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Youthful Prisoners

     A juvenile prisoner in Virginia challenged his repeated denial of parole. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that juvenile-specific Eighth Amendment protections do not apply to the prisoner because he was sentenced to life with parole, and that the Parole Board procedures satisfied procedural due process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal appeals court declined to extend the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment rulings to juvenile parole proceedings to find that it is cruel and unusual punishment for a parole board to deny juvenile offenders parole without specifically considering age-related mitigating characteristics as a separate factor in the decision-making process. With regards to a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, the court concluded that, although there was no constitutional or inherent right to parole proceedings, Virginia state law gave rise to an expectation of parole proceedings that created a liberty interest in parole consideration. However, to satisfy the due process requirements triggered by this liberty interest, a parole board need only provide an offender with an opportunity to be heard and a statement of reasons stating why parole has been denied. In this case, the parole proceedings satisfied those due process requirements. Bowling v. Director, Virginia Dept. of Corrections, #18-6170, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 9633 (4th Cir.).

     A federal appeals court upheld a judgment in an action under a federal statute, 34 U.S.C. 12601(a), the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. That statute makes it unlawful for “any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” When there are violations, the U.S. Attorney General can file a civil suit to “obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.” The action, filed by the federal government, claimed that a county and its two Youth Court judges operated a “school-to-prison pipeline” and, through their administration of the juvenile justice process, were engaged in patterns or practices that denied juveniles their constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the lawsuit against the judges on the basis that they are outside the scope of Section 12601, and because the government has affirmatively waived any other argument for continuing the lawsuit against the County. The phrase “officials or employees of any governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice,” as it is used in the statute does not include the judges of a county youth court. The youth court was not an “agency,” which was what the statute applied to. Congress knew how to deviate from the ordinary usage of “agency” by expressly defining the term to include courts, but did not do so. United States v. Lauderdale County, #17-60805, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 3344,2019 WL 406878 (5th Cir.).

      A juvenile defendant involved in a fight appealed an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court and placing him on probation after the trial court sustained a petition for battery with serious bodily injury. An intermediate California state appeals court upheld a probation condition prohibiting the defendant from discussing his case on social media, ruling that the condition was neither overbroad nor in violation of the defendant’s First Amendment rights. In this case, the defendant posted on social media “bragging” about being a 16-year-old felon. The appeals court held that the juvenile court had broad discretion in imposing probation conditions and that the restriction on social media postings was precise, narrow, and reasonably tailored to address the defendant’s posting conduct and rehabilitation. In re A.A., #B289821, 30 Cal. App. 5th 596, 2018 Cal. App. Lexis 1186, 2018 WL 6695839.

      Iowa closed a state girls training school and entered into a contract to use a Wisconsin facility to place juvenile delinquents. Two such offenders placed there when they were 16 claimed that the facility, since its opening had had a very high staff turnover rate, resulting in an overworked and untrained staff, and “sordid and inhumane” treatment of juveniles. They claimed that they were subjected to prolonged isolation, received little or no educational instruction, were subjected to excessive force and sprayed with mace on multiple occasions, and both attempted suicide. A federal appeals court reversed the dismissal of their claims. The trial court acted prematurely in deciding the Director of the Iowa Department of Human Services’ entitlement to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage. At the time the plaintiffs were allegedly in the defendant’s custody, isolation of pre-trial juvenile detainees not “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective” could amount to a constitutional violation. On the record, it was impossible to determine whether such a constitutional violation occurred.   Reed v. Palmer, #18-1429, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 28436 (7th Cir.).

Youthful Prisoners – See also, Foreign Prisoners and Immigrant Detainees (2nd case)

      Foreign minors who entered the country unaccompanied by a parent or guardian were put in the custody of the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) which later released the plaintiff minors to a parent or sponsor after concluding that each minor was not dangerous to himself or the community, and was not a flight risk. Each minor was subsequently rearrested because of alleged gang membership and transferred to secure juvenile detention facilities. A federal appeals court upheld the trial court’s preliminary injunction requiring a prompt hearing before a neutral decision maker at which the minors could contest the basis for their rearrest. The appeals court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the minors were entitled to some sort of due process hearing and ordering the government to provide members of the minor class with the procedural protections set forth in its order. The injunction was consistent with a federal statute, the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A), providing that ORR should place unaccompanied children in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child. Saravia v. Sessions, #18-15114, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 27779 (9th Cir.).

     In a prior case, the highest court in Massachusetts held that the procedure used by the Department of Correction to determine the security classification of juvenile homicide offenders violated a state statute which prohibits the Department from categorically barring juvenile homicide offenders from being placed in minimum security facilities. Since then, the Department developed a modified process for classifying juvenile homicide offenders. Now juvenile homicide offenders who were also petitioners in the earlier case challenged that modified process. The Massachusetts high court held that, after applying the earlier holding, the Department continued to fall short of the requirements of the statute.  The Department’s written explanations for blocking the majority of objectively qualifying juvenile homicide offenders from placement in a minimum security facility did not go far enough to ensure that the classification procedure was actually individualized and that no juvenile homicide offender was categorically barred from classification to a minimum security facility. Deal v. Commissioner of Correction, #SJC-12246, 478 Mass. 332, 2017 Mass. Lexis 781.

   A federal appeals court overturned a grant of qualified immunity to the defendant employees of a juvenile home on claims by a juvenile formerly confined there that he was improperly housed in prolonged solitary confinement, failed to receive educational services, and was allowed to be sexually abused. The trial court in its decision addressed only the fact of juvenile court supervision and occasional review in determining that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and its opinion did not contain sufficient detail to allow the appeals court to review whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Reports submitted to the juvenile court did not show that it was made aware of the alleged conditions of his confinement. Bradford v. Palmer, #16-1767, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 7655 (8th Cir.).

       A middle school student’s mother sued the county and other defendants after her daughter was arrested for fighting on school property, taken to a juvenile detention facility, and underwent a strip and body cavity search. A federal appeals court upheld partial summary judgment for the county on the Fourth Amendment claim, applying the deferential test in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, #10-945,  566 U.S. 318 (2012). The deference given to correctional officials in the adult context applies to correctional officials in the juvenile context as well. Applying Florence, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to make a substantial showing that the center's search policy is an exaggerated or otherwise irrational response to the problem of center security. Mabry v. Lee County, #16-60231, 849 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2017).

    A Massachusetts correctional policy of using discretionary override codes to block juvenile homicide offenders from being placed in a minimum security facility unless and until they had received a positive parole vote violated a state statute barring a categorical ban on such placement and requiring a consideration on suitability for minimum security classification on a case-by-case basis. The practice did not, however, violate juvenile homicide offenders' right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation because there is no constitutionally protected expectation under the Eight Amendment or Mass. Const. Decl. Rights art. 26 that a juvenile homicide offender will be released to the community after serving a statutorily prescribed portion of his or her sentence. Deal v. Comm'r of Correction, #SJC-12053, 475 Mass. 307, 56 N.E.3d 800 (Mass. 2016).
     The U.S. government entered into a settlement agreement in a 1997 class action lawsuit, setting out a "nationwide policy for the detention, release, and treatment of minors in the custody of the INS." The plaintiff class in 2015 filed a motion to enforce the settlement, arguing that it applied to all minors held in the custody of immigration authorities, regardless of whether or not they were accompanied by parents. A federal appeals court agreed, but further held that this did not create affirmative release rights for parents, as the trial court erroneously held. The fact that the settlement agreement granted minors a right to preferential release to a parent did not mean that the government had any obligation to make a parent available for that purpose. Flores v. Lynch, #15-56434, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 12439 (9th Cir.).
     A 12-year-old boy brandished a homemade knife and threatened to break a girl's arms. Three weeks later, after juvenile charges were filed, he was taken to a county youth detention facility, processed, and strip searched. The strip search was conducted under a facility policy to check incoming youths for “injuries, markings, skin conditions, signs of abuse, or further contraband." The search was conducted with the boy behind a curtain so that only the officer conducting the search could observe him. The boy was made to remove his pants and underwear for approximately 90 seconds, as well as to bend over, spread his buttocks, and cough. In his lawsuit challenging the search, a federal appeals court held that the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, #10-945, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) that every arrestee committed to the general population of a detention center can be subjected to a close visual inspection while undressed applies to juvenile offenders such as the plaintiff admitted to the general population in a juvenile detention facility. J. B. v. Fassnacht, #14-3905, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 16404 (3rd Cir.).
     The mother of a juvenile allegedly beaten to death by other residents at a juvenile detention facility sued the Districrt of Columbia, claiming that th death occurred because the facility was overcrowded and understaffed, that deliberate indifference was shown towards her son's safety, and that the District was negligent in hiring, training, and supervising its employees at the detention center in violation of District of Columbia tort law, the Eighth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. A federal appeals court vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant and its denial of the plaintiff's motion to disqualify the Attorney General of the District of Columbia as the counsel for the defendant because of an alleged conflict of interest. The appeals court ruled that the trial court should have resolved the motion to disqualify before determining the merits of any dispositive motion, such as one for summary judgment, since the motion to disqualify called into question the integrity of the process in which the allegedly conflicted counsel participated. The plaintiff mother raised at least a plausible claim of conflict of interest, and the trial court did not consider the merits of her motion, instead granting summary judgment first and then denying the motion to disqualify as moot. Before becoming Attorney General, the counsel for the District had represented a class of detainees that included the decedent, on claims against the District for alleged overcrowding of its detention facilities and resulting unsafe conditions. Grimes v. District of Columbi, #13-7038, 794 F.3d 83 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
     The Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice has agreed to new court approved policies that prohibit the punitive solitary confinement of juvenile prisoners, in a lawsuit filed by the Illinois ACLU. The lawsuit argued that protracted isolation and solitary confinement of juveniles, especially of those suffering mental illness, increased the risk of suicide and other self-harm. Under the new policy, punitive isolation is not allowed, youths separated from the general population for any non-punitive reason must be provided their ordinary education and mental health services, and youths separated for 24 hours or longer must be allowed out of their rooms, and provided an opportunity to interact with staff, for at least eight (8) hours each day. The new policies were the result of negotiations between the parties in the lawsuit and court-ordered monitors. R.J. v. Jones, #12-cv-07289, U.S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Ill. April 24, 2015).
     A Michigan prisoner was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for drug offenses. At the time of his arrest, he was 17 years and 10 months old and he was 18 years and 7 months old when sentenced. A Michigan Supreme Court decision later held that life without parole for simple drug possession was unconstitutional. The prisoner was denied parole at his first opportunity, and in 2012, the Parole Board indicated that it had no interest in taking action on his case then, scheduling his next interview for 2017. A federal appeals court rejected a claim that the parole consideration process failed to provide him with a meaningful opportunity to obtain his release in violation of due process, but allowed him to proceed with his claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated, since the trial court had failed to take into account his youth at the time of his arrest. Wershe v. Combs, #13-1209, 763 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 2014).
     A ward at a Hawaii youth correctional facility received a jury award on claims that a male youth correctional officer sexually assaulted her, and against a number of other defendants. The officer's motion for a new trial was granted, however, because there was an irreconcilable conflict in the jury's answers to various special verdict questions that rendered it impossible to determine what each defendant was to pay. The retrial would be limited to the amount of general and special damages each defendant was to pay, and whether the awards were against each defendant in their individual or official capacities. A state statute did not bar the plaintiff from obtaining judgment both against the state and against the individual officer. Costales v. Rosete, #SCWC-30683, 133 Haw. 124, 324 P.3d 934 (2014).
     A 15-year-old who received special education services while going to school was arrested before turning 16 on felony charges and sent to a county jail awaiting trial. The Supreme Court of California held that the school district where a child's parent lives has the responsibility of providing special education services to qualifying individuals while incarcerated in a county jail. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, S199639, 58 Cal. 4th 175, 2013 Cal. Lexis 9747.
     A pre-trial detainee at a juvenile facility who arrived there at the age of 11 claimed that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated by the regular use on him of a "Pro-Straint Restraining Chair, Violent Prisoner Model." The chair, which was equipped with wrist, chest and ankle restraints, was sometimes used in a legitimate effort to prevent him from committing suicide, but he claimed that it was mostly used to improperly punish him. A federal appeals court upheld the denial of qualified immunity to all defendants but one,. That one defendant was granted qualified immunity on a claim that he was liable for failure to transfer the detainee to a nearby unlocked shelter where he had been housed before and had apparently been disobedient. Blackmon v. Sutton, #12-3199, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 22680 (10th Cir).
     A federal court has approved an almost $18 million settlement to approximately 1,600 teenagers and their parents who claimed that the young people were wrongfully incarcerated at two for-profit youth detention centers by two county judges who were accused of taking over $2 million in payments from the real estate developer who built the facilities. Over 4,000 juvenile convictions issued by one of the judgers were thrown out based on evidence that he frequently tried juveniles without lawyers and routinely sent many to the juvenile facilities for months for the most petty of offenses. The two judges are accused of receiving money from the developer and extorting funds from the facilities' co-owner. Around $4.3 million in attorneys' fees is to be paid, with most of the juveniles receiving between $500 and $5,000. Dawn v. Ciavarella, #3:10-cv-00797, U.S. Dist. Court (M.D. Pa.), reported in The Times Herald, Norristown, Pa. (January 10, 2013).
     The U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile murderers violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The ruling came in two consolidated cases of juveniles given such sentences after being convicted of murder at the age of 14. Miller v. Alabama, #10-9646, 2012 U.S. Lexis 4877.
     In three consolidated appeals by juveniles who had pled guilty to aggravated sexual abuse of children, a federal appeals court rejected their claims objecting to conditions of probation or supervision requiring them to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. Chapter 109. Applying the registration requirements to juveniles does not violate equal protection of law, procedural or substantive due process, constitute cruel and unusual punishment, or violate the right against self-incrimination. Congress intentionally exempted the registration of juvenile sex offenders from the confidentiality provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. Sec 5031 et seq. U.S. v. Juvenile Male, #09-30330, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012).
     Because a county jail did not have the resources to adequately handle pregnancy-related medical emergencies, a pregnant minor stated a claim for deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs by alleging that personnel there failed to rush her to a hospital when she began having labor pains, and that she was not seen by a doctor until seven hours later. She was subsequently taken to a hospital, but then returned to the jail, where her baby was born, suffering various birth defects including severe mental retardation and cerebral palsy. Havard v. Wayne County, #09-1235, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 17404 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
      The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment bars the sentencing of a juvenile offender to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for any crime short of homicide. In this case, the offender was 16 when he committed armed burglary and another crime. He was sentenced to probation, with adjudication of guilt withheld, but was later found to have violated probation by committing additional crimes, found guilty of the earlier offenses, and sentenced to life in prison. The sentence left him with no possibility of release except executive clemency, since Florida, where he was sentenced, has abolished its parole system for prisoners sentenced after 1983. Graham v. Florida, #08–7412, 2010 U.S. Lexis 3881.
    When detainee-on-detainee violence was "very rare" and there was no prior complaint by a detainee of sexual assault at the juvenile detention facility, a juvenile detainee allegedly raped by another detainee failed to show deliberate indifference to the risk of such an assault. Officers' alleged failure to provide assistance to the plaintiff detainee might constitute negligence, but was hardly deliberate indifference. The defendant juvenile detention officers, however, did not have discretion under state law to leave a detainee at the facility unsupervised, but allegedly did "exactly that," so that they were not entitled to "state agent immunity" under Alabama law on state law negligence, recklessness, and wantonness claims.  D.S. v. County of Montgomery, Alabama, No. 07-15671, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 14237 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
     Nurse was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in a lawsuit accusing her of deliberate indifference to risk of suicide of detainee at youth correctional facility. The deceased youth's parents claimed that the nurse was aware that their son had a history of suicide attempts and bipolar disorder, but failed to put him on suicide watch or to complete a form that would have notified other facility staff that he was a suicide risk, resulting in him committing suicide hours later. The nurse claimed that the youth appeared "happy" during the intake process. Matis v. Johnson, No. 07-30104, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 2086 (5th Cir.).
     Federal appeals court rejects a claim by 17-year-old public school student convicted and incarcerated in Maryland who alleged that the District of Columbia violated an agreement to provide him with special education services in the Maryland prison, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(a). The Maryland prison allegedly did not allow access to the prisoner for the purposes of providing those services, and the appeals court found that the trial court acted erroneously in ruling that the agreement provided that the District would provide those promised special education services after the prisoner's release from custody if access to the Maryland prison could not be obtained. Maryland, instead, provided the plaintiff with its own special education services, and the plaintiff sought compensatory services from D.C. to make up for the time he spent in the Maryland prison without services from D.C., even though he received such services in prison from Maryland. The appeals court, overturning a decision by the trial court, ruled that the now released prisoner was not entitled to additional special education services from D.C. Hester v. DC, No. 06-7102, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 24415 (D.C. Cir.).
     Female juvenile adjudicated delinquent did not show that her federal constitutional or statutory rights were violated by the fact that a community corrections facility near her home did not accept females, resulting in her having to serve 11 months in a juvenile correctional facility and a drug rehabilitation center that were further away. Her constitutional rights were not violated because she was provided with opportunities comparable to those provided for male inmates. The decision made by her family members not to drive to the facility where she was incarcerated for attendance at family therapy sessions did not alter the fact that family therapy was offered. Additionally for purposes of federal civil rights statutes prohibiting sex discrimination in a governmental "program or activity," the "program or activity" at issue was the entire system of juvenile institutions operated by the State of Ohio, rather than a particular juvenile facility. Lothes v. Butler County Juvenile Rehabilitation Center, No. 06-3389, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 16559 (6th Cir.).
     Federal appeals court upholds award of $200,000 in compensatory and $797,160 in punitive damages to parent whose son was murdered in a residential program for juvenile delinquents. By the end of 1999, four youths had been murdered while in the same juvenile facility, provided by a private company for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff's son became the fifth in 2000. The plaintiff had argued that the company that operated the facility acted in a reckless manner in failing to protect the decedent against a foreseeable risk of harm, and violated his constitutional rights, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on both claims. Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc., No. 05-7169, 2007 U.S. App. Lexus 15814 (D.C. Cir.).
     California intermediate court issues order setting aside juvenile court policy of having sheriff's department shackle all minors during court prisoners without a case-by-case determination of the need for such restraints. In making such a determination, factors to be considered included the type of proceeding, courtroom or security considerations, and the behavior and conduct of the juvenile. Tiffany A. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. B193134, 2007 Cal. App. Lexis 783 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist.).
     Correctional officials were entitled to qualified immunity in lawsuit brought by juvenile detainee allegedly subjected to strip searches under policy allowing such searches without reasonable suspicion of possession of contraband, as the law on the subject was not clearly established in the context of a juvenile facility. Doe v. Preston, Civil Action No. 03-11804, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6871 (D. Mass.). [N/R]
     Mother of youthful incarcerated son with alleged disabilities, including emotional problems, and auditory and visual hallucinations, as well as other mental health concerns, could not pursue claims for money damages under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1400 et seq. regarding educational services required to be provided to him, when she failed to show that she provided any educational expenses for her son. Court also rules that neither the Alabama Department of Youth Services (ADYS) nor its employees could be held liable for allegedly not providing the juvenile with services to which he was allegedly entitled under the Americans with Disabilities Ac (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12112(a), as the Department and the individual defendants sued in their official capacities were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the individuals could not be sued in their individual capacities under ADA. McReynolds v. Alabama Department of Youth Services, No. 2:04-CV-850, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (M.D. Ala. 2006). [N/R]
     Requiring a female juvenile to remove her outer clothing when entering a juvenile detention facility after arrest for a curfew violation did not constitute a full strip search and was not unreasonable, given the state's role as a "substitute parent" for such juveniles in its custody. Further, in 1999, at the time of the search, the case law on the subject was not "clearly established. Smook v. Minnehaha County, No. 05-1363, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 20382 (8th Cir.). [2006 JP Oct]
     Juvenile facility in Hawaii ordered to take steps to remedy "pervasive" sexual, physical, and verbal abuse of lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender juvenile wards, and to stop, except in emergencies, using isolation as a means of "protecting" such wards against abuse and harassment. Court rejects, however, the claim that staff members violated the First Amendment rights of the juveniles by quoting from the Bible or discussing religion with them, when there was no evidence that these actions were based on the facility's policies. R.G. v. Koller, No. Civ.05-00566, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Hawaii 2006). Subsequent decision at 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21254. [2006 JB Jun]
     Federal appeals court upholds injunction requiring the provision of both general educational services and special educational services for school age inmates incarcerated in New York City jails, based on the failure to comply with federal law. Portions of the injunction based on alleged violations of state law, the court held, were beyond the power of the federal trial court. City defendants had previously waived a defense of failure to exhaust available administrative remedies by stating that no such remedies were applicable to the claims made in the class action lawsuit. Handberry v. Thompson, No. 03-0047, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 1062 (2d Cir.). [2006 JB Mar]
     Mother of youth murdered while in the custody of a contractors for the District of Columbia Youth Services Administration, was awarded $997,161 in compensatory and punitive damages on civil rights and negligence claims. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's failure to monitor the youth's medication and whereabouts, to connect him with court ordered mental health and substance abuse services, or to properly care for him caused his death. Court rules that plaintiff was also entitled to an award of $398,490.75 in attorneys' fees and $22,528.30 in costs. Court rejected argument that it was unreasonable to spend 96 hours preparing opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, but did rule that a 25% reduction in requested hourly rates was justified when the same evidence was presented on both the civil rights and negligence claims and the requested attorneys' fee award would otherwise have amounted to almost 54% of the damage award. Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc., No. CIV. A. 01-2537, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2005). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court upholds $72,000 award against District of Columbia in lawsuit over murder of juvenile delinquent in juvenile detention "independent living" apartment by unknown assassin with a silencer-equipped gun. Evidence showed that the District adopted no standards whatsoever for selection of a private contractor to run the program, and had no standards for monitoring the program's performance. Security at the apartments was allegedly inadequate and no additional security measures were allegedly taken after another youth living there was mugged and robbed by an armed assailant in his apartment. Smith v. District of Columbia, No. 03-7143, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 13288 (D.C. Cir.). [2005 JB Aug]
     D.C. trial c lacked jurisdiction to order the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to provide educational services to a youthful offender after he was transferred to BOP custody and outside of the District of Columbia. U.S. v. Crockett, No. 03-C0-749, 861 A.2d 604 (D.C. 2004). [N/R]
      Juvenile pre-trial detainee's rights were not violated by his incarceration in adult county jail when it was done in compliance with Michigan state law and he was kept segregated from adult prisoners. Conditions he faced in lock-down were not punitive but were justified by a legitimate interest in preventing his possible suicide. Federal appeals court further finds that his due process rights were not violated by his loss of credit in alternative education program following his arrest and detention or by the program's refusal to re-enroll him after his release. Daniels v. Woodside, No. 03-2053, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 1127 (6th Cir.). [2005 JB Mar]
     Alleged policy of county juvenile detention facility of strip-searching all those admitted there, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion of possession of weapons or contraband could not be justified on the basis of a state statutory duty to report child abuse or neglect, and would constitute an unreasonable search of non-felony detainees without such reasonable suspicion. Court also holds that a strip search of one such juvenile detainee taken into custody for a curfew violation did not become sufficiently "non-intrusive" merely because she was permitted to keep her underwear on. Smook v. Minnehaha County, No. Civ. 00-4202, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (D.S.D. 2004). [N/R]
     California enters into consent decree concerning improvement of numerous conditions in its youth correctional facilities. Farrell v. Allen, No. RG 03079344 (Superior Court of California, Alameda County 2004). [2005 JB Jan]
     Federal appeals court rules that strip searches performed on young girls following their entry into custody in juvenile detention centers were constitutional on the basis of the special need to protect them and other children in the facility, but that "repetitive" strip searches conducted while the juveniles remained in custody are violative of the Fourth Amendment unless there is reasonable suspicion that the juvenile possesses contraband. N.G. v. State of Connecticut, No. 02-9274, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 18834 (2nd Cir. 2004). [2004 JB Oct]
     A county juvenile training facility was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity against liability in a federal civil rights lawsuit concerning the alleged failure to adequately train employees and failure to investigate and prevent sexual abuse committed against one juvenile resident by another. The facility was not an arm of the state, because the county rather than the state would be responsible for paying any damage award against the facility, even though the facility was built pursuant to a state statutory scheme concerning juveniles found to be delinquent, dependent, abused, unruly or neglected, as well as juvenile traffic offenders. S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, No. 02-3852, 374 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     While requiring a convicted youth offender to perform military-style exercises at a one-day "boot camp" was not cruel and unusual punishment, the claim that camp officials waited almost two hours before summoning an ambulance for the minor, who was unconscious and vomiting while suffering heat stroke, if true, was sufficient to constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Austin v. Johnson, #02-41137, 328 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 2003). [2003 JB Aug]
     City liable under state law for alleged rape of 16-year-old female juvenile doing court mandated community service by inmate-trustee working for the city. Trial court properly assessed city as 70% negligent and inmate-trustee as 30% at fault when city had an obligation to supervise the inmate-trustee, but knowingly allowed the teenage victim to work with him in a situation where they were left alone. City liable for 70% of $153,365.64 general damage award, but no liability found for damages or attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and 1988. Ashmore v. Hilton, No. 02-816, 834 So. 2d 1131 (La. App. 2002), rehearing denied (2003). [N/R]
     A state training school for juveniles constituted a "correctional facility" under provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(d)(1)(A), limiting the awards of attorneys' fees in cases challenging prison conditions of confinement to those directly and reasonably incurred in "proving an actual violation" of protected rights. Class of juvenile inmates was not a "prevailing party" entitled to $376,637.48 award of attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 when the court order approving a settlement of the claims incorporated none of the specific terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties. Christina A. v. Bloomberg, #01-3698, 315 F. 3d 990 (8th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
      Officer was entitled to qualified immunity for conducting warrantless strip searches of five minors at juvenile home suspected of possession of drugs. Reynolds v. City of Anchorage, 225 F. Supp. 2d 754 (W.D. Ken. 2002). [2003 JB Mar.]
     In lawsuit alleging that officer at juvenile correctional facility sexually assaulted a male minor prisoner, there was good cause to postpone the deposition of the minor plaintiff for a short time until after his release from custody in order to protect the minor from the possibility of further psychological harm. Williams v. Greenlee, 210 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Tex. 2002). [N/R]
     Youth adjudicated a juvenile delinquent did escape from a "detention facility" within the meaning of a New York criminal statute, McKinney's Penal Law Sec. 205.10, subd. 1, when he jumped out of the window of a cabin at a camp operated by the N.Y. State Division for Youth. People v. Juarbe, 749 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Sup. 2002). [N/R]
     Settlement for confidential amount reached in wrongful death lawsuit by mother of child who died at reformatory camp when the 80-pound boy was allegedly crushed by a 300-pound counselor laying on top of him for five to ten minutes to restrain him after he got into a fight with another child. The 12-year-old had been ordered to attend the camp by juvenile courts. Ibarra v. Eckerd Youth Alternative Inc., No. 00-1159-CA (Marion County, Fla. Circuit Court), reported in The National Law Journal, p. B4 (July 15, 2002). [N/R]
     Mother of juvenile detainee allegedly sexually assaulted and abused by warden in juvenile detention facility did not show that alleged assault was caused by the failure of state employees to mention warden's prior marijuana conviction when writing letters of reference to obtain warden position. Warden had previously received a pardon on that conviction from the governor and the conviction had been effectively expunged, with a criminal records search not revealing it. K.S., v. Summers, No. 2001 CW 0794, 799 So. 2d 510 (La. App. 2001) [2002 JB Mar]
     298:158 Nebraska state statute mandating parental notification of juvenile detention did not impose liability on county and sheriff's deputies, based on failure to do so, for juvenile's subsequent suicide after his release from custody. Claypool v. Hibberd, #S-99-1223, 626 N.W.2d 539 (Neb. 2001).
     273:136 State of Arizona reaches $725,000 wrongful death settlement with husband of woman killed during assault by their 17-year-old paroled son; lawsuit argued that parole was improper, that parole should have been revoked because of various misconduct, and that drug and anger counseling should have been conditions of parole. Janecke v. State, Ariz., Maricopa Co. Super. Ct., No. CV96-06697, Sept. 24, 1998, reported in 42 ATLA Law Rptr. 185 (June 1999).
     267:46 Co. liable for $8,000 in damages and $34,824.92 in attorneys' fees and costs to 15-year-old detainee raped and beaten by cellmates after guard allegedly told them he was a "snitch"; jury could properly find that overcrowding of juvenile prisoners created dangerous situation; Prison Litigation Reform Act's limits on attorneys' fees awards did not apply since juvenile was not a prisoner when he filed suit after leaving jail. Doe v. Washington Co., #97-3969, 98-1126, 150 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1998).
     259:110 Update: Indiana Supreme Court overturns ruling that state constitutional provision prohibits juvenile offenders from being incarcerated in adult correctional facilities. Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530 (Ind. 1998).
     254:30 Indiana state constitutional provision prohibits juvenile offenders being incarcerated in adult correctional facilities, state appeals court rules. Ratliff v. Cohn, 679 N.E.2d 985 (Ind. App. 1997).
     243:46 Prisoners in protective custody in youth correctional facility stated a claim for cruel and unusual punishment based on double celling combined with other conditions and assertion that they were subject to sexual assaults in cells which correctional officials failed to prevent; claim also stated for denial of access to courts based on alleged lack of paralegals to help with claims other than disciplinary cases. Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63 (3rd Cir. 1996).
     221:73 Alleged violation of federal statute in placing juvenile detainee in adult jail was not proximate cause of his suicide attempt; federal appeals court rejects argument that juvenile detainees, as a class, are specially susceptible to suicidal tendencies and therefore should be specially screened. Horn v. Madison Co. Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 1994).
     $105,575 awarded for sexual assault on juvenile detainee by fellow detainee. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Whaley, 531 So.2d 723 (Fla. App. 1988).
     West Virginia Supreme Court holds that prisoners between 18 and 20 years of age under jurisdiction of juvenile court may not be held within sight or sound of adult prisoners. State ex rel. M.L.N. v. Greiner, 360 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1987).
     Juvenile not entitled to hearing before transfer to county jail. Cooper v. Elrod, 622 F.Supp. 373 (D.C. Ill. 1985).
     Defendants given second chance to support prolonged isolation against testimony in favor of only the briefest period for isolation. Santana v. Collazo, 793 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1986).
     U.S. Supreme Court allows for pretrial detention of juveniles. Schall v. Martin, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984).
     Juvenile properly placed in most secure facility. Matter of Katherine W., 468 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1984). Extensive discussion of procedures of juvenile justice system and conditions of confinement. Morales v. Turman, 596 F.Supp. 332 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
     Pretrial detention of juveniles was improper; juveniles not provided same criminal procedural rights as adults. R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1983); on appeal from 540 F.Supp. 772 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
     State juvenile pretrial detention statute subject to constitutional attack in federal court under Section 1983; discharged juveniles have standing and are not required to exhaust state remedies. Colesman v. Stanziani, 570 F.Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
     Behavioral modification program in private school violated constitutional rights of students. Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982).
     Juveniles awaiting trial cannot be confined in adult jails as punishment; conditions of confinement must meet constitutional standards. D.B. v. Tewksbury, 545 F.Supp. 896 (D. Ore. 1982).
     Pretrial detention of juveniles held unconstitutional. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2nd Cir. 1982).
     Puerto Rico Federal Court reviews commonwealth's juvenile facilities and finds them basically sound. Santana v. Collazo, 533 F.Supp. 966 (D.P.R. 1982).
     Third Circuit rules that youth corrections act may provide basis for damages under the Fifth Amendment due process clause. Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227 (3rd Cir. 1980).

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