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Employment & Labor Law for Public Safety Agencies
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Supreme Court of the United States
Recent Labor/Employment Cases – List
----- 2019-----
A federal appeals court judge died on March 29, 2018. The court on which he sat, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, listed him as the author of an en banc decision issued on April 9, 2018. Counting his vote made his opinion a majority ruling that constituted binding precedent. Without his vote, the opinion would have been approved by only five of the 10 members of the en banc panel who were still living when the decision was filed. The voting was completed before the judge’s death. The case involved a claim by a county employee that her employer was violating the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision. The Court noted that a judge generally may change his position up to the moment when a decision is released. When the appeals issued its opinion in this case, the deceased judge was neither an active judge nor a senior judge. By federal law, 28 U.S.C. 46, he was without power to participate in the court’s decision at the time it was released. The appeals court “effectively allowed a deceased judge to exercise the judicial power of the United States after his death. But federal judges are appointed for life, not for eternity.” Yovino v. Rizo, #18-272, 139 S. Ct. 706, 2019 U.S. Lexis 1354, 2019 WL 886486.
A county employee filed an EEOC Title VII charge against her employer, asserting sexual harassment and retaliation for reporting the harassment. While the charge was pending, the county fired her because she failed to come to work on a Sunday, going to a church event instead. She then attempted to supplement her EEOC charge by handwriting “religion” on an intake questionnaire, but did not amend the formal charge document. Upon receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, she filed suit, alleging discrimination on account of religion and retaliation for reporting sexual harassment. After years of litigation, only the religion-based discrimination claim remained. The county then asserted for the first time that the court lacked jurisdiction because the EEOC charge did not state a religion-based discrimination claim. A federal appeals court reversed dismissal of the suit. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is “not jurisdictional.” A claim-processing rule requiring parties to take certain procedural steps during or before litigation may be mandatory so that a court must enforce the rule if timely raised. A mandatory rule of that sort, unlike a prescription limiting the kinds of cases a court may adjudicate, is ordinarily forfeited if not timely asserted. The Court found that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is discrete from the statutory provisions empowering federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over Title VII actions. The plaintiff, therefore, could proceed with her religious discrimination claim despite not having listed it on her original charge form. Fort Bend County v. Davis, #18-525, 2019 U.S. Lexis 3891
In a case involving a private employer, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the remedies available under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2, when the agreement between an employer and a employee is ambiguous concerning class arbitration. In the case, a computer hacker tricked an employee of the company into disclosing the tax information of about 1,300 employees. After a fraudulent federal income tax return was filed in the name of one of them, he filed a proposed class action on behalf of employees whose information had been compromised. Like all company employees, he had signed an arbitration agreement when hired. Relying on the arbitration agreement, the company sought to compel arbitration on an individual rather than a classwide basis. A federal appeals court upheld the rejection of the individual arbitration request, authorizing class arbitration. While prior U.S. Supreme Court precedent held that a court may not compel classwide arbitration when an agreement is silent on the availability of such arbitration, the appeals court concluded that that prior case did not apply because the agreement in question was ambiguous, not silent, concerning class arbitration. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. An ambiguous agreement, the Court held, cannot provide the necessary contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration. Arbitration is strictly a matter of consent. Class arbitration, unlike the individualized arbitration envisioned by the Act, “sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration” its informality, and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural “morass” rather than a final judgment. Courts, therefore, may not infer consent to participate in class arbitration absent an affirmative “contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.” Silence is not enough, the Court stated, and ambiguity does not provide a sufficient basis to infer consent. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, #17-988, 203 L. Ed. 2d 636, 2019 U.S. Lexis 2943, 2019 WL 1780275.
After a man retired from the U.S. Marshals, his home state of West Virginia imposed state income taxes on his federal pension benefits, as it does on all former federal employees. Pension benefits of certain former state and local law enforcement employees, however, are exempt from state taxation under a West Virginia statute. The retired Marshal argued that the state statute violates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine of 4 U.S.C. 111, under which the United States consents to state taxation of the pay or compensation of federal employees, only if the state tax does not discriminate on the basis of the source of the pay or compensation. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected this argument, but a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court reversed. A state violates section 111 when it treats retired state employees more favorably than retired federal employees and no significant differences between the two classes justify the differential treatment. West Virginia expressly affords state law enforcement retirees a tax benefit that federal law enforcement retirees cannot receive. The state’s interest in adopting the discriminatory tax is irrelevant, the Court stated. The Court noted that the West Virginia statute does not draw lines involving job responsibilities and that the state courts agreed that there are no “significant differences” between the retired Marshal’s former job responsibilities and those of the tax-exempt state law enforcement retirees. Dawson v. Steager, #17-419, 203 L. Ed. 2d 29, 2019 U.S. Lexis 1349, 2019 WL 691579.
----- 2018-----
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) applies to employers who are a state or a political subdivision of a state regardless of the number of employees the employer has. The case was brought by two firefighters (46 and 56 years old respectively) who were the oldest in their department. They claimed that their termination after a budget shortfall was based on their age, in violation of the statute. The trial court ruled that the employing fire district was too small to qualify as an employer under the statute, which defines employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees.” The U.S. Supreme Court, however, noted that the statute also includes as an employer “(1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State” 29 U.S.C. 630(b). The Court acknowledged that reading section 630(b) to apply to states and political subdivisions regardless of size gives the ADEA broader reach than Title VII, but this disparity is a “consequence of the different language” Congress chose to use. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has for 30 years interpreted the ADEA to cover political subdivisions regardless of size, and a majority of the states, the Court stated, also impose age discrimination bans on political subdivisions with no numerical threshold. Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido, #17-587, 2018 U.S. Lexis 6639, 2018 WL 5794639.
When a union was designated as the collective bargaining agent for a group of Illinois public sector workers, it represented even those employees who did not join the union and was empowered to collect an agency fee from nonmember employees, a percentage of the full union dues to cover union expenditures attributable to activities “germane” to the union’s collective bargaining activities, but which may not cover the union’s political and ideological projects. A non-member of the union that represented him and his fellow public employees, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the state law authorizing agency fees. The U.S. Supreme Court overruling its holding, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, #75-1153, 431 U.S. 209 (1977) as inconsistent with First Amendment principles. It ruled that Illinois law compelled non-consenting workers to subsidize the speech of other private speakers and could not be justified by asserted interests in “labor peace,” which can readily be achieved through less restrictive means, or in avoiding “the risk of free riders,” because unions are willing to represent nonmembers without agency fees. Interests in bargaining with an adequately funded agent and improving the efficiency of the workforce also did not suffice to justify the fee. Unions can be effective without agency fees, the Court found. The union speech at issue did not cover only matters of private concern but covered critically important public matters such as the state’s budget crisis, taxes, and collective bargaining issues related to education, child welfare, healthcare, and minority rights. The government’s stated interests must, therefore, justify the heavy burden of agency fees on nonmembers’ First Amendment interests. They do not, the Court ruled. States and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from non-consenting employees. Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, #16-1466, 2018 U.S. Lexis 4028.
----- 2017-----
Under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) has the power to review certain personnel actions against federal employees. If an employee asserts rights under the CSRA only, MSPB decisions are subject to judicial review exclusively in the Federal Circuit. If the employee invokes only federal antidiscrimination law, the proper forum is federal district court. An employee who complains of a serious adverse employment action and attributes the action, in whole or in part, to bias based on race, gender, age, or disability brings a “mixed case.” When the MSPB dismisses a mixed case on the merits or on procedural grounds, review authority lies in district court, not the Federal Circuit. In this case, an employee received notice that he would be terminated from his Census Bureau employment for spotty attendance. He agreed to early retirement. The settlement required him to dismiss discrimination claims he had filed separately with the EEOC. After retiring, he appealed to the MSPB, alleging discrimination based on race, age, and disability, and retaliation for his discrimination complaints. He claimed the settlement had been coerced. Presuming the retirement to be voluntary, an administrative law judge dismissed his case for lack of jurisdiction. The MSPB affirmed, stating that the plaintiff could seek review in the Federal Circuit. He instead sought review in the D.C. Circuit, which transferred the case to the Federal Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the proper review forum when the MSPB dismisses a mixed case on jurisdictional grounds is the district court. Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board, #16-399, 137 S. Ct. 1975, 198 L. Ed. 2d 527, 2017 U.S. Lexis 4044.
----- 2016-----
In
18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(9), Congress extended the federal prohibition on firearms
possession by convicted felons to persons convicted of misdemeanant crimes of
domestic violence under federal, state, or tribal law, committed against a
domestic relation that necessarily involves the use of "physical
force." In a previous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a knowing
or intentional assault qualifies under Sec. 922(g)(9), but failed to address
reckless assaults. Two individuals pled guilty under a Maine law making it a
misdemeanor to “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[ ] bodily injury”
to another. The U.S. Supreme Court held that a reckless domestic assault
qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, barring them from owning
or possessing firearms. Reckless conduct, which requires the conscious
disregard of a known risk, the Court stated, is not an accident: It involves a
deliberate decision to endanger another. Voisine v. United States, #14-10154,
2016 U.S. Lexis 4061, 84 U.S.L.W. 4525.
A police detective was a friend of the former
police chief, who was running against the incumbent mayor. He was not, however,
involved in his campaign, and could not even vote for him based on his city of
residence. He did, however, at the request of his mother, who was bedridden,
pick up one of the candidate's campaign signs to replace one that had been
stolen from her lawn. An officer assigned to the mayor's security staff saw
this, and the next day, the detective was demoted to a walking post as a result
of his "overt involvement in a political election." He sued, claiming
that this was unlawful retaliation for protected First Amendment activity. A
federal appeals court rejected his free speech claim, as he did not intend to
convey a political message when he picked up the sign. He did not show
retaliation for an exercise of the right to freedom of association as he had no
affiliation with the campaign. Prior precedent barred a claim of unlawful
retaliation based solely on a "perceived," as opposed to actual,
exercise of First Amendment rights. Heffernan v. City of Paterson, #14-1610,
777 F. 3d 147 (3rd Cir. 2015). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. It held that
the officer was entitled to seek relief for his demotion based on the city's
mistaken belief that he was engaged in political speech, since the city
allegedly acted upon a constitutionally harmful policy regardless of whether or
not the officer did in fact engage in political activity. The harm— discouraging
employees from engaging in protected speech or association in violation of the
First Amendment—is the same, regardless of factual mistake. Heffernan v. City
of Paterson, #14-1280, 2016 U.S. Lexis 2924. In a further development in the
case, in remanding for trial, the federal appeals court said that, if, when the
detective was disciplined, the city had in effect (whether written or
unwritten) a neutral policy prohibiting officers assigned to the Office of the
Chief of Police from overt involvement in political campaigns, such a policy
meets constitutional standards. The trial court must then determine whether he
was aware or reasonably should have been aware of such a policy and whether he
was disciplined for what reasonably appeared to be a violation. Heffernan v.
City of Paterson, #14-1610, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 15695 (3rd Cir.).
----- 2015-----
The
U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, has ruled that there is a constitutional
right to same-sex marriage and that each state must also recognize such marriages
legally entered into in other states. Departments and agencies will now
universally have to recognize same-sex marriages, whether entered into in their
state or in another state as the same as opposite sex marriages for purposes of
benefit, retirement/pension, family leave, and similar purposes. Obergefell v.
Hodges, #14-656, 2015 U.S. Lexis 4250.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an 8-1 ruling, held
that an employer may have discriminated against a Muslim woman applicant for
employment on the basis of religious discrimination when it failed to hire her
because she wore a hijab headscarf to her interview. The subject of her
religious beliefs never came up in the interview process, and the employer
contended that its reason for the rejection was that the headscarf would
violate its dress code. The Court held that in establishing a claim for
unlawful disparate treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
it was not necessary to show that the employer had actual knowledge of the
applicant's need for an accommodation, but only that the applicant's need for
an accommodation for a religious practice was a motivating factor in the
employer's decision. Further a discrimination claim based on failure to
accommodate a religious practice did not have to be raised as a disparate
impact claim rather than a disparate treatment claim, as religious practice was
a protected characteristic that could not be accorded disparate treatment.
Title VII gives favored treatment to religious practices rather than demanding
that a religious practice be treated no worse than other practices. EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., #14-86, 2015 U.S. Lexis 3718.
In a case involving a private employer, the
U.S. Supreme Court, by a 6-3 vote, further clarified the analysis of what is
required for an employer to raise a claim of disparate treatment for pregnancy
discrimination under Title VII. A pregnant employee must show that the
employer's accommodation policy imposes a "significant burden" on
pregnant employees and that the employer's basis for enforcing that policy does
not have a "sufficiently strong justification." In this case, a UPS
driver became pregnant and her doctor directed that she not lift more than 20
pounds, while the employer required its drivers to lift up to 70 pounds. The
employer refused to let her work under her doctor's lifting restriction, and
the employee argued that this imposed a disparate burden on pregnant employees
as other policies better accommodated employees who were injured on the job, disabled
employees covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act, or who had lost
Department of Transportations certifications. The Supreme Court vacated summary
judgment for the employer, finding that the employee created a genuine dispute
as to whether the employer provided more favorable treatment to some employees
whose situation could not reasonably be distinguished from hers. Young v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., #12-1226, 2015 U.S. Lexis 2121, 25 Fla. L. Weekly
Fed. S 155, 126 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 765.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal
appeals court did not err in finding that the federal Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) violated an air marshal's whistleblower rights by firing
him for disclosing to a reporter that the TSA had decided to cut costs by
removing air marshals from some flights even though there was supposedly
credible information that al Qaeda was planning attacks on passenger flights in
the U.S. The reason given for his firing was disclosing sensitive security
information without authorization. When Congress used the phrase
"specifically prohibited by law" in crafting an exception to the
federal Whistleblower statute, it chose not to use the phrase
"specifically prohibited by law, rule, or regulation," and therefore
did not remove protection for unauthorized disclosures that violated rules or
regulations but not laws. TSA administrative regulations did not qualify as
"law" for purposes of the exception, and the statute authorizing the
TSA to issue regulations did not specifically prohibit the disclosures at
issue. Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean, #13-894, 2015 U.S. Lexis
755.
----- 2014-----
Police
officers claimed that they were fired because they exposed the criminal
activities of one of their municipality's alderman, rather than for deficient
performance, as the city claimed. The trial court entered summary judgment for
the defendant city based on the officers' failure to explicitly invoke 42
U.S.C. Sec. 1983 as the basis for their civil rights due process claim.
Overturning a federal appeals court's affirmance of this result, the U.S.
Supreme Court noted that federal rules concerning pleading in lawsuits only
require “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief," and the lawsuit could not be rejected merely for an
"imperfect statement" of the legal theory relied on. Additionally,
qualified immunity was not applicable here, as no claims were made against any
individual municipal officer, only against the city The complaint in the
lawsuit adequately informed the city of the factual basis for the claim.
Johnson v. City of Shelby, #13-1318, 135 S. Ct. 346, 190 L. Ed. 2d 309, 2014
U.S. Lexis 7437.
An ex-employee of a community college who
directed a program for underprivileged youth there learned that a state
representative also employed by the program had not been reporting for work, so
he fired her, and later testified under subpoena in two federal prosecutions
against the representative for mail fraud and theft in a program receiving
federal funds. The community college president later terminated the director,
citing budget shortfalls. The director claimed, however, that it was because of
his testimony. A federal appeals court ruled that the testimony was not
protected by the First Amendment because he was a public employee and did not
speak as a citizen while testifying. The appeals court also found that the
community college president was entitled to qualified immunity. The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, unanimously finding that the testimony given was
protected by the First Amendment, while agreeing that the community college
president was entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity, as the
law on the subject had not been clearly established, so he reasonably could
have believed that a government employer could fire an employee because of
testimony given outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities. He was
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in his official capacity. Further
proceedings were ordered to determine if the community college president's
successor could be ordered to reinstate the plaintiff. The sworn testimony was
outside the scope of the plaintiff's ordinary job duties and constituted speech
as a citizen on corruption in a public program, a matter of public concern.
There was no indication, further, that the testimony was false and erroneous.
Lane v. Franks, #13-483 189 L. Ed. 2d 312, 2014 U.S. Lexis 4302.
The U.S. Supreme Court
has ruled that a man's prior conviction for "intentionally or knowingly
causing bodily injury to" his child's mother qualified as a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(9), which
forbids anyone convicted of such crimes from possessing firearms. The
requirement of physical force can be satisfied by the "offensive
touching" degree of force that supports a common-law battery conviction.
The effect of the ruling will be to expand the types of convictions that will
be classified as misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence barring those
convicted of firearms possession. United States v. Castleman, #12-1371, 188 L.
Ed. 2d 426, 2014 U.S. Lexis 2220, 82 U.S.L.W. 4207.
----- 2013-----
The
U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that Sec. 3 of the federal Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA), that had the effect of barring the extension of federal
benefits to same-sex couples who are legally married under state law by
defining marriage and spouse as excluding same sex partners, was
unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.
While this did not rule on whether there is a federal constitutional right to
same sex marriage, it does mean that in instances where a state recognizes same
sex marriages, those marriages must be treated the same as any other marriages
for purposes of federal law. U.S. v. Windsor, #12-307, 2013 U.S. Lexis
4921. In another case decided the same day regarding a federal trial court
decision that struck down a California state initiative Proposition 8, that put
a halt to same sex marriage in California, the Court held by 5-4, that private
parties had no standing to defend the constitutionality of Proposition 8 when
state officials declined to do so. This had the effect of restoring same sex
marriage in California. As a result of this and laws about to become effective
in a number of states, same sex marriages will now be legally recognized in 13
states and the District of Columbia. Hollingsworth v. Perry, #12-144, 2013 U.S.
Lexis 4919.
An African-American employee working for a
university claimed that she was subjected to racial harassment by another
employee who she contended was her supervisor. She sought to hold the employer
vicariously liable for the other employee's actions. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that an employee is classified as a supervisor for purposes of vicarious
liability under Title VII only in circumstances where he or she is given
authority by the employer to take "tangible employment actions"
against the alleged victim. In this case, no such empowerment existed, so the
other employee was not a supervisor. A tangible employment action is one that
effects a significant change in "employment status, such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities,
or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Vance v. Ball
State University, #11-556, 2013 U.S. Lexis 4703.
A former university employee of Middle Eastern
descent claimed that he had been constructively discharged by racially and
religiously motivated harassment and also that in retaliation for complaining
about the harassment, efforts were made to interfere with a hospital's job
offer to him, resulting in the offer's withdrawal. After a jury returned a
verdict for the employee on both claims, a federal appeals court overturned the
harassment/discrimination claim, but upheld the verdict on the retaliation
claim. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the ruling on the retaliation claim,
finding that the legal standard to prevail had to be to show "but for
causation," to prove that the harm would not have occurred in the absence
of the alleged wrongful actions (unlawful retaliation) of the employer, not a
lessened causation test used in an EEOC manual, requiring only a showing that
retaliation was a motivating factor in the action taken causing the harm.
Because the wrong legal standard was used, further proceedings were required.
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, #12-484, 2013 U.S.
Lexis 4704.
----- 2012-----
A
freedom of information law in Virginia granted access to all public records to
citizens of the state, but denied access to those who were not state citizens.
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled that this did not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause of the Constitution nor the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
since that only protects those privileges and immunities regarded as
fundamental. McBurney v. Young, #12-17 133 S. Ct. 1709
In a federal employee's mixed case against the U.S.
Department of Labor asserting claims for age and sex discrimination and
discriminatory removal, a federal appeals court improperly upheld the trial
court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, when the trial court said that the
employee should have filed her claim initially with The Federal Circuit U.S.
Court of Appeals. A federal employee, who claims that the employing agency's
action that can be appealed to the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB)
violates a federal antidiscrimination statute, can seek judicial review in a
federal district court regardless of whether the MSPB decided her case on the
merits or on procedural grounds. Kloeckner v. Solis, #11-184, 2012 U.S. Lexis
9420.
The U.S. government fired a number of
employees of executive branch agencies under a statute barring such employment
of persons who knowingly and willfully failed to register for the Selective
Service as required by law. The employees sued, claiming that the law under
which they were fired was an unconstitutional bill of attainder and also
amounted to sex discrimination, since only males were required to register for
Selective Service. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 1101 et seq. barred the federal district courts from
deciding the case. The employees needed to bring their claim before the Merit
System Protection Board (MSPB), despite that board's professed lack of
authority to decide constitutional questions, and could then seek review in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Elgin v. Dept. of Treasury,
#11-45,183 L. Ed. 2d 1, 2012 U.S. Lexis 4461.
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the individual
health insurance purchase mandate of the health care reform legislation
popularly known as Obamacare. While rejecting the notion that such a mandate
could be imposed under the Commerce clause, it ruled that it could be upheld
under the power of Congress to impose a tax. The consequence of failing to
purchase health insurance under the law is the imposition of a tax penalty
collected by the IRS. A portion of the law expanding the Medicaid program,
however, was unconstitutional in threatening states with the termination of
their present Medicaid funding if they do not implement the planned expansion.
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, #11-363, 2012 U.S.
Lexis 4876.
A firefighter sued a city and a private attorney hired
by the city to conduct an internal investigation of his conduct for violation
of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The firefighter was suspected of
malingering while supposedly off work on account of illness. The firefighter
argued that the attorney's order to him to produce building materials stored at
his home violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He had been seen
buying the building supplies and the issue was whether he had been installing
the building materials rather than being ill. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
the private attorney was entitled to qualified immunity along with other
individual defendants despite not being a city employee. A private individual
temporarily retained by a city to carry out its work is able to seek qualified
immunity from civil rights liability. In this case, the city needed the
attorney's experience and expertise in employment law. Filarsky v. Delia,
#10–1018, 132 S. Ct. 1657; 2012 U.S. Lexis 3105.
A state court employee sued his employer for
alleged violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29
U.S.C.S. § 2601 et seq., claiming that it had refused to provide him with
self-care leave (personal sick leave). A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that the provisions of the statute concerning leave for self-care were
distinguishable from those concerning family-care leave. On claims for family-care
leave, the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from suit enjoyed by the
states has been validly abrogated based on evidence at the time of the law's
enactment that state family-leave policies concerning leave for the care of a
spouse, son, daughter, or parent with a serious medical condition discriminated
against women. No such evidence was presented about similar discrimination on
self-care leave policies. Congress did not abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity on claims under the FMLA concerning denials of self-care
leave. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, #10–1016, 2012 U.S. Lexis 2315.
A pilot who contracted HIV and applied for FAA
medical certificates multiple times without disclosing his HIV status or his
medications pled guilty to making false statements to a government agency. The
plea came after the Social Security Administration (SSA) revealed his HIV
status to the Department of Transportation (DOT). He sued the DOT, FAA, and
SSA, for violating his privacy rights by unlawful disclosure of confidential
medical information causing him mental and emotional damages. The
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, while permitting recovery against
government agencies for actual damages, does not unequivocally include damages
for mental or emotional damages as within the definition of "actual
damages." Therefore, the statute did not waive the sovereign immunity of
the federal government for claims for mental or emotional damages arising out
of violations of privacy rights. Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper,
#10-1024, 2012 U.S. Lexis 2539
-----
1998 -----
Court issues multiple opinions on when an
employer is liable for a supervisor's harassment. Employers can prevent some
liability by taking prompt, corrective action. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth,
118 S.Ct. 2257, 1998 U.S. Lexis 4217; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct.
2275, 1998 U.S. Lexis 4216; Gebser v. Lago Vista Sch. Dist., 1998 U.S. Lexis
4173, 118 S.Ct. 1989. [1998 FP 123-4]
----- 1997 -----
Justices reject St. Louis police sergeants'
overtime suit and reaffirms the "salary test" for exempt employees.
Justices avoid a constitutional attack on the FLSA. Auer v. Robbins, 1997 U.S.
Lexis 1272, 117 S.Ct. 905. [1997 FP 39]
Court holds that former workers are
"employees" within the meaning of Title VII, for the purpose of
enforcing its anti-retaliation provisions. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337, 117 S.Ct. 843, 1997 U.S. Lexis 690, 72 FEP Cases (BNA) 1856. [1997 FP 74]