AELE LAW LIBRARY OF CASE SUMMARIES:
Corrections Law for
Jails, Prisons and Detention Facilities
Back to list of subjects Back to Legal Publications Menu
U.S. Supreme Court Actions
A Texas death
row inmate sought to prohibit his execution until the state allowed his
preferred spiritual advisor, a Buddhist priest, to be physically present in the
execution chamber at the time of execution. After the petition was denied, he
filed a federal civil rights lawsuit over the issue. The motion for a stay of
execution was denied as untimely, a result upheld by the federal appeals court.
The court ruled that held that the proper time for raising such claims has long
since passed. The execution date was set on November 29, 2018 for March 28,
2019; and by his lawyer’s admission, he had waited until February 28 to first
request that the state allow his Buddhist priest to not just meet with him
prior to entering the execution chamber and watch from the viewing room, but
actually enter the execution chamber with him; and then waited until March 20
-- eight days before the scheduled execution -- to raise his First Amendment
and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claims. These claims
were not brought before the federal courts until March 26. The appeals court
also took note of the multiple warnings the plaintiff's lawyer had received in
the past for filing motions at the last moment. Subsequently, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court, by 7-2, granted a stay of execution “pending the timely filing
and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari unless the state permits
Murphy's Buddhist spiritual advisor or another Buddhist reverend of the state's
choosing to accompany Murphy in the execution chamber during the execution.” Murphy v. Collier, #19-70007, 919 F.3d 913 (5th Cir.
2019), stay granted, Murphy
v. Collier, #18A985, 139 S. Ct. 1111, 203 L. Ed. 2d 633, 2019 U.S. Lexis
2298, 2019 WL 1410989.
Under prior precedent, a state’s refusal to alter its execution protocol can violate the Eighth Amendment only if an inmate identifies a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative procedure that would “significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.” The state of Missouri planned to execute the plaintiff inmate by lethal injection using a single drug, pentobarbital. He presented an as-applied Eighth Amendment challenge, alleging that, regardless of whether the protocol would cause excruciating pain for all prisoners, it would cause him severe pain because of his particular medical condition. A federal appeals court and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of that challenge. The Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a prisoner a painless death. To establish that a state’s chosen method cruelly “superadds” pain to the death sentence, a prisoner must show a feasible and readily implemented alternative method that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain and that the state has refused to adopt without a legitimate penological reason. Traditionally accepted methods of execution are not necessarily unconstitutional because an arguably more humane method becomes available. Precedent foreclosed the plaintiff’s argument that methods posing a “substantial and particular risk of grave suffering” when applied to a particular inmate due to his “unique medical condition” should be considered “categorically” cruel. Identifying an available alternative is a requirement of all Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claims alleging cruel pain. The plaintiff failed to present a triable question on the viability of nitrogen hypoxia as an alternative to Missouri’s protocol. He merely pointed to reports from other states indicating the need for additional study. Missouri had a “legitimate” interest in choosing not to be the first to experiment with a new, “untried and untested” method of execution. Bucklew v. Precythe, #17-8151, 2019 U.S. Lexis 2477.
Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), the Secretary of Homeland Security, under a federal statute, 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), generally has the discretion to arrest and hold a deportable alien pending a removal decision or to release the alien on bond or parole. Section 1226(c), enacted out of “concern that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear,” sets out four categories of aliens who are inadmissible or deportable for bearing links to terrorism or for committing specified crimes. Paragraph (1) directs the Secretary to arrest any such alien “when the alien is released” from jail, and paragraph (2) forbids the Secretary to release any “alien described in paragraph (1)” pending a removal determination. Aliens detained under 1226(c)(2), alleged that because they were not immediately detained by immigration officials after their release from criminal custody, they are not aliens “described in paragraph (1),” even though they fall into at least one of the four categories. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the statute’s text does not support the argument that because the aliens were not arrested immediately after their release, they are not “described in” 1226(c)(1). Congress’s use of the definite article in “when the alien is released” indicates that the scope of the word “alien” “has been previously specified in context,” so the class of people to whom “the alien” refers must be fixed by the predicate offenses identified in subparagraphs (A)–(D). Paragraph (c)(2) does not limit mandatory detention to those arrested “pursuant to” or “under authority created by” (c)(1), but to anyone simply “described in” (c)(1). Accordingly, the plaintiffs were properly detained under the statute even if it occurred months or even years after their release from custody from a jail or prison. Nielsen v. Preap, #16-1363, 203 L. Ed. 2d 333, 2019 U.S. Lexis 2088, 2019 WL 1245517.
A prisoner on death row in Alabama filed a civil rights complaint and emergency motion for stay of execution, claiming that excluding his Muslim Imam from the execution chamber at the time of his execution in favor of a Christian chaplain violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and that requiring the presence of a Christian chaplain in the execution chamber at the time of his execution also violated his rights under RLUIPA. He further argued that Alabama’s practice of requiring a Christian chaplain in the execution chamber, while forbidding clerics of other faiths, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and that refusing to honor his late election for nitrogen hypoxia as the method of his execution, where his lateness resulted from his religious beliefs, also violated RLUIPA. A federal appeals court held that Alabama’s prison officials favored one religious denomination to the detriment of all others, that they had made only general claims about their compelling interest, and they had offered nothing remotely establishing that their policy was narrowly tailored to further that interest. The appeals court held that the prisoner was substantially likely to succeed on the merits of his Establishment Clause claim given the little evidence in the record to support the government’s interest and the fit between those interests and the state's policy. In this case, given the paucity of evidence, the court concluded that it was not altogether surprising that the state had not clearly argued that prisoner knew or should have known sooner that his religious beliefs would not be accommodated. Therefore, the appeals court granted the petition for an emergency stay of execution. The U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, did not agree. It vacated the stay, allowing the prisoner to be executed by lethal injection without his Imam present. Ray v. Commissioner, #19-10405, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 3664 (11th Cir.), vacated, Dunn v. Ray, #18A815, 139 S. Ct. 145, 203 L. Ed. 2d 145, 2019 U.S. Lexis 817, 2019 WL 488293.
A prisoner was awarded a judgment in his federal civil rights suit against two prison guards, including an award of attorney’s fees. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(2) provides that in such cases “a portion of the [prisoner’s] judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant.” The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay 10% of his judgment toward the fee award, leaving the defendants responsible for the remainder. A federal appeals court reversed, holding that section 1997e(d)(2) required the district court to exhaust 25% of the prisoner’s judgment before demanding payment from the defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed. The mandatory phrase “shall be applied” suggests that the district court has some nondiscretionary duty to perform. The infinitival phrase “to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded” specifies the purpose of the preceding verb’s nondiscretionary duty and “to satisfy” an obligation, especially a financial obligation, usually means to discharge the obligation in full. The trial court did not have wide discretion to pick any “portion” that does not exceed the 25% cap. This conclusion is reinforced by section 1997e(d)’s surrounding provisions, which also limit the trial court’s pre-existing discretion under U.S.C. section 1988(b). Murphy v. Smith, #16-1067, 200 L. Ed. 2d 75, 2018 U.S. Lexis 1379.
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S. government detained hundreds of illegal aliens, pending a determination of their possible connection to terrorist activity. The plaintiffs, six men of Arab or South Asian descent who were among the detainees and were subsequently removed from the country, filed a proposed class action lawsuit against federal executive officials and wardens, seeking damages, and claiming that their “harsh pretrial conditions” were punitive, violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and were based on race, religion, or national origin. They also asserted that the defendant wardens allowed guards to abuse them. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected all these claims. In 42 U.S.C. 1983, Congress provided a damages remedy for plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated by state officials. There was no corresponding remedy for constitutional violations by federal agents. In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized (in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, #301, 403 U. S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619) an implied damages action for violations of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures by federal agents. The Court later allowed Bivens-type remedies in Fifth Amendment gender-discrimination and Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments cases. Bivens, however, will not be further extended to a new context if there are “special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” To avoid interference with sensitive Executive Branch functions or any inquiry into national-security issues, the Court ruled, a Bivens remedy should not be extended to the claims concerning confinement conditions. With respect to the wardens, Congress did not provide a damages remedy against federal jailers in the Prison Litigation Reform Act 15 years after the U.S. Supreme Court’s expressed caution about extending Bivens. Qualified immunity bars the claims of conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). Reasonable officials in the defendants’ positions would not have known with sufficient certainty that section 1985(3) prohibited their joint consultations and the resulting policies. There was no clearly established law on the issue of whether agents of the same executive department are distinct enough to “conspire” within the meaning of the statute. Ziglar v. Abbasi, #15-1358, 198 L. Ed. 2d 290, 2017 U.S. Lexis 3874.
North Carolina law prohibited as a felony offense any registered sex offender accessing “a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages.” Over 1,000 people were prosecuted under that law. A man registered as a sex offender was indicted after posting a statement on his personal Facebook profile about a positive traffic court experience, and state courts rejected his challenge to the law.The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute impermissibly restricts lawful speech in violation of the First Amendment. Today, the Court reasoned, one of the most important places to exchange views is cyberspace, particularly social media. Even if the statute was content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny, the provision was not “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” While social media will be exploited by criminals and sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime, the Court agreed, the assertion of a valid governmental interest “cannot, in every context, be insulated from all constitutional protections.” The statute “enacts a prohibition unprecedented in the scope of First Amendment speech it burdens…. With one broad stroke, North Carolina bars access to what for many are the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge.” The state did not establish that this “sweeping law” was necessary to keep convicted sex offenders away from vulnerable victims. Social media websites today are integral to the fabric of modern society and culture. The First Amendment does, however, permit a state to enact specific, narrowly-tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender from engaging in conduct that often precedes a sexual crime, such as contacting a minor or using a website to gather information about a minor. Packingham v. North Carolina, #15-1194, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
A Colorado woman was convicted of both felonies and misdemeanors connected with the alleged abuse of her children. She was sentenced to prison and ordered to pay $8,192.50 in fees, court costs, and restitution. Subsequently, her conviction was reversed on appeal, and she was acquitted on retrial. A Colorado man was convicted of attempting to patronize a prostituted child and attempted sexual assault. He was sentenced to prison and ordered to pay $4,413 in fees, costs, and restitution. His convictions were reversed and vacated and he was not retried. Colorado correctional officials withheld $702.10 from the woman’s inmate account between her conviction and acquittal. The man paid the state $1,977.75 after his conviction. After their convictions were overturned, both of them sought refunds of the money withheld or paid. The Colorado Supreme Court denied the refunds, ruling that Colorado’s Exoneration Act provided the exclusive authority for refunds and that neither of them had filed a claim under that Act. The court also upheld the constitutionality of the Act, which permits the state to retain conviction-related assessments until the prevailing defendant institutes a separate civil proceeding and proves his or her innocence by clear and convincing evidence. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Act’s scheme violates the guarantee of due process. The former prisoners had an obvious interest in regaining the money. The state may not retain these funds simply because their convictions were in place when the funds were taken. Once the convictions were erased, the presumption of innocence was restored. Colorado may not presume a person, adjudged guilty of no crime, guilty enough for monetary penalties. Colorado’s scheme creates an unacceptable risk of the erroneous deprivation of the defendants’ property, conditioning refunds on proof of innocence by clear and convincing evidence, while defendants in their position are presumed innocent. When the amount sought is not large, the cost of pursuing a claim under the Act would be prohibitive. The state had no equitable interest in withholding the refund of the money. Nelson v. Colorado, #15-1256, 197 L. Ed. 2d 611, 2017 U.S. Lexis 2615.
A man was searched during a traffic
stop and a vitamin bottle containing pills was found. Officers conducted a
field test which proved negative for controlled substances. They arrested him
and an evidence technician at the police station also got a negative result for
controlled substances when he tested the pills but reported that one of the
pills tested “positive for the probable presence of ecstasy.” He was charged
with unlawful possession and a judge, relying solely on an officer’s complaint,
ruled that there was probable cause to hold the detainee pending trial. A state
police lab then again tested the pills and found no controlled substance, but
not before the detainee had been in custody for 48 days. The detainee sued the
city and its officers more than two years after he was arrested but less than
two years since the criminal case was dismissed. The U.S. Supreme Court
rejected lower court rulings that a two year statute of limitations barred an unlawful
arrest claim and that the pretrial detention after legal process was initiated
barred a Fourth Amendment claim. The Fourth Amendment prohibits detention
without probable cause. When the legal process has begun, but probable cause
was not satisfied, as here where the judge’s probable cause determination was
allegedly based on fabricated evidence, it does not cut off a Fourth Amendment
claim. The unlawful detention claim was properly brought under the Fourth
Amendment, rather than the due process clause. On remand, the appeals court was
ordered to hold further proceedings on when the claim accrued, unless it found
that the city waived its timeliness argument. Manuel v. Joliet,
#14-9496, 197 L. Ed. 2d 312, 2017 U.S. Lexis 2021, 85 U.S.L.W. 4130.
A California
prisoner was "validated" as a prison-gang associate and placed in
secured housing. A year later, the state amended its laws so that secured
housing prison-gang associates could no longer earn future good-time credit. He
filed a writ of habeas corpus in state court challenging the application of the
changed law to him as an ex post facto law impermissibly enhancing his
punishment. His petition was rejected by the trial court and a state
intermediate appellate court on grounds that he had filed it in the wrong
county. He then filed an original petition for habeas relief with the
California Supreme Court, which was also summarily denied. The federal district
court denied the prisoner's ex post facto claim under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires a state prisoner
seeking federal habeas relief to exhaust state remedies, 28 U.S.C.
2254(b)(1)(A). If the state courts adjudicate a federal claim “on the merits,”
AEDPA mandates deferential, rather than de novo, review, unless the state-court
decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law,”, or “was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts.” In this case, a federal appeals court incorrectly ruled that the
California Supreme Court's ruling was not on the merits. While the lower
California courts rejected the prisoner's petition for reasons of improper
venue, which did not deal with the merits, there is only one California Supreme
Court, and he filed an original petition there, so improper venue could not
have been the basis, the decision was on the merits, and any federal review of
the issue should therefore have used a "differential lens" on the
state court ruling. Kernan v. Hinojas, #15-833, 136 S. Ct. 1603, 194 L. Ed. 2d
701, 2016 U.S. Lexis 3051, 84 U.S.L.W. 4284.
As two guards undertook
to move an inmate to a segregation unit, one of them allegedly assaulted him,
pnnching him in the face. The prisoner sued that guard for excessive force and
the second guard for failing to take protective action. A jury found the first
guard liable, but the second raised as a defense the Prison Litigation Reform
Act's requirement that a prisoner exhaust available administrative remedies
before filing suit. The prisoner argued that an internal investigation of the
incident was a substitution for the grievance procedures. A federal appeals
court overturned the dismissal of the failure to protect claim on exhaustion of
remedies grounds. It held that "special circumstances" could excuse
failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements, especially when
the prisoner mistakenly, but reasonably, believed that he sufficiently
exhausted his remedies. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned this ruling. “The Fourth
Circuit's unwritten 'special circumstances’ exception is inconsistent with the
text and history of the PLRA.” The exhaustion of available administrative
remedies is mandatory under the statute. However, under circumstances were an
administrative remedy is officially on the books but not actually available,
operating as a dead end, it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use. It
is also not "available" if prison administrators thwart prisoners
from using it by intimidation or misrepresentation. Further proceedings were
required to determine whether the prisoner actually had an "available
administrative remedy." Ross v. Blake, #15-339, 2016 U.S. Lexis 3614
A federal prisoner sued the U.S. government
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), claiming that he was
severely beaten by another prisoner because of negligence by prison officials.
The defendants were granted summary judgment under an exception to liability
under the Act for “[a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance . .
. [of] a discretionary function," in this case decided where to house
inmates. While that lawsuit was pending, the prisoner filed a second claim
asserting constitutional claims against prison employees arising out of the
first incident. The first lawsuit was dismissed based on the discretionary
function, and the second suit was then dismissed based on the first suit's
dismissal. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this was improper. The trial court
did not dismiss the first suit based on a finding that the employees were not
negligent, but only based on an exception to the FTCA as to federal government
liability. That had no bearing on the issue of whether employees could be
liable instead on a constitutional claim. Simmons v. Himmelreich, #15-109, 2016
U.S. Lexis 3613.
Both federal and state courts hearing federal
civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 have discretion to award a
prevailing party (other than the federal government) reasonable attorneys' fees
under 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has restricted such
awards to prevailing defendants only to cases in which the plaintiff's lawsuit
was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." The Idaho
Supreme Court held that it was not bound by that interpretation of the law and
made a Sec.1988 award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant in a Sec.
1983 lawsuit without first deciding whether the plaintiff's claim was
"frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed. Sec. 1988 is a federal statute, so the Supreme Court's
interpretation is final and binding on all courts, federal or state. James v. Boise,
#15-493, 136 S. Ct. 685, 2016 U.S. Lexis 947.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a
prisoner who qualifies to proceed in a lawsuit as a pauper has to pay an
initial partial court filing fee of 20% of the larger of either the average
monthly deposits in their inmate account or the average monthly balance of that
account over the last six months, and then pay the rest of the fee in monthly
installments of 20% of the last month's income credited to their account. A
federal inmate who frequently engages in litigation argued that such monthly
payments were not due in a new case until all obligations incurred in a prior
case were paid off. A federal appeals court disagreed, holding that monthly
payments on a new case were due together with the monthly payments for prior
cases. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this ruling. The statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1915(b)(2), requires simultaneous rather than sequential payment of multiple
monthly installment payments. Bruce v. Samuels, #14-844, 136 S. Ct. 627, 193 L.
Ed. 2d 496, 2016 U.S. Lexis 620.
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected an Eighth
Amendment constitutional challenge by death penalty inmates to Oklahoma's
practice of using a 500-milligram dose of midazolam as the first drug it
administered, before it administered a paralytic agent and potassium chloride
in carrying out executions. The first drug made it a virtual certainty that the
prisoner being executed would be unconscious when the second and third drugs
were administered, and the plaintiff inmates failed to show that there was a
known available alternative method of carrying out an execution that would
provide a substantially less severe risk of pain. Glossip v. Gross, #14-7955,
2015 U.S. Lexis 4255.
The
U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, has ruled that there is a constitutional
right to same-sex marriage and that each state must also recognize such
marriages legally entered into in other states. As a result, to the extent that
prisoners have a constitutional right to marry, which they generally do, with
very limited exceptions, that right now extends to entering into same-sex
marriages. Prisons will now have to universally accommodate prisoners entering
into same-sex marriages to the same extent as they now accommodate opposite sex
marriages. Obergefell v. Hodges, #14-656, 2015 U.S. Lexis 4250.
The U.S. Supreme Court has vacated and
remanded a federal appeals court decision rejecting liability for the use of a
Taser in the stun mode and other force against a detainee. In the case, a jail
detainee claimed that jailers used excessive force against him when they moved
him to a different cell after he refused orders to take down a yellow sheet of
paper covering the light in his cell. The prisoner refused to cooperate with
the move, lying face down on his bunk and refusing to get up. He was forcibly
removed and handcuffed and placed on a bunk. When the officers tried to remove
the handcuffs, he allegedly resisted, which he later denied. The officers then
allegedly smashed his head into the concrete bunk, which they later denied. A
Taser was then applied to the detainee's back in stun mode for five seconds. He
declined the attentions of a nurse. The trial court noted the case law that
held that it was reasonable to use force against an inmate who refused to
comply with orders but concluded that the issue in the case was "whether
[the] defendants' response to plaintiff's obstinance was reasonable under the
circumstances or whether it was excessive and was intended to cause [the]
plaintiff harm." The court also concluded that, because a jury could find
that the defendants had acted with malice, qualified immunity was not
available. Later, a jury returned a verdict for the defendants, which was
upheld on appeal. The Fourteenth Amendment governed the plaintiff's claims
as a pretrial detainee. The federal appeals court held that the jury was
adequately instructed on the elements of that claim. The jury instructions, the
court said, properly required them to find, in order to impose liability, that
the defendants knew that their use of force posed a risk of harm to the
plaintiff, but that they recklessly disregarded his safety. Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
#12-3639, 744 F.3d 443, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 3972, 2014 WL 806956 (7th Cir.
2014). In reversing by a 5-4 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the
detainee only had to show that the force purposefully or knowingly used was
objectively unreasonable, as that standard adequately protected an officer who
acted in good faith. The jury instructions were erroneous because they
suggested that the jury should weigh the officers' subjective reasons for using
force, whether the officers actually intended to violate, or recklessly
disregarded the detainee's rights, and the issue of whether that error was
harmless would depend in part on the detailed specifics of the case. This
determination must be made from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, including what the officer knew at the time, and must account for the
"legitimate interests [stemming from the government's] need to manage the
facility in which the individual is detained," appropriately deferring to
"policies and practices that in th[e] judgment" of jail officials
"are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security." Kingsley v. Hendrickson, #14-6368, 192 L. Ed. 2d
416, 2015 U.S. Lexis 4073.
A domestic violence probation violator with a
lengthy history of substance abuse and mental health problems killed himself
while awaiting transportation to another facility. A federal appeals court
ruled that prison administrators in the case were not entitled to qualified
immunity on a claim that inadequate provision of medical care by a private
third party contractor cause the prisoner's suicide. Barkes v. First Corr. Med.
Inc., #12-3074, 766 F.3d 307 (3rd Cir. 2014). The U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously reversed, holding that even if the facility's suicide screening and
prevention procedures had the shortcomings that the plaintiffs alleged, no
precedent in effect on the date of the suicide, November of 2004, would have
made it clear to the defendant officials that they were overseeing a system
that violated the Constitution. Since the defendants were not violating clearly
established law that mandated the proper implementation of adequate suicide
prevention protocols, they were entitled to qualified immunity. Taylor v.
Barkes, #14-939, 2015 U.S. Lexis 3715.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a correctional
policy that prohibited prisoners from growing beards (with an exception for
inmates with a diagnosed skin condition allowed to grow 1/4 inch beards)
violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.
2000cc-1(a), when used to deny a sincerely devout Muslim prisoner the right to
grow a 1/2-inch beard as required by his religious beliefs. The rights granted
by the statute are not limited to beliefs shared by all practitioners of a religion.
The defendants failed to show that enforcing the policy in this manner served
the stated compelling interests in safety, keeping out contraband, and
preventing inmates from quickly changing their appearance. It would be
difficult to hide contraband by such a short beard, and hair on the head was
allowed to be that length. It was not shown that security concerns could not be
satisfied by searching such beards. Requiring prisoners to be photographed both
with and without beards would be a less restrictive means of preventing them
from being able to quickly change appearance, such as during an escape. The
opinion noted that many other institutions allowed facial fair.Holt v. Hobbs,
#13-6827, 2015 U.S. Lexis 626.
Officers who make a lawful arrest for a serious
offense may take and analyze a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA. Like
fingerprinting and photographing, it is a legitimate police booking procedure
that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Maryland v. King, #12-207, 2013
U.S. Lexis 4165.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory life
sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile murderers violated the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The ruling came
in two consolidated cases of juveniles given such sentences after being
convicted of murder at the age of 14. Miller v. Alabama, #10-9646, 2012 U.S.
Lexis 4877.
Subjecting an arrestee taken into custody on
civil contempt charges to a strip search at a county jail did not violate his
constitutional rights. County jail and county correctional facility rules could
mandate such searches for persons entering the general population and did not
have to limit strip searches to persons reasonably suspected of possessing
drugs, weapons, or other contraband. Security interests in preventing smuggling
at the time of prisoner intake is as strong as the interest in preventing it
during contact visits. Jails need not show a past history of smuggling problems
to justify such searches, and the strip searches helped deter smuggling.
Applying the search policy to all arrestees also helped promote equal
treatment. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington,
#10-945, 2012 U.S. Lexis 2712.
A prisoner was questioned for between five and
seven hours in a conference room at a prison by two deputies who asked him
about crimes he was accused of engaging in before his incarceration. He
confessed and was later convicted, with the confession admitted into evidence
despite the fact that he had been given no Miranda warnings during the
questioning. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the prisoner had not been taken
into custody for Miranda purposes, since he was told at the beginning and
reminded later that he was free to leave and go back to his cell. Additionally,
he was not physically restrained or threatened, was interviewed in a well-lit,
average-sized conference room where the door was sometimes left open, and was
offered food and water. These "facts are consistent with an environment in
which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and
leave, subject to the ordinary restraints of life behind bars." Howes v.
Fields, #10-680, 2012 U.S. Lexis 1077.
An inmate at a privately run federal prison filed
a civil rights lawsuit against employees there for alleged deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs in connection with treatment of
injuries suffered in a fall. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, in these
circumstances, California state law provides adequate alternative damage
remedies for negligence or medical malpractice so that there is no need to
imply a federal constitutional civil rights cause of action against the private
employees. These state law remedies provide both adequate deterrence of similar
future conduct and compensation for any damages suffered. Minneci v.
Pollard, #10-1104, 2012 U.S. Lexis 573.
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the order of a
special three-judge court ordering that the California state prison system
reduce its population from 156,000 prisoners, nearly double capacity, by
approximately 46,000 prisoners, or 137.5% of design capacity within two years.
Current overcrowding was found to have resulted in inadequate medical care and
mental health treatment. The Court found that the injunctive order complied
with the stringent requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and that
the court below properly gave "substantial weight" to any potential
adverse impact on public safety from the order. Brown v. Plata, #09–1233, 2011
U.S. Lexis 4012.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that states, in
accepting federal funding, do not consent to waive their sovereign immunity to
private suits for money damages under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U. S. C. §2000cc-1. The
decision means that prisoners may still file lawsuits seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief to compel states to change policies or practices that they
claim unduly restrict religious freedom under the statute, but may not seek money
damages against states and their agencies. The lawsuit was brought by a Texas
inmate who claimed that he was denied the right to attend Christian worship
services because of disciplinary rules restricting him to his cell, and sought
damages from the state and its prison officials. Sossamon v. Texas, #08–1438,
2011 U.S. Lexis 3187.
A man sentenced to death after being convicted of
murdering his girlfriend sought to challenge his conviction in Texas state
court by seeking DNA testing of various untested evidence from the crime scene,
including knives, an axe handle, vaginal swabs, fingernail clippings, and
certain hair samples. State courts rejected his plea for DNA testing, finding
that he had not made a required showing that he "would not have been convicted
if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing." He then
filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the prosecutor, seeking injunctive
relief requiring the DNA tests. By a 6-3 vote, the U.S, Supreme Court held that
claims concerning the right to DNA testing could be asserted not only in habeas
corpus proceedings, but also in federal civil rights lawsuits. Success in
having the testing done would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the
plaintiff's conviction. The Court therefore ordered further proceedings on the
merits of the plaintiff's claim that denying him the DNA testing violated his
due process rights. Skinner v. Switzer, #09–9000, 2011 U.S. Lexis 1905.
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned a federal
appeals court ruling ordering California officials to grant parole to an inmate
convicted of attempted murder. The Court held that "there is no right
under the federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the
expiration of a valid sentence, and the states are under no duty to offer
parole to their prisoners." The "responsibility for assuring that the
constitutionally adequate procedures governing California's parole system are
properly applied rests with California courts, and is no part of the Ninth Circuit’s
business." Swarthout v. Cooke, #10–333, 2011 U.S. Lexis 486
A former prisoner in an Ohio facility
claimed that a correctional officer had sexually assaulted her on two
consecutive nights, and sued two superintending prison officers, a case manager
on her living unit, and a prison investigator. She claimed that the case
manager failed to take any action to prevent the second assault after she
reported the first one, and that the investigator retaliated against her for
her accusations by placing her, shackled and handcuffed, in solitary
confinement in a cell without adequate heat, clothing, bedding, or blankets.
The trial court denied the defendants summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity, finding that there were disputed material issues of fact,
and the defendants did not appeal that ruling. After a full trial, a jury
awarded the plaintiff $350,000 in compensatory and punitive damages against the
case manager and $275,000 against the investigator. The defendants did not then
file a motion seeking judgment as a matter of law after the verdict, nor did
they seek a new trial. Instead, they argued, on appeal, that the trial court
should have granted their motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity. A federal appeals court agreed, and reversed the jury's verdict. The
U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, reversing the appeals court, and holding that a
party may not appeal a denial of summary judgment after a district court has
conducted a full trial on the merits. There was no "purely legal"
issue of qualified immunity preserved for appeal, as the dispute was not over
what the pre-existing law was, but instead what the facts were--such as whether
the case manager was adequately informed, after the first attack, of the
assailant's identity. The defendants could not argue, on appeal, that the
plaintiff had not proven her case, as they failed to raise an issue of the
sufficiency of the evidence by a post-judgment motion for judgment as a matter
of law. Ortiz v. Jordan, #09–737, 2011 U.S. Lexis 915.
While detained by immigration authorities, a
prisoner claimed that he "persistently" sought treatment for a
bleeding, suppurating lesion. While a Public Health Service (PHS) physician's
assistant and three outside specialists repeatedly advised that he urgently
needed a biopsy, a PHS physician and a commissioned PHS officer allegedly
denied that request. After the prisoner's release from custody, he had tests
that confirmed the presence of metastatic cancer. He filed a lawsuit asserting
both medical negligence claims against the U.S. government under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680, and constitutional claims against
the individual defendants under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Officers,
#301, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The plaintiff subsequently died, and the lawsuit was
continued by his estate. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, under 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 233(a), the Federal Tort Claims Act is the exclusive remedy for any claims
against any PHS employees or officers for damages for personal injury,
including death, arising out of the performance of medical functions while
acting within the scope of employment. As a result, the constitutional claims
under Bivens were barred. Hui v. Castaneda, #08-1529, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010).
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected claims that
Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4248,
providing for the civil commitment of sexually dangerous federal prisoners
beyond the date that they would otherwise be released. Congress had such
authority under the "necessary and proper" clause of the
Constitution, and Congress has long been involved in the delivery of mental
health care to federal prisoners. The statute was supported by sound reasons,
particularly the need to protect the community from the danger such prisoners
may pose. The Court rejected arguments that the statute invaded the province of
state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment, particularly as, under
the statute, states may assert their authority on such prisoners domiciled or
tried within their jurisdiction if they wish to do so, which would result in
the immediate transfer of the prisoner to state custody. The Court also found
that the legislation was narrow in scope, and that its ruling did not confer on
Congress a general police power, which continues to remain with the states. The
Court stated that it was not deciding any claim that the law violates equal
protection or substantive or procedural due process, claims that the plaintiffs
"are free to pursue" on remand. U.S. v. Comstock, #08–1224, 2010 U.S.
Lexis 3879.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal appeals
court incorrectly dismissed a prisoner's complaint that a correctional officer
used excessive force against him based on a determination that his allegedly
resulting injuries were "de minimus" (minimal). Such claims of the
use of excessive force against prisoners, under the principles set forth in
Hudson v. McMillian, #90-6531, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), should be decided based on the
nature of the force used rather than the extent of the injuries. In this case,
the prisoner asserted that the officer, acting without provocation, responded
to his request for a grievance form by snatching him off the ground, slamming
him into a concrete floor, and then proceeding to punch, kick, knee, and choke
him, until another officer intervened. These actions allegedly resulted in a
bruised heel, lower back pain, increased blood pressure, migraine headaches,
dizziness, and psychological trauma. The legal standard for whether the force
employed was excessive, the Court noted, was not the extent of the injuries,
but whether the force was "applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Wilkins
v. Gaddy, #08-10914, 2010 U.S. Lexis 1036.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a federal civil
rights lawsuit brought by a man convicted of sexual assault and other crimes,
ruled that the plaintiff had no constitutional right to post-conviction access
to the state's evidence for DNA testing for the purpose of attempting to prove
his innocence. The Court also reasoned that it was a legislative task to
develop procedures and rules for obtaining access to such evidence for DNA
testing. District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Circuit v. Osborne,
#08–6, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
A New York state law that purported to protect correctional
officers from liability in lawsuits by prisoners for conduct carried out within
the scope of their employment violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Under the New York law, the state's general courts were stripped
of jurisdiction over federal civil rights lawsuits or similar state law claims
filed by prisoners in that context, which would result in the dismissal of such
lawsuits, and prisoners being limited, instead, to filing claims against the
State of New York in the New York Court of Claims. The U.S. Supreme Court found
that Congress has made the judgment, as a matter of federal law, that any
person who violates a federal right while acting under color of state law is
subject to a federal civil rights lawsuit for damages, and that both federal
and state courts have jurisdiction over such claims. A state, the Supreme Court
declared, may not "relieve congestion in its courts by declaring a whole
category of federal claims to be frivolous," which appeared to be the
basis of the New York statute. Haywood v. Drown, #07-10374, 2009 U.S. Lexis
3807.
U.S. Supreme Court rules, by 5-4, that imposing a
death sentence for the rape of a child where the crime did not involve and was
not intended to result in the child's death violates the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343,
2008 U.S. Lexis 5262.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush, No.
06-1195, 2008 U.S. Lexis 4887, ruled that aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba as enemy combatants after their capture in Afghanistan or elsewhere
overseas are constitutionally entitled to pursue claims for habeas corpus, and
found that the procedures provided in a 2005 statute for review of the
detainees' status are inadequate and constitute an unconstitutional suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus. In another case, Munaf v. Geren, No. 06-1666,
2008 U.S. Lexis 4888, decided the same day, June 12, 2008, the Court ruled that
the habeas corpus statute applies to U.S. citizens held overseas by U.S.
military forces, such as in Iraq, even if those forces are operating as a
component of an multinational coalition. The U.S. citizens being detained had
traveled voluntarily to Iraq and are alleged to have committed crimes there.
The Court further ruled, however, that the particular plaintiffs in that case
were not entitled to relief to enjoin the U.S. from transferring them to the
custody of Iraqi authorities for criminal prosecution.
Kentucky's use of lethal injection to execute
death row prisoners did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Baze v. Rees, No. 07–5439, 128 S. Ct. 1520
(2008).
In a case (Avena and Other Mexican Nationals)
involving 51 Mexican nationals confined in U.S. prisons, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the U.S. had violated Article 36(1)(b) of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by failing to provide them with notice
of their rights to contact the Mexican consulate after they were taken into
custody. The ICJ, therefore, held that each of these individuals were entitled
to review and reconsideration of the U.S. state court convictions, even if they
had failed to comply with otherwise applicable state rules concerning the
challenging of those convictions. In a prior decision, Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, No. 04-10566, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
the Convention did not negate the need to apply state rules. The President of
the United States, however, issued a memo stating that the U.S. would
"discharge its institutional obligations" and have state courts
follow the ICJ decision. The Plaintiff in the immediate case, incarcerated
in Texas, then filed a Texas state court habeas application challenging his
capital murder conviction and death sentence because of the failure to inform
him of his rights under the Vienna Convention. The U.S. Supreme Court has now
held that neither the ICJ decision nor the President's memo are directly
enforceable federal law which would pre-empt state limits on the filing of
successive habeas petitions. The court further found that a treaty such as the
Vienna Convention is not binding domestic law in the U.S. when Congress has not
passed statutes to implement it, except if the treaty itself conveys an
intention that it be "self-executing." The plaintiff's habeas
petition was therefore properly dismissed. Medellin v. Texas, No. 06-984, 2008
U.S. Lexus 2912.
A federal prisoner transferred from a facility in
Atlanta, Georgia to one in Kentucky allegedly noticed that a number of items
were missing from his property, which the federal Bureau of Prisons had shipped
to his new facility. He filed a lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346, seeking recovery of damages. The property involved
included items of religious and nostalgic significance, including two copies of
the Qur'an, a prayer rug, and religious magazines, with an estimated total
value of $177. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an exception to the FTCA's
waiver of sovereign immunity for actions of federal employees, which bars
liability arising from the detention of any property "by any officer of
customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer," 28 U.S.C. Sec.
2680(c), applies to all law enforcement officers, including federal
correctional officers. The Supreme Court therefore upheld the dismissal of the
prisoner's lawsuit. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 06-9130, 2008 U.S. Lexis
1212.
The Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(b)(1)
provides federal employees absolute immunity from tort claims for actions taken
in the course of their official duties, and gives the Attorney General the power
to certify that a federal employee sued for wrongful or negligent conduct was
acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the
incident. Once that certification takes place, the U.S. government is
substituted as the defendant instead of the employee, and the lawsuit is then
governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act. Additionally, if the lawsuit began in
state court, the Westfall Act provides that it shall be removed to federal
court, and renders the Attorney General's certification "conclusive"
for purposes of the removal. Once the certification and removal take place, the
federal court has the exclusive jurisdiction over the case, and cannot decide
to send the lawsuit back to state court. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court
also ruled that certification can take place under the Westfall Act in
instances where the federal employee sued asserts, and the Attorney General
also concludes, that the incident alleged in the lawsuit never even took place.
Osborn v. Haley, No. 05-593 2007 U.S. Lexis 1323. [N/R]
Interpreting the scope of the "exhaustion of
remedies" requirement in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, (PLRA), 42
U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that: (a) Failure
to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and inmates are not
required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their
complaints--instead, defendant prison officials must specifically raise the
failure to do so as a defense; (b) Exhaustion is not per se inadequate under
the PLRA when an individual later sued was not named in the grievance, and the
applicable procedural rules that a prisoner must properly exhaust are not
defined by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself; and (c) The
PLRA does not require dismissal of the entire complaint when a prisoner has
failed to exhaust some, but not all, of the claims included in the complaint.
Jones v. Bock, No. 05-7058, 05-7142, 2007 U.S. Lexis 1325. [N/R]
The U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5-3 vote (with the
Chief Justice not participating), holds that the President did not have
authority to conduct military tribunal trials for detainees at the detention
facility at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and that the military commission convened
had a structure and procedures violating the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184,126 S. Ct.
2749 (2006). [N/R]
U.S. Supreme Court overturns an appeals court
decision that a prison policy forbidding certain very dangerous and "recalcitrant"
prisoners access to newspapers, magazines, and photographs violated the First
Amendment as a matter of law. Policy was justified by prison officials'
legitimate interest in providing such prisoners with incentives for improvement
of their behavior. Beard v. Banks, No. 04-1739 2006 U.S. Lexis 5176. [2006 JB
Aug]
U.S. Supreme Court rules that prisoners are
required, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, to properly exhaust available
administrative remedies for their grievances before pursuing federal lawsuits
over prison conditions, including complying with procedural rules, such as
deadlines for grievance filing. Woodford v. Ngo, No. 05-416, 2006 U.S. Lexis
4891. [2006 JB Aug]
U.S. Supreme Court rules that states and state agencies
can be sued for damages for disability discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) to the extent that a disabled prisoner asserts a claim
for conduct that actually violates constitutional rights under the 14th
Amendment. U.S. v. Georgia, No. 04-1203, 04-1236 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006). [2006
JB Mar]
U. S. Supreme Court vacated a temporary stay
order issued by Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas that prevented a Missouri
prison inmate from obtaining an abortion. The Missouri prisoner, who was
pregnant when incarcerated on a parole violation, had obtained an order from a
federal trial court requiring the state to provide access to an abortion by
providing transportation to a clinic 80 miles away, despite a Department of
Corrections policy under which such transportation is not provided for
abortions that the Department does not deem "medically necessary."
The prisoner reportedly planned to pay for the abortion herself. The Supreme
Court action, which was a brief two-sentence order, with no dissents, had the
effect of reinstating the trial court's order. Crawford v. Roe, No. 05A333,
2005 U.S. Lexis 7841, 74 U.S.L.W. 3270. [N/R]
Unanimous U.S. Supreme Court finds that
procedures Ohio adopted to govern its placement of its most dangerous prisoners
at its "Supermax" facilities are constitutionally adequate to satisfy
due process. Such procedures, while providing prisoners with an opportunity to
present information and receive notice concerning the basis for the proposed
classification, need not be full-blown adversary proceedings, and the
prisoners' rights were not violated by their inability to call witnesses at the
hearings. Wilkinson v. Austin, No. 04-495, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005). [2005
JB Aug]
U.S. Supreme Court
rules that the use of visible shackles, whether during the guilt phase of a
criminal trial or the penalty phase of a capital case, is a violation of
constitutional due process unless it is justified by specific findings
concerning the need for such restraint of the particular defendant based on
"essential" interests like courtroom security. Deck v. Missouri, No.
04-5293, 2005 U.S. Lexis 4180. [2005 JB Jul]
Unanimous Supreme Court, in a case filed by
inmates belonging to Satanist, Wicca (witchcraft), and white supremacist religions,
rejects the argument that a federal statute barring restrictions on religious
practice without a "compelling" governmental interest is an
unconstitutional "establishment of religion." Court notes that prison
safety and security are such "compelling" interests, and expects that
courts applying the statute will give "due deference" to the
experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators. Cutter v.
Wilkinson, No. 03-9877, 2005 U.S. Lexis 4346. [2005 JB Jul]
U.S. Supreme Court rules that prisoners could
challenge state parole procedures through a federal civil rights lawsuit, and
were not required to instead seek habeas corpus relief, when success in their
challenge would not directly result in their release from custody. Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 03-287, 2005 U.S. Lexis 2204. [2005 JB Apr]
U.S. Supreme Court, by 5-3, rules that prisons
cannot segregate prisoners by race even temporarily except under extraordinary
circumstances where there is a compelling interest in doing so. Johnson v.
California, No. 03-636, 2005 U.S. Lexis 2007. Supervisor of prison
transportation work crew did not violate an inmate's Eighth Amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment by allegedly using a racial epithet
against him. While the use of the term, if true, was "inexcusable and
offensive," it did not, without more, constitute a violation of
constitutional rights. Moore v. Morris, No. 04-6140, 116 Fed. Appx. 203 (10th
Cir. 2004). [2005 JB Apr]
U.S. Supreme Court to examine what due process is
required before placing prisoners in a "super-maximum security"
facility. Austin v. Wilkinson, #02-3429, 372 F.3d 346(6th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted, Wilkinson v. Austin, 04-495, 2004 U.S. Lexis 8174. [2005 JB Feb]
U.S. Supreme Court rules that foreign nationals
detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, captured in Afghanistan hostilities, have a
right to access to U.S. courts to challenge the legality of their detention,
and that U.S. citizen detained as an "enemy combatant" for allegedly
fighting against the U.S. in Afghanistan, also had a due process right to
access to a "neutral decision maker" to challenge the factual basis
for his detention. In a third case involving a U.S. citizen detained as an
"enemy combatant" on U.S. soil for alleged involvement in terrorist
conspiracy, Court does not reach ultimate issues because of procedural defects
in court filing. Rasul v. Bush, No. 03-334, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4760; Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4761; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, No. 03-1027,
2004 U.S. Lexis 4759. [2004 JB Aug]
U.S. Supreme Court rules that states may be sued
for damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for acts of
disability discrimination which allegedly interfere with the constitutional
right of access to the courts, and that such claims are not barred by Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Court does not provide a clear answer about whether similar
lawsuits against governmental employees for damages are proper in other
circumstances of alleged disability discrimination in the providing of public
services or programs. Tennessee v. Lane, #02-1667, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
[2004 JB Jul]
U.S. Supreme Court rules that prisoners may
pursue federal civil rights lawsuits for damages over prison discipline despite
the fact that the disciplinary conviction has not been set aside, so long as
the lawsuit challenges only the conditions of confinement, rather than the fact
or duration of the confinement. Muhammad aka Mease v. Close, # 02-9065, 124 S.
Ct. 1303 (2004). [2004 JB Apr]
U.S. Supreme Court to review issue of whether
California prison practice of routinely segregating prisoners by race during
initial period of incarceration is permissible for purposes of preventing
racial violence, as federal appeals court ruled, or unconstitutional
discrimination in violation of the right to equal protection. Johnson v.
California, #03-636, 72 U.S. Law Week 3551 (March 1, 2004). [2004 JB Apr]
U.S. Supreme Court upholds Michigan prison rules
limiting visits by children, non-family members, former prisoners, or for
prisoners who commit two violations of substance abuse rules. Overton,
Director, Michigan Department of Corrections v. Bazzetta, #02-94, 123 S. Ct.
2162 (2003). [2003 JB Aug]
U.S. Supreme Court holds that a punitive damages
award of $145 million was excessive in a case where the compensatory damages
were $1 million. Such a disproportionate award of punitive damages violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts reviewing punitive
damages should consider: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
misconduct, (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by
the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and (3) the difference between
the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, #01-1289, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003). [N/R]
U.S. Supreme Court to review constitutionality of
Michigan prison regulations banning visits from inmate's minor relatives and
former prisoners who are not family members. Federal appeals court struck down
regulations as applied to non-contact visits. Bazzetta v. McGinnis, #01-1635,
286 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted sub nom., Overton v. Bazzetta,
#02-94, 71 U.S.L.W. 3387 (12/02/2002). [2003 JB Jan]
U.S. Supreme Court rules that punitive damages
may not be awarded in private lawsuits under provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act prohibiting disability
discrimination by public entities or the recipients of federal funding.
Decision overturns $1.2 million award against city for failure to provide
wheelchair restraints in a vehicle in which a wheelchair-bound detainee was
transported and injured. Barnes v. Gorman, #01-682, 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002).
[2002 JB Aug]
U.S. Supreme Court holds that alleged use of
"hitching post" to restrain prisoner outside in hot weather for seven
hours without bathroom breaks and with only one or two water breaks, if true,
established an Eighth Amendment violation, for which defendant prison officials
were not entitled to qualified immunity defense at summary judgment phase of
proceedings. Hope v. Pelzer, #01-309, 122 S. Ct. 2508 (2002). [2002
JB Aug]
U.S. Supreme Court rules that prisoners may
be offered incentives to participate in treatment and rehabilitation programs
in which they are required to disclose prior acts that may be crimes without
violating the compelled self-incrimination prohibitions of the Fifth Amendment.
McKune v. Lile, #00-1187, 2002 U.S. Lexis 4206. [2002 JB Jul]
Unanimous U.S. Supreme Court rules that
"exhaustion of remedies" requirement of Prison Litigation Reform Act
applies to all lawsuits by inmates about prison life, including those involving
particular incidents, such as an allegation of excessive use of force by a
correctional officer, as well as those that involve general circumstances or
conditions. Porter v. Nussle, 2002 U.S. Lexis 1373. [2002 JB Apr]
Civil commitment of previously convicted sex
offender require some finding of the offender's "lack of control."
Kansas v. Crane, #00-957, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002). [2002 JB Apr]
Sending notice of a proposed forfeiture of
property to an incarcerated prisoner via certified mail in care of the prison
where he was incarcerated is adequate to satisfy due process of law when the
prison had a procedure for delivering mail to inmates; the government must only
attempt to provide actual notice, there is no requirement that actual notice must
be received. Dusenbery v. United States, No. 00-6567, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 401.
[2002 JB Feb]
U.S. Supreme Court upholds warrantless searches
of a probationer's home without probable cause as a condition of probation;
evidence uncovered in one such search, conducted by a sheriff's detective with
reasonable suspicion, did not need to be suppressed. United States v. Knights,
No. 00-1260, 121 S. Ct. 1955 (2001). [2002 JB Feb]
U.S. Supreme Court, by 5-4 vote, rules that
federal civil rights claims may not be brought against private companies acting
under color of federal law, such as a private company operating a halfway house
under a contract with the federal Bureau of Prisons. Correctional Services
Corp. v. Malesko, #00-860, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10812. [2002 JB Jan]
296:115 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
prisoners must exhaust available administrative remedies before filing a
lawsuit, even when they are seeking only money damages and money damages may
not be obtained through the administrative grievance process. Booth v. Churner,
#99-1964, 121 S. Ct. 1819 (2001).
296:115 U.S. Supreme Court rejects "catalyst
theory" for the award of attorneys' fees in federal lawsuits; a plaintiff,
in order to be entitled to an attorneys' fee award must receive a court
judgment on the merits or a court- ordered consent decree; a voluntary change
in the behavior of the defendant will not suffice. Buckhannon Board and Care
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, No.
99-1848, 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001).
294:83 U.S. Supreme Court rules that prisoners do
not have a special First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to fellow
inmates. Shaw v. Murphy, No. 99-1613, 121 S. Ct. 1475 (2001).
291:35 U.S. Supreme Court rules that Congress
exceeded its authority by attempting to make employment discrimination
provisions of Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) applicable to state
government; employees can no longer sue states under this federal statute for
money damages for disability discrimination. Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett, #99-1240, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
279:35 Federal Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) may not constitutionally be applied to state employees; Congress
exceeded its authority in attempting to create a remedy for age discrimination
which went beyond what the Supreme Court had previously ruled concerning equal
protection of law in age discrimination. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
#98-791, 98-796, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
283:99 U.S. Supreme Court upholds federal statute
requiring an automatic stay of injunctive orders against correctional
facilities when officials ask for termination or modification of such orders
and the trial court fails to hold a hearing and make findings that there are
currently existing violations within a designated time period. This time limit
did not constitute a violation of separation of powers. Miller v. French,
#99-224, 120 S. Ct. 2246 (2000).
285:142 U.S. Supreme Court strikes down federal
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) as unconstitutional. Some plaintiffs were
attempting to use statute to assert claims arising out of alleged sexual
assaults by law enforcement personnel. United States v. Morrison, #99-5, 120 S.
Ct. 1740 (2000).
272:115 Attorneys' fee cap in Prison Litigation
Reform Act applied to work done after law's effective date, even in cases which
were pending prior to the law's enactment. Martin v. Hadix, #98-262, 119 S. Ct.
1998 (1999).
273:131 U.S. Supreme Court, in three decisions,
narrowly interprets federal disability discrimination statute; plaintiff
employees whose disabilities may be corrected by medication or devices such as
eyeglasses will generally not be disabled persons entitled to protection
against employment discrimination. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., #97-
1992, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., #97-1943, 119
S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, #98-591, 119 S. Ct. 2162
(1999).
273:132 Monetary sanctions awarded against
plaintiff's lawyer in federal civil rights lawsuit were not immediately
appealable; any appeal must wait until the final resolution of the underlying
case. Cunningham v. Hamilton Co., Ohio, #98-727, 119 S. Ct. 1915 (1999).
273:132 Congress did not have constitutional
authority under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate states' sovereign
immunity to lawsuits in their own state courts; probation officers could not
sue state of Maine, in either federal or state court, for overtime pay they
claimed they were owed under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Alden
v. Maine, #98-436, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
258:83 U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rules that
same-sex sexual harassment claims can be pursued under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998
(1998).
258:84 Appeals court order to trial court to
enter final judgment reducing amount of damages awarded to plaintiff by jury,
without allowing possibility of plaintiff obtaining a new trial, violated
Seventh Amendment constitutional right. Hetzel v. Prince William Co., Va., 118
S.Ct. 1210 (1998).
260:115 Unanimous U.S. Supreme Court rules that
the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) applies to state prisons, based on
"unambiguous" text of statute; Court does not address question of
whether applying ADA to state prisons was a constitutional exercise of
authority by Congress; ruling expected to result in more ADA lawsuits by
prisoners. Penn. Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, No. 97-634, 118 S.Ct. 1952
(1998).
260:117 U.S. Supreme Court rejects imposition of
higher burden of proof on federal civil rights plaintiffs asserting that
defendants acted with unconstitutional motive. Crawford-El v. Britton, 118
S.Ct. 1584 (1998).
263:163 Despite the presence, in terminated
correctional officer's suit, of several claims against the State of Wisconsin
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, correctional defendants could still properly
remove the entire lawsuit from state to federal court, and the federal trial
court had jurisdiction to consider and rule on remaining claims not barred by
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht,
#97-461, 118 S.Ct. 2047 (1998).
263:163 Exclusionary rule does not apply to
parole revocation hearings. The rule would apply to a subsequent criminal
trial, for offenses committed while on parole, if police officers conduct an
illegal search of a parolee's person or premises. Penn. Bd. of Probation &
Parole v. Scott, #97-581, 118 S.Ct. 2014 (1998).
263:164 Asymptomatic HIV infection qualifies as a
disability for purposes of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). Bragdon
v. Abbott, #97-156, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (1998).
263:164 U.S. Supreme Court issues two important
decisions on sexual harassment; establishes legal standards for employer
liability for supervisor's harassment; prompt corrective action by employer can
limit or bar liability. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, #97-569, 118 S.Ct. 2257
(1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, #97-282, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998).
255:35 U.S. Supreme Court upholds convictions of
former sheriff and deputy sheriff on federal bribery and conspiracy charges for
allegedly allowing conjugal visits to federal prisoner held in county jail.
Salinas v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 469 (1997).
250:147 U.S. Supreme Court rules that Congress
exceeded its constitutional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment in passing
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; rules and laws of general applicability,
including jail and prison rules and regulations, no longer need to be justified
by a compelling state interest or use the least restrictive means when they
allegedly impose a substantial burden on the exercise of religion. Boerne, City
of, v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 1997 U.S. Lexis 4035 (June 25, 1997).
250:150 No federal right to immediate appeal of
denial of qualified immunity in federal civil rights cases filed in state
court. Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S.Ct. 1800, 1997 U.S. Lexis 3547 (June 9, 1997).
US Supreme Court overturns $800,000 award against
county based on alleged inadequate screening before hiring deputy with arrest
record who caused injuries to arrestee; single hiring decision could not be the
basis for municipal liability in absence of evidence that sheriff consciously
disregarded high risk that deputy would use excessive force Bd of Co. Com'rs of
Bryan Co., Okl v. Brown, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (1997).
249:131 U.S. Supreme Court rules that prisoner's
federal civil rights lawsuit challenging procedures used to discipline him was
barred when disciplinary result had not previously been invalidated, if a
judgment in prisoner's favor would necessarily imply invalidity of the
discipline. Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1997 U.S. Lexis 3075 (May 19,
1997).
250:148 U.S. Supreme Court rules that qualified
immunity defense in federal civil rights lawsuits is not available to
correctional officers working for privately run state prisons. Richardson v.
McKnight, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 1997 U.S. Lexis 3866 (June 23, 1997).
238:153 U.S. Supreme Court adopts
therapist-patient privilege protecting disclosures during therapy sessions from
compelled disclosure in court; affirms ordering of new trial in which jury
awarded $545,000 in police shooting case where jury was told it could presume
withheld therapy records would be unfavorable to officer. Jaffee v. Allen, 116
S.Ct. 1923 (1996).
237:131 U.S. Supreme Court rules that an award of
punitive damages which was 500 times the size of the compensatory damages
awarded by a jury was "grossly excessive" and constitutionally
violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996).
234:83 U.S. Supreme Court rules that defendants
in civil rights lawsuits may raise qualified immunity defense in both motion to
dismiss and motion for summary judgment, and may be able to appeal denials both
times in same case prior to trial. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S.Ct. 834 (1996).
238:151 U.S. Supreme Court overturns detailed
injunctive order requiring system-wide changes in Arizona prison law library
and legal assistance programs; Court sets forth rule that prisoners have no
"abstract" right to law libraries, but rather to access to courts;
relief granted by courts must be limited to instances where "actual
injury" is shown; prison law libraries and legal assistance programs are
not constitutionally required to provide inmates with ability to litigate
"any" kind of legal claim, but only those related to challenging
their sentences or conditions of confinement; courts must show
"deference" to prison regulations which impinge on right of access to
courts, even if actual injury is shown, if "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests." Lewis v. Casey, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (1996).
226:150 Update: U.S. Supreme Court vacates grant
of qualified immunity to prison officials in suit brought by inmate challenging
his placement in administrative detention after he told the press he sold drugs
to Vice Presidential candidate; Court orders reconsideration in light of
Johnson v. Jones, reported above. Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir.
1993), rehearing denied, 17 F.3d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115
S.Ct. 929 (1995), vacated, 115 S.Ct. 2552 (1995).
226:149 U.S. Supreme Court, resolving major split
between U.S. appeals courts, unanimously rules that defendants in federal civil
rights cases may not seek immediate appeal of denials of qualified immunity
when trial court bases such denial on basis that there is a genuine issue of
material fact for trial; immediate appeal in such cases is limited to reviewing
whether "clearly established law" violation is alleged, not issues of
sufficiency of evidence. Johnson v. Jones, 115 S.Ct. 2151 (1995).
226:147 U.S. Supreme Court rules that prisoner
placed in disciplinary segregation following charges of misconduct was not
entitled to due process procedural protections; state regulation simply
requiring that disciplinary guilt be supported by substantial evidence did not
result in a state-created constitutionally protected "liberty"
interest; focus in determining whether state creates a liberty interest to
shift from search for mandatory language in state laws or regulations to the
nature of the deprivation imposed. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995).
U.S. Supreme Court rules that peremptory
challenges of potential jurors based on gender violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. J.E.B. v. Alabama Ex. Rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct.
1419 (1994).
U.S. Supreme Court Holds that courts should
dismiss federal civil rights suits seeking damages when a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff necessarily implies the invalidity of the plaintiff's criminal
sentence, but that sentence has not already been overturned. Heck v. Humphrey,
114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994).
U.S. Supreme Court holds that liability in a
civil rights lawsuit for "deliberate indifference" to inmate safety
and health must be based on a showing that prison officials were
"subjectively aware" of the risk, rejecting an objective test that
would base liability on what officials "should have known." Farmer v.
Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994).
Oregon state constitutional provision prohibiting
judicial review of jury awards of punitive damages in most cases violates the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Supreme Court holds. Honda
Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 114 S.Ct. 2331 (1994).
U.S. Supreme Court rules that "significant
injury" is not a requirement for proving use of excessive physical force
against a prisoner in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1 (1992).
Consent decrees may be modified without showing a
"grievous wrong," U.S. Supreme Court adopts "flexible"
standard in case involving jail overcrowding. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Co.
Jail, 112 S.Ct. 748 (1992).
Federal Tort Claims Act prohibition of award of
"punitive damages" against U.S. government does not bar awards for
future medical expenses or for loss of enjoyment of life. Molzof v. U.S., 112
S.Ct. 711 (1992).
Prisoner's civil rights lawsuit can be dismissed
as frivolous when the facts alleged are irrational or wholly incredible. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992).
Civil rights plaintiff solely seeking monetary
damages who was awarded only $1 in nominal damages was a "prevailing
party," but was not entitled to attorneys' fee award of $280,000; Court
states that, in such cases, "the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at
all." Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S.Ct. 566 (1992).
U.S. Supreme Court holds that $10 million
punitive damage award did not violate due process. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), a claim the court rejected.
Punitive damages are not, per se, a violation of
due process, but Supreme Court indicates that "extreme results" may
be "unacceptable" under due process. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (1991).
Federal statute authorizing nonconsensual
referral of prisoner lawsuits challenging "conditions of confinement"
to magistrates includes civil rights lawsuits over individual incidents of
unconstitutional conduct, such as alleged excessive use of force, as well as
over ongoing prison conditions. McCarthy v. Bronson, 111 S.Ct. 1737 (1991).
Race-based peremptory challenges to potential
jurors in civil lawsuits is unconstitutional, U.S. Supreme Court rules.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991).
U.S. Supreme Court, reacting to repeated
frivolous petitions from two men, invokes rule denying them permission to avoid
paying filing fees as paupers. Zatko v. California, 112 S.Ct. 355 (1991).
Prison officials cannot be held liable, in
federal civil rights suits, for inadequate prison conditions absent a showing
of "deliberate indifference" as a mental state; U.S. Supreme Court
adopts tougher standard for inmate suits. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.Ct. 2321
(1991).
State officials may be sued for damages in their
individual capacities in federal civil rights cases, even if they were acting
"in their official capacities" during the complained of conduct, U.S.
Supreme Court rules. Hafter v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
U.S. Supreme Court upholds forced treatment of
mentally ill inmate with antipsychotic drugs without judicial hearing; state's
provision for prison administrative hearing met due process requirements.
Washington v. Harper, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (1990).
U.S. Supreme Court vacates court decision that
regulation prohibiting rosary beads in visiting area violates first amendment.
Higgins v. Burroughs, 816 F.2d 119 (3rd Cir.), vacated, 108 S.Ct. 54 (1987).
U.S. Supreme Court denies award of attorney's
fees to inmate who did not receive any relief on the merits of his claim. Hewitt
v. Helms, 107 S.Ct. 2672 (1987). U.S. Supreme Court rules injured inmates have
no constitutional right to sue. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, S.Ct. 662
and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986).
U.S. Supreme Court rules using lethal force in
good faith to quell a prison disturbance does not violate constitutional
rights. Whitley v. Albers, No. 84-1077; 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
U.S. Supreme Court allows attorneys to waive fees
in settlements. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
U.S. Supreme Court rules administrative record
need not contain reasons for denying witnesses to inmates. Ponte v. Real, U.S.,
105 S.Ct. 2192 (1985).
U.S. Supreme Court rules inmates not protected by
Fourth Amendment; pretrial detainees not entitled to contact visits. Block v.
Rutherford, 104 S.Ct. 3227 (1984) and Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.Ct. 3194.
U.S. Supreme Court allows for pretrial detention
of juveniles. Schall v. Martin, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984).
U.S. Supreme Court rules right to appointed
counsel does not attach until judicial proceedings are begun against inmate
regardless of confinement in administrative segregation. United States v.
Gouveia, 104 S.Ct. 2292 (1984).
Reasonable restrictions on pretrial detainees are
O.K. -mail, searches of inmates and cells, double-celling. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979).