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Corrections Law for
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Prisoner Restraint
Monthly
Law Journal Article: Shackling of Pregnant
Prisoners, 2009 (12)
AELE Mo. L. J. 301.
Monthly Law Journal Article: Restraint and
Asphyxia: Part One – Restraint Ties, 2008 (12) AELE Mo. L.J. 101.
Monthly Law Journal Article: Restraint and Asphyxia: Part
Two – Compressional Asphyxia, 2009 (1) AELE Mo. L.J. 101.
Monthly Law Journal Article: The Use of Electronic Control
Weapons Against Handcuffed or Restrained Persons - Part 2, 2012 (10) AELE
Mo. L. J. 101.
Monthly Law Journal Article: Prisoner Restraint and Court Appearances, 2017 (11) AELE Mo. L. J. 301.
A state inmate who claimed that he was shackled without justification during his three-day trial on his Eighth Amendment excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs claims was entitled to a new trial. The trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial where the inmate’s alleged dangerousness and flight risk were central issues at the trial. Therefore, it was plain error to allow him to be visibly shackled without any showing of a sufficient need for those restraints. On remand, a federal appeals court stated, the trial court had the discretion to impose shackling during the new trial only if it could do so after a full hearing at which the officers showed a compelling need for security and the trial court first considered less restrictive alternatives. Claiborne v. Blauser, #16-16077, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 19477 (9th Cir.).
A federal appeals court rejected a death row inmate’s claim that the trial court erred in requiring him to wear a stun belt under his clothing during the resentencing trial without holding a new evidentiary hearing to determine whether the restraint was necessary where the stun belt was not visible to the jury or the public, and the state court’s opinion was not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. Nance v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison, #17-15361,2019 U.S. App. Lexis 12941 (11th Cir.).
A man sentenced to 30 days for civil contempt for failing to appear at a child support enforcement hearing collapsed in his cell. An overhead camera recorded officers and medical staff responding to the lethargic and unbalanced detainee, with blood and saliva coming from his mouth, trying to stand. The officers told him to “stay down,” pulled him from the cell, and placed him face down on the floor. Despite a jail policy banning the placement of restrained inmates in a prone position and a medic’s appeal to handcuff him in front, he was handcuffed behind his back and restrained face down. He died following a 22-minute struggle during which he continually said that he could not breathe. In a federal civil rights lawsuit over the death, the trial court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified- and statutory-immunity grounds. A federal appeals court upheld this result. Because the detained was sanctioned outside the criminal context (civil contempt), the Fourteenth Amendment governed. The appeals court rejected an argument that, as long as they acted without reckless or malicious intent, the officers could apply any degree of force. Existing precedent gave them notice that it “[w]as unconstitutional” to create asphyxiating conditions by “forcibly restraining an individual in a prone position for a prolonged period” when that individual posed no material threat. Because the finding regarding the defendants’ “knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm” was based on the detainee’s complaints about his inability to breathe, the qualified immunity inquiry was sufficiently individualized. Hopper v. Plummer, #17-3175, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 9113, 2018 Fed. App. 71P (6th Cir.).
A federal trial court’s district-wide policy of routinely shackling all pretrial detainees in the courtroom violated the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause. Before a government entity seeks to shackle a criminal defendant, it must first justify the infringement with specific security needs as to that particular defendant. Before a presumptively innocent defendant may be shackled, the court must make an individualized decision that a compelling government purpose would be served and that shackles are the least restrictive means for maintaining security and order in the courtroom. The en banc court held that there was still a live controversy over the shackling policy and the case was not moot, despite the policy having been changed, because of the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness. The en banc court clarified the right to be free from shackles and held that it applies whether the proceeding is pretrial, trial, or sentencing, with a jury or without. Although the court held that the policy was unconstitutional, it withheld the issuance of a formal writ of mandamus because the policy was no longer in effect. U.S. v. Sanchez-Gomez, #13-50561, 859 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2017).
A prisoner who spent three and a half hours on a restraint board sued correctional officers and medical staff members for alleged violations of his civil rights. The trial court dismissed all claims except an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against a lieutenant who authorized the use of the restraint board. A federal appeals court held that it was erroneous to deny qualified immunity to the defendant lieutenant. Under the totality of the circumstances, he was entitled to qualified immunity even if he may have been mistaken in believing that the prisoner was trying to injure himself when placed on the board. The prisoner had violated rules for obtaining medical assistance, falsely claimed a medical emergency, and seriously disrupted medical operations. Discipline was warranted after nurses reported that he had contrived a medical emergency and could safely be placed on the restraint board. Using the restraint in accordance with the safety precautions required by prison policy was needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. Jackson v. Gutzmer, #16-2184, 866 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2017).
A female prisoner was in county
custody for a nonviolent offense when she gave birth to her son. She sued after
her release, claiming that her federal civil rights were violated by her being
shackled and restrained during labor as well as during postpartum recovery. A
federal appeals court vacated and remanded the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the county defendants on most of the plaintiff's shackling claims,
finding that the question of whether the U.S. Constitution allows law
enforcement officers to restrain a female inmate while she is pregnant, in
labor, or during postpartum recovery was one of first impression. In this case,
the answer to that question depended on factual disputes about whether the
restraint policy was justified that a properly instructed jury had to resolve.
The appeals court rejected equal protection claims as no evidence of
discriminatory intent was shown. Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, #14-15189, 836
F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016).
A federal district
court failed to provide adequate justification for a restrictive prisoner
shackling policy under which pretrial detainees brought before the court were
placed in full shackle restraints for court appearances, including arraignments
unless the judge specifically requested that the restrains be removed. Such a
policy cannot be based primarily on the economic strain of the jailer in
providing adequate safeguards. Instead, the policy must be supported by an
"adequate justification of its necessity." United States v.
Sanchez-Gomez, #13-50561, 798 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2015).
A prisoner claimed that hia Eighth Amendment
rights were violated when he was secured and kept in a four-point restraint
chair naked for 14 hours, although he allegedly did not pose a threat to
himself or others. He had a long history of mental illness, which included
schizo-affective disorder and bipolar disorder. His symptoms had intensified
after his detention in solitary confinement, during which he was kept in his
cell 23 hours a day, with one hour of daily recreation in a solitary pen on
weekdays. He suffered from both auditory and visual hallucinations, paranoid
thoughts, episodes of self-harm, suicidal impulses, and episodes of smearing or
throwing his own feces. A federal appeals court vacated summary judgment for
the defendants, finding that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether he
posed an imminent threat at the time of the restraint. Young v. Martin,
#13-4057, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 15922 (3rd Cir.).
A sexually violent person civil detainee claimed that
security guards accompanying him to a courthouse refused to remove his hand
restraints while he attempted to use a restroom there, and laughed as he
struggled to unzip his pants and urinate. He was secured with leg shackles, a
wrist chain, handcuffs, and a black-box restraint that fit over the chain
between handcuffs and a portion of the cuffs themselves, largely immobilizing
the hands in front of the body approximately two inches apart. A jury awarded
him $1,000 in compensatory damages. A federal appeals court found that the
trial judge improperly failed to instruct the jury that the plaintiff had to
prove that the guards had a purposeful, knowing, or possibly reckless state of
mind with respect to their actions or inaction toward him. At the same time,
the court noted that a security directive allowed the guards to call their
supervisor for permission to remove the restraints, and a reasonable jury could
find that they chose not to do so for the purpose of humiliating him. He had no
means of escape from the windowless restroom other than by force through the
two younger, bigger, and healthier guards, and he would still be wearing leg
shackles if the hand restraints were removed. The guards were therefore not
entitled to qualified immunity on a due process claim as it was clearly
established that the unreasonable use of body restraints in a manner that
served to punish a civilly committed person was unlawful. Further proceedings
were ordered. Davis v. Wessel, #13-3416, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 11685 (7th Cir.).
A prisoner suffered symptoms of acute
appendicitis, and was sent to a hospital emergency room the following day based
on the recommendation of the prison doctor. The officer who accompanied the
prisoner initially refused to remove his restraints, allegedly causing a 45
minute delay in treatment. The prisoner allegedly suffered nerve damage to his
leg during the surgery, and the prison doctor allegedly subsequently decline to
prescribe Neurontin for pain from the nerve damage, a medication that other
doctors indicated was necessary. A federal appeals court found that the
defendants (the prison doctor and correctional officer) had waived possible
qualified immunity defense by failing to assert them in an answer to the
complaint. Allowing them to assert that defense at this point in the
proceeding, after discovery issues had been litigated for a number of years
would unduly prejudice the plaintiff. Henricks v. Gonzalez, #13-4468, 2015 U.S.
App. Lexis 5646, 2015 Fed. App. 0065P (6th Cir.).
A correctional officer entered a cell where an
inmate had been assigned for a medical assessment. The prisoner was
uncooperative and aggressively resisted when asked to sit on the bunk, and he
bit the officer's abdomen when he was forcibly placed on the bed. He was
subsequently placed in four-point restraints at approximately 9:10 a.m., and
not removed from them until 3:45 p.m. the next day. At a disciplinary hearing,
the prisoner was found guilty of assaulting the officer and suffered a loss of
privileges. The prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition claiming his Fifth
Amendment due process rights were violated by placing him in four point
restraints without a hearing. The trial court dismissed, finding that a habeas
petition was not the correct vehicle to raise claims about the conditions of
confinement. A federal appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the
trial court should have "liberally construed" the petition, which the
prisoner filed while acting as his own attorney, and given him the option to
pursue a federal civil rights claim rather than dismissing the case. Spencer v.
Haynes, #13-3460, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 23699 (8th Cir.).
A prisoner who was convicted at a trial after
being forced to wear visible shackles during the proceeding was entitled to a
new trial. The appeals court said that the "sight of a shackled litigant
is apt to make jurors think they're dealing with a mad dog." There was
nothing to show that other security measures or methods of concealing the
restraints would not have been feasible, or that the prisoner was so violent as
to require being manacled at all. There was no incident when his handcuffs were
removed while he testified. The proposed "curative instruction" that
the trial judge declined to give to the jury would not have been adequate to
overcome the prejudice arising from the combination of the guards' uniforms,
the prison uniform, and the visible manacles. Maus v. Baker, #13-2420, 2014
U.S. App. Lexis 6307 (7th Cir.).
A pre-trial detainee at a juvenile facility who
arrived there at the age of 11 claimed that his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights were violated by the regular use on him of a "Pro-Straint
Restraining Chair, Violent Prisoner Model." The chair, which was equipped
with wrist, chest and ankle restraints, was sometimes used in a legitimate
effort to prevent him from committing suicide, but he claimed that it was
mostly used to improperly punish him. A federal appeals court upheld the denial
of qualified immunity to all defendants but one,. That one defendant was
granted qualified immunity on a claim that he was liable for failure to
transfer the detainee to a nearby unlocked shelter where he had been housed
before and had apparently been disobedient. Blackmon v. Sutton, #12-3199, 2013
U.S. App. Lexis 22680 (10th Cir).
Both medical professionals and other defendants
were entitled to summeay judgment on a sexually violent civil detainee's claim
that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by
requiring that he wear leg irons every time he was transported out of the
facility, when his legs were swollen and possibly cancerous. There was no
medical evidence, other than the detainee's own personal opinion, that there
was a medical need to exempt him from the routine use of metal leg shackles.
The non-medical defendants were reasonable in relying on the medical
professionals' opinion that there was no reason not to use the shackles on the
detainee. The detainee showed that his legs became swollen when he walked four
blocks, but failed to show evidence of any other resulting injury. McGee v.
Adams, #11-2666, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 16039 (7th Cir.).
An arrestee who appeared intoxicated actively
resisted officers both during the process of being arrested and when taken into
jail. He was handcuffed and pepper sprayed. Then, at the jail, when he
continued to resist, he was held down and a Taser was applied to him three
times in the stun mode. He was held face down, ceased breathing, and was taken
to a hospital where he died. A medical expert for the plaintiff expressed the
opinion that his cause of death was traumatic asphyxia due to compression of
his neck and back while being restrained. A federal appeals court ruled that
the defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity when there was
insufficient evidence to support the strangulation theory, since only the
expert's conclusory opinion supported it. That opinion was contradicted by
other evidence, including the testimony of all the officers and two EMTs.
Burdine v. Sandusky County, Ohio, #12-3672, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 7691, 2013
Fed. App. 376N, 2013 WL 1606906 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
A pregnant woman was being held as an immigration
detainee and classified as a medium-security inmate. She was restrained and
shackled prior to giving birth and claimed that this violated her rights. A
federal trial court granted her summary judgment on liability and a jury
awarded her $200,000 in damages. A federal appeals court reversed, finding that
summary judgment on liability had been improper. There were genuine material
factual issues as to whether she had been shown to be a flight risk, as well as
conflicting expert testimony about the alleged negative effects of shackling on
pregnant inmates. It was also not established whether or not the officers
involved in her restraint had any knowledge about a no restraint order.
Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty., #11-6031, 2013 U.S.
App. Lexis 4382, 2013 Fed. App. 59P (6th Cir.).
Persons civilly committed to a state sex
offender program failed to show that their rights were violated by the use of
restraints during transport, or unclothed visual body searches. The searches
were justified by institutional security concerns, and the policy of
restraining sex offenders during transport was a valid exercise of professional
judgment. There was no evidence that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to the plaintiffs' health, safety, and sanitation concerns. There
was also no showing that the alleged improper opening of their legal mail
interfered with their access to the court or that monitoring their phone calls
was not justified by security concerns. Beaulieu v. Ludeman, #11–1845, 690 F.3d
1017 (8th Cir.)
A prisoner claimed that after he refused to stand for
an afternoon prisoner count, officers grabbed him from his cell, handcuffed
him, and left him in an observation cell in an uncomfortable position for
approximately 12 hours. During that time, he asserted, he was not able to push
a button to ask for water or pull down his pants to use the toilet. If true,
these actions violated his Eighth Amendment rights, since there was no
legitimate reason to keep him restrained in handcuffs after putting him in the
cell or for denying him use of the toilet or access to water for that length of
time. Barker v. Goodrich, #10-3195, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 16411 (6th Cir.).
A prisoner filed suit, claiming that a
correctional officer attacked him in his cell, and that he was then denied
adequate medical treatment. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and
the prisoner appealed, arguing that he had been denied a fair trial on his
claims because he had been required to appear in court in shackles (both
handcuffs and leg irons). A federal appeals court stated that requiring a party
in a civil trial to appear n shackles can, indeed, constitute a denial of due
process if the restraints are not necessary. In this case, however, any error
in ordering that the prisoner remain shackled throughout the trial was
harmless, in light of indications from the Department of Corrections that the
prisoner was considered "very high risk," and was a "very
assaultive inmate." Sides v. Cherry, #08-1982, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 12771
(3rd Cir.).
A federal prisoner was injured in an accident,
slipping on a cart left in a doorway. He was referred to an orthopedic clinic
outside the prison. Prior to being transported there, a prison employee
allegedly required him to put on a jumpsuit, despite his protests that putting
his arms through the sleeves would cause him severe pain. Two employees also
allegedly forced him to wear a "black box" mechanical restraint
device despite his complaints about the resulting pain. He also claimed that a
doctor's direction that his left elbow be put into a posterior splint for two
weeks was not followed at the prison because of limitations in staffing and
facilities. He was allegedly unable to feed or bathe himself for several weeks,
and prison employees failed to make alternative arrangements for him. He filed
a federal civil rights lawsuit against the private company that ran the prison
under a contract with the federal Bureau of Prisons, as well as a number of
their employees, claiming violation of his constitutional rights. Overturning
dismissal of the lawsuit, a federal appeals court ruled that the company's
employees acted under color of federal law for purposes of a civil rights
lawsuit. Pollard v. GEO Group, Inc., #07-16112, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 11496 (9th
Cir.).
A woman died after being placed in four-point
restraints and put into a vehicle face down for transport to jail. Upholding
summary judgment for the defendant deputies and county in a federal civil
rights lawsuit, the court, assuming the facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, assumed that the decedent died from positional asphyxia. The
plaintiffs, however, failed to show that the use of the restraints was
unnecessary, or excessively disproportionate to the resistance the deputies
faced from the prisoner, so that no reasonable jury could have found that the
deputies used excessive force to subdue her. The plaintiff also failed to
sufficiently prove a claim for alleged inadequate monitoring of the prisoner
during transport. Loggins v. Carroll County, Mississippi, #08-60516, 2009 U.S.
App. Lexis 23730 (5th Cir.).
A prisoner claimed that her
constitutional rights were violated when she was shackled to a bed while she
was giving birth. A state corrections department director was entitled to
qualified immunity from liability because he was not personally involved in the
incident and had not established any policies to require or encourage the
shackling of pregnant prisoners. A corrections officer directly involved in the
shackling, however, was not entitled to qualified immunity, given that she
stated that the prisoner, who was a non-violent offender, had not done or said
anything to indicate that she was an escape risk or that she posed any other
threat. There was evidence from which a fact finder could decide that the
officer, in shackling the prisoner's ankles to opposite sides of a hospital bed
during the final stages of labor, acted with deliberate indifference to her
serious medical needs. She allegedly knew that the prisoner had severe pain,
that the labor was risky, and that hospital personnel had requested that she be
unshackled. The officer also allegedly failed to abide by administrative
regulations requiring her to balance medical and security concerns in deciding
whether to shackle the inmate. At the time of the incident, September of 2003,
the prisoner's right to be free from unnecessary suffering was clearly
established. Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services; #07-2481, 2009 U.S. App.
Lexis 21730 (8th Cir.).
A prisoner claimed that he had been denied a fair
trial because he was tried in leg restraints. In light of the fact that the
prisoner was an already convicted person being tried for a murder committed in
prison, and that a number of other convicted prisoners testified at his trial,
any error in having him shackled during the trial was harmless. Further,
evidence of his guilt was "overwhelming," including evidence that he
beat the victim in front of numerous witnesses and continued to beat him after
he fell. The prisoner himself did not deny the beating, and the victim was
handcuffed at the time. Since the jury clearly knew that he was a prisoner,
viewing him in leg restraints did not prejudice him. Tamez v. Thaler, #08-40615,
2009 U.S. App. Lexis 20231 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
A detainee suffering from organ failure was taken
to a hospital and restrained there by a handcuff attached to his bed. He died
there from causes unrelated to the handcuffing. A federal appeals court rejected
civil rights claims, holding that the use of handcuffs in these circumstances
was neither punitive nor excessive. There were legitimate and important
security interests involved in keeping detainees or prisoners adequately
restrained while they receive off-site medical treatment. A negligence claim
under the Federal Tort Claims Act was also rejected, in the absence of any
evidence of actual injury flowing from the alleged negligence. At most, the
plaintiff showed that there may have been some "friction marks" on
the detainee's wrists from the handcuffs. Hoyte v. Wagner, #07-4138, 2009 U.S.
App. Lexis 2197 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
Further proceedings were ordered on prisoner's
claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was continuously
restrained in ambulatory restraints that allegedly prevented him from lying
flat on his bed, bathing, or cleaning himself in a proper manner after using
the toilet. The trial court improperly ruled for the defendants based only on
written discovery materials, which failed to adequately address the subjective
mental state of the defendant correctional employees. There were also factual
issues as to whether the prisoner's alleged failure to timely file a grievance
concerning the issue was excused because his restraint, followed by his 30 days
of solitary confinement after his release from the restraints prevented him
from filing a grievance within 20 days. Womack v. Smith, No. 08-2229, 2009 U.S.
App. Lexis 2840 (3rd Cir. Unpub.).
In a inmate's lawsuit claiming that corrections
officers violated the Eighth Amendment in failing to adequately decontaminate
him after subjecting him to pepper spray, and in holding him in restraints for
eighteen hours, a federal court ruled that a reasonable officer could have believed
that allowing the prisoner to briefly shower before he was placed into
restraints, as well as rinse his eyes with saline, was adequate to avoid a
rights violation. Normally, the effects of pepper spray are gone after 45
minutes. Claims related to the decontamination were therefore rejected. Further
proceedings were ordered, however, as to whether an officer could have believed
that it was reasonable to restrain the prisoner for eighteen hours, when it was
disputed whether the prisoner made threatening gestures or verbal threats.
Montgomery v. Johnson, Case No. 7:05CV00131, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 74256 (W.D.
Va.).
A pregnant prisoner brought to a hospital for
labor, was kept shackled to the bed at all times, except when medical personnel
requested that the shackles be removed. A federal appeals court ruled that the
policy of shackling inmates while they received medical treatment did not
constitute deliberate indifference to their medical needs, and the shackling
policy was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Nelson v.
Correctional Medical Services, No. 07-2481, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 15270 (8th
Cir.).
Placing a prisoner in a four-point restraint and
keeping him shackled to his bed in this manner for four hours did not violate his
substantive due process rights, and doing this, as well as fastening the
restraints without the presence of the nurse were not an "atypical and
significant hardship," but an expected "adverse consequence" of
his confinement when the prisoner was accused of biting the prison guard at the
time the restraints were applied. Grinter v. Knight, No. 05-6755, 2008 U.S.
App. Lexis 12919 (6th Cir.).
Summary judgment should not have been entered
against a prisoner on his excessive force claims since there were genuine
factual disputes as to whether officers used force against him, including
pepper spray, after he had begun to comply with their orders to him.
Additionally, he allegedly was not warned before the use of the pepper spray,
was not permitted to clean up after its use, and was then handcuffed to a bench
and denied bathroom breaks, food, and water during that restraint. Walker v.
Bowersox, No. 06-3118, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11507 (8th Cir.).
Prior to trying to get a court-ordered blood
sample from a detainee at a county jail, employees there placed him in a
three-point restraint, and a blanket was allegedly placed against his head. The
prisoner then allegedly stopped breathing and, while CPR was attempted, he
was subsequently pronounced dead at a hospital. Upholding summary judgment for
defendant correctional officers and county, as well as the county sheriff, a
federal appeals court noted that the detainee had resisted arrest, was
"aggressive" at the time of the incident, and that it took several
officers to restrain him. The officers were then faced with the need to make a
quick decision about how to control him, and the court found that they did not
apply excessive force in doing so. Burkett v. Alachua County, No. 06-14777,
2007 U.S. App. Lexis 24172 (11th Cir.).
Use of restraints on prisoner at county jail
after she stated that she was having suicidal thoughts and wanted to try to
make herself bleed to death did not shock the conscience or violate her due
process rights. Norris v. Engles, No. 06-3394, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 18838 (8th
Cir.).
California intermediate court issues order
setting aside juvenile court policy of having sheriff's department shackle all
minors during court prisoners without a case-by-case determination of the need
for such restraints. In making such a determination, factors to be considered
included the type of proceeding, courtroom or security considerations, and the
behavior and conduct of the juvenile. Tiffany A. v. The Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, No. B193134, 2007 Cal. App. Lexis 783 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist.).
Prisoner stated viable claim for excessive use of
force by alleging that he was placed in hand restraints, and taken to a holding
cell after his attempt to enter the prison library caused a metal detector to
sound, and then that a guard repeatedly tightened the restraints on his hands
for approximately 20 minutes, followed by kicking him to the ground. Viable
claims were also asserted against other defendants who allegedly either
threatened the prisoner for his prior involvement in litigation or else
"stood by and watched" while other persons threatened or assaulted
him. Clark v. Argutto, No. 06-12350, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 6445 (11th Cir.).
Officers who placed prisoner in restraints during
suicide watch did not use excessive force or place him there with the intent of
harming him. Additionally, verbal insults by two officers after his suicide
attempt did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Martinez v. Zadroga,
No. 06-1410, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 1769 (10th Cir.). [N/R]
Prisoner's rights were not violated by placing
him in shackles and handcuffs while obtaining dental treatment when the
prison's routine security measures provided that prisoners were subject to such
restrains whenever they left their assigned areas. Samuel v. First Correctional
Medical, No. 05-037, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 87247 (D.Del.). [N/R]
In inmates' lawsuit claiming that, while
being transported, they were subjected for 10 to 15 hours in restraints so
tight that many of them were injured and were denied access to water, defendant
officers were entitled to qualified immunity, because the law on the use of
severely tight restrains and denial of water for an extended period being
constitutional violations was not "clearly established" until two
years after the incident in question, in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hope v.
Pelzer, #01-309, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). Anderson-Bey v. District of Columbia, No.
00-2000, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 88891 (D.D.C.). [N/R]
Former pre-trial detainee asserted possibly
viable claims as to whether his rights were violated when he was placed in
four-point restraints, chained to a wall in a rubber room, and denied hearings
before being punished. Claims for injunctive relief were properly rejected,
however, when he was no longer confined at the jail where these incidents took
place. Hanks v. Prachar, No. 05-2410, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 19821 (8th
Cir.).[2006 JP Oct]
Michigan court finds that the cause of a
prisoner's death was his suicide, and not anything that city or county
personnel did, so that they were entitled to governmental immunity from
liability under state law. Cooper v. Washtenaw County, No. 262141, 713 N.W.2d
908 (Mich. App. 2006). [N/R]
The decision by a prison nurse to place a
prisoner in four-point restraint was not shown to be retaliation for his prior
lawsuits against other prison personnel, when there was no evidence that the
nurse even knew of those lawsuits, and she was not named as a defendant in a
lawsuit until after the incident. Ziemba v. Clark, No. 05-1613, 167 Fed. Appx.
831 (2nd Cir. 2006). [N/R]
Federal appeals court overturns order upholding
requirement that all pre-trial detainees be shackled while making their first
appearance in criminal cases before magistrate judges. Federal district court,
in issuing its order, provided no explanation or justification for the policy
based on past safety problems or existing circumstances. U.S. v. Howard, No.
03-50524, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 24527 (9th Cir.). [2006 JB Jan]
Placement of leg irons on prisoner during
escorted medical trip did not violate prisoner's clearly established
constitutional rights. Prison officials used their best judgment in applying
such restraints to this prisoner during the transport, and the officers did not
deliberately inflict pain on the prisoner in the manner in which the restraints
were placed. Perez Olivo v. Gonzalez, No. CIV.01-1515, 384 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D.
Puerto Rico, 2005). [N/R]
U.S. Supreme Court rules that the use of visible
shackles, whether during the guilt phase of a criminal trial or the penalty
phase of a capital case, is a violation of constitutional due process unless it
is justified by specific findings concerning the need for such restraint of the
particular defendant based on "essential" interests like courtroom
security. Deck v. Missouri, No. 04-5293, 2005 U.S. Lexis 4180. [2005 JB Jul]
Correctional officer did not use excessive force
in using restraints to keep prisoner seated in wheelchair while escorting him
to optometrist when prisoner was repeatedly moving himself between the
wheelchair and another seat in the doctor's waiting room. Munera v. Metro West
Detention Center, No. 02-23612-CIV, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2004).[N/R]
Reasonable prison officials should have
understood, in 1998, that placing a mentally ill prisoner in four-point
restraints for twenty-two hours without food, water, or access to a bathroom,
and without the necessity for continued restraint, violated the Eighth Amendment,
so that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity in the prisoner's
lawsuit alleging such conduct. Ziemba v. Armstrong, No. CIV.A.3-98-CV-2344, 343
F. Supp. 2d 173 (D. Conn. 2004). [N/R]
Federal judge sets aside jury verdict for
correctional officials, and rules, as a matter of law, that keeping a prisoner
in five-point restraints for almost forty-eight hours without periodic review
of whether continued restraint was justified violated due process and
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Based on prisoner's conduct during
brief releases, continued restraint was unjustified after three hours. Warden,
while not personally involved in the incident, was liable because he failed to
take corrective action after reading reports of eight prior similar incidents.
Sadler v. S.K. Young, 325 F. Supp. 2d 689 (W.D. Va. 2004). [2004 JB Nov]
Prisoner was properly awarded $1,500 in
compensatory damages for allegedly being left in restraint chair for long
periods of time, and $500 for alleged excessive use of force against him, but
trial court properly did not award punitive damages in light of fact that the
prisoner admitted disobeying orders, and that the facility had not developed
policies governing the use of the restraint chair. Guerra v. Drake, #03-3137,
371 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 2004). [2004 JB Sep]
Prison official was entitled to qualified
immunity against prisoner's claim that he used excessive force against him when
handcuffing him, resulting in a lacerated wrist and injured thumb. The prisoner
admitted that he violated facility cuffing procedures by withdrawing his
uncuffed hand and disobeying the officer's orders, and defendant reasonably
believed that the plaintiff prisoner was trying to pull the cuffs into his cell
in order to possibly use them as a weapon. Avery v. Anderson, No. 03-4213, 94
Fed. Appx. 735 (10th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Prisoner was not entitled to damages for use of
back restraints after his disciplinary conviction. He failed to show that their
use was an "atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life," and rash which he allegedly suffered from the
use of the restrains was not "serious harm" as required to support a
claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Tasby v. Cain,
#03-30334, 86 Fed. Appx. 745 (5th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Correctional officers did not violate inmate's
Eighth Amendment rights by restraining him for approximately 20 hours on a
stretcher. Prisoner had kicked a door and assaulted a correctional officer, and
after he was placed on a stretcher, the officers loosened his handcuffs and
allowed him "numerous" bathroom breaks, as well as food, liquids, and
medications. Action in feeding him a disciplinary diet of
"nutra-loaf" was also not an Eighth Amendment violation, despite the
prisoner's claim that he experienced adverse effects, including vomiting,
burning in his chest and throat, and frequent bowel movements. These effects
were not "serious medical conditions," and there was no order or instruction
from medical personnel to stop the "nutra-loaf" diet. Myers v.
Milbert, 281 F. Supp. 2d 859 (N.D.W.Va. 2003). [N/R]
County jail personnel's actions in
strapping a female detainee naked and spread-eagle to a restraining board for
three and a half hours and failing to cover her, allowing her to be observed by
male officers, violated her constitutional right to privacy, but defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity on federal civil rights claim, as the right
violated was not "clearly established" at the time. State law award
of $2,500 in damages for violation of privacy is upheld. Hill v. McKinley,
#01-2574, 311 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2002). [2003 JB Feb.]
U.S. Supreme Court holds that alleged use of
"hitching post" to restrain prisoner outside in hot weather for seven
hours without bathroom breaks and with only one or two water breaks, if true,
established an Eighth Amendment violation, for which defendant prison officials
were not entitled to qualified immunity defense at summary judgment phase of proceedings.
Hope v. Pelzer, #01-309, 122 S. Ct. 2508 (2002). [2002 JB Aug]
Pre-trial detainees were entitled to
after-the-fact procedural due process protections when they were required to be
put in additional restraints when being moved within or outside the jails. This
includes the right to a hearing, written decision, and timely review of appeal
from placement in special restraint status. Such restraint must be imposed for
a legitimate security purpose rather than an impermissible purpose of punishment.
Benjamin v. Fraser, #00-9093 & 00-9095, 264 F.3d 175 (2nd Cir. 2001). [N/R]
A prisoner's four-hour immobilization in
"four-point" restraints, by itself, did not constitute an atypical
and significant hardship sufficient to support a federal civil rights claim.
Laws v. Cleaver, 140 F. Supp. 2d 145 (D. Conn. 2001). [N/R]
Prisoner's claim
that he was restrained with 5-point restraint for 48 hours because of his race
and prior complaints about expressions of racism -- and that he was shown a drawing
of a person in a noose -- state a claim for denial of equal protection. Use of
restraints for such an extended time period could also constitute excessive use
of force. Davis v. Lester, 156 F. Supp. 2d 588 (W.D. Va. 2001). [2002 JB Jan]
295:107 Keeping
an inmate handcuffed to a hitching post in the sun for seven hours without
regular water or bathroom breaks constituted cruel and unusual punishment;
prison guards who did this, however, were entitled to qualified immunity
because the law on the subject was not clearly established in 1995. Hope v.
Pelzer, No. 00- 12150, 240 F.3d 975 (11th Cir. 2001).
295:106 Overly
tight application of handcuffs on a nonviolent detainee may be excessive use of
force, in the absence of any indication that detainee would resist or attempt
to flee. Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, #00-1037, 247 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2001).
EDITOR'S NOTE:
See also: Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917 (2nd Cir. 1993) (refusing to hold
that handcuffing is per se reasonable). In a different factual context, where
officers arrested a woman following her physical altercation with her grown
daughter, and the arrestee sued, claiming that her wrist was allegedly swollen
from being handcuffed, another federal appeals court found that "handcuffing
too tightly, without more, does not amount to excessive force." Glenn v.
City of Tyler, #00- 40133, 242 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2001). This case, in contrast
to the one decided by the 6th Circuit, did not involve a nonviolent offense.
[N/R] Whether
inmate was placed in a restraint chair to stop his disruptive behavior or for
purposes of punishment without procedural due process was a question for the
jury to decide, but placement of him in a restraint chair for eight hours did
not violate substantive due process under Eighth Amendment standards. Judgment
for defendants upheld on appeal. Fuentes v. Wagner, No. 99- 1062, 206 F.3d 335
(3rd Cir. 2000).
[N/R] Former
inmate claimed deprivations that were sufficiently atypical to implicate a
liberty interest, stating a claim for due process violations in disciplinary
proceedings, including placement in full restraints for nearly seven months
after disciplinary proceedings allegedly lacking due process protections, and
remaining naked in his cell for a number of days. Sims v. Artuz, #97-2674 , 230
F.3d 14 (2nd Cir. 2000)
286:147 County
sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity from lawsuit by 52-year-old
prisoner with AIDS challenging an alleged policy of shackling all hospitalized
inmates hand and foot 24 hours a day despite also having an armed guard
stationed at their hospital room; lawsuit stated claims for denial of access to
the courts, denial of equal protection, and excessive bodily restraint of a
pretrial detainee. May v. Sheahan, #99-3140, 226 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2000).
277:7 Placing
prisoner in restraints for twenty-four hours after he threw water at
correctional officer did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; prisoner
had no right to a hearing prior to being placed in restraints. Key v. McKinney,
#98-2749, 176 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 1999).
277:8 Prisoner
who slipped and fell down stairs while being escorted to a gymnasium in full
restraints did not state claim for cruel and unusual punishment. Pendergrass v.
Hodge, 53 F. Supp. 2d 838 (E.D. Va. 1999).
282:90 Use of
"L" shape method of restraint was not excessive force when used on
prisoner who posed a serious threat to herself and others and when other lesser
forms of restraint had proved ineffective; restraint itself caused no physical
harm and prison officials were careful to monitor the prisoner while she was
restrained in this manner. Campbell v. Sikes, #98-8265, 169 F.3d 1353 (11th
Cir. 1999).
269:75 Jury
awards almost $13 million to family of schizophrenic man who died of
asphyxiation after being placed in restraints face down; trial judge also
awards $343,953.70 in attorneys' fees, but rejects one plaintiff's attorney's
request for fees of $1,000 per hour. Swans v. City of Lansing, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20043 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
274:153 Trial
court upholds settlement of prisoners' claim that chaining all prisoners
together on "chain gang" work detail put them in danger of injury;
court rules that use of "hitching post" on all prisoners who refuse
to work was cruel and unusual punishment; private settlement of class action
was not subject to limitations on injunctive relief set forth in Prison
Litigation Reform Act. Austin v. Hopper, 15 F.Supp.2d 1210 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
[N/R] Allegation
that medical director allowed restraints and segregation for prisoner in
psychiatric hospital without specific approval from a medical doctor stated a
claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and
unusual punishment; prisoner's right to such medical approval in these
circumstances was clearly established. Buckley v. Rogerson, No. 96-3108, 133
F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 1998).
262:154 Prison
officials did not violate any clearly established rights of disruptive prisoner
who repeatedly threw urine at correctional officers when they maced him and
placed him in four-point restraints for twenty-eight hours. Price v. Dixon, 961
F.Supp. 894 (E.D.N.C. 1997).
263:169 Trial
court, relying on new study, concludes that "positional asphyxia" was
not cause of arrestee's death, questions entire scientific basis for
"positional asphyxia." Price v. Co. of San Diego, 990 F.Supp. 1230
(S.D. Cal. 1998). » Editor's Note: The study relied on by the trial court in
the decision above has been published as JL Clausen, TC Chan, T Neuman, &
GM Vilke, "Restraint Position and Positional Asphyxia" in Vol. 30
Annals of Emergency Medicine, p. 578-586 (Nov. 1997).
[N/R] Court
declines to dismiss claims against police chief and municipality based on
failure to train allegations after pretrial detainee placed in restraint chair
subsequently denied; court also refuses to grant qualified immunity to
individual defendants; focus of case is on the issue of dealing with mentally
disturbed individuals. Swans v. City of Lansing, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17264
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 1997).
[N/R] Court
upholds criminal conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 241 of a correctional officer
for conspiracy to violate the civil rights of a pre-trial detainee who was
placed in a restraint chair, based not on the use of restraint chair, but
rather on alleged mistreatment of prisoner while he was in it, including
pouring boiling water on his groin. U.S. v. Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233 (1st Cir.
1997).
[N/R] Trial
court had to hold hearing to determine whether it was necessary to place
restraints on prisoner when he appeared to represent himself in court on civil
rights claim and should not simply defer to opinions of prison security guards.
Davidson v. Riley, 45 F.3d 625 (2nd Cir. 1995).
[N/R] Prisoner
did not need to show that disciplinary proceedings were terminated in his favor
in order to successfully bring federal civil rights lawsuit over claim that he
was disciplined in retaliation for exercising his right of access to the
courts. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161 (5th Cir. 1995).
223:107 Federal
appeals court upholds summary judgment for correctional officer sued by unruly
prisoner he placed in restraints; officer did not make the decision to place
the prisoner in the restraints or to keep him in them for 73 hours; further
proceedings ordered on whether assistant warden approved of the length of
restraints and whether such restraint constituted a violation of prisoner's
liberty interests. Williams v. Vidor, 17 F.3d 857 (6th Cir. 1994).
[N/R]
Handcuffing prisoner from behind violated Eighth Amendment when inmate told
officers he suffered from a medical condition that precluded such restraint and
officer intentionally inflicted pain on inmate for a significant period of
time. Aldape v. Lambert, 34 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 1994).
Lawsuit alleging
guard's negligence in use of leg irons and lockbar was properly dismissed as
frivolous; discomfort experienced by prisoner was minor and acts complained of
were common and necessary in prison environment. Thomas v. Texas Dept. of Crim.
Justice, 848 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App. 1993).
Trial judge in
prisoner's suit alleging excessive force by correctional officers abused his
discretion in relying on "selfserving" opinions of fellow
correctional officers of the defendants as to what restraints of prisoner were
necessary when he appeared in court; hearing should have been held to determine
whether restraint of prisoner in leg irons and handcuffs in court were
required. Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1993).
Trial court
appropriately ordered inmate's prisoner/witnesses to be shackled when in
courtroom because of security concerns and risk of escape. Woods v. Thieret, 5
F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 1993).
Prison officials
were entitled to qualified immunity from prisoner's suit against the use of a
"black box" placed over his handcuffs to further restrain him
whenever he was moved outside of segregation unit. Knox v. McGinnis, 998 F.2d
1405 (7th Cir. 1993).
Pretrial
detainee kept in "three-way" chain restraints for a week following
his suicide attempt, and not permitted normal use of toilet, awarded $5,000 in
compensatory and $2,000 in punitive damages. Jones v. Thompson, 818 F.Supp.
1263 (S.D. Ind. 1993).
Use of black box
restraint device over handcuffs while transporting prisoner to and from
hospital was not itself cruel and unusual punishment; officers who had no
discretion as to whether to use the restraint device could not be held liable
for prisoner's wrist injuries. Moody v. Proctor, 986 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1993).
Placing prisoner
in four-point restraints and gag for 28 hours to restore order following
disturbance was not cruel and unusual punishment. Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d
1572 (11th Cir. 1991).