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Corrections Law for
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Segregation: Disciplinary
A lawsuit claimed that correctional officials violated a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by keeping him in solitary confinement for three-and-a-half years. He was arrested for murder and allegedly made violent threats against correctional officers and was “combative.” Determining that it had jurisdiction over the appeal and that the due process claims were not moot, a federal appeals court held that two defendants were entitled to summary judgment because they lacked sufficient personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivations. The court held, however, that a corrections department director and a sheriff were not entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process claims arising from plaintiff's solitary confinement. Because the trial court did not properly apply the legal principles that control substantive and procedural due process claims being pursued by a pretrial detainee, the appeals court held that the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to these two defendants on these claims. There was a triable issue concerning the purpose of the detainee’s solitary confinement and the level of process he was due. Williamson v. Stirling, #17-6922, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 36102 (4th Cir.).
A pretrial detainee was entitled to
a hearing before he was punished by being placed in disciplinary segregation.
In this case, the defendants conceded that no such hearing was provided, so
judgment should be entered for the plaintiff on his due process claim. Dilworth
v. Adams, #15-6910, 841 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2016).
A trial court erred in granting a warden summary
judgment in a prisoner's lawsuit alleging that his conditions of confinement in
disciplinary segregation violated the Eighth Amendment. There was evidence that
the warden had actual knowledge of unusually harsh weather conditions and that
the windows in the prisoner's cell would not close, having himself toured the
segregation unit. The warden's "plainly inappropriate" response to
the inmate's grievance and to the extreme cold faced by him allowed an
inference that he was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's suffering.
Haywood v. Hathaway, #12-1678, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 21367 (7th Cir.).
A prisoner who is a
member of the Nation of Gods and Earths (NOGE), a group whose adherents are
also known as "Five Percenters" participated in a prison riot with
other members of the group in 1995, and was placed in solitary confinement as a
result, where he remained for 20 years. He claimed that his confinement in
solitary for this long violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. He claimed
that the state correctional policy required him to renounce his affiliation
with his religion before it would release him, and that his procedural due
process rights were also violated. The plaintiff could not prevail on his
religious exercise claim, even if his religion was entitled to protection, as
he failed to show that the department's policy actually did require him to
renounce his faith before being released from the special management unit. But
the 20-year period of solitary confinement was held to amount to an
"atypical and significant hardship in relation to the general
population," and implicated a liberty interest in avoiding security
detention. There was a triable dispute of fact as to whether the process used
for determining which prisoners were fit for release from security detention
met the minimum due process requirements. Incumaa v. Stirling, #14-6411, 2015
U.S. App. Lexis 11321 (4th Cir.).
The Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice
has agreed to new court approved policies that prohibit the punitive solitary
confinement of juvenile prisoners, in a lawsuit filed by the Illinois ACLU. The
lawsuit argued that protracted isolation and solitary confinement of juveniles,
especially of those suffering mental illness, increased the risk of suicide and
other self-harm. Under the new policy, punitive isolation is not allowed,
youths separated from the general population for any non-punitive reason must
be provided their ordinary education and mental health services, and youths
separated for 24 hours or longer must be allowed out of their rooms, and
provided an opportunity to interact with staff, for at least eight (8) hours
each day. The new policies were the result of negotiations between the parties
in the lawsuit and court-ordered monitors. R.J. v. Jones, #12-cv-07289, U.S.
Dist. Ct. (N.D. Ill. April 24, 2015).
A prisoner's grievance that his rights were violated
when he was given six months of disciplinary segregation was upheld and the
disciplinary conviction overturned because insufficient details about the
specific time, place or date of the incident were given and he allegedly was
not allowed to see the official electronics contract forms he was accused of
trafficking in or argue any defense during the hearing. In a lawsuit, he sought
damages for this, as he had already served his six months of segregation by the
time the discipline was overturned. He also claimed that he was improperly
denied a cell with bars which he requested because of a childhood incident
involving abuse and rape, making him afraid of being behind closed metal doors.
He claimed he suffered mental anguish, was attacked by a cellmate, and was only
taken out of his cell once a week to shower and use the yard. A federal appeals
court upheld a grant of qualified immunity to the defendants as the right to
avoid disciplinary segregation in a cell with a solid metal door and a
confrontational cell mate for 182 days with weekly access to the shower and
recreational yard was not a clearly established right in September 2009.
Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, #12-2856, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 22386 (7th Cir.).
A prisoner was in the Justice Department's
Witness Security Program. Because he allegedly broke program rules by having
unauthorized contact with unauthorized persons, he was terminated from the
program, allegedly without notice or an opportunity to be heard. After being
terminated from the program, he was placed in a segregated housing unit and
kept there for 188 days. Prison officials claimed that this was administrative
segregation. A federal appeals court rejected his claim that his termination
from the program violated due process since he had not shown that he had a
property right to be in the witness program. No process was due because the
benefit of the program was not an entitlement and government officials could
grant or deny it at their discretion. Because the prisoner claimed that his
placement in segregation was punitive and designed to punish him for violating
the program's rules, further proceedings were ordered on whether that was the
case and if so, whether his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. JS v.
T'Kach, #11-1287, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 7283 (2nd Cir.).
A Wisconsin prisoner was placed in the prison's
most restrictive disciplinary segregation for 240 days because he had committed
misconduct while in a less restrictive disciplinary segregation environment. In
his lawsuit complaining about this and the procedures used to find that he had
violated the rules, the prisoner failed to show that the conditions he was
placed in deprived him of constitutionally protected liberty or property. The
prisoner needed to, but failed to, show that the conditions in the prison's
most restrictive disciplinary segregation were more onerous than those of a
high-security prison in Wisconsin, to which a prisoner may be assigned without
any opportunity for a hearing. While due process requires a hearing before a
prisoner loses more liberty than he lost as a result of his conviction and
sentence, "the right comparison is between the ordinary conditions of a
high-security prison in the state, and the conditions under which a prisoner is
actually held." Marion v. Radtke, #10-2446, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 11054
(7th Cir.).
A prisoner who received 132 disciplinary tickets
for violating various rules sued over his placement in disciplinary segregation
for a total of 22 months, and also claimed that his due process rights were
violated in a disciplinary proceeding because he had been denied the right to
call a witness. An intermediate Illinois appeals court ruled that the
disciplinary segregation had not implicated any liberty interest the prisoner
had under federal law. He was not subject to any "atypical and significant
hardship" by his placement into disciplinary segregation compared to the
general conditions in the super-maximum security prison where he was already
confined. It also found that the denial of his request to call a witness did
not deprive him of due process when he refused to use a required witness
request form, and also sought to introduce irrelevant testimony about the
alleged homosexual orientation of a guard. Taylor v. Frey, #5-08-0210, 2011
Ill. App. Lexis 28 (5th Dist.).
A prisoner placed in disciplinary custody should
have been allowed to proceed with his due process claims. The trial court
improperly analyzed the case under a lower standard only sufficient for
restraint for administrative rather than disciplinary reasons. Claims
concerning the alleged denial of assessment hearings once he was in
disciplinary custody were properly rejected, however, when the prisoner himself
had refused to sign the required form when presented with the opportunity for
such a hearing. Pressley v. Blaine, #08-1517, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 25405
(Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
A prisoner was placed in disciplinary segregation
for 30 days after a search found a razor blade in his pocket. His segregation
for possession of contraband did not violate his procedural due process rights.
He did not show that he faced "atypical" or "significant"
hardships in segregation. The requirement that he be handcuffed while out of
his cell and the monitoring by guards of his access to resources were not
significant departures from normal prison conditions. The search of the
prisoner's cell and person that discovered the razor blade did not violate his
rights. Shaarbay v. Palm Beach County Jail, #09-11294, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis
23404 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
Placement of a prisoner in disciplinary
segregation for 240 days following a hearing was a sufficiently long period of
time to involve a constitutionally protected liberty interest provided the
conditions of confinement there were severe enough. The appeals court
overturned the dismissal of the prisoner's due process and equal protection
lawsuit, and ordered further proceedings. Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst.,
#07-2556, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 6171 (7th Cir.).
Prisoner's placement in administrative
segregation in a penitentiary Special Management Unit (SMU) was not intended to
be punitive in nature, but instead to provide him, as a person who had been
involved in a gang related disturbance at his prior facility, with additional
program opportunities. His placement in the SMU, therefore, did not raise due
process issues. His subsequent placement in disciplinary segregation in the SMU
was justified by his involvement in "no less" than eighteen
disciplinary incidents, and the prisoner failed to show that he faced atypical
conditions while so confined. MacKey v. Strada, No. 3:CV-06-015, 2008 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 86339 (M.D. Pa.).
Even if a prisoner was mistakenly kept in a
special housing unit in disciplinary segregation for an additional 60 days
after his transfer to a new facility, his constitutional rights were not
violated when he failed to show that the conditions to which he was subjected
were an "atypical and significant hardship." Anderson v. Beaver, No.
01-CV-6536, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 73902 (W.D.N.Y.). [N/R]
Conditions that prisoner faced in disciplinary
segregation were not severe enough to amount to a deprivation of a liberty
interest, so that he could not pursue a federal civil rights claim that he had
been placed in such confinement without procedural due process. Lekas v.
Briley, No. 04-1420 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 7528 (7th Cir.). [2005 JB Jun]
Prisoner was not barred from pursuing his claim
that his disciplinary segregation was the result of him improperly being denied
the right to present witnesses at disciplinary hearing merely because his
disciplinary segregation lasted only 77 days. The question of whether his
conditions of confinement in disciplinary segregation were "atypical"
was unknown, based on the record presented. Withrow v. Donnelly, No.
03-CV-6283L, 333 F. Supp. 2d 108 (W.D.N.Y. 2004). [N/R]
Hearing officer in disciplinary hearing which
resulted in sentence of prisoner to 90 days of confinement in Special Housing
Unit was not entitled to qualified immunity on prisoner's due process claim
challenging alleged procedural defects in the hearing, including purported
intentional erasure of a portion of a tape of the hearing containing
exculpatory testimony. Palmer v. Richards, #03-290, 364 F.3d 60 (2nd Cir.
2004). [2004 JB Jul]
Prisoner who had been convicted but not yet sentenced
should be treated the same as a sentenced prisoner for purposes of whether he
had a liberty interest in procedural due process before being punished for
alleged violation of prison rules against possession of contraband, rather than
being treated as a pre-trial detainee. Federal appeals court upholds dismissal
of prisoner's due process lawsuit over his placement in a punitive cell for
eight hours without first being given a hearing. Tilmon v. Prator, #03-31071,
2004 U.S. App. Lexis 8961 (5th Cir.). [2004 JB Jun]
Penalty of placement in disciplinary segregation
for a 15 day period with no loss of good time credits was not a sufficiently
"atypical and significant" hardship that it implicated a prisoner's
due process rights. Marksberry v. Chandler, No. 2002-CA-001920-MR, 126 S.W.3d
747 (Ky. App. 2004). [N/R]
U.S. Supreme Court to review issue of whether
California prison practice of routinely segregating prisoners by race during
initial period of incarceration is permissible for purposes of preventing
racial violence, as federal appeals court ruled, or unconstitutional
discrimination in violation of the right to equal protection. Johnson v.
California, #03-636, 72 U.S. Law Week 3551 (March 1, 2004). [2004 JB Apr]
Prisoner who had been convicted, although not yet
sentenced, had no due process liberty interest in not being placed in
disciplinary segregation, and therefore was not entitled to a hearing before
his placement there. Tilmon v. Prator, 292 F. Supp. 2d 898 (W.D. La. 2003).
[N/R]
Prisoner's transfer to a long-term segregation
unit for 120 days in disciplinary custody did not impose an "atypical and
significant hardship" on him in relation to ordinary life in prison, so
that no liberty interest requiring due process was involved. Brown v. Blaine,
833 A.2d 1166 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). [N/R]
Private corporation operating correctional
facility was not liable for violating a prisoner's liberty interest by placing
him in medium security status. Prisoner was not entitled to any particular
status and the company's officials had explained the basis for the
classification. Additionally, his placement in disciplinary segregation for
committing a battery while in prison did not violate his rights when there was
nothing "atypical" about the conditions in segregation. The city in
which the prison was located could not be held liable for any alleged violation
of the prisoner's rights when there was nothing to show that the city had any
role in operating the prison. Byrd v. Cornell Corrections, Inc., No. 02-6316,
60 Fed. Appx. 191 (10th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Prisoner's placement in segregation for three
days after being found guilty of a disciplinary charge of making threatening
statements did not implicate a protected liberty interest, since it was not an
"atypical and significant hardship." No basis found for prisoner's
race discrimination claim. Adams v. Jones, No. 02-5472, 52 Fed. Appx. 744 (6th
Cir. 2002). [2003 JB May]
Prisoner could not sue for damages for alleged
due process violations in prison disciplinary proceeding for hitting fellow
inmates with a baseball bat or pursue claim that disciplinary charges were
brought against him for racially discriminatory reasons. No such lawsuit was
permitted unless the disciplinary conviction was first set aside. Prisoner's
claim for habeas corpus was his proper avenue for restoration of lost good time
credits, and his placement in punitive segregation for 30 days was not an
"atypical and significant hardship" implicating a protected liberty
interest. Portley-El v. Brill, #00-1923, 288 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002). [2002
JB Aug]
Pretrial detainee cannot be put in segregation as
a punishment for a disciplinary offense without notice and an opportunity to be
heard, and an issue of fact existed as to whether the detainee was placed in
lockdown segregation purposes for 34 days for punishment or preventive
purposes. Further, the prisoner's claim that he was placed in lockdown
segregation for 11 days in retaliation for pursuing his lawsuit sufficiently
stated a possible claim for violation of his rights. Higgs v. Carver, #01-1559,
286 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Pretrial
detainee allegedly placed in segregation for two and a half years as punishment
without procedural due process could pursue constitutional claim. At the time
of segregation, in 1995, the law clearly established that a pretrial detainee
could only be punished for misconduct after being given some sort of procedural
protection, so that defendant officials were not entitled to qualified
immunity. Love v. Sheahan, 156 F. Supp. 2d 749 (N.D. Ill. 2001). [N/R]
274:157
Pre-trial detainee could be punished for misconduct while incarcerated, but was
entitled to procedural protections before segregation was imposed; correctional
officers were entitled to qualified immunity, however, since law on the subject
was not previously clearly established. Rapier v. Harris, #97-1348, 172 F.3d
999 (7th Cir. 1999).
266:27
Prisoner's confinement in special housing unit for a period of 545 days after
being found guilty of disciplinary offenses was not an "atypical,
significant hardship," when conditions were generally the same as those
faced by other prisoners. Vasquez v. Coughlin, 2 F.Supp.2d 255 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
270:92 New York
prisoner's confinement in disciplinary segregation for 376 days imposed an "atypical
and significant" hardship which prisoner had a liberty interest in
avoiding. Lee v. Coughlin, 26 F.Supp.2d 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
257:77 Federal
appeals court rules that trial judge should have made detailed factual findings
as to whether or not prisoner's placement in disciplinary segregation imposed
"atypical and significant hardship," rather than summarily ruling for
defendants. Driscoll v. Youngman, 105 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997). »
Editor's Note: The same appeals court reached an identical result and holding
in Hemphill v. Delo, 105 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 1997), in which another Missouri
prisoner claimed that he was found guilty of a disciplinary offense without due
process, and then sentenced to thirty days in disciplinary segregation. As in the
case reported above, the appeals court ruled that the trial court erred in
summarily rejecting the prisoner's claims based on Sandin without making a
factual determination that would demonstrate that the segregation "did not
work a major disruption" in the prisoner's environment.
262:157 Federal
trial court should not have decided that prisoner's 288 days in disciplinary
segregation was not an "atypical and significant hardship" without
taking into consideration the duration of the segregation and the differences
between administrative and disciplinary segregation. Wright v. Coughlin, 132
F.3d 133 (2nd Cir. 1998). » Editor's Note: See also Brooks v. DiFasi, 112
F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1997) (trial court should have considered the duration of
prisoner's confinement in determining whether his punishment constituted an
"atypical and significant" hardship).
[N/R]
Confinement of prisoner in disciplinary segregation for 15 day period was not
sufficiently serious to violate Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. Leslie v. Doyle, 125 F.3d 1132 (7th Cir. 1997).
[N/R] Members of
prison disciplinary board liable for compensatory damages of $ and punitive
damages of $5,000 on claim that they allowed inmate to be held in segregation
for ten days without a determination of guilt on charges that he violated
prison rules; evidence showed that segregation was punitive and prison
regulations required a hearing within three days. Wilson v. Philadelphia
Detention Center, 986 F.Supp. 282 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
235:106 Keeping
Illinois state prisoner in disciplinary segregation for 19 days longer than
maximum punishment period allowed under state law did not constitute federal
constitutional rights violation; forcing inmate to choose between medically requested
lower bunk available in segregation unit or transfer out to protective custody
unit where no such bunk was available was not cruel and unusual punishment.
Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246 (7th Cir. 1995). [Cross-reference: Medical
Care].
237:140 Federal
appeals court rules that Washington state prisoner had a protected liberty
interest in accumulating good time credits and that the record was not
sufficient to determine whether there was a liberty interest in remaining free
of disciplinary segregation which was violated by alleged improprieties in
disciplinary proceedings. Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1995).
[Cross-reference: Prisoner Discipline].
[N/R] Prisoner's
claim for damages for time spend in segregation after disciplinary charge was
reversed by state court was not a frivolous claim. Muhannad v. Kinney, 51 F.3d
762 (8th Cir. 1995).
226:147 U.S.
Supreme Court rules that prisoner placed in disciplinary segregation following
charges of misconduct was not entitled to due process procedural protections;
state regulation simply requiring that disciplinary guilt be supported by
substantial evidence did not result in a state-created constitutionally
protected "liberty" interest; focus in determining whether state creates
a liberty interest to shift from search for mandatory language in state laws or
regulations to the nature of the deprivation imposed. Sandin v. Conner, 115
S.Ct. 2293 (1995).
220:59 Prison
officials' failure to release prisoner from punitive segregation when lab tests
later showed that substance seized from his cell was not cocaine, but a
prescription drug, did not violate prisoner's due process or Eighth Amendment
rights; possession of prescription drug without doctor's prescription still
violated same prison rule. Ricker v. Leapley, 25 F.3d 1406 (8th Cir. 1994).
Federal appeals
court reconsiders earlier decision on placement in disciplinary confinement
after transfer; prisoner released into general population when transferred to
another state was not entitled to a new hearing prior to being placed back into
disciplinary segregation when transferred back to original state. Pletka v.
Nix, 957 F.2d 1480 (8th Cir. 1992).
Placing inmate
in punitive segregation without a hearing after transfer to prison violated his
due process rights. Pletka v. Nix, 943 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1991).
Illinois prison
regulations governing minor disciplinary offenses created a "liberty
interest" in having a hearing before being placed in disciplinary
segregation; placement of inmate in such segregation and holding a hearing
afterwards violated due process. Gilbert v. Frazier, 931 F.2d 1581 (7th Cir.
1991).
New York's
highest court bars civil liability for violations over segregation. Edmonson v.
State, 504 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Ct. cl. 1986).
Mail and access
to court rights properly restricted. Little v. Norris, 787 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir.
1986).
Periodic review
not always necessary. Grandison v. Cuyler, 600 F.Supp. 967 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
Inmate properly confined
in isolation until he consents to blood test to determine venereal disease.
Smallwood - El v. Coughlin, 589 F.Supp. 692 (S.D. N.Y. 1984).
No federal
jurisdiction in suit challenging inmate's prison hearing. Monahan v. Wolff, 585
F.Supp. 1198 (D. Nev. 1984).
Hearing required
for continued segregation. Arrington v. Wainwright, 452 So.2d 1120 (Fla. App.
1984).
One officer's
written violation report serves as basis to segregate inmate; witnesses gave no
reason for not testifying. White v. Wyrick, 727 F.2d 757 (8th cir. 1984).
Limited number
of staff does not justify routine exclusion of inmates from disciplinary
hearings when witnesses testify. People Ex Rel. McBayne v. Smith, 469 N.Y.S.2d
893 (App. 1983).
Case to proceed
for determination of whether officials afforded a timely review of inmate
placed in administrative segregation. Royce v. Commissioner of Correction, 456
N.E.2d 1127 (Mass. 1983).
Inmate kept in
solitary isolation for five years without proper evaluation awarded damages.
Burton v. Shapp, 574 F.Supp. 637 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
Inmates confined
to segregation without due process. Granger v. Florida State Prison, 424 So.2d
937 (Fla. App. 1983).
Inmate pro se
complaint of solitary confinement without due process was improperly dismissed;
frivolity of suits discussed. Inmate complaint failed to follow procedural
rules of federal district court. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct.
700 (1982).
Illinois
District court rules that inmate's constitutional rights were violated by
placing him in punitive segregation for 18 months without a hearing; awards
$5,000 damages. Black v. Brown, 524 F.Supp. 856 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
Court of appeals
rules that inmate's assertion that he was arbitrarily placed in segregation and
denied access to courts stated valid claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Gildoy
v. Boone, 657 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).
Delaware guard
captain ordered to pay inmate $680 for keeping him in solitary confinement and
preventing him from answering charges about a riot. Pitts v. Kee, 511 F.Supp.
497 (D. Del. 1981). Illinois prisoners found to have protectible liberty
interest in not being assigned to segregation absent a finding of major
misconduct. Williams v. Franzen, 499 F.Supp. 304 (N.D. Ill. 1980).