AELE LAW LIBRARY OF CASE SUMMARIES:
Corrections Law for
Jails, Prisons and Detention Facilities
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Bail
New Jersey changed its pretrial release system, abandoning one which had long relied on monetary bail, based on a finding that the system resulted in the release of defendants who could afford to pay for their release, even if they posed a substantial risk of flight or danger to others, and the detention of poorer defendants who presented minimal risk and were accused of less serious crimes. Following a constitutional amendment, a state law ushered in created a new framework that prioritizes the use of non-monetary conditions of release over monetary bail. Plaintiff arrestees challenged the law as a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Fourth Amendment, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the state “from taking any actions to enforce statutory provisions [of the Act] . . . that allow imposition of severe restrictions on the pre-trial liberty of presumptively innocent criminal defendants without offering the option of monetary bail.” A federal appeals court ruled that there is no federal constitutional right to deposit money or obtain a corporate surety bond to ensure a criminal defendant’s future appearance in court as an equal alternative to non-monetary conditions of pretrial release. Holland v. Rosen, #17-3104, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 18554 (4th Cir.).
A class action alleged that a county’s system of setting bail for indigent misdemeanor arrestees violated Texas constitutional and statutory law as well as federal constitutional due process and equal protection. The federal trial court denied the county’s summary judgment motion and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. A federal appeals court upheld most of the trial court’s rulings, including its decision that plaintiff established a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims that the county’s policies violated procedural due process and equal protection. However, the appeals court held that the trial court’s definition of arrestees’ liberty interest under due process was too broad, and the procedures it required to protect that interest were too onerous. Further, the trial court erroneously concluded that the county sheriff could be considered a county policymaker for purposes of federal civil rights liability, and that the issued injunction was overbroad. The appeals court vacated the injunction and ordered the trial court to modify its terms. ODonnell v. Harris County, Tex., #17-20333, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 14578 (5th Cir.).