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Youthful Prisoners
A juvenile prisoner in Virginia challenged his repeated denial of parole. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that juvenile-specific Eighth Amendment protections do not apply to the prisoner because he was sentenced to life with parole, and that the Parole Board procedures satisfied procedural due process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal appeals court declined to extend the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment rulings to juvenile parole proceedings to find that it is cruel and unusual punishment for a parole board to deny juvenile offenders parole without specifically considering age-related mitigating characteristics as a separate factor in the decision-making process. With regards to a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, the court concluded that, although there was no constitutional or inherent right to parole proceedings, Virginia state law gave rise to an expectation of parole proceedings that created a liberty interest in parole consideration. However, to satisfy the due process requirements triggered by this liberty interest, a parole board need only provide an offender with an opportunity to be heard and a statement of reasons stating why parole has been denied. In this case, the parole proceedings satisfied those due process requirements. Bowling v. Director, Virginia Dept. of Corrections, #18-6170, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 9633 (4th Cir.). A federal appeals court upheld a judgment in an action under a federal statute, 34 U.S.C. 12601(a), the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. That statute makes it unlawful for “any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” When there are violations, the U.S. Attorney General can file a civil suit to “obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.” The action, filed by the federal government, claimed that a county and its two Youth Court judges operated a “school-to-prison pipeline” and, through their administration of the juvenile justice process, were engaged in patterns or practices that denied juveniles their constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the lawsuit against the judges on the basis that they are outside the scope of Section 12601, and because the government has affirmatively waived any other argument for continuing the lawsuit against the County. The phrase “officials or employees of any governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice,” as it is used in the statute does not include the judges of a county youth court. The youth court was not an “agency,” which was what the statute applied to. Congress knew how to deviate from the ordinary usage of “agency” by expressly defining the term to include courts, but did not do so. United States v. Lauderdale County, #17-60805, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 3344,2019 WL 406878 (5th Cir.). A juvenile defendant involved in a fight appealed an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court and placing him on probation after the trial court sustained a petition for battery with serious bodily injury. An intermediate California state appeals court upheld a probation condition prohibiting the defendant from discussing his case on social media, ruling that the condition was neither overbroad nor in violation of the defendant’s First Amendment rights. In this case, the defendant posted on social media “bragging” about being a 16-year-old felon. The appeals court held that the juvenile court had broad discretion in imposing probation conditions and that the restriction on social media postings was precise, narrow, and reasonably tailored to address the defendant’s posting conduct and rehabilitation. In re A.A., #B289821, 30 Cal. App. 5th 596, 2018 Cal. App. Lexis 1186, 2018 WL 6695839. Iowa closed a state girls training school and entered into a contract to use a Wisconsin facility to place juvenile delinquents. Two such offenders placed there when they were 16 claimed that the facility, since its opening had had a very high staff turnover rate, resulting in an overworked and untrained staff, and “sordid and inhumane” treatment of juveniles. They claimed that they were subjected to prolonged isolation, received little or no educational instruction, were subjected to excessive force and sprayed with mace on multiple occasions, and both attempted suicide. A federal appeals court reversed the dismissal of their claims. The trial court acted prematurely in deciding the Director of the Iowa Department of Human Services’ entitlement to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage. At the time the plaintiffs were allegedly in the defendant’s custody, isolation of pre-trial juvenile detainees not “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective” could amount to a constitutional violation. On the record, it was impossible to determine whether such a constitutional violation occurred. Reed v. Palmer, #18-1429, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 28436 (7th Cir.). |
Youthful Prisoners – See also, Foreign Prisoners and Immigrant Detainees (2nd case)
A
Massachusetts correctional policy of using discretionary override codes to
block juvenile homicide offenders from being placed in a minimum security
facility unless and until they had received a positive parole vote violated a
state statute barring a categorical ban on such placement and requiring a
consideration on suitability for minimum security classification on a
case-by-case basis. The practice did not, however, violate juvenile homicide
offenders' right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation because there is no constitutionally
protected expectation under the Eight Amendment or Mass. Const. Decl. Rights
art. 26 that a juvenile homicide offender will be released to the community
after serving a statutorily prescribed portion of his or her sentence. Deal v.
Comm'r of Correction, #SJC-12053, 475 Mass. 307, 56 N.E.3d 800 (Mass. 2016).
The U.S. government entered into a settlement agreement in
a 1997 class action lawsuit, setting out a "nationwide policy for the
detention, release, and treatment of minors in the custody of the INS."
The plaintiff class in 2015 filed a motion to enforce the settlement, arguing
that it applied to all minors held in the custody of immigration authorities,
regardless of whether or not they were accompanied by parents. A federal
appeals court agreed, but further held that this did not create affirmative
release rights for parents, as the trial court erroneously held. The fact that
the settlement agreement granted minors a right to preferential release to a parent
did not mean that the government had any obligation to make a parent available
for that purpose. Flores v. Lynch, #15-56434, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 12439 (9th
Cir.).
A 12-year-old boy brandished a homemade knife and
threatened to break a girl's arms. Three weeks later, after juvenile charges
were filed, he was taken to a county youth detention facility, processed, and
strip searched. The strip search was conducted under a facility policy to check
incoming youths for “injuries, markings, skin conditions, signs of abuse, or
further contraband." The search was conducted with the boy behind a
curtain so that only the officer conducting the search could observe him. The
boy was made to remove his pants and underwear for approximately 90 seconds, as
well as to bend over, spread his buttocks, and cough. In his lawsuit
challenging the search, a federal appeals court held that the U.S. Supreme
Court holding in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, #10-945, 132 S. Ct.
1510 (2012) that every arrestee committed to the general population of a
detention center can be subjected to a close visual inspection while undressed
applies to juvenile offenders such as the plaintiff admitted to the general
population in a juvenile detention facility. J. B. v. Fassnacht, #14-3905, 2015
U.S. App. Lexis 16404 (3rd Cir.).
The mother of a juvenile allegedly beaten to
death by other residents at a juvenile detention facility sued the Districrt of
Columbia, claiming that th death occurred because the facility was overcrowded
and understaffed, that deliberate indifference was shown towards her son's
safety, and that the District was negligent in hiring, training, and
supervising its employees at the detention center in violation of District of
Columbia tort law, the Eighth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. A federal appeals
court vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant and
its denial of the plaintiff's motion to disqualify the Attorney General of the
District of Columbia as the counsel for the defendant because of an alleged
conflict of interest. The appeals court ruled that the trial court should have
resolved the motion to disqualify before determining the merits of any
dispositive motion, such as one for summary judgment, since the motion to
disqualify called into question the integrity of the process in which the
allegedly conflicted counsel participated. The plaintiff mother raised at least
a plausible claim of conflict of interest, and the trial court did not consider
the merits of her motion, instead granting summary judgment first and then
denying the motion to disqualify as moot. Before becoming Attorney General, the
counsel for the District had represented a class of detainees that included the
decedent, on claims against the District for alleged overcrowding of its
detention facilities and resulting unsafe conditions. Grimes v. District of
Columbi, #13-7038, 794 F.3d 83 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
The Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice has
agreed to new court approved policies that prohibit the punitive solitary
confinement of juvenile prisoners, in a lawsuit filed by the Illinois ACLU. The
lawsuit argued that protracted isolation and solitary confinement of juveniles,
especially of those suffering mental illness, increased the risk of suicide and
other self-harm. Under the new policy, punitive isolation is not allowed,
youths separated from the general population for any non-punitive reason must
be provided their ordinary education and mental health services, and youths
separated for 24 hours or longer must be allowed out of their rooms, and
provided an opportunity to interact with staff, for at least eight (8) hours
each day. The new policies were the result of negotiations between the parties
in the lawsuit and court-ordered monitors. R.J. v. Jones, #12-cv-07289, U.S.
Dist. Ct. (N.D. Ill. April 24, 2015).
A Michigan prisoner was sentenced to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for drug offenses. At the time of
his arrest, he was 17 years and 10 months old and he was 18 years and 7 months
old when sentenced. A Michigan Supreme Court decision later held that life
without parole for simple drug possession was unconstitutional. The prisoner
was denied parole at his first opportunity, and in 2012, the Parole Board
indicated that it had no interest in taking action on his case then, scheduling
his next interview for 2017. A federal appeals court rejected a claim that the
parole consideration process failed to provide him with a meaningful
opportunity to obtain his release in violation of due process, but allowed him
to proceed with his claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated, since
the trial court had failed to take into account his youth at the time of his
arrest. Wershe v. Combs, #13-1209, 763 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 2014).
A ward at a Hawaii youth correctional
facility received a jury award on claims that a male youth correctional officer
sexually assaulted her, and against a number of other defendants. The officer's
motion for a new trial was granted, however, because there was an
irreconcilable conflict in the jury's answers to various special verdict
questions that rendered it impossible to determine what each defendant was to
pay. The retrial would be limited to the amount of general and special damages
each defendant was to pay, and whether the awards were against each defendant
in their individual or official capacities. A state statute did not bar the
plaintiff from obtaining judgment both against the state and against the
individual officer. Costales v. Rosete, #SCWC-30683, 133 Haw. 124, 324 P.3d 934
(2014).
A 15-year-old who received special education
services while going to school was arrested before turning 16 on felony charges
and sent to a county jail awaiting trial. The Supreme Court of California held
that the school district where a child's parent lives has the responsibility of
providing special education services to qualifying individuals while
incarcerated in a county jail. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia,
S199639, 58 Cal. 4th 175, 2013 Cal. Lexis 9747.
A pre-trial detainee at a juvenile facility who
arrived there at the age of 11 claimed that his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights were violated by the regular use on him of a "Pro-Straint
Restraining Chair, Violent Prisoner Model." The chair, which was equipped
with wrist, chest and ankle restraints, was sometimes used in a legitimate
effort to prevent him from committing suicide, but he claimed that it was
mostly used to improperly punish him. A federal appeals court upheld the denial
of qualified immunity to all defendants but one,. That one defendant was
granted qualified immunity on a claim that he was liable for failure to
transfer the detainee to a nearby unlocked shelter where he had been housed
before and had apparently been disobedient. Blackmon v. Sutton, #12-3199, 2013
U.S. App. Lexis 22680 (10th Cir).
A federal court has approved an almost $18
million settlement to approximately 1,600 teenagers and their parents who
claimed that the young people were wrongfully incarcerated at two for-profit
youth detention centers by two county judges who were accused of taking over $2
million in payments from the real estate developer who built the facilities.
Over 4,000 juvenile convictions issued by one of the judgers were thrown out based
on evidence that he frequently tried juveniles without lawyers and routinely
sent many to the juvenile facilities for months for the most petty of offenses.
The two judges are accused of receiving money from the developer and extorting
funds from the facilities' co-owner. Around $4.3 million in attorneys' fees is
to be paid, with most of the juveniles receiving between $500 and $5,000. Dawn
v. Ciavarella, #3:10-cv-00797, U.S. Dist. Court (M.D. Pa.), reported in The
Times Herald, Norristown, Pa. (January 10, 2013).
The U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory life
sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile murderers violated the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The ruling came
in two consolidated cases of juveniles given such sentences after being
convicted of murder at the age of 14. Miller v. Alabama, #10-9646, 2012 U.S.
Lexis 4877.
In three consolidated appeals by juveniles who
had pled guilty to aggravated sexual abuse of children, a federal appeals court
rejected their claims objecting to conditions of probation or supervision
requiring them to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. Chapter 109. Applying the registration requirements to
juveniles does not violate equal protection of law, procedural or substantive
due process, constitute cruel and unusual punishment, or violate the right
against self-incrimination. Congress intentionally exempted the registration of
juvenile sex offenders from the confidentiality provisions of the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. Sec 5031 et seq. U.S. v. Juvenile
Male, #09-30330, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012).
Because a county jail did not have the resources
to adequately handle pregnancy-related medical emergencies, a pregnant minor
stated a claim for deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs by
alleging that personnel there failed to rush her to a hospital when she began
having labor pains, and that she was not seen by a doctor until seven hours
later. She was subsequently taken to a hospital, but then returned to the jail,
where her baby was born, suffering various birth defects including severe
mental retardation and cerebral palsy. Havard v. Wayne County, #09-1235, 2011
U.S. App. Lexis 17404 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment bars the sentencing of
a juvenile offender to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for
any crime short of homicide. In this case, the offender was 16 when he
committed armed burglary and another crime. He was sentenced to probation, with
adjudication of guilt withheld, but was later found to have violated probation
by committing additional crimes, found guilty of the earlier offenses, and
sentenced to life in prison. The sentence left him with no possibility of
release except executive clemency, since Florida, where he was sentenced, has
abolished its parole system for prisoners sentenced after 1983. Graham v.
Florida, #08–7412, 2010 U.S. Lexis 3881.
When detainee-on-detainee violence was "very
rare" and there was no prior complaint by a detainee of sexual assault at
the juvenile detention facility, a juvenile detainee allegedly raped by another
detainee failed to show deliberate indifference to the risk of such an assault.
Officers' alleged failure to provide assistance to the plaintiff detainee might
constitute negligence, but was hardly deliberate indifference. The defendant
juvenile detention officers, however, did not have discretion under state law
to leave a detainee at the facility unsupervised, but allegedly did
"exactly that," so that they were not entitled to "state agent
immunity" under Alabama law on state law negligence, recklessness, and
wantonness claims. D.S. v. County of Montgomery, Alabama, No. 07-15671,
2008 U.S. App. Lexis 14237 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
Nurse was not entitled to summary judgment on the
basis of qualified immunity in a lawsuit accusing her of deliberate
indifference to risk of suicide of detainee at youth correctional facility. The
deceased youth's parents claimed that the nurse was aware that their son had a
history of suicide attempts and bipolar disorder, but failed to put him on
suicide watch or to complete a form that would have notified other facility
staff that he was a suicide risk, resulting in him committing suicide hours
later. The nurse claimed that the youth appeared "happy" during the
intake process. Matis v. Johnson, No. 07-30104, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 2086 (5th
Cir.).
Federal appeals court rejects a claim by
17-year-old public school student convicted and incarcerated in Maryland who
alleged that the District of Columbia violated an agreement to provide him with
special education services in the Maryland prison, pursuant to the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(a). The Maryland prison
allegedly did not allow access to the prisoner for the purposes of providing
those services, and the appeals court found that the trial court acted erroneously
in ruling that the agreement provided that the District would provide those
promised special education services after the prisoner's release from custody
if access to the Maryland prison could not be obtained. Maryland, instead,
provided the plaintiff with its own special education services, and the
plaintiff sought compensatory services from D.C. to make up for the time he
spent in the Maryland prison without services from D.C., even though he
received such services in prison from Maryland. The appeals court, overturning
a decision by the trial court, ruled that the now released prisoner was not
entitled to additional special education services from D.C. Hester v. DC, No.
06-7102, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 24415 (D.C. Cir.).
Female juvenile adjudicated delinquent did not
show that her federal constitutional or statutory rights were violated by the
fact that a community corrections facility near her home did not accept
females, resulting in her having to serve 11 months in a juvenile correctional
facility and a drug rehabilitation center that were further away. Her
constitutional rights were not violated because she was provided with
opportunities comparable to those provided for male inmates. The decision made
by her family members not to drive to the facility where she was incarcerated
for attendance at family therapy sessions did not alter the fact that family
therapy was offered. Additionally for purposes of federal civil rights statutes
prohibiting sex discrimination in a governmental "program or activity,"
the "program or activity" at issue was the entire system of juvenile
institutions operated by the State of Ohio, rather than a particular juvenile
facility. Lothes v. Butler County Juvenile Rehabilitation Center, No. 06-3389,
2007 U.S. App. Lexis 16559 (6th Cir.).
Federal appeals court upholds award of $200,000
in compensatory and $797,160 in punitive damages to parent whose son was
murdered in a residential program for juvenile delinquents. By the end of 1999,
four youths had been murdered while in the same juvenile facility, provided by
a private company for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff's son became the
fifth in 2000. The plaintiff had argued that the company that operated the
facility acted in a reckless manner in failing to protect the decedent against
a foreseeable risk of harm, and violated his constitutional rights, and the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on both claims. Muldrow v. Re-Direct,
Inc., No. 05-7169, 2007 U.S. App. Lexus 15814 (D.C. Cir.).
California intermediate court issues order
setting aside juvenile court policy of having sheriff's department shackle all
minors during court prisoners without a case-by-case determination of the need
for such restraints. In making such a determination, factors to be considered
included the type of proceeding, courtroom or security considerations, and the
behavior and conduct of the juvenile. Tiffany A. v. The Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, No. B193134, 2007 Cal. App. Lexis 783 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist.).
Correctional officials were entitled to qualified
immunity in lawsuit brought by juvenile detainee allegedly subjected to strip
searches under policy allowing such searches without reasonable suspicion of
possession of contraband, as the law on the subject was not clearly established
in the context of a juvenile facility. Doe v. Preston, Civil Action No.
03-11804, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6871 (D. Mass.). [N/R]
Mother of youthful incarcerated son with alleged
disabilities, including emotional problems, and auditory and visual
hallucinations, as well as other mental health concerns, could not pursue
claims for money damages under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1400 et seq. regarding educational services required to
be provided to him, when she failed to show that she provided any educational
expenses for her son. Court also rules that neither the Alabama Department of
Youth Services (ADYS) nor its employees could be held liable for allegedly not
providing the juvenile with services to which he was allegedly entitled under
the Americans with Disabilities Ac (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12112(a), as the
Department and the individual defendants sued in their official capacities were
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the individuals could not be sued
in their individual capacities under ADA. McReynolds v. Alabama Department of
Youth Services, No. 2:04-CV-850, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (M.D. Ala. 2006). [N/R]
Requiring a female juvenile to remove her outer
clothing when entering a juvenile detention facility after arrest for a curfew
violation did not constitute a full strip search and was not unreasonable,
given the state's role as a "substitute parent" for such juveniles in
its custody. Further, in 1999, at the time of the search, the case law on the
subject was not "clearly established. Smook v. Minnehaha County, No.
05-1363, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 20382 (8th Cir.). [2006 JP Oct]
Juvenile facility in Hawaii ordered to take steps
to remedy "pervasive" sexual, physical, and verbal abuse of lesbian,
gay, bisexual, or transgender juvenile wards, and to stop, except in
emergencies, using isolation as a means of "protecting" such wards
against abuse and harassment. Court rejects, however, the claim that staff
members violated the First Amendment rights of the juveniles by quoting from
the Bible or discussing religion with them, when there was no evidence that
these actions were based on the facility's policies. R.G. v. Koller, No.
Civ.05-00566, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Hawaii 2006). Subsequent decision at
2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21254. [2006 JB Jun]
Federal appeals court upholds injunction
requiring the provision of both general educational services and special
educational services for school age inmates incarcerated in New York City
jails, based on the failure to comply with federal law. Portions of the
injunction based on alleged violations of state law, the court held, were
beyond the power of the federal trial court. City defendants had previously
waived a defense of failure to exhaust available administrative remedies by
stating that no such remedies were applicable to the claims made in the class
action lawsuit. Handberry v. Thompson, No. 03-0047, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 1062
(2d Cir.). [2006 JB Mar]
Mother of youth murdered while in the custody of
a contractors for the District of Columbia Youth Services Administration, was
awarded $997,161 in compensatory and punitive damages on civil rights and
negligence claims. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's failure to monitor
the youth's medication and whereabouts, to connect him with court ordered
mental health and substance abuse services, or to properly care for him caused
his death. Court rules that plaintiff was also entitled to an award of
$398,490.75 in attorneys' fees and $22,528.30 in costs. Court rejected argument
that it was unreasonable to spend 96 hours preparing opposition to the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, but did rule that a 25% reduction in
requested hourly rates was justified when the same evidence was presented on
both the civil rights and negligence claims and the requested attorneys' fee
award would otherwise have amounted to almost 54% of the damage award. Muldrow
v. Re-Direct, Inc., No. CIV. A. 01-2537, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2005). [N/R]
Federal appeals court upholds $72,000 award
against District of Columbia in lawsuit over murder of juvenile delinquent in
juvenile detention "independent living" apartment by unknown assassin
with a silencer-equipped gun. Evidence showed that the District adopted no
standards whatsoever for selection of a private contractor to run the program,
and had no standards for monitoring the program's performance. Security at the
apartments was allegedly inadequate and no additional security measures were
allegedly taken after another youth living there was mugged and robbed by an
armed assailant in his apartment. Smith v. District of Columbia, No. 03-7143,
2005 U.S. App. Lexis 13288 (D.C. Cir.). [2005 JB Aug]
D.C. trial c lacked jurisdiction to order the federal
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to provide educational services to a youthful offender
after he was transferred to BOP custody and outside of the District of
Columbia. U.S. v. Crockett, No. 03-C0-749, 861 A.2d 604 (D.C. 2004). [N/R]
Juvenile pre-trial detainee's rights were
not violated by his incarceration in adult county jail when it was done in
compliance with Michigan state law and he was kept segregated from adult
prisoners. Conditions he faced in lock-down were not punitive but were
justified by a legitimate interest in preventing his possible suicide. Federal
appeals court further finds that his due process rights were not violated by
his loss of credit in alternative education program following his arrest and
detention or by the program's refusal to re-enroll him after his release.
Daniels v. Woodside, No. 03-2053, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 1127 (6th Cir.). [2005
JB Mar]
Alleged policy of county juvenile detention
facility of strip-searching all those admitted there, even in the absence of
reasonable suspicion of possession of weapons or contraband could not be
justified on the basis of a state statutory duty to report child abuse or
neglect, and would constitute an unreasonable search of non-felony detainees
without such reasonable suspicion. Court also holds that a strip search of one
such juvenile detainee taken into custody for a curfew violation did not become
sufficiently "non-intrusive" merely because she was permitted to keep
her underwear on. Smook v. Minnehaha County, No. Civ. 00-4202, 340 F. Supp. 2d
1037 (D.S.D. 2004). [N/R]
California enters into consent decree concerning
improvement of numerous conditions in its youth correctional facilities.
Farrell v. Allen, No. RG 03079344 (Superior Court of California, Alameda County
2004). [2005 JB Jan]
Federal appeals court rules that strip searches
performed on young girls following their entry into custody in juvenile
detention centers were constitutional on the basis of the special need to
protect them and other children in the facility, but that
"repetitive" strip searches conducted while the juveniles remained in
custody are violative of the Fourth Amendment unless there is reasonable
suspicion that the juvenile possesses contraband. N.G. v. State of Connecticut,
No. 02-9274, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 18834 (2nd Cir. 2004). [2004 JB Oct]
A county juvenile training facility was not
entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity against liability in a
federal civil rights lawsuit concerning the alleged failure to adequately train
employees and failure to investigate and prevent sexual abuse committed against
one juvenile resident by another. The facility was not an arm of the state,
because the county rather than the state would be responsible for paying any
damage award against the facility, even though the facility was built pursuant
to a state statutory scheme concerning juveniles found to be delinquent,
dependent, abused, unruly or neglected, as well as juvenile traffic offenders.
S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, No. 02-3852, 374 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
While requiring a convicted youth offender to
perform military-style exercises at a one-day "boot camp" was not
cruel and unusual punishment, the claim that camp officials waited almost two
hours before summoning an ambulance for the minor, who was unconscious and
vomiting while suffering heat stroke, if true, was sufficient to constitute
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Austin v. Johnson, #02-41137,
328 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 2003). [2003 JB Aug]
City liable under state law for alleged rape of
16-year-old female juvenile doing court mandated community service by
inmate-trustee working for the city. Trial court properly assessed city as 70%
negligent and inmate-trustee as 30% at fault when city had an obligation to
supervise the inmate-trustee, but knowingly allowed the teenage victim to work
with him in a situation where they were left alone. City liable for 70% of
$153,365.64 general damage award, but no liability found for damages or
attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and 1988. Ashmore v. Hilton, No.
02-816, 834 So. 2d 1131 (La. App. 2002), rehearing denied (2003). [N/R]
A state training school for juveniles constituted
a "correctional facility" under provisions of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(d)(1)(A), limiting the awards of attorneys'
fees in cases challenging prison conditions of confinement to those directly
and reasonably incurred in "proving an actual violation" of protected
rights. Class of juvenile inmates was not a "prevailing party"
entitled to $376,637.48 award of attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. Sec.
1988 when the court order approving a settlement of the claims incorporated
none of the specific terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties. Christina
A. v. Bloomberg, #01-3698, 315 F. 3d 990 (8th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Officer was entitled to qualified immunity
for conducting warrantless strip searches of five minors at juvenile home
suspected of possession of drugs. Reynolds v. City of Anchorage, 225 F. Supp.
2d 754 (W.D. Ken. 2002). [2003 JB Mar.]
In lawsuit alleging that officer at juvenile
correctional facility sexually assaulted a male minor prisoner, there was good
cause to postpone the deposition of the minor plaintiff for a short time until
after his release from custody in order to protect the minor from the
possibility of further psychological harm. Williams v. Greenlee, 210 F.R.D. 577
(N.D. Tex. 2002). [N/R]
Youth adjudicated a juvenile delinquent did
escape from a "detention facility" within the meaning of a New York
criminal statute, McKinney's Penal Law Sec. 205.10, subd. 1, when he jumped out
of the window of a cabin at a camp operated by the N.Y. State Division for
Youth. People v. Juarbe, 749 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Sup. 2002). [N/R]
Settlement for confidential amount reached in
wrongful death lawsuit by mother of child who died at reformatory camp when the
80-pound boy was allegedly crushed by a 300-pound counselor laying on top of
him for five to ten minutes to restrain him after he got into a fight with
another child. The 12-year-old had been ordered to attend the camp by juvenile
courts. Ibarra v. Eckerd Youth Alternative Inc., No. 00-1159-CA (Marion County,
Fla. Circuit Court), reported in The National Law Journal, p. B4 (July 15,
2002). [N/R]
Mother of juvenile detainee allegedly sexually
assaulted and abused by warden in juvenile detention facility did not show that
alleged assault was caused by the failure of state employees to mention
warden's prior marijuana conviction when writing letters of reference to obtain
warden position. Warden had previously received a pardon on that conviction
from the governor and the conviction had been effectively expunged, with a
criminal records search not revealing it. K.S., v. Summers, No. 2001 CW 0794,
799 So. 2d 510 (La. App. 2001) [2002 JB Mar]
298:158 Nebraska state statute mandating parental
notification of juvenile detention did not impose liability on county and
sheriff's deputies, based on failure to do so, for juvenile's subsequent
suicide after his release from custody. Claypool v. Hibberd, #S-99-1223, 626
N.W.2d 539 (Neb. 2001).
273:136 State of Arizona reaches $725,000
wrongful death settlement with husband of woman killed during assault by their
17-year-old paroled son; lawsuit argued that parole was improper, that parole
should have been revoked because of various misconduct, and that drug and anger
counseling should have been conditions of parole. Janecke v. State, Ariz.,
Maricopa Co. Super. Ct., No. CV96-06697, Sept. 24, 1998, reported in 42 ATLA
Law Rptr. 185 (June 1999).
267:46 Co. liable for $8,000 in damages and
$34,824.92 in attorneys' fees and costs to 15-year-old detainee raped and
beaten by cellmates after guard allegedly told them he was a
"snitch"; jury could properly find that overcrowding of juvenile
prisoners created dangerous situation; Prison Litigation Reform Act's limits on
attorneys' fees awards did not apply since juvenile was not a prisoner when he
filed suit after leaving jail. Doe v. Washington Co., #97-3969, 98-1126, 150
F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1998).
259:110 Update: Indiana Supreme Court overturns
ruling that state constitutional provision prohibits juvenile offenders from
being incarcerated in adult correctional facilities. Ratliff v. Cohn, 693
N.E.2d 530 (Ind. 1998).
254:30 Indiana state constitutional provision
prohibits juvenile offenders being incarcerated in adult correctional
facilities, state appeals court rules. Ratliff v. Cohn, 679 N.E.2d 985 (Ind.
App. 1997).
243:46 Prisoners in protective custody in youth
correctional facility stated a claim for cruel and unusual punishment based on
double celling combined with other conditions and assertion that they were
subject to sexual assaults in cells which correctional officials failed to
prevent; claim also stated for denial of access to courts based on alleged lack
of paralegals to help with claims other than disciplinary cases. Nami v.
Fauver, 82 F.3d 63 (3rd Cir. 1996).
221:73 Alleged violation of federal statute in
placing juvenile detainee in adult jail was not proximate cause of his suicide
attempt; federal appeals court rejects argument that juvenile detainees, as a
class, are specially susceptible to suicidal tendencies and therefore should be
specially screened. Horn v. Madison Co. Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653 (6th Cir.
1994).
$105,575 awarded for sexual assault on juvenile
detainee by fellow detainee. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Whaley, 531
So.2d 723 (Fla. App. 1988).
West Virginia Supreme Court holds that prisoners
between 18 and 20 years of age under jurisdiction of juvenile court may not be
held within sight or sound of adult prisoners. State ex rel. M.L.N. v. Greiner,
360 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1987).
Juvenile not entitled to hearing before transfer
to county jail. Cooper v. Elrod, 622 F.Supp. 373 (D.C. Ill. 1985).
Defendants given second chance to support
prolonged isolation against testimony in favor of only the briefest period for
isolation. Santana v. Collazo, 793 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1986).
U.S. Supreme Court allows for pretrial detention
of juveniles. Schall v. Martin, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984).
Juvenile properly placed in most secure facility.
Matter of Katherine W., 468 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1984). Extensive discussion of
procedures of juvenile justice system and conditions of confinement. Morales v.
Turman, 596 F.Supp. 332 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
Pretrial detention of juveniles was improper;
juveniles not provided same criminal procedural rights as adults. R.W.T. v.
Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1983); on appeal from 540 F.Supp. 772 (E.D. Mo.
1982).
State juvenile pretrial detention statute subject
to constitutional attack in federal court under Section 1983; discharged
juveniles have standing and are not required to exhaust state remedies.
Colesman v. Stanziani, 570 F.Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
Behavioral modification program in private school
violated constitutional rights of students. Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931
(10th Cir. 1982).
Juveniles awaiting trial cannot be confined in
adult jails as punishment; conditions of confinement must meet constitutional
standards. D.B. v. Tewksbury, 545 F.Supp. 896 (D. Ore. 1982).
Pretrial detention of juveniles held
unconstitutional. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2nd Cir. 1982).
Puerto Rico Federal Court reviews commonwealth's
juvenile facilities and finds them basically sound. Santana v. Collazo, 533
F.Supp. 966 (D.P.R. 1982).
Third Circuit rules that youth corrections act
may provide basis for damages under the Fifth Amendment due process clause.
Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227 (3rd Cir. 1980).