AELE LAW LIBRARY OF CASE SUMMARIES:
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Medical Care: Mental Health
Monthly Law
Journal Artice: Civil Liability for
Inadequate Prisoner Medical Care, 2007 (9) AELE Mo. L.J. 301.
Monthly Law Journal
Article: Forced Feeding or Medication
of Prisoners, 2007 (12) AELE Mo. L. J. 301.
Monthly Law Journal Article: Mental
Health Care of Prisoners, 2009 (11)
AELE Mo. L. J. 301.
A prisoner with a long history of mental health issues was incarcerated for 13 years for a home invasion. He began to improve while enrolled in a residential treatment program (RTP). He was a Housing Unit Representative on a “Warden’s Forum.” After he brought complaints, a doctor raised his “Global Assessment Functioning score” so that he was now ineligible for the RTP. The prisoner claimed that this action was retaliatory. When he was discharged from the RTP, his condition deteriorated. His care was overseen by the unit chief of the outpatient mental-health program, a psychologist with that program, and a private doctor. The prisoner then had had homicidal thoughts and engaged in self-injury, ultimately attempting suicide. He was transferred to a Crisis Stabilization Program, with the doctors saying that they could not transfer him to “Mars.” He sued the three doctors for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. He claimed that, after his suicide attempt, he was restrained, and a sergeant told him, in response to a bathroom break, to “hold it,” and that he was going to “stay just like that until [his] mental illness goes away.” He was allegedly left laying in his own urine and feces for several hours. A federal appeals court upheld the denial of qualified immunity to all the defendants. The plaintiff prisoner, the court found, produced sufficient evidence to show violations of clearly established constitutional rights. Berkshire v. Dahl, #17-2039, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 19482, 2019 Fed. App. 0139P (6th Cir.).
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A federal appeals court overturned the dismissal of a lawsuit claiming that state correctional officials violated the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners suffering from serious mental illnesses in the Montana State Prison. The factual allegations in the complaint were sufficient to state a claim for relief that was “plausible on its face.” Among other things, the plaintiffs claimed that prisoners with serious mental illness were denied diagnosis and treatment of their conditions; suffered a distressing pattern of being placed in solitary confinement for “weeks and months at a time” without significant mental health care, and were frequently improperly punished with solitary confinement for behavior arising from mental illness. Additionally, the trial court had actually mistaken this case for another case brought by the plaintiff against a different defendant. The appeals court therefore ordered further proceedings before a different trial court judge. Disability Rights Montana v. Batista, #15-35770, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 21465, 2019 WL 3242038 (8th Cir.). |
Former civil immigration detainees who had been treated for serious mental illnesses sued a county and other defendants, claiming that the failure to engage in “discharge planning” or to provide them with discharge plans upon release violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. They had been released when it was determined that they were lawfully in the United States. A federal appeals court vacated the dismissal of the lawsuit, finding that it adequately stated a Fourteenth Amendment claim. The plaintiffs plausibly alleged that they had serious medical needs requiring discharge planning and that the defendants’ failure to provide discharge planning constituted deliberate indifference. One plaintiff, diagnosed in a New York detention center as a paranoid schizophrenic, was released in below-freezing temperature with no medication or treatment plan. A second, diagnosed as a bipolar schizoaffective, was allegedly released and pushed into the cold with nothing but the clothes on his back and identification. They both wound up in emergency rooms shortly thereafter. The court stated that the county knew or should have known that “failing to provide the omitted medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to the detainee's health.” Charles v. Orange County, #17-3506, 925 F.3d 73 (2nd Cir. 2019).
An intermediate California appeals court held that the state Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) gave the trial judge discretionary authority to involuntarily medicate an incompetent person placed with the state hospital pre-commitment. It affirmed an order finding that the defendant did not have the capacity to refuse medical treatment and requiring him to undergo the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. While the defendant had not been committed to the state hospital, the judge had the discretionary authority under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 6602.5 to require his involuntary medication based upon a proper finding that he was incompetent to refuse medical treatment. He was provided with adequate due process, since he was represented by an attorney, given a full evidentiary hearing on request, and the trial judge expressly found that he lacked the capacity to refuse treatment. State Dept. of State Hospitals v. J.W., # F077220, 31 Cal. App. 5th 334, 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 596, 2018 Cal. App. Lexis 1238
A prisoner suffering from schizoaffective disorder and made multiple suicide attempts filed a federal civil rights lawsuit pro se alleging that prison officials violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and failing to protect him from other inmates. A trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, ruling that the plaintiff could not establish the subjective elements of his claims because the defendants, who were all non-medical officials, appropriately relied on the judgment of medical professionals. A federal appeals court upheld this result. It found that the plaintiff could not show that the defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. The record showed that he received regular medical attention from psychologists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals, and that several of his grievances were subjected to emergency review. He had not presented evidence that his grievances were ignored or mishandled nor was there any indication from his medical records that he was not receiving adequate care. The non-medical officials relied on the medical professionals to provide proper treatment, and there was nothing to give notice to them of a need to intervene. Giles v. Godinez, #15-3077, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 2959, 2019 WL 349423 (7th Cir.).
A jail detainee received medical treatment for a burn that she suffered from setting her seatbelt on fire while trying to escape a police car following her arrest. She claimed that the medical treatment was inadequate, as a result of which she required skin grafting surgery after her release. She also claimed that she was illegally deprived of her psychiatric medicine for about two weeks while detained. A federal appeals court overturned summary judgment for the defendants in part, finding that a reasonable jury could find that one doctor knew or should have known of the plaintiff’s need for psychiatric medication as shown by a nurse’s notation, yet failed to take steps to ensure that she received it. There was also evidence that psychiatric social workers knew or had reason to know that she had serious psychiatric needs that required treatment and that there was a risk that she would begin experiencing symptoms of depression and bipolar disorder days before she could expect to receive any medication to treat those conditions. Richmond v. Huq, #16-2560, 872 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2017).
A federal appeals court has overturned a trial court’s dismissal of a former inmate’s lawsuit claiming that she was psychologically traumatized by being forced to undergo sexual shame therapy while incarcerated. The appeals court ruled that it was erroneous to deny as futile the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend to include new assertions when she may be able to allege that she was unaware of her injuries until sometime after she stopped participating in the therapy sessions, and she may have reasonably viewed the embarrassment and humiliation she felt as the ordinary, and therefore not harmful, response to the therapy. Gregg v. Hawaii DPS, #14-16785, 870 F.3d 883, (9th Cir. 2017).
An inmate at a treatment and detention facility for
persons believed to be prone to sexual violence claimed that the staff there
had caused him to take the antipsychotic drug Risperdal for over a month
without his knowledge or consent. A federal appeals court reversed summary
judgment. The staff failed to follow Illinois’ mandated procedures for ordering
forced medication. The plaintiff had not properly been found to be a danger to
himself or others. A doctor had prescribed the medication after the inmate
complained about feelings of aggression and hopelessness, so that he could take
the medication if he wanted, but a nurse who did not know what the pill was,
included it with the inmate’s medication for blood pressure, cholesterol, and
stomach problems, which the plaintiff then took without consent or knowledge.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a “significant liberty interest,” under
the due process clause in “avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs,” which can have “serious, even fatal, side effects.” While
the plaintiff was not forced to take the pill, the doctor “must have known that
pills were delivered to the inmates, unlabeled, in little cups.” Johnson v. Tinwalla, #15-3525, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis
7554 (7th Cir.).
A
prisoner suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) claimed that
prison wardens and supervisory physicians acted with deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs. The wardens were entitled to qualified immunity
because there was no specific evidence that they were directly involved in or
responsible for the allegedly inadequate treatment. Further, the evidence
showed that the physicians were aware of the prisoner's medical needs and took
steps to meet them. The prisoner also failed to show that he engaged in
activities protected by the First Amendment or that his transfer to another
facility or placement in segregation was retaliatory or violated due process.
In fact, the transfer was to facilitate him receiving necessary psychiatric
treatment. Saylor v. Randy Kohl, M.D., #14-3889, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 1459 (8th
Cir.).
A county filed a petition for
involuntary commitment of a prisoner for mental health care as well as for the
involuntary administration of psychotropic medication and treatment. Upholding
the granting of the petition, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the statute
under which the requests were granted did not violate the prisoner's due
process rights because it was reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
interest in providing treatment to mentally ill inmates, and the evidence
proved by a clear and convincing standard that the prisoner was incompetent to
refuse treatment, based on undisputed testimony from a medical expert. Winnebago
County v. Christopher S., #2014AP001048, 2016 WI 1, 2016 Wisc. Lexis 1
A prisoner claimed that
hia Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was secured and kept in a
four-point restraint chair naked for 14 hours, although he allegedly did not pose
a threat to himself or others. He had a long history of mental illness, which
included schizo-affective disorder and bipolar disorder. His symptoms had
intensified after his detention in solitary confinement, during which he was
kept in his cell 23 hours a day, with one hour of daily recreation in a
solitary pen on weekdays. He suffered from both auditory and visual
hallucinations, paranoid thoughts, episodes of self-harm, suicidal impulses,
and episodes of smearing or throwing his own feces. A federal appeals court
vacated summary judgment for the defendants, finding that, viewing the facts in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there were genuine issues of
material fact as to whether he posed an imminent threat at the time of the
restraint. Young v. Martin, #13-4057, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 15922 (3rd Cir.).
A federal prisoner serving a felony sentence
challenged her civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4245, claiming that the
statutory preponderance of the evidence standard applied to civil commitment of
prisoners by the statute violated due process, which she argued required clear
and convincing evidence for civil commitment. Rejecting this argument, a
federal appeals court stated that clear and convincing evidence is indeed
needed for the indefinite commitment of a person with mental illness who is an
ordinary citizen, but that it did not violate due process for Congress to apply
a different standard to an incarcerated felon. While prisoners still have
interests in not being confined to mental hospitals, they "have lost their
right to freedom from confinement as a result of their convictions. Sealed
Appellee v. Sealed Appellant, #14-10274, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis ___ (5th Cir.).
A prisoner being admitted to a federal
penitentiary allegedly told an intake psychologist that he was mentally ill to
the extent that it impaired his ability to function and that he was afraid that
he would be attacked if he was placed in the general population. He was placed
in the general population and was attacked by another prisoner without
provocation on his way to lunch, suffering extensive injuries to his face and
head. He sued the U.S. government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 2674, claiming that the psychologist did not examine all his available
medical documents before releasing him into the general population and that
guards failed to monitor their assigned areas, thereby failing to observe the
assault, all in violation of mandatory regulations. The federal appeals court
overturned summary judgment granted to the government under the discretionary
function exception to liability under the Act. The appeals court found that the
government had failed to meet its burden of showing that the discretion
function exception shielded it from liability as a matter of law under these
circumstances. Keller v. United States, #13-3113, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis
21718 (7th Cir.).
A private psychiatrist who examined a pretrial
detainee in a county jail under a contract with his employer to provide mental
health services there acted under color of state law. She performed a public
function in examining the detainee, who had been acting strangely, and
determining that he did not meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization
in a psychiatric facility. Accordingly, the detainee could proceed with his
claim that her actions denied him the mental health services he needed while
detained. Carl v. Muskegon County, #13-2296, 763 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2014).
Under California state law, persons found not
guilty by reason of insanity have the same constitutional rights to refuse to
take antipsychotic medication as sexually violent predators and mentally
disordered offenders, until and unless a court finds that they are either a
danger to others or incompetent to make the decision. The plaintiff was
entitled to a hearing to rule on whether he should be forcibly medicated. In re
Greenshields, #B252222, 227 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 2014
Cal. App. Lexis 615.
A prisoner who engaged in suicide attempts,
fighting, and other disruptive activities allegedly suffered from significant
mental illness. Prison officials repeatedly subjected him to observation
placements and Behavioral Action Plans (BAPs). Summary judgment for the
defendants on claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs was
upheld, but the appeals court found that the prisoner had raised genuine issues
of disputed material fact as to whether the imposition of the BAP imposed an
atypical and significant hardship compared to the ordinary incidents of prison
life, without appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard, in violation
of due process. There was also a genuine issue as to whether the BAP imposed
conditions of confinement denying him the "minimal civilized measures of life's
necessities." Townsend v. Cooper, #12-3620, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 13776
(7th Cir.).
A detainee in custody awaiting a probable cause
determination was rapidly tapered off his psychotropic medication at a jail. He
complained of seizure-like symptoms and was placed in an isolated cell for
seven hours, after which he was found dead. The plaintiff's lawyer argued,
correctly, that the correct standard for jury instructions in the lawsuit was
objective reasonableness not the deliberate indifference standard that had been
used by both parties in the case pleadings, summary judgment briefing,
subsequent appeal, and remand pretrial preparations. The trial court barred the
plaintiff's attorney from arguing this because of tardiness in raising the
issue. The federal appeals court reversed, stating that the delay in asserting
the correct standard was "puzzling," but that the trial court had
failed to show how the defendants would suffer any prejudice because of the
delay. King v. Kramer, #13-2379, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 13252 (7th Cir.).
During his intake at a facility, a pretrial
detainee said that he had no prior suicide attempts, no thoughts of killing or
injuring himself, and no major medical problems. A number of weeks later, after
he reported suicidal thoughts, he was placed on a 15-minute suicide watch, but
subsequently denied that such thoughts continued, while complaining about
health issues and acting out in an attempt to be housed outside lockdown. On a
night that he was seen crying in his cell, he attempted to hang himself in his
cell. He suffered severe brain damage and disability from the unsuccessful
suicide attempt. The federal appeals court reversed summary judgment as to two
defendants, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether they had been deliberately indifferent to the detainee's risk of
suicide when he allegedly asked to see a crisis intervention person. If true,
there was an obligation to refer the detainee to the person charged, under
prison procedures, with making the definitive assessment of his psychological
condition. Additionally, the county might have vicarious liability for state
law claims arising out of the actions of these defendants. There was no
support, however, for the claim that a doctor and a nurse acted with deliberate
indifference. Pittman v. Cnty. of Madison, #12-3233, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 4444
(7th Cir.).
A prisoner who had been released from custody
pursued a lawsuit asserting claims for deliberate indifference to his mental health
needs, violations of his right to exercise his religion, and interference with
his right of access to the courts. A federal appeals court held that his claims
for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot as he was no longer in custody.
His claim concerning his mental health treatment boiled down with a mere
disagreement with the treatment provided, which was inadequate for a federal
civil rights claim. His claims concerning religious freedom and access to the
courts were properly dismissed, as he failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies concerning these issues, as required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act. Lastly, he was properly denied an appointed lawyer as he
was unlikely to succeed on the merits and was able to present the case adequately
by himself. Cano v. Taylor, #10-17030, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 703 (9th Cir.).
A federal appeals court upheld an order for the
forced medication of a defendant to render him competent to stand trial. The
fact that he might subsequently face civil commitment did not alter the
circumstances, nor was the court impressed with the argument that he was
"not dangerous" aside from having allegedly threatened bodily harm to
the President of the U.S. This did not make it unimportant to uphold the
government's interest in prosecuting him for a crime that was dangerous and
serious and there was a solid evidentiary basis for the trial court's order,
which was not clearly erroneous. United States v. Dillon, #13-3044, 2013 U.S.
App. Lexis25597 (D.C. Cir).
The Federal Bureau of Prisons was properly
authorized to medicate a mentally ill prisoner without his consent. The
evidence showed that he was mentally ill, that he posed a danger to himself or
others, and that the treatment was in his medical interest. The determination
was supported by the record of his past disciplinary conduct record. He
threatened harm, attempted to bite or hit officers, repeatedly threw liquids in
officers' faces, and engage in both actual and attempted stabbings. Testifying
psychiatrists and psychologists showed a consensus that the prescribed
antipsychotic medication was the proper treatment for his condition. U.S. v.
Hardy, #12-2951, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 15942 (2nd Cir.).
A New York prisoner claimed that officials
violated his equal protection and Eighth Amendment rights by denying his
request for a leave of absence from incarceration to seek treatment for
post-traumatic stress disorder. He claimed that prisoners suffering certain
physical ailments were granted such leaves, but that he was denied one because
his was a mental health issue. The defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity because there was no evidence that they had acted unreasonably in
believing that the mental health needs of prisoners were being adequately met in
the facility. There was a rational basis for distinguishing between mental
ailments for which treatment was available in the facility, and certain
physical ailments that there were no treatments provided for while still
incarcerated. Spavone v. N.Y. State Department of Correctional Services,
#11-617, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 12549 (2nd Cir.).
A 23-year-old prisoner, with no known
life-threatening conditions, was transferred to a new facility. Under the care
of employees of a private medical provider that had a contract to provide care
to prisoners, he was treated for moderate depression and prescribed
medications. A month later, he was found dead in his cell and an autopsy showed
that he died of an epileptic seizure disorder. He had been given both Amitriptyline
and Trazodone the previous three days. In a lawsuit by his estate a forensic
pathologist for the plaintiff reported that the death was likely caused by a
fatal drug interaction. A federal appeals court rejected a motion for qualified
immunity by the defendant psychiatrist, as a fact finder could find that he had
been deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm from the drug
interaction. Quigley v. Thai, #11-2014, 707 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2013).
A 16-year-old in an Illinois juvenile detention
facility had a history of mental illness and three known prior in custody
suicide attempts. The record of his latest intake assessment indicated that he
suffered from major depression, psychosis, bipolar disorder, anger, behavior
disorders and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.
He had also previously gone through drug abuse counseling. He had a history of
setting fires, cruelty to animals, threatening to kill teachers, alcohol and
cannabis use, gang affiliation, and putting a gun to a cousin's head. Despite
all this, the juvenile stated that he was not having depressive or manic
symptoms and had not recently had suicidal thoughts. Prozac and lithium was
prescribed for him and he was evaluated for suicide risk from time to time.
Subsequently, he successfully hung himself in his cell. Even assuming that the
plaintiff had shown that the defendants were aware of the suicide risk of using
metal bunk beds in rooms for mentally disturbed detainees, and that alternative
arrangements were feasible, the law was not clearly established enough to
defeat the defendant supervisors' defense of qualified immunity. A defendant
doctor was not sufficiently enough involved with the decedent to be liable for
his death. Miller v. Harbaugh, #11-3418, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 21855 (7th Cir.).
A delusional convicted prisoner claimed that his
involuntary medication with antipsychotic drugs and his transfer to a state
hospital treatment unit from a city correctional center violated his due
process rights. A federal appeals court rejected these claims, noting that such
forcible medication can be approved based on "overriding justification and
a determination of medical appropriateness." He received appropriate due
process, including a hearing, within seven days of arrival at the treatment
facility and before any involuntary medication had begun. The hearing
determined, based on an evaluation that he suffered from a grave disability
that made it impossible for him to function either in prison or in society
following his release, which justified the medication. His constitutional
liberty interest in avoiding involuntary medication was not expanded by the
particulars of a state correctional policy on the subject. Green v. Dormire,
#11–2251, 691 F.3d 917 (8th Cir.).
The state of Nevada has reached a $450,000
settlement with the mother of an inmate who died in state prison. The board
that approved the award was told by the state that he died from an adverse
reaction to an administered anti-psychotic drug, even though his death
certificate labeled his death a homicide. The plaintiff's attorney claimed that
the prisoner "literally was strangled to death by the correctional
officers" who were holding him down to administer the medication. Johnson
v. Palmer, #2:11-cv-01604, U.S. District Court (D. Nev. Aug. 2012).
A pre-trial detainee in a county facility had a
history of depression but had exhibited no signs of suicidal tendencies. A
social worker decided not to forward his request to see a prison psychiatrist
to ask for anti-depressant medication. After the detainee hung himself and
died, a lawsuit was filed for deliberate indifference against the psychiatrist,
who was an employee of a private nonprofit organization which furnishes medical
services to the facility. The psychiatrist could not seek qualified immunity
from federal civil rights liability as a private doctor working part-time for a
government entity, as there was no history of such immunity for such doctors at
the time the federal civil rights statute was enacted. McCullum v. Tepe,
#11-3424, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 18171, 2012 Fed. App. 0287P (6th Cir.).
When a court is presented with evidence from a
mental health professional that unrepresented prisoner litigants in a civil
lawsuit seeking damages from prison officials may be incompetent, it is a
violation of the court's duty under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(2) to
not at least consider whether an attorney should be appointed for the prisoner.
That rule obligates the court to protect unrepresented people who are
incompetent. In one case, a psychiatric report presented enough evidence of
incompetence to make it an abuse of discretion not to appoint a representative.
In another, a psychiatrist's letter at least required that the court consider
the issue. Powell v. Symons, #10–2157, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 6467
(3rd Cir.).
A mentally disturbed man arrested for assaulting
an officer was forcibly dressed in pink underwear at the county jail, and
yelled out that he was being "raped" (which was not the case).
Following his release on bail, and hearing that there was a warrant for his
arrest for spitting on an officer during the dress out, he ran away from his
home, fearing another arrest. Running four or five miles, he died the next day
from acute cardiac arrhythmia. A federal appeals court found that his estate
validly stated a federal civil rights claim, and that testimony was properly
offered to show that the decedent experienced a "sense of humiliation at
being forced to wear pink." With no explanation or defense offered for the
practice of dressing detainees in pink, the practice "appears to be
punishment without legal justification." The trial court acted properly,
however, in excluding testimony by the plaintiff's expert that the dress-out
procedure was "probably" the cause of his death. That testimony
failed to take into account "generally accepted facts" that cardiac
arrhythmia occurred at a generally higher rate among schizophrenics, and
explain how that and the fact that stress could render the condition fatal were
enough to pinpoint the specific incident that caused the death. Family members
should not have been barred from testifying about what the decedent told them about
his experiences, for the purpose of showing his state of mind in reaction to
it. Wagner v. County of Maricopa, #10-15501, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 4721
(9th Cir.).
A schizophrenic man arrested for an attempted
bank robbery often refused to take his medication, bathe or eat while in a
county jail. He was transported back and forth between a number of mental
health facilities and the jail on a number of occasions. While at the jail
pending a transfer to a state psychiatric institution, he died from excessively
drinking water ("psychogenic polydipsia."). While his estate could
pursue claims concerning the sanitary condition of his cell (despite the fact
that he may have helped cause the conditions, based on his mental incompetence,
there was no basis that any of the defendants were liable for his death, absent
any evidence that they were on notice that he might compulsively engage in
water drinking to the extent that it would put his life in danger. Estate of
Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, #09–2804, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 5728
(7th Cir.),
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the order
of a special three-judge court ordering that the California state prison system
reduce its population from 156,000 prisoners, nearly double capacity, by
approximately 46,000 prisoners, or 137.5% of design capacity within two years.
Current overcrowding was found to have resulted in inadequate medical care and
mental health treatment. The Court found that the injunctive order complied
with the stringent requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and that
the court below properly gave "substantial weight" to any potential
adverse impact on public safety from the order. Brown v. Plata, #09–1233, 2011
U.S. Lexis 4012.
A prisoner who claimed that a psychologist improperly
ordered him placed on suicide watch instead of medicating him failed to
establish a claim for deliberate indifference. There was nothing to show that
the defendant's actions were inconsistent with his duties as a medical
professional. The prisoner had a history of substance abuse and expressed a
desire to be medicated with Zoloft, which the psychologist did not believe he
needed. Walker v. Eyke, #09-1695, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 6512 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
A former prisoner sued a prison doctor,
claiming that he knew he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, but had refused
to provide him with antipsychotic medication, resulting in him hearing voices
for six months while incarcerated. The trial court appointed a lawyer to
represent him, after he stated that his mental impairment made it difficult to
present his case. Despite this, the plaintiff's responses to discovery requests
were late, incomplete, and vague, and he failed to provide medical records
within his control. In response to a question about his medical treatment since
2000, the plaintiff stated that he had been hospitalized about 150 times, but
offered no details about where or when, failing to name any hospitals or
physicians. A federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit as a sanction
for failing to comply with discovery requests. The court below had taken the
prisoner's mental condition into account in extending deadlines and appointing
a lawyer to assist him. Despite these accommodations, the plaintiff failed to
cure defects in his discovery responses, and failed to appear in court when his
presence was required by court order. Watkins v. Nielsen, #10-2366, 2010 U.S.
App. Lexis 25775 (Unpub. 7th Cir.).
A Massachusetts man civilly committed as a sexually
dangerous person, claimed that doubling bunking him in a cell with another
detainee violated his due process rights and exposed him to harm. But he did
not allege any specifics as to how double bunking caused him any ham. He failed
to show how either his treatment needs or his safety required a single cell. He
also did not show any unusual circumstances, such as being forced to be housed
with a suicidal person. Rector v. Dept. of Correction, #10-1079, 2010 U.S. App.
Lexis 14924 (Unpub. 1st Cir.).
A prisoner sued a prison psychiatrist who treated
him for various psychological disorders, asserting that the doctor prescribed
anti-psychotic medications in order to cause him to commit suicide. The
evidence, however, indicated that the inmate, who stated that he had lost trust
in the doctor, exhibited paranoid thoughts, stopped taking his medication, and
threatened suicide, and that the doctor had him placed under observation. There
was no evidence of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs,
much less an intent to harm him. There was also no evidence of the inmate's
contention that the anti-psychotic medication prescribed interacted with other
medication he was taking to cause suicidal tendencies. Thomas v. Beard,
#10-1375, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 16390 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
A federal investigation into conditions at Cook
County Jail in Chicago, Illinois allegedly found widespread unconstitutional
conditions resulting in unnecessary inmate deaths and amputations, inadequate
medical care, and routine prisoner beatings. The federal government settled a
lawsuit with the county in an effort to remedy these problems. The agreement
calls for the hiring of 600 additional jail guards, the hiring of four new
outside jail monitors, and improvements in jail medical and mental health
facilities. It also provides for stepped-up inspections for contraband and more
video surveillance of inmate housing. U.S.A. v. Cook County, Illinois,
#10-C-2946 (U.S. Dist Ct., N.D. Ill., May 13, 2010). Click here to read the
Complaint in the case. Click here to read the press release announcing the
settlement agreement.
Officials at a treatment center for sex offenders
were properly denied summary judgment in a lawsuit claiming that the were
deliberately indifferent to the risk that he would be assaulted by another
offender. He adequately alleged that it was "readily apparent" that
placing him in a room with another sex offender who then assaulted him
subjected him to an objectively serious risk of harm. There were also
sufficient facts from which a jury could find that a defendant acted with
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need by failing to provide him
with prescribed psychological treatment. Nelson v. Shuffman, #09-2225, 603 F.3d
439 (8th Cir. 2009).
A prisoner sought an injunction against being placed in
a double-bunked cell. He had repeatedly refused orders to enter such a cell,
and had been disciplined for these refusals. He claimed to suffer from
"mental health issues" which would make double-bunking an "inhumane"
condition of confinement and put him at substantial risk of harm from anxiety
over the possibility of fights and violence. The trial court held that he had
stated a possible Eighth Amendment claim, but that he had to produce some
evidence of his purported mental health issues. The court rejected the
plaintiff's due process and equal protection claims since he had no protected
right to a single-bunk cell and had not been treated differently than other
similarly situated inmates. Finally, the prisoner had no First Amendment right
to "keep to himself" and refuse to be placed in a double-bunked cell.
He was given 45 days to produce evidence of a mental illness justifying his
alleged need not to be placed in a cell with another prisoner. Restucci v.
Clarke, #09-10584, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 106880 (D. Mass.).
In a lawsuit filed by the sister of a detainee
who successfully committed suicide, a federal appeals court upheld a finding of
no liability on civil rights claims against the county, but reversed summary
judgment for a psychiatrist under contract with the jail on a medical
malpractice claim. The psychiatrist, who was consulted by jail personnel on the
detainee's prescriptions, tried to meet with him for a psychiatric examination,
but the detainee became "highly agitated" and refused to speak with
him in front of a jail officer. The psychiatrist believed that this was a manic
episode and discontinued an antidepressant medication to attempt to deal with
it. For purposes of the medical malpractice claim, this was a treatment
decision, resulting in a duty of care. Whether the psychiatrist violated the
applicable standard of care and whether this proximately caused the detainee's
death required further proceedings to determine. While it was clear that the
jail's express policy required the presence of a jail officer during the
interview with the psychiatrist, this was not a violation of the detainee's
constitutional rights. Hunter v. Amin, #08-3719, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 21731
(7th Cir.).
Prison officials did not act with deliberate
indifference to a prisoner's mental health needs in downgrading his mental
health status and having him placed in the general population, where he harmed
himself. There was no established protected liberty interest in a prisoner's
mental health classification. Rather than showing deliberate indifference, the
actions taken merely reflected a difference of opinion about the care that the
plaintiff needed. West v. Higgins, #08-11309, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 21057
(Unpub. 11th Cir.).
An inmate failed to show that a prison
psychiatrist failed to provide him with needed treatment or disregarded a known
risk of harm he faced. He also failed to show that the psychiatrist conspired
with prison officials to unlawfully revoke his single-cell status or that
placing him in a double-cell subjected him to an atypical and significant
hardship. His claims that he suffered from depression, paranoia, and physical
discomfort were not serious enough to show an Eighth Amendment violation.
Hodges v. Wilson, #08-4868, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 17828 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
Injuries a prisoner allegedly suffered from
withdrawal from Xanax, which he claimed included hallucinations, nausea,
anxiety, and fluctuating blood pressure, did not satisfy the requirement, under
42 U.S.C. Sec. 19997e(e) that he show physical injury before being able to
recover damages for mental injuries. At the time, the plaintiff prisoner
himself only complained of cold symptoms and "agitation."
Additionally, because medical personnel provided other psychotropic medication
during his Xanax withdrawal, they were not deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. Chatham v. Adcock, #07-14995, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 13731
(Unpub. 11th Cir.).
A new Florida law, effective July 1, 2009,
requires law enforcement agencies to have a protocol with care facilities
concerning mental health examination of persons transported there. "Each
law enforcement agency shall develop a memorandum of understanding with each
receiving facility within the law enforcement's jurisdiction which reflects a
single set of protocols for the safe and secure transportation of the person
and transfer of custody of the person. These protocols must also address
crisis-intervention measures."
Jail employees were not entitled to qualified
immunity in a lawsuit contending that they were deliberately indifferent to the
serious medical needs of a prisoner with mental problems, resulting in his
death. The complaint alleged that the prisoner's mother brought his
anti-depression medicine to the jail, that he received it until it ran out, and
that his new prescription was not available until two days later. When the
prisoner's cellmate informed an employee of the sheriff's department that the
prisoner had been engaging in odd behavior and swallowing shampoo, a reasonable
jury could conclude that the defendants knew that he needed medical attention,
but acted with deliberate indifference to that need. Vaughn v. Gray, #07-2921,
2009 U.S. App. Lexis 4800 (8th Cir.).
A prisoner failed to show that there was a
genuine issue concerning whether he was provided inadequate treatment for
mental health problems. He was provided with psychiatric medications within 30
days of his arrival at a county jail. His lawsuit demonstrated merely a disagreement
with the course of treatment provided, rather than deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs. The court also rejected a claim concerning treatment
provided for an erupted wisdom tooth, when a dentist who examined the prisoner
found no cause for concern. Jaquez v. Newell, #07-CV-498, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis
15964 (N.D. Ok.).
A prisoner failed to show that the decision to
forcibly medicate him with anti-psychotic drugs constituted deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. The trial court had authorized the
expenditure of funds for the prisoner to hire an expert for the purpose of
making an assessment of the medical evidence, but the prisoner declined to do
so. His failure to present expert witness evidence could not be overcome solely
by the prisoner's presentation of his own sworn statement concerning his
treatment. Aruanno v. Glazman, #07-2543, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 4154 (Unpub. 3rd
Cir.).
Inmate failed to establish a claim for inadequate
medical treatment, as he was examined by a number of mental health providers
while incarcerated, as well as being provided with treatment for a number of
physical ailments. His medical needs were not "serious," he suffered
no long-term effects from any delay in treatment, and he never complained about
his treatment while at the prison. Tsakonas v. Cicchi, No. 07-4115, 2009 U.S.
App. Lexis 1856 (3rd Cir.).
Prison administrators would be authorized to
provide consent to medical treatment on a prisoner's behalf when he was engaged
in a hunger strike predicated on "delusional" reasons that showed an
"irrational" thought process. Conservatorship of Burton, No.
F0548632009, Cal. App. Lexis 96 (Cal. App. 5th Dist.).
An Ohio prisoner claimed that lithium prescribed
for his mental condition caused failure of his kidneys, and that he was he
being medicated in this manner over his objections. He also claimed that he was
improperly held down and forcibly administered anti-psychotic drugs on at least
one occasion. The court also found, in the alternative, that the requirements
of procedural due process had been met. There was no violation of the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment since the facts alleged
did not show that the care provided by prison doctors was grossly inadequate or
medically unsound. Kramer v. Wilkinson, No. 07-4104, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 24538
(Unpub. 6th Cir.).
In a class action over alleged inadequate mental
health care of inmates at a county jail, the plaintiffs failed to define in
"reasonably particular" detail, what adequate mental health screening
would be or a system for delivering medications, and that injunctive relief
concerning the treatment of the class was manageable and
"conceivable," in light of the individual characteristics and
circumstances of class members, including the severity and nature of their
mental illnesses. Class certification was therefore properly denied. Shook v.
Board of County Commissioners, County of El Paso, No. 06-1454, 2008 U.S. App.
Lexis 18542 (10th Cir.).
While an inmate's claim concerning his allegedly
inadequate mental health treatment focused on his desire to be admitted to a
particular mental health facility, he was nevertheless required under 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 1997e of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to exhaust all available
administrative procedures before filing suit, even if those procedures could
not provide him with the precise relief that he was seeking. He had an
opportunity to appeal a decision to transfer him out of the facility after a
determination that his conduct had become a "barrier" to his
participation in the program there, but failed to appeal. Additionally,
examining psychologists failed to find that he suffered from a mental illness.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants in his
lawsuit. Gruenberg v. Lundquist, No. 08-1251, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 18216
(Unpub. 7th Cir.).
A psychiatrist's deliberate indifference caused a
mentally ill prisoner's death from severe dehydration he experienced after he
was kept in a 90 to 100 degree observation room for several days. A jury
awarded $2 million in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages.
The compensatory damage award was reduced to $1.5 million. A federal appeals
court rejected arguments that the remaining damage awards were excessive, and
found that there was sufficient evidence for the deliberate indifference
finding, as well as a medical malpractice claim. Further proceedings were
ordered on the trial court's reasons for allocating the compensatory damage
award between the federal deliberate indifference claim and a state law medical
malpractice claim, which was subject to a cap on non-economic damages. Gibson
v. Moskowitz, No. 07-1074, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 9233 (6th Cir.).
A federal civil detainee sufficiently presented a
claim that prison employees acted with deliberate indifference to his mental
health needs by denying him needed psychiatric treatment despite his
deteriorating condition, which went beyond mere negligence in care. Because he
was a civil detainee, and not a prisoner, he was not required to exhaust
available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42
U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a). Additionally, as a civil detainee, his claims were
analyzed under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, rather than under
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The
detainee was confined under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4246(a), providing for the
hospitalization (and continued detention) of a person in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons when their sentence is about to expire or when criminal
charges against them have been dismissed on the basis of their mental
condition, if they suffer from a mental disease or defect as a result of which
their release would create a "substantial risk of bodily harm to another
persons or serious damage to property of another." Hicks v. James, No.
06-6786, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 28251 (4th Cir.).
In a lawsuit over the death of an allegedly
mentally ill pretrial detainee while in custody in a county jail, the plaintiff
failed to show that the decedent had been discriminated against because of his
alleged disability of mental illness or that there had been deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. There was also no proof of an
official policy or custom of depriving mentally ill detainees of needed medical
treatment. The cause of the detainee's death was a previously undiagnosed
physical ailment of "peritonitis due to a perforated ulcer,"
and the prisoner's mental illness may have rendered meaningful communication
with the medical personnel who treated him "almost impossible." In
the absence of accurate information from the patient, the medical personnel
were denied information that might have aided in their ability to timely
diagnose the perforated ulcer. Winters v. Arkansas Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., No. 06-2787 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 15486. (8th Cir.).
A New York prisoner failed to show that
correctional officials violated his due process rights by putting him on a restrictive
diet that he claimed aggravated his existing mental health condition, resulting
in him suffering a mental breakdown. There was no violation of due process,
based on the fact that a medical clearance was given before the diet was
implemented. A federal appeals court, however, reinstated the prisoner's Eighth
Amendment claim, finding that the trial court used too high a standard,
requiring the prisoner to show that correctional officials acted in a sadistic
and malicious manner, rather than with deliberate indifference to his health or
safety. The prisoner adequately alleged that correctional officials knew about
the seriousness of his mental condition, and intentionally used a false charge
to impose the restricted diet which caused his breakdown, requiring further
proceedings. Guilbert v. Sennet, No. 05-6594, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 13401 (2nd
Cir.).
While a prisoner suffering from a bipolar
disorder and severe depression showed that he had serious medical needs, he
failed to show that a mental health counselor acted with deliberate
indifference to these needs by denying him medication after learning from a
psychiatrist that he had been self-medicating himself. The counselor made a
good-faith effort to determine whether the inmate's symptoms justified
medication and allegedly determined that they did not. Goodrich v. Clinton
County Prison, No. 04-3741, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 1148 (3rd Cir.). [N/R]
New York state corrections law does not give
prison superintendents authority to authorize the commitment of inmates who are
sexual offenders to psychiatric hospitals in a unilateral manner. Prisoners are
entitled, prior to such commitment, to procedural safeguards, including a right
to be heard in court. New York ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, No. 140, 2006 N.Y.
Lexis 3580. [N/R]
Despite prior suicide attempt by detainee, jail
caseworker/counselor was not liable for 18-year-old's subsequent successful
suicide when she returned him to a single person cell in the general population
of the jail. She was entitled to qualified immunity, as there was no clearly
established law indicating that her actions would violate his constitutional
rights, even if she arguably acted with poor judgment. Perez v. Oakland County,
No. 05-1583, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 25754 (6th Cir.). [2006 JB Dec]
Detainee in county jail presented a viable equal
protection claim by alleging that the jail had a policy and practice of
discrimination and that an officer there discriminated against him in his
conditions of confinement because of his mental illness of bi-polar disorder.
Glisson v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Department, No. 05-3250, 408 F. Supp. 2d
609 (C.D. Ill. 2006). [N/R]
Bipolar prisoner who saw mental health staff,
counselors, and doctors 38 times in a 13 month period failed to show that
prison authorities acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs, or retaliated against him for filing a grievance by pursuing misconduct
charges against him or transferring him to another facility. Moots v. Lombardi,
No. 05-1594, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 17479 (8th Cir.). [2006 JB Sep]
Prisoner's claim that officials violated his due
process rights by requiring him to agree to take anti-psychotic medications
specified by a program coordinator of a sex offender treatment program as a
condition of parole was not frivolous, and should not have been dismissed on
that basis. The prisoner stated a possible claim for infringement on his
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of anti-psychotic
medications. Bundy v. Stommel, No. 05-1099, 168 Fed. Appx. 870 (10th Cir.
2006). [N/R]
Under Kentucky state law, a county jail, rather
than the state, had the financial responsibility of providing indigent
prisoners with psychotropic medications. Osborne v. Commonwealth, No.
2004-SC-000566, 185 S.W.2d 645 (Ky. 2006). [N/R]
Nebraska prisoner did not have a clear right
under state law to access to his mental health records, nor a federally
protected constitutional right to such access, and therefore was not entitled
to a court order requiring correctional officials to provide him with a copy of
the records. State ex rel. Jacob v. Bohn, No. S-04-1410, 711 N.W.2d 884 (Neb.
2006). [N/R]
Schizophrenic prisoner who murdered Jeffrey
Dahmer and two other persons failed to show that prison officials at Supermax
facility knew that the heat in his cell, the constant illumination there, and
the denial of his request for audiotapes to "still the voices" in his
head were making his mental illness worse. Scarver v. Litscher, No. 05-2999,
2006 U.S. App. Lexis 1135 (7th Cir.). [2006 JB Mar]
Man detained by the State of Wisconsin as a
sexually violent person failed to show that he was provided with
constitutionally inadequate mental health treatment. He failed to show that
decisions about his treatment were either made by unqualified personnel or that
his treatment was "outside the bounds" of acceptable professional
judgment. Williams v. Nelson, No. 04-C-774C, 398 F. Supp. 2d 977 (W.D. Wis.
2005). [N/R]
Connecticut prisoner's allegation that his
meetings with mental health staff at the prison were conducted on the cell
tier, within the hearing of other inmates, adequately stated a possible claim
for violation of his right to privacy concerning his mental health issues under
federal and state law. Hunnicutt v. Armstrong, No. 04-1565, 152 Fed. Appx. 34
(2nd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
In lawsuit claiming that county failed to provide
adequate medical care to mentally ill prisoners, a report by a consulting
expert retained by the county to evaluate health services and programs at the
county's jails was not protected from discovery under the work products
doctrine protecting materials prepared in anticipation of litigation. The
expert was not asked to investigate any particular claims but rather to help
the county develop long range planning and analysis of its health care needs.
There was no evidence that the county's outside litigation attorney was
involved in or directed the preparation of the report. Mims v. Dallas County, No.
3-04-CV-2754, 230 F.R.D. 479 (N.D. Tex. 2005). [N/R]
Detainee suffering from paranoid schizophrenia,
acute psychosis, impulse-control disorder, and "polysubstance abuse"
could not assert disability discrimination claims since his impairments, because
they could be corrected "or mitigated" by medication, did not
constitute disabilities. Jail personnel did not use excessive force in using
pepper spray to subdue him when he actively resisted his transfer to a hospital
for treatment, and did not violate his right to receive adequate medical
attention. Atwell v. Hart County, Kentucky, No. 03-6421, 122 Fed. Appx. 215
(6th Cir. 2005). [2005 JB Dec]
Prison officials did not show deliberate indifference
to the serious needs of a mentally ill and suicidal prisoner by failing to
provide requested therapeutic art supplies, when they did provide a medical
examination and anti-psychotic medications. Scarver v. Litscher, No.01C497, 371
S. Supp. 2d 986 (W.D. Wis. 2005). [N/R]
Mere three-day delay between the date a prisoner
was incarcerated in a county jail and the date she was seen by a psychiatrist
did not establish deliberate indifference by the County or its Commissioner to
her serious medical needs. Evidence in the record showed that she was seen by mental
health personnel whenever she requested, and that problems with her medication
were remedied as soon as those problems were brought to the attention of
medical personnel. Atkins v. County of Orange, No. 01CIV.11536, 372 F. Supp. 2d
377 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). [N/R]
A jail doctor's decision not to put a pre-trial
detainee on psychiatric medications after he attempted to swallow a razor blade
was not deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The doctor made a
medical determination that the detainee was not psychotic, and had him placed
in segregation and under close monitoring and supervision by the jail's mental
health personnel. Edmonds v. Horton, No. 03-6031, 113 Fed. Appx. 62 (6th Cir.
2004). [N/R]
Federal trial court applied the wrong legal
standard in denying certification of a class action lawsuit challenging the
alleged denial of access to mental health care at a county jail. Shook v. El
Paso County, No. 03-1397, 386 F.3d 963 (10th Cir. 2004). [2005 JB Jan]
Statements by state prison psychologist to
mentally ill prisoner who made suicidal threats that no one would care if he
died did not constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, when
psychologist also recommended that the prisoner remain under observation, and
the prisoner had access to other psychologists at the prison, as well as to a
psychiatrist to whom he had been referred. Means v. Cullen, 297 F. Supp. 1148
(W.D. Wis. 2003). [N/R]
Private psychiatric hospital and not-for-profit
company which owned it were not immune under Tennessee law for potential
liability for county jail inmate's suicide on the basis of their employee's
alleged action in telling county jail that suicide protocol precautions were
not necessary for this prisoner. Employee also qualified as a "state
employee" because of his service in screening prisoners to determine if
hospitalization was appropriate, and as a state employee, he was entitled to
statutory immunity, but this did not alter the result as to the hospital or its
owner. Shelburne v. Frontier Health, 126 S.W.3d 838 (Tenn. 2003). [N/R]
Psychiatrist was entitled to summary judgment on
prisoner's claim against him alleging unjustified forced administration of
anti-psychotic drugs and excessive doses of one such drug, causing memory loss,
headaches, twitching, and confusion. Prisoner failed to properly present expert
testimony or other medical evidence sufficient to establish a claim of
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, or that the psychiatrist
had subjective knowledge that there was an excessive risk to the prisoner's
health and that the psychiatrist then failed to act on the basis of that
knowledge. Roberson v. Goodman, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (D.N.D. 2003). [N/R]
California Supreme Court rules that mentally ill
inmates, placed in mental institutions after the conclusion of their sentences,
may not be forced to take anti-psychotic drugs unless they are found to be an
immediate danger to themselves or others or incompetent to refuse treatment. In
re Qawi, No. S100099, 2004 Cal. LEXIS 1, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 780, 81 P.3d 224.
[2004 JB Feb]
Plaintiff failed to show that county had a policy
of deliberate indifference in training correctional officers in the handling of
mentally ill detainees, or that any such inadequacy in county's training caused
detainee's death. No liability for county for the death of detainee from heart
failure while incarcerated. Carey v. Helton, No. 01-5623, 70 Fed. Appx. 291
(6th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Prisoners asserting claims against county and
sheriff for alleged systemic violations of their rights as persons with
"serious mental health needs" were not required to exhaust available
administrative remedies before filing suit when there was "no available
administrative remedies" that the plaintiffs could have used for relief.
Shook v. Bd. of County Commissioners of the County of El Paso, 216 F.R.D. 644
(D. Colo. 2003). [N/R]
Mentally ill county jail inmates could not pursue
their claims for disability discrimination against the county and county
officials for alleged degrading treatment. They failed to show that they were
denied the benefits of any services, program or activity of the jail, or that
violent and self-destructive inmates who were mentally ill were treated any
differently than violent and self-destructive inmates not suffering from a
mental illness. Atkins v. County of Orange, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). [2003 JB Aug]
Montana Supreme Court finds that prison's
practice of subjecting certain inmates to behavior modification plans, along
with the living conditions in the areas where such inmates were housed,
violated the state constitutional right to "human dignity" of
mentally ill prisoner and represented cruel and unusual punishment, especially
when used as a substitute for medical treatment for disruptive and suicidal
prisoner. Walker v. State of Montana, #01-528, 68 P.3d 872 (Mont. 2003). [2003
JB Aug]
Federal appeals court establishes legal standard for
medicating criminal defendants involuntarily to enable them to be competent for
trial. United States v. Gomes, No. 01-1143, 289 F.3d 71 (2nd Cir. 2002). [2002
JB Oct]
Widow of manic depressive detainee who suffered a
heart attack and died while in custody could pursue claim that county policy of
delaying medical screening of combative inmates constituted a substantial risk
of serious harm to the decedent. Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, #99-17338,
290 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2002). [2002 JB Oct]
Prisoner's mental health disorder, diagnosed as
bipolar disorder, was sufficiently serious so that deliberate indifference to
his resulting medical needs, including anxiety he allegedly suffered due to a
lack of medication review, would violate the Eighth Amendment. Further
proceedings ordered as to whether manager of counseling treatment services
purposefully misdiagnosed prisoner's mental illness or denied medication
review. Page v. Norvell, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (D. Ore. 2000). [N/R]
Federal trial court prohibits housing of
seriously mentally ill inmates at "super-maximum" security state
prison, based on claim that conditions there, as applied to the mentally ill,
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Jones 'El v. Berge, #00-C-421-C, 164
F. Supp. 2d 1096 (W.D. Wis. 2001). [2002 JB Apr]
290:22 Mentally ill prisoners in New York City
jails are entitled, under state law, to help in obtaining continuing treatment
on their discharge; trial court issues preliminary injunction requiring
discharge planning for such prisoners. Brad v. City of New York, 712 N.Y.S.2d
(Sup. 2000).
278:24 New Jersey reaches wide-ranging $16
million settlement in lawsuit over allegedly inadequate treatment of
mentally-ill prisoners and disability discrimination against them; plaintiffs'
attorneys to receive $1.22 million in attorneys' fees; disciplinary policies to
take prisoners' mental illness into account; all new prisoners to receive
mental health assessment within 72 hours. D.M. v. Terhune, 67 F. Supp. 2d 401
(D.N.J. 1999).
[N/R] Pretrial detainee who was incompetent to
stand trial could immediately appeal administrative order permitting medical
personnel to forcibly administer anti- psychotic medication, but was not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing before the district court when
administrative proceeding complied with due process. U.S. v. Morgan, No.
99-6245, 193 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 1999).