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Prisoner Classification
Monthly Law Journal Article: Prisoner Classification and Gang Activity, 2013 (11) AELE Mo. L. J. 301.
In a prior case, the highest court in Massachusetts held that the procedure used by the Department of Correction to determine the security classification of juvenile homicide offenders violated a state statute which prohibits the Department from categorically barring juvenile homicide offenders from being placed in minimum security facilities. Since then, the Department developed a modified process for classifying juvenile homicide offenders. Now juvenile homicide offenders who were also petitioners in the earlier case challenged that modified process. The Massachusetts high court held that, after applying the earlier holding, the Department continued to fall short of the requirements of the statute. The Department’s written explanations for blocking the majority of objectively qualifying juvenile homicide offenders from placement in a minimum security facility did not go far enough to ensure that the classification procedure was actually individualized and that no juvenile homicide offender was categorically barred from classification to a minimum security facility. Deal v. Commissioner of Correction, #SJC-12246, 478 Mass. 332, 2017 Mass. Lexis 781.
A prisoner claimed that the defendant
prison employees falsely classified him as a gang member in retaliation for him
filing a federal civil rights lawsuit against their co-workers. California
courts rejected his claim for habeas relief,
finding sufficient evidence to support the gang classification. A federal
appeals court ruled that this determination by the California courts precluded
the prisoner’s subsequent federal civil rights lawsuit asserting claims for
violation of his First Amendment retaliation and equal protection rights based
on the same classification. The appeals
court held that the same primary right—the prisoner’s right to be free from
unlawful gang validation and placement in segregated housing —was at issue in
both suits. Because the suit involved the same cause of action between the same
parties after a final judgment on the merits of the first suit, the subsequent
suit was barred. Furnace v. Giurbino, #13-17620, 838 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2016).
A
Massachusetts correctional policy of using discretionary override codes to
block juvenile homicide offenders from being placed in a minimum security
facility unless and until they had received a positive parole vote violated a
state statute barring a categorical ban on such placement and requiring a
consideration on suitability for minimum security classification on a
case-by-case basis. The practice did not, however, violate juvenile homicide
offenders' right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation because there is no constitutionally
protected expectation under the Eight Amendment or Mass. Const. Decl. Rights
art. 26 that a juvenile homicide offender will be released to the community
after serving a statutorily prescribed portion of his or her sentence. Deal v.
Comm'r of Correction, #SJC-12053, 475 Mass. 307, 56 N.E.3d 800 (Mass. 2016).
A prisoner was placed
in a Special Management Unit (SMU), a unit intended for those with a history of
violence and prisoners who “participated in or had leadership roles in
geographical groups/gang related activity." He sued, claiming that through
a pattern, practice, or policy, prison officials often placed inmates with
hostile cellmates, unnecessarily increasing the risk of violence. He also claimed
that those who refused to accept a hostile cellmate were placed in painful
restraints. He was transferred out of the facility, but a federal appeals court
found that his class claims were not moot. When individual claims for relief
are acutely susceptible to mootness, a would-be class representative may, in
some circumstances, continue to seek certification after losing his personal
stake in the case, and that applied to the plaintiff in this case. He could
continue to seek class certification. Richardson v. Dir., Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, #15-2876, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 12997 (3rd Cir.).
A federal appeals court found no error in summary
judgment granted to prison officials rejecting a prisoner's claim that they
violated his procedural due process rights by classifying him as a sex
offender, although he had committed no crime requiring him to register as such.
He was classified as a sex offender based on an assessment of the risk that he
would commit such crimes, given the types of crimes he had committed. That
classification did not implicate his liberty interests under the due process
clause and the individual defendants, further, were entitled to qualified
immunity from liability. Toney v. Owens, #14-50331, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 2863
(5th Cir.).
A prisoner stabbed a correctional officer in the
chest with some wire from a fence. He was then transferred to a supermax unit
and assigned to an incentive level program. He claimed that his placement there
violated his constitutional rights, including due process and equal protection.
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the complaint was properly dismissed as
the prisoner failed to raise any valid constitutional issue. Waller v. Banks,
#CV-11-403, 2013 Ark. 399, 2013 Ark. Lexis 476.
A pretrial detainee in a county detention facility was
housed in a maximum security cellblock because of a history of problems during
a prior detention and a parole hold. While housed there another inmate severely
beat him. He sued, claiming that the approach used in classifying detainees for
cellblock placement created a risk to his safety by not taking steps to
separate violent offenders from nonviolent ones, leading to his assault.
Upholding summary judgment for the defendant sheriff's department, a federal
appeals court found that the plaintiff failed to provide any real evidence that
the security classification policy in effect represented a systematic failure
to avoid obvious risks to detainee safety. Smith v. Sangamon Cnty. Sheriff's
Dep't., #11-1979, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 7830 (7th Cir.).
A California prisoner challenged his validation
as an associate of the Mexican Mafia prison gang, claiming that the regulation
under which this was carried out was void for vagueness. A federal appeals
court rejected this claim, finding that the regulation was sufficiently
particular in spelling out what types of conduct could result in validation.
The record showed that the validation was supported by "some
evidence," which was a sufficient legal standard. Castro v. Terhune,
#11-16837, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 6905 (9th Cir.).
Two California prisoners claimed that authorities
violated their rights by validating them as active gang associates. In the case
of both prisoners, the decisions were based on three sources of information, a
minimum number mandated by state regulations, and included gang rosters and
other gang documents as well as a debriefing report by another prisoner
involved in gang activity. As to one prisoner, there was adequate evidence of
his gang involvement. As to the other prisoner, however, the debriefing report
lacked specifics about his involvement in any gang-related conduct or acts. The
court also ruled that due process was required before validating a prisoner as
an active gang associate, because the decision had an impact on a prisoners'
housing and credits, but the lack of any procedure for the prisoners to call
witnesses and the limited disclosure of confidential information did not
violate due process because concerns about institutional safety justified using
less demanding procedural protections. In re Fernandez, #C070016, 2013 Cal.
App. Lexis 31.
A prisoner serving two consecutive sentences for
conspiracy to distribute heroin and for possession of a prohibited object
challenged the determination of the Federal Bureau of Prisons that, given his
history, his placement in a halfway house for 5-6 months prior to his release
at the end of his sentence was adequate, despite legislation that empowered
them to place him there for up to 12 months. The determination was not an abuse
of discretion and did not fail to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 17541, the Federal
prisoner reentry initiative. Vasquez v. Strada, #12-1114, 684 F.3d 431 (3rd
Cir. 2012).
California prison regulations provided that
classifying a prisoner as a gang member could have the consequence of him being
housed in a security housing unit. An intermediate appeals court granted a
petitioner habeas relief from being designated a gang member, as it disagreed
with the department's interpretation of the regulation at issue. The California
Supreme Court overturned that ruling, finding that the appeals court had failed
to appropriately defer to the corrections department's interpretation of its
own regulations. The department interpreted the regulation as not requiring
proof of two-way interaction between the prisoner and another inmate already
deemed a gang affiliate. The department's policy of classifying some inmates as
gang affiliates based on their own unilateral actions was not clearly
unreasonable. In re Cabrera, #S19728, 2012 Cal. Lexis 9985.
A prisoner argued that he was improperly
classified as a member of a Security Threat Group in violation of his
constitutional rights. Rejecting this argument, a federal appeals court noted
that a "prisoner has no liberty interest in his custodial
classification." His resulting confinement in administrative segregation
was not so restrictive as to implicate a liberty interest. Flores v.
Livingston, #10-10280, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 26304 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
A number of inmates claimed that prison officials
violated their rights by classifying them as associated with members of the
Prison Motorcycle Brotherhood and refusing to grant them access to their files
for the purpose of reviewing and challenging their classification. The appeals
court upheld dismissal of claims regarding their classification, as they failed
to show that the officials had participated in their classifications. The
prisoners also failed to show how access to their personal files would affect
any due process right they had. Jenner v. Backus, #09-1093, 2009 U.S. App.
Lexis 17618 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
A psychiatrist, a psychologist, and an intern
were entitled to absolute immunity on a prisoner's claims arising from their
actions in preparing reports at the request of a state court that resulted in
him being housed in a more restrictive special housing unit rather than in a
"special needs unit." The defendants were functioning as n arm f the
court in preparing the reports. Further, the prisoner did not have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in any particular classification.
Lewis v. Pearsall, #08-786, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9707 (D. Del.).
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulations allowing the
transfer of prisoners to community correctional facilities (Residential
Re-Entry Centers or RRC) only during the final ten percent of their sentences
held to violate statutory provisions enacted by Congress giving the BOP
authority to transfer prisoners to such facilities at any time. Rodriguez v.
Smith, No. 07-16014, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 18918 (9th Cir.).
A security threat group (STG) policy under which
a prisoner was classified and housed as a member of such a group did not
constitute impermissible additional punishment for his crimes. Additionally,
the prisoner failed to show that his STG classification was based on
retaliation rather than legitimate penological goals. Ramirez v. Guinn, No.
06-16553, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 6738 (9th Cir.).
Sex offender's objection to the application of a
mental health category to him without "due process of law" rejected,
as no violation of any constitutionally protected liberty interest was
involved, since the categorization did not concern a hospital placement.
Classification as a sexual offender was justified by his past convictions of
three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Disability discrimination claims under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12131 et seq., and
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794 were rejected because the
definition of "disability" in those statutes specifically excludes
"sexual behavior disorders." Rice v. Mich. Dept. of Corrections, No.
1:07-CV-578, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 83792 (W.D. Mich).
Prisoner's claims concerning the alleged
violation of his rights as a result of his classification as a gang member and
placement in administrative segregation were either frivolous or meritless.
Additionally, his claims for injunctive relief were moot since he had been
released from prison. The conditions he was allegedly subjected to, such as the
denial of access to salt and pepper, denial of participation in work and
education programs, and denial of access to television and games were not
sufficient to show a deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty
interests. The alleged limitation of access to legal research to only three
days a week was found not to have denied his right of access to the courts.
Farr v. Rodriguez, No. 05-41395, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 28191 (5th Cir.).
The New York Department of Corrections acted in
an "arbitrary and capricious manner" in failing to provide an inmate
with a written statement of why he was denied the right to call witnesses at a
hearing to determine whether he should be placed in "close custody"
on the basis of his alleged gang influence and ability to
"orchestrate" violence. The DOC's own regulations required such a
statement and there was nothing in the hearing record to indicate why the
prisoner's request to call witnesses was denied. The court ordered a new
hearing. Matter of Singh v. Okada, #403573/07, 2007 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 6880
(Supreme Court, N.Y. County).
Prison officials did not violate inmate's rights
by classifying him as a security risk without a hearing after he was accused of
planning to escape by using a passport his twin brother had provided him. The
state of Connecticut had not given inmates a protected liberty interest in
their security classifications, and the deprivations he allegedly suffered were
not an "atypical and significant hardship." Additionally, the court
noted, prisoners do not generally have constitutionally protected liberty
interests in classifications that allow them to participate in rehabilitative
programs (one of the arguments the prisoner put forward for why he was entitled
to a hearing. Taylor v. Levesque, No. 06-0356, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 21178 (2nd
Cir.).
Oklahoma state law did not create an expectation
that a prisoner would be held in any particular facility and his transfer and
classification reduction did not violate his constitutional rights. Prison
officers needed to be able to house and classify prisoners as they deemed
necessary for security purposes, and the prisoner was not entitled to a hearing
before his classification was reduced. Gauthier v. Higgins, No. 06-7102, 2007
U.S. App. Lexis 8396 (10th Cir.).
Prisoners housed in "Capital Case Unit"
in Pennsylvania prison failed to show that their rights were violated when they
were not transferred from there to the general population when their death
sentences were vacated or overturned. The state Department of Corrections had
discretion as to where to house such prisoners, and the prisoners failed to
show that remaining where they were subjected them to "atypical and
significant" hardships in relation to the "ordinary incidents of
prison life." Clark v. Beard, No. 644 C.D. 2006, 2007 Pa. Commw. Lexis 61.
Placement of a prisoner into a "level
IV" rather than a "level III" prison in California did not
violate a 14th Amendment due process liberty interest or violate the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when the prisoner
did not suffer an "atypical and significant hardship" by reason of
the classification. Myron v. Terhune, No. 04-15770, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 2818
(9th Cir.). [N/R]
Bureau of prisons regulations barring a
prisoner's transfer to a Community Correctional Center (CCC) until only 10% of
his sentence remained to be served were a violation of the intent of Congress
in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3621(b) that all decisions regarding placement and transfers
of inmates be made on an individual basis. Wedelstedt v. Wiley, No. 06-1461,
2007 U.S. App. Lexis 3701 (10th Cir.). [N/R]
Policy under which prisoner's status was changed
to a more restrictive classification, rendering him ineligible to participate
in employment or other prison programs or make phone calls, and the application
of that policy without written notice did not inflict an "atypical or significant
hardship" and therefore did not violate his due process rights. Padilla v.
Beard, No. 06-2900, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 28439 (3rd Cir.). [N/R]
Prisoner transferred to Supermax facility
received all due process required in hearing even though the findings were
eventually overturned and he was transferred out again. Prisoner himself failed
to pursue claim that the hearing should have been held before his transfer.
Lagerstrom v. Kingston, No. 06-1521, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 22741 (7th Cir.).
[2006 JB Nov]
Prisoner in Colorado correctional facility failed
to show that either local or state law required that the Department of
Corrections hold a hearing concerning whether a prisoner could be referred for
a placement in a community corrections program, and court rules that it could
not review the issue of whether the Department improperly included immigration
detainers, such as the one the prisoner had, as an exclusionary factor for
community corrections placement. The prisoner was also not entitled to a
hearing on the question of whether the Department had properly determined that
he was a flight risk. Rivera-Bottzeck v. Ortiz, No. 04CA1628, 134 P.3d 517
(Colo. App. 2006). [N/R]
Bureau of Prisons, in deciding whether to
transfer an inmate to a community corrections center must consider the factors
spelled out in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3621(b). Federal appeals court upholds challenge
to BOP regulation limiting a prisoner's placement in a CCC to the lesser of six
months or ten percent of his sentence of imprisonment. Levine v. Apker, No.
05-2590, 455 F.3d 71(2d Cir. 2006). [N/R]
New Mexico prisoner incarcerated in California
prison failed to state a claim against New Mexico correctional authorities for
alleged violations of his rights in connection with prisoner classification
hearings and alleged denial of adequate recreation. Garcia v. LeMaster, No.
04-2280, 439 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2006). [2006 JB May]
Federal appeals court finds that Bureau of
Prisons regulation limiting prisoners' placement in halfway houses to a maximum
of ten percent of their sentences violates a statute requiring a determination
of eligibility for such placement based on consideration of specific criteria.
Fults v. Sanders, No. 05-3490, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 8289 (8th Cir.). [2006 JB
May]
Federal prison regulations limiting prisoners'
placements in community confinement ruled invalid by federal appeals court.
Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 05-3657, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 27413 (3d
Cir.). [2006 JB Feb]
Connecticut prisoner had no constitutionally
protected due process liberty interest in retaining a particular security
classification or placement in a less restrictive half-way house or
work-release setting, and therefore had no right to any particular procedures before
being designated a "Security Risk Group Threat Member." Harris v.
Meulemans, No. 3:02 CV 1580, 389 F. Supp. 2d 438 (D. Conn. 2005). [N/R]
Missouri's creation and use of revised prisoner
classification policies, which resulted in a prisoner's reclassification and
transfer to a higher security center did not amount to an unconstitutional
retroactive enhancement of his punishment in violation of the "ex post
facto" prohibitions of the U.S. or state constitutions. Davis v. Kempker,
No. WD 64237, 167 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005). [N/R]
Designating a prisoner as a member of a
"Security Threat Group" on the basis of gang activity without a prior
hearing did not violate his rights. Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, No. 04-1458, 2005
U.S. App. Lexis 17511 (6th Cir.). [2005 JB Oct]
Trial court improperly dismissed prisoner's
lawsuit against probation officer claiming that his placement in a detention
facility was a violation of his rights when there were court orders requiring
that he be placed in a halfway house for his alleged probation violation. The
lawsuit was not barred by the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, No. 93-6188, 512 U.S.
477 (1994) when it only challenged his confinement in one facility instead of
another, and did not challenge either the duration or fact of his confinement.
Taylor v. U.S. Probation Office, No. 03-5370, 409 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
[N/R]
Unanimous U.S. Supreme Court finds that
procedures Ohio adopted to govern its placement of its most dangerous prisoners
at its "Supermax" facilities are constitutionally adequate to satisfy
due process. Such procedures, while providing prisoners with an opportunity to
present information and receive notice concerning the basis for the proposed
classification, need not be full-blown adversary proceedings, and the
prisoners' rights were not violated by their inability to call witnesses at the
hearings. Wilkinson v. Austin, No. 04-495, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005). [2005
JB Aug]
A non-profit charity that owns and operates
eighteen community corrections centers in seven states did not have standing to
pursue a legal challenge to a Bureau of Prisons' policy that had the effect of
reducing the number of federal prisoners who could serve all or part of their
sentences in such centers by claiming that the policy was an abuse of
discretion. The appeals court found that the prisoners affected by the policy
would be more appropriate plaintiffs for such a claim. Dismas Charities, Inc.
v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, No. 03-6502, 401 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Federal Bureau of Prisons did not violate a
prisoner's due process rights when it refused to transfer him to another
facility where he could participate in a residential drug abuse treatment
program based on his classification as a security risk. The classification was
based on his "undisputed" record of misconduct while incarcerated and
his own voluntary action in providing information to prison officials about
gang activity, resulting in a need to protect him from possible assault by placement
in a special housing unit. Beckley v. Miner, No. 04-4081, 125 Fed. Appx. 385
(3rd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Prisoner's claim that his due process rights were
violated when he was classified by prison officials as a sex offender because
of an accusation by a female prison guard that he deliberately masturbated in
his cell for her to see was not frivolous. Prisoner claimed that he was
improperly denied the opportunity to present witnesses at a hearing on the sex
offender classification. The appeals court does, however, reject as frivolous
his equal protection and Eighth Amendment claims. Fistell v. Neet, No. 03-1285,
125 Fed. Appx. 219 (10th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
U.S. Supreme Court to examine what due process is
required before placing prisoners in a "super-maximum security"
facility. Austin v. Wilkinson, #02-3429, 372 F.3d 346(6th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted, Wilkinson v. Austin, 04-495, 2004 U.S. Lexis 8174. [2005 JB Feb]
Federal appeals court rules that Bureau of
Prison's policy of limiting prisoner placement in Community Corrections Centers
to the lesser of six months or ten percent of the prisoner' sentence is based
on an incorrect interpretation of the applicable statutes. Elwood v. Jeter, No.
04-2253, 386 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2004). [2005 JB Feb]
Mississippi prisoner failed to show that the
state Department of Corrections acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in
reclassifying his custody status. Prisoners do not have a property or liberty
interest, under either the U.S. Constitution or Mississippi state law, in a
particular custodial classification or housing assignment. Further, the
prisoner himself admitted that he had received an administrative hearing, that
an investigation was conducted, and that relevant evidence was presented at the
hearing concerning his alleged activities as a leader of a gang called the
"Gangster Disciples" prior to the change in his classification. Hurns
v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, No. 2002-CP-01895-COA, 878 So. 2nd
223 (Miss. App. 2004). [N/R]
Federal Bureau of Prison's changed interpretation
of statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3621(b) as limiting its authority to place prisoners
in community confinement centers (CCC) to only the final ten percent or six
months of a sentence, whichever was less, was not entitled to deference, as it
was a legal interpretation of a statute, rather than a regulation adopted
pursuant to the BOP's rule-making authority. Court rules that the
interpretation was invalid, since the statute grants the BOP the authority to
designate or transfer prisoners to a CCC at any time prior to the end of their
sentence. Further, any application of this policy to the plaintiff prisoner's
sentence was an improper retroactive enhancement of his punishment, violative
of the "ex post facto" clause of the U.S. Constitution. Crowley v.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 312 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). [N/R]
Ohio prisoners had a protected liberty interest
in not being placed in a "supermax" high-security facility without
due process. Federal appeals court upholds trial judge's injunctive orders
concerning procedures to be followed prior to placement, including specific
notice of grounds for placement and evidence to be relied on, but also finds
that trial court went too far in modifying substantive state regulations, such
as specifying the amount of drug possession or level of gang involvement
required before placement in the "supermax" facility. Austin v.
Wilkinson, #02-3429, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 11414 (6th Cir.). [2004 JB Jul]
Establishment of new guidelines governing
security classifications, work release, and family leave were not
unconstitutional "ex post facto" laws increasing prisoners'
punishment retroactively. They were not laws, but merely guidelines promulgated
as an exercise of discretion and correctional officials had the authority to
modify them. Watkins v. Secretary, Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services, No. 118, 831 A.2d 1079 (Md. 2003). [N/R]
Prisoner was entitled to a preliminary injunction
against the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) new regulation which had the effect of
delaying his release to a halfway house until 90% of his sentence had been
served. Prisoner claimed that regulation was adopted in violation of
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553 (b,c,d). Colton v. Ashcroft,
299 F. Supp. 2d 681 (E.D. Ky. 2004). [N/R]
Placement of intersexual (hermaphrodite) prisoner
with both male and female characteristics in segregated confinement for 438
days with severely limited privileges solely because of status of ambiguous
gender was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Such placement was not
aimed at punishment, but at protecting the safety of the inmate and other
prisoners, and the plaintiff prisoner was provided with all basic necessities.
Court also rejects equal protection claim. Continuation of administrative
segregation beyond 30 days, however, without a hearing and with no attempt to
"elevate" prisoner's living conditions was "completely arbitrary
and capricious," and lacked a rational basis. Prison officials should have
known this, and were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity, but only
nominal damages of $1 were awarded, in the absence of evidence of actual harm,
such as lasting mental or physical damages resulting from the segregated
confinement. Plaintiff would also be awarded expert costs, attorneys' fees, and
court costs as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. DiMarco v. Wyoming
Dept. of Corrections, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Wyo. 2004). [N/R]
U.S. Supreme Court to review issue of whether
California prison practice of routinely segregating prisoners by race during
initial period of incarceration is permissible for purposes of preventing
racial violence, as federal appeals court ruled, or unconstitutional
discrimination in violation of the right to equal protection. Johnson v.
California, #03-636, 72 U.S. Law Week 3551 (March 1, 2004). [2004 JB Apr]
Bureau of Prisons' application to prisoner of a
statutory requirement limiting the amount of time an inmate can spend in a
community confinement center to 10% of his total sentence was not a violation
of his rights. The fact that the prisoner was sentenced before a Deputy
Attorney General's opinion on the subject was issued did not alter the result.
Adler v. Menifee, 293 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). [N/R]
Federal Bureau of Prisons' policy deciding that
it lacked discretion to place low-risk federal prisoners in community
corrections centers was based on a "clearly erroneous" interpretation
of a controlling federal statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3621, and the bureau's
conclusion was therefore not entitled to deference. Court orders bureau to
reconsider the designation of place of imprisonment for each of the plaintiff
prisoners. Estes v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Ala.
2003). [N/R]
Virginia prisoner had no right to be housed in a
state correctional facility rather than a local jail, even if the facilities
and opportunities for participation in programs such as work release, paid
work, furlough, contact visits, additional exercise, and vocational training
were not the same. This did not violate equal protection when prisoners were
not classified on the basis of a suspect class, such as race, and there was a
rational basis for disparate treatment. Khalig v. Angelone, #02-7365, 72 Fed.
Appx. 895 (4th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Federal trial court enjoins U.S. Bureau of
Prisons from transferring prisoner out of community corrections center into
prison for service of his sentence for bank fraud previously plea-bargained for.
The Bureau of Prison's new policy precluding community corrections center
confinement, allowed for the previous 17 years, may well be additional
punishment, the court stated, barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The court agreed that it (the new policy)
was contrary to the plaintiff prisoner's expectations when he entered into the
plea bargain. Ashkenazi v. Attorney General of the U.S., 246 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2003). [N/R]
Indiana prisoner had no constitutionally
protected right to a hearing concerning his transfer from protective custody.
"Classification matters should be left to prison authorities unless there
are clear constitutional violations involved." Miller v. McBride, 259 F.
Supp. 2d 738 (N.D. Ind. 2001). [N/R]
Private corporation operating correctional
facility was not liable for violating a prisoner's liberty interest by placing
him in medium security status. Prisoner was not entitled to any particular
status and the company's officials had explained the basis for the
classification. Additionally, his placement in disciplinary segregation for
committing a battery while in prison did not violate his rights when there was
nothing "atypical" about the conditions in segregation. The city in
which the prison was located could not be held liable for any alleged violation
of the prisoner's rights when there was nothing to show that the city had any
role in operating the prison. Byrd v. Cornell Corrections, Inc., No. 02-6316,
60 Fed. Appx. 191 (10th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Admitted policy of using race as a factor--even
the dominant factor--in assigning new inmates with their initial cell mate for
a 60 day period did not constitute racial discrimination in violation of the
right to equal protection. Johnson v. State of California, No. 01-56436, 321
F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2003). [2003 JB Jun]
Kansas correctional "incentive programs"
placing prisoners in various "levels" and according them privileges
accordingly based on their participation in what prisoners described as
"involuntary behavioral modification" systems did not violate
prisoners' due process rights. Love v. McKune, #01-3332, 33 Fed. Appx. 369
(10th Cir. 2002). [2002 JB Aug]
Prisoner who was reclassified into a
classification in which he could not earn good time credits based on a
disciplinary conviction for failing to obey prison's grooming policy could not
pursue federal civil rights claim for damages when the disciplinary conviction
had not previously been set aside. Diaz v. Terhune, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (N.D.
Cal. 2001). [2002 JB Mar]
Removing inmate from a "house arrest" program
and placing him in the general prison population after allegedly refusing to
allow prisoner to present witnesses and evidence at a classification committee
hearing or to let his lawyer participate was arbitrary and capricious. Edwards
v. Booker, #2000-CA-00283-SCT, 796 So. 2d 991 (Miss. 2001). [2002 JB Feb]
284:125 County liable for $40,000 for injuries to
prisoner in protective custody who was attacked by two gang member pre-trial
detainees in common recreation area; court rules that policy allowing prisoners
with different security levels to take recreation together was deliberate
indifference in light of knowledge of specific threats to plaintiff prisoner.
Miller v. Shelby County, Tenn., 93 F. Supp. 2d 892 (W.D. Tenn. 2000).
286:156 Prisoner
who was classified as a sexual offender under an Alabama state statute, despite
never having been convicted of a sex related offense was entitled to due
process before such classification because of the "stigmatizing"
effect of this classification; second prisoner who had been convicted of a sex
related offense could not challenge sex offender community notification statute
while incarcerated, since it did not affect him prior to his release. Kirry v.
Siegelman, Nos. 98-6236, 98-6672, 195 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999).
272:121 District
of Columbia did not violate Spanish-speaking prisoners' rights by failing to
provide official interpreters for all disciplinary, classification, housing, or
other institutional hearings, or by failing to have bilingual medical
personnel. Franklin v. District of Columbia, #97-7162, 163 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
255:41 Kentucky
prisoner's retention in medium security classification after reclassification
committee recommended minimum security classification did not violate his due
process or equal protection rights when possibility of override of committee
recommendations was explicitly provided for by correctional policy. Mahoney v.
Carter, 938 S.W.2d 575 (Ky. 1997).
247:102 Prisoner
could sue correctional officials for alleged failure to provide him with
qualified sign language interpreter for disciplinary and classification
hearings; federal appeals court rules, however, that formal certification of
interpreter was not required, as a matter of law, under federal disability
discrimination law. Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 1996 U.S. App. Lexis 26529
(9th Cir. 1996).
[N/R] Prison
superintendent's failure to wait for classification committee's recommendation
before reducing inmate's classification from minimum security to medium
security did not violate due process. Griffin-El v. Delo, 34 F.3d 602 (8th Cir.
1994).
Reclassification/administrative
detention of cuban inmate facing deportation did not violate rights; justified
by riots elsewhere. Vallina v. Meese, 704 F.Supp. 769 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
Inmate's due
process rights were not violated by consideration of hearsay materials in
making classification determination. Wolfe v. State, 759 P.2d 950 (Idaho App.
1988).
Policy assigning
women to high security unit on basis of their radical political beliefs and
alleged association with revolutionary organizations declared unconstitutional.
Baraldini v. Meese, 691 F.Supp. 432 (D.D.C. 1988).
Inmates
reclassified and relocated from work camp to main prison had no protectible due
process claim. Jenkins v. Fauver, 219 N.J. Super. 170, 530 A.2d 37 (N.J. Super.
A.D., 1987).
Prisoner's
classification as "violent offender" raised no constitutional issue.
Hernandez v. Johnson, 833 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1987).
Assignment of
dangerous inmate to administrative segregation without formal hearing did not
violate his rights. Bailey v. Shillinger, 828 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1987).
No denial of
equal protection in allowing murderers, but not sex offenders, certain
privileges. Kendking v. Smith, 781 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1986).
No violation in
cell placement. Freeman v. Fuller, 623 F.Supp. 1224 (D.C. Fla. 1985).
Co. jail
officials have broad discretion in classification. Marshall v. Kozakiewicz, 601
F.Supp. 1549 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
No liability for
escapee's acts. Reddish v. Smith, 468 So.2d 929 (Fla. 1985).
Florida Supreme
Court asked to decide whether classification is a discretionary function
afforded immunity for assaults. Davis v. State, Dept. of Corrections, 460 So.2d
452 (Fla. App. 1984).
Inmates ordered
returned to previous status before disciplinary. Edwards v. State, 461 So.2d 39
(Ala. App. 1984).
Correctional
officer liable for racial cell assignments. Belvins v. Brew, 593 F.Supp. 245
(W.D. Wis. 1984).
Officials can
change custody classifications without due process protections. In Re Dowell,
674 P.2d 666 (Wash. 1984).
Information not
leading to conviction can be kept in inmate's personnel file. Martin v.
Duckworth, 581 F.Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
Inmate in
maximum security not entitled to transfer, job or group religious services;
possible violation for confiscation of inmate's property. Jackson v. Hogan, 446
N.E.2d 692 (Mass. 1983).
Inmate's past
prison conduct justified decision of reclassification board to keep him in
maximum security. Wilkerson v. Maggio, 703 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1983).
Appeals court rules
that State of Florida must explain why inmate should not be released from
disciplinary confinement; vacates denial of habeas corpus petition. Costello v.
Strickland, 418 So.2d 443 (Fla. App. 1982).
Dismissal of
disciplinary proceedings against inmate on a technicality held no bar to
consideration of same facts by classification committee; limited due process
protections suffice. Layton v. Wolff, 516 F.Supp. 629 (D. Nev. 1981).
Injunction
ordering transfer of medium-security prison to medium-security prison vaacated
by Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283 (4th Cir
1980).
Prison officials
ordered to review case of inmate who has been in segregated confinement for six
and one half years. Morris v. Travisono, 499 F.Supp. 140 (D.R.I. 1980).
Eighth Circuit
rules that inmate was properly classified as a maximum security detainee.
Villanueva v. George, 632 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1980).
Correctional
officials who believed inmate was a security risk kept her in restrictive
custody for a prolonged period of time; Virginia District Court rules that
inmate's rights had not been violated. Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 F.Supp. 1162 (4th
Cir. 1980).
California Court
rules that reclassification of inmate from medium to close custody without a
hearing was a denial of due process of law. In re Westfall, 162 Cal.Rptr. 462
(App. 1980).
Court of Appeals
rules that procedural due process standards do not apply to central monitoring
case classification. Makriss v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 606 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.
1979).
Federal judge
orders Maryland prison officials to revamp classification procedures to prevent
sexual assaults. Doe v. Lally, 467 F.Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1979).
Ninth Circuit
rules that failure of county sheriff to appoint classification committee
relative to prisoner's transfer from honor camp to county jail might subject
sheriff to liability under civil rights act. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740
(9th Cir. 1978).