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****Editor's Case Alert****

      A prisoner serving a 65-year sentence for murder placed an order for the death certificate of the woman he killed. The death certificate arrived in the mail from the county clerk's office, along with an unsigned note that stated "There is a place in hell waiting for you, as you must know you will reap what you have sowed!" Prison staff members confiscated the certificate as posing a threat to prison safety and security and for having a negative impact on the prisoner's rehabilitation. A federal trial court upheld this action, finding that it would decrease the risk that other prisoners would retaliate against "boasting inmates" such as the plaintiff, and would protect the victim's family from being identified. A federal appeals court reversed, except for claims against a staff member not involved in the confiscation. It ruled that prisoners have a clearly established right to read the mail they receive so long as it would not infringe on legitimate interests. The prison needed to show "some evidence" justifying the restriction. While the prison had a legitimate safety interest in preventing boasting inmates displaying "trophies," the prisoner claimed that he had a need for the death certificate in connection with state court post-conviction proceedings, and the defendants presented no evidence to dispute it. Williams v. Hansen, #15-2236, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 17183 (7th Cir.).

Marriage/Procreation

     A female prisoner was in county custody for a nonviolent offense when she gave birth to her son. She sued after her release, claiming that her federal civil rights were violated by her being shackled and restrained during labor as well as during postpartum recovery. A federal appeals court vacated and remanded the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the county defendants on most of the plaintiff's shackling claims, finding that the question of whether the U.S. Constitution allows law enforcement officers to restrain a female inmate while she is pregnant, in labor, or during postpartum recovery was one of first impression. In this case, the answer to that question depended on factual disputes about whether the restraint policy was justified that a properly instructed jury had to resolve. The appeals court rejected equal protection claims as no evidence of discriminatory intent was shown. Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, #14-15189, 836 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016).

     Editor's Note: For more on this issue, see Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners, 2009 (12) AELE Mo. L. J. 301.

Medical Care

     A prisoner heard a "pop" and experienced extreme pain while climbing some stairs. A doctor at the prison infirmary prescribed Vicodin, crutches, and a week of "lay-in" rest. The injury was listed as an Achilles tendon rupture by the medical director, who modified the instructions by mandating an MRI and an orthopedic examination on an "urgent" basis. A lockdown at the facility resulted in cancelation of three medical appointments, so that he only received an orthopedic boot eight weeks later. The prisoner claimed that he still experienced ankle stiffness, soreness, and pain a year later. His lawsuit claimed that the medical director had been deliberately indifferent in failing to immediately immobilize his ankle with a cast or boot, and that another doctor later was deliberately indifferent in failing to order physical therapy. While a federal appeals court panel affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, a rehearing en banc reversed. It stated that even when a doctor disputes knowing that he was exposing a plaintiff patient to a substantial risk of harm, evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that he knew that the treatment being provided was deficient. There was sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment for the defendants. Petties v. Carter, #14-2674, 836 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2016).

    An arrestee suffered an injury to his hand in a fight prior to his arrest. A trial court properly granted summary judgment on a deliberate indifference claim against a jail nurse as her treatment of his injury, if at all deficient, was at most negligent, which was insufficient for a federal civil rights claim, and the plaintiff's own attorney agreed that there was no medical evidence in the record to support the plaintiff's claim that a five-day delay in treatment caused a detrimental effect to his hand. Further, this isolated incident was insufficient to support municipal liability claims. Corwin v. City of Independence, MO, #15-1732, 829 F.3d 695 (8th Cir. 2016).

     While serving a probation-revocation sentence, a prisoner fell ill with a rare form of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. A doctor at first merely diagnosed it as an infection and prescribed antibiotics and some nonprescription pain relievers. Two months later, the doctor ordered a biopsy that discovered the cancer. The prisoner sued the doctor and the prison's private medical provider for alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs during the two months his cancer went undiagnosed. Summary judgment for the defendants was upheld as there was no evidence from which a jury could infer that the doctor was subjectively indifferent to the prisoner's condition. Without expert testimony, a lay jury could not infer that because amoxicillin and Bactrim did not work, it was obvious to the doctor that the doxycycline and Augmentin also would fail. To survive summary judgment, the prisoner needed to present evidence sufficient to show that decision was "so far afield of accepted professional standards as to raise the inference that it was not actually based on a medical judgment." He failed to do so. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., #15-1647, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 18416 (7th Cir.).

Prisoner Assault: By Officer

     A former jail detainee sued four county detention officers, claiming that they beat him without justification. A jury found one of the officer liable, awarding both $10,000 in compensatory damages and $4,000 in punitive damages. A federal appeals court held that the trial court did not err in concluding that he complied with the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997(e)(a), exhaustion of remedies requirement, Further sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that the officer was liable for excessive force. Since that was enough to support the damages awarded, the appeals court did not have to address the defendant officer's challenges to the jury's other findings of bystander liability or state law assault. Cowart v. Erwin, #15-10404, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 16736 (5th Cir.).

     An inmate sued a corrections officer for excessive force over an altercation the two had engaged in about a decade ago. A jury found that the officer had used excessive force but only awarded nominal damages of $1 on the grounds that no injury had occurred. A federal appeals court upheld this result. "By making the deprivation of such rights . . . actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, it remains true to the principle that substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury," and there was alternative evidence that the plaintiff had hit his head on a table, which was an accident the officer was not responsible for. Moore v. Liszewski, #14-3244, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 17428 (7th Cir.).

Public Protection

     After a halfway home resident broke into a woman's home and seriously injured her by shooting her, the victim sued the state, the halfway home's manager, and the state director of corrections. The trial court entered summary judgment for the halfway home's manager, the halfway home, the state, and the state corrections director. Affirming that result, a federal appeals court found no evidence that the halfway home manager knew about the assailant's history of abusing the plaintiff, or of her phone call to the halfway home the afternoon of the shooting. There was insufficient evidence that the manager's subordinates were deliberately indifferent to a known risk of harm to the plaintiff when they authorized the assailant to visit a store, or that they or the manager had created a new danger to the victim or increased the danger to her, as the danger had already existed before the assailant came to live at the halfway home and would have continued to exist after he left. As to claims against the state director of corections, he had no personal involvement in the halfway home. Eleventh Amendment immunity barred failure to protect claims against the state. Montgomery v. City of Ames, #15-1540, 829 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 2016).

Religion

     A Muslim inmate at a federal correctional facility claimed that he was terminated from his paid work assignment because he complained that two correctional officers were subjecting him to anti-Muslim harassment at work. He further claimed that this harassment had caused him to refrain from praying at work. He asserted claims under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, and the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA). Reversing dismissal of the plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation and RFRA claims, a federal appeals court ruled that a prisoner's oral grievance to prison officials can constitute protected activity under the Constitution, that the RFRA prohibits individual conduct that substantially burdens religious exercise, and that the RFRA provides for monetary relief from an official sued in his individual capacity. The appeals court affirmed dismissal of the First Amendment Free Exercise and Fifth Amendment equal protection claims. Mack v. Warden, Loretto Fed. Corr. Inst., #14-2738, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 18336 (3rd Cir.).

Sex Offenders

     A man was civilly committed under a state sexually dangerous persons statute after he was found to be a sexually violent person who suffers from a mental disorder that creates a substantial risk that, unless confined, he is apt to commit further sexual violence. He sued, claiming that the state improperly restrained his liberty by hiring detention staff members who were unable to provide him with the care and treatment without which he will never be eligible for release. A federal appeals court reversed dismissal of the lawsuit. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that civil detainees receive treatment for the disorders that led to their confinement and be released when they are no longer dangerous. It is not clear whether the facility at which he was confined was providing the plaintiff with treatment by licensed professionals who have authority to determine the detainees’ right to be released. The private company which furnishes the personnel there does not require that all of them be licensed. Hughes v. Dimas, #16-1818, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 17081 (7th Cir.).

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     Federal Prison Policies: Program Statement 006-2016, Electronic Cigarettes, Federal Bureau of Prisons (October 14, 2016).

     Federal Prison Policies: Program Statement 6130.01, Management of Staff Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, Federal Bureau of Prisons (September 23, 2016).

     Federal Prison Policies: Program Statement 1480.06 Victim and Witness Notification Program, Federal Bureau of Prisons (October 20, 2016).

     Federal Prison Policies: Program Statement 5215.07, Youth Corrections Act (YCA) Inmates, Federal Bureau of Prisons (Sept. 23, 2016).

  Reference:

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.