N.Y. City rejects the claims of a volunteer attorney who sought to hold the bar association liable for sexual harassment.

     Title VII does not protect plaintiffs who do not qualify as employees, and volunteers are generally not considered employees.  The court said that compensation or significant job-related benefits “is an essential condition to the existence of an employer-employee relationship.”

     The judge distinguished two volunteer fire department cases, Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Cmsnrs., 180 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1999) [discussed at 1999 FP 137-8] and Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993) [discussed at 1994 FP 21].

     If volunteer firefighters or police officers receive substantial benefits, they are protected under Title VII.  York v. Assn. of the Bar, #00 Civ. 5961, 86 FEP Cases 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

Arbitrator overturns a 15-day suspension of a sheriff's officer who told a joke that had two meanings, one of which had a sexual inference.  Management and the complainant had overreacted to a tasteless joke.

     In Chicago, a male correctional officer was accused of whispering to a female employee, to go home and give her husband a tongue massage. She yelled “Get the fuck away from me” and reported him for sexual harassment.

     The sheriff imposed a 15-day disciplinary suspension and the male employee grieved. He said he was repeating a joke he had heard on the radio, and had a toothbrush in his hand (for the purpose of applying a nonsexual tongue massage).

     Testimony revealed that the male officer had repeated the “joke” throughout the day, and not once did anybody express any objection to it. The arbitrator said that “15 days is simply outrageous for poor judgment.”

     The conduct was not harassment or sexual, because the grievant had a toothbrush in his hand.  It was a tasteless joke, but not a sexual joke, although it sounded sexual without displaying the toothbrush.

     Management also ignored the progressive discipline steps in the collective bargaining agreement.  The grievance was upheld.  Sheriff of Cook County and Metro. Alliance of Police C-222, 115 LA (BNA) 1346 (Wolff, 2001).

»  Note: Sheriff's General Order No. 3.7A, part II-A-2-a, prohibits “sexually-oriented... remarks, jokes ...” No disciplinary action was taken against the complainant for her sexually-explicit verbal response to the joke.

Divided appellate court upholds a state agency’s decision to fire a disabled worker rather than to accommodate his request to work from his home.

     The Maine Unemployment Division closed 15 field offices, including one 10 minutes from the plaintiff's home. He is partially paralyzed from spina bifida, which limits his ability to walk, affects his bowels and bladder, and triggers pain.

     He was able to work for 22 years for various state agencies, including more than 7 in the position of unemployment claims adjudicator.  He unsuccessfully sought permission to work at home, and brought an ADA when the accommodation was refused.

     The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer because of a lack of evidence demonstrating that he could accomplish essential aspects of his job at home.  The appellate court split 2-to-1.  The majority noted that conducting research would be difficult for an at-home employee because it requires physical access to paper files and the unemployment insurance database.

     The dissenting judge noted “it is clear from the record that no accommodation was ever considered” by his superiors. Kvorjak v. Maine DoL, #00-2385, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 17875 (1^st Cir.).

When posted: www.law.emory.edu/1circuit

»  Research Note: Working at home might be a reasonable accommodation for some jobs but the court found it was not an option for the plaintiff's position.  Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999).

     A federal appeals court in D.C. held that the HHS had to consider accommodating a computer programmer with multiple sclerosis by allowing her to work at home.  Langon v. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 295 U.S. App. D.C. 49, 959 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Carr v. Reno, 306 U.S. App. D.C. 217, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

     A federal District Court in Louisiana ruled that a disabled employee’s request to work at home may be a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.  Anzalone v. Allstate Ins., 1995 WL 21672, 1995 U.S.Dist. Lexis 588 & 1272 (E.D.La.).

     “Traffic Hazards to Fire Fighters While Working Along Roadways,” HHS/NIOSH Publication No. 2001-143. Text: www.cdc.gov/niosh/hid12.html

     California Public Employees' Retirement System's telework policy includes a written plan, safety checklist, guidelines for a home office & a specimen telework agreement:

www.dpa.ca.gov/telework/PERS%20Final.pdf

     The Colorado Dept. of Personnel, General Support Services, has a site entitled, “Flexplace: Working Smarter - Maximizing Human Resources Potential,” at: www.state.co.us/govdir/gss/hr/worklife/FLEXPLAC.pdf

     OPM's Office of Merit Systems Oversight and Effectiveness has issued a “Special Study Report” (May 2001) on the success of teleworking in the federal service:

www.opm.gov/wrkfam/telecomm/

     The State of Wyoming has issued proposed rules for state employees to standardize its telework program; see Ch. 18, “Alternative Work Schedules.”

personnel.state.wy.us/01Rules/proposed.htm

Anzalone v. Allstate Ins., 1995 WL 21672, 1995 U.S.Dist. Lexis 588 & 1272 (E.D.La.). [142]
Boardman Twp. and IAFF L-1176, FMCS #01/01427, 115 LA (BNA) 1021 (Lalka, 2001). [132-3]
Candelaria v. Greifinger, 1997 U.S.Dist. Lexis 4616, 4617 & 16146 (N.D.N.Y.). [138]
Carr v. Reno, 306 U.S. App. D.C. 217, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994). [142]
Conrail v. Railway Labor Exec. Assn., 491 U.S. 299, at 311- 12 (1989). [136]
Conroy v. Township of Lower Merion, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11460 (E.D. Pa.). [135-6]
Cripe v. City of San Jose, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 18534, 01 C.D.O.S. 7163 (9th Cir.). [138-9]
Davis v. Mak, 1997 WL 133410 (Conn. Super. 1997). [138]
EEOC Decision No. 71-2620, 1975 EEOC Lexis 61 (1975). [137]
FTC Adv. Opin. to Judi A. Vail (5 Apr. 1999). [135]
FTC Adv. Opin. to Susan R. Meisinger (31 Aug. 1999). [135]
Flannery v. Prentice, #S080150, 2001 Cal. Lexis 5256, 01 C.D.O.S. 6991. [131-2]
Gorman v. Easley, #00-1029 and 1030, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 12827 (8th Cir.). [137-8]
Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993). [140-1]
Hartman v. Lisle Park Dist., #01C1904, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12414 (N.D. Ill.). [134-5]
Hilt-Dyson v. Chicago, #99-C-6307, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5346,
     39 (1914) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 655 (N.D.Ill., 2001). [139-40]
Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 9249 (7th Cir. 2001). [133-4]
Johnson v. Federal Express, 147 F.Supp.2d 1268, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8558 (M.D. Ala. 2001). [135]
Kvorjak v. Maine DoL, #00-2385, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 17875. [141-2]
Langon v. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 295 U.S. App. D.C. 49,
     959 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  [142]
Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). [131]
Perez v. Globe Airport Security, #00-13489, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 12394 (11th Cir.).  [131]
Phillips v. Collings, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 16000, 86 FEP Cases (BNA) 411 (8th Cir. 2001). [139]
Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Cmsnrs., 180 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1999). [140]
Robinson v. Time Warner, 187 F.R.D. 144, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14304 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). [135]
S.P.I., Inc. and Int. Union, Security, Police & Fire Prof., 115 LA (BNA) 1403 (Rivera, 2001). [133]
Sheriff of Cook County and Metro. Alliance of Police C-222, 115 LA (BNA) 1346 (Wolff, 2001). [141]
Tobing (In re Stacy) and Montgomery Co., Md., Wash. Post, Jul. 13, 2001, p. B05. [136-7]
Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 110 S.Ct. 1679 (1990). [132]
Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999). [142]
Warren (City of) and Ohio PBA, FMCS #01/099-490, 115 LA (BNA) 1486 (Lalka, 2001). [136]
Welsh v. U.S., 90 S.Ct. 1792 (1970). [137]
York v. Assn. of the Bar, #00 Civ. 5961, 86 FEP Cases 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). [140-1]