FEATURED CASES

WITH LINKS TO THE OPINIONS

Prison visitor who sought $9 million in damages on multiple constitutional and state law claims over purported unlawful search and arrest, and excessive use of force against him by correctional officers was ultimately awarded only $2,501 in damages against one officer on a single claim of excessive use of force. Trial judge reduces requested attorneys' fee award and costs of over $140,000 to a total of $27,157.80, based on "unnecessary prolonging," by plaintiff's attorney, of the duration and cost of the case.

     A man and his wife went to visit their son, who was incarcerated in a Maryland correctional facility. The man claimed that he was subjected to an unconstitutional search and arrest as the result of a false alert by a drug dog, and that during the course of the search he was beaten by correctional officers. He filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against seven different defendants, asserting numerous claims for constitutional and state law violations, seeking damages of $9 million.

     After trial, he ultimately obtained a jury award of $2,501 against one defendant on a single claim of excessive use of force, including $1 in nominal damages and $2,500 in punitive damages. His attorney then filed a motion seeking attorneys' fees of $128,710 and costs of $12,132.80. The trial judge instead awarded attorneys' fees of $25,000 and costs of $2,157.80.

     While the plaintiff's success in obtaining damages from one defendant on one of the claims rendered him a prevailing party, the trial judge found that a significant reduction in the amount of attorneys' fees and costs awarded was justified by the actions of the plaintiff's attorney in "unnecessarily prolonging" the duration and cost of the case.

     The court noted that the attorney "over-complicated" the pleading process, filing four different complaints, in some of which they named defendants and asserted claims that were not supportable. The defendants were therefore required to file numerous motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, which were meritorious except as to three of the defendants on the single claim of excessive use of force.

     Further, instead of narrowing the plaintiff's claims when the facts established during the discovery process "demonstrated that they lacked merit," these claims continued to be pursued "aggressively," and an expert witness was subsequently hired on the dog alert issue whose proposed testimony was later barred by the court as irrelevant since none of the defendants were responsible for conducting the dog sniff. The court excluded from the award of costs the fee for this expert.

     Even after trial, the court found, the counsel for the plaintiff "unreasonably and unnecessarily increased the cost of the proceedings," asserting that they spent over 50 hours in pursuing their motion for fees and costs, for which work alone they requested over $11,200. Indeed, the plaintiff's counsel claimed that over seven hours were spent "preparing time records," showing that "improper contemporaneous record-keeping" took place, for which the plaintiff tried to make the defendant pay more than $1,500 in fees.

     The court's decision engages in a detailed analysis of twelve different factors involved in reducing the amount of the fees awarded.

     Lynn v. State of Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 2d 594 (D. Md. 2003).

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Even if correctional officer shot and killed the wrong prisoner during violent prison yard fight between two rival gangs, his use of deadly force to break up the disturbance was reasonable and he was entitled to qualified immunity for claims brought by the prisoner's estate.

     The estate of a California prisoner who was shot and killed by a correctional officer during a prison riot between rival gangs sued the officer and other defendants, claiming excessive use of force and wrongful death under state law. The disturbance involved eighteen prisoners and two rival gangs, and the officer shot the prisoner from an observation tower.

    The trial court denied a motion by the defendant officer for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The trial court found that there was a factual dispute about whether the decedent was an aggressor or victim in the prison yard melee. The officer and a number of other witnesses said that the deceased prisoner was an aggressor, standing upright and "delivering kicks and blows." Witnesses for the plaintiff stated that the prisoner was on the ground when the officer shot him, and the plaintiff also offered forensic evidence tending to show that the entry and exit wounds were consistent with the prisoner lying on the ground, as well as offering the officer's admission that he had specifically targeted the prisoner as an aggressor.

     Reversing the trial court's decision and granting the correctional officer qualified immunity, the federal appeals court noted that there was no evidence that the officer knew the prisoner or acted with any animus toward him. "At most," the court found, he may have been negligent in shooting the wrong person. Ultimately, the appeals court found that it need not resolve the factual dispute over whether the prisoner was an aggressor or not, or was lying on the ground at the time he was shot.

     The court stated that the defendant officer and other correctional officers present had yelled repeated verbal warnings to "get down," as well as deploying pepper spray in the yard and firing warning shots in an effort to stop the disturbance, to no avail. The evidence was uncontradicted that the officer aimed at and intended to shoot the inmate whom he saw kicking an unconscious inmate to death, "whether or not he hit the wrong person or was mistaken about which person was hit." The officer fired one shot each at two groups, and hit two inmates, including the decedent, following which the fight stopped soon thereafter.

     Under these circumstances, given that the violent assaults in the prison yard continued unabated despite non-deadly force tactics, the officer acted reasonably in using deadly force to secure the safety of inmates "he believed to be defenseless and at the risk of serious bodily injury." The appeals court also noted that the state Department Shooting Review Board found that the officer acted "within established guidelines." The appeals court concluded that it could not say that the officer's conduct "was unreasonable under the circumstances."

     Torres v. Runyon, #02-15273, 80 Fed. Appx. 594 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Employee accident reports, employee interviews, and employee training records were not exempt from disclosure under New York law to prisoner seeking information concerning an incident in which he was allegedly injured by correctional officers, so long as personal data about individual officers was excluded. Disclosure of employee staffing records, however, were exempt, as their disclosure could endanger officers' lives and safety by revealing where they were posted within the correctional facility.

     A New York prisoner requested a number of documents and records from the Department of Correctional Services concerning an incident in which he claimed that he was injured by several correctional officers. His request was filed under a state Freedom of Information Law, McKinney's Public Officers Law Sec. 84 et seq. After his request was denied, he filed a lawsuit seeking to compel the disclosure of the documents, but the trial court upheld the denial and declined to award him attorneys' fees.

     An intermediate New York appellate court found that a number of documents requested were not exempt from disclosure under exemptions for unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

     In particular, the court ruled that employee accident reports filed concerning the incident were not exempt, if the officers' personal data was excluded (redacted) from the release. The reports in question did describe the general nature of the officers' alleged injuries, but did not reveal details of any existing medical condition that an individual officer had.

     The court also rejected arguments that employee interviews were exempt from disclosure, noting that these interviews were not part of the officers' personnel records, since they were not used in evaluating their performance and the interviews did not reveal any source or information that could be considered confidential. The court also found that a report of the complaint process concerning the incident could be revealed so long as officers' personal data was excluded, as these records did not reveal any confidential source and did not show methods of investigation beyond the routine process of contacting participants and witnesses to the incident.

     The court further found that employee training records were not exempt from disclosure, provided that officers' personal data was excluded, even though these were personnel records relied on in performance evaluations towards promotion or continued employment. The court found that there was no "substantial and realistic" potential that these records could be used in an "abusive" manner against the officers.

     The court also allowed the disclosure of a prison directive concerning the maintaining of logbooks.

     Employee staffing records, however, were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law since their disclosure could "endanger" the officers' lives or safety by revealing where they were posted throughout the facility.

     Despite the finding that some of the records sought were subject to disclosure, the intermediate appellate court upheld the denial of an award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiff prisoner, on the basis that the information sought, concerning his alleged injury by correctional officers, were not of "clearly significant interest" to the "general public," but rather mostly of interest to the prisoner himself.

     Beyah v. Goord, 766 N.Y.S.2d 222 (A.D. Dept. 3 2003).

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Correctional officers who allegedly knew that detainee was diabetic and who failed to provide him with food or insulin despite his complaints could be liable for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Federal appeals court orders further proceedings on medical care issue and claim that officers used excessive force in response to prisoner's request for food or medicine.

     A man was brought to a county jail on an outstanding warrant, and allegedly informed jail personnel, including a screening nurse, that he was diabetic and felt ill, and therefore needed to eat as soon as possible. The nurse tested his blood sugar, recorded his diabetic status on her chart, and allegedly assured him that he would soon receive food.

     He was placed in a holding cell with about a dozen other men and allegedly remained there for approximately four hours without food or insulin, or an opportunity to communicate with any officers. When a deputy entered the holding cell, the detainee claims that he told him "in all respect" that he needed to eat because he was not feeling well and was diabetic, attempting to find out what happened to the snack that the nurse had promised.

     The deputy allegedly then grabbed him, pulled him to the ground, and then several deputies kicked him, punched him, hit him with batons, twisted his arms and legs, poked his face, knuckled his ear and pepper sprayed him. He claims that this continued even after his hands were handcuffed behind his back. After he was taken to a medical observation cell, he claims, deputies bent his spine and pounded his head on the ground. He also claims that his diabetes was still not properly treated, and that he was not given the appropriate insulin or food to regulate his blood sugar.

     The officers testified that the detainee was verbally abusive and disruptive, unresponsive to orders, combative, and struggling and resisting, swinging one cuffed hand around and posing a danger to himself and the officers. They denied kicking him or using their batons, and also denied knowing that he was a diabetic or needed food or insulin. Medical records subsequently showed that he suffered a perforated eardrum and three fractured ribs, as well as other injuries.

     A trial court granted the defendant county and its officers summary judgment on the prisoner's claims for denial of adequate medical care and use of excessive force.

     A federal appeals court found that the county could not be held liable for the officers' alleged conduct in the absence of any showing that their actions were carried out pursuant to an official policy, custom or practice.

     The appeals court found, however, that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the officers were aware that the plaintiff detainee was diabetic and was showing signs of the beginnings of a ketoacidic condition, but deliberately failed to provide him with food or insulin.

     There were also disputed genuine issues of material fact as to whether or not the defendant officers used excessive force, or only that force necessary under the circumstances.

     Further proceedings were ordered on both issues.

     Lolli v. County of Orange, #02-56309, 351 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Correctional officers' alleged failure to remove prisoner from area where fellow inmates were attempting to gain access to him to assault him, if true, constituted deliberate indifference to his safety, so that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.

     A South Carolina prisoner claimed that three correctional officers were deliberately indifferent to his safety, ignoring his requests for protection against an assault committed by fellow inmates. According to the prisoner's "uncontradicted version" of the facts, according to a federal appeals court, the defendant officers knew that the other inmates intended to kill or seriously injure him, and the officers "even watched as these inmates worked for at least forty-five minutes to break into an outdoor recreational cage in which" he was being held, yet ignored his pleas for help.

     The trial court granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to the defendant officers. Noting that the defendant officers "failed to submit any evidence explaining why" they did not grant the prisoner's request to be removed from his cage "despite the clear and substantial risk posed by the hostile inmates in the adjoining cage," a federal appeals court reversed the grant of summary judgment, ordering further proceedings.

     The evidence in the case showed that the plaintiff prisoner's fellow inmates started a fire in the evening in order to create an opportunity to attack him. Because of the fire, they were moved from their cells to outdoor, chain-link cages used for temporary confinement in the recreation yard. The plaintiff allegedly warned the officers that a group of fellow inmates would kill him if he were put in an area where they could gain access to him, but his concerns were allegedly dismissed.

     A number of inmates made demands to be placed in the same cage as the plaintiff prisoner, and when they were instead put into an adjoining cage, they immediately began tearing down the fence that separated them from him and making verbal threats to him.

     Several inmates from the adjoining cage finally destroyed enough of the fence to climb into the plaintiff's cage and brutally attack him, and officers used pepper spray to break up the fight. Two of the attackers allegedly later returned and picked up the plaintiff prisoner, swinging him face first into the fence, and beating him until they "got tired." He was removed forty-five minutes later, and suffered three broken ribs.

     If the prisoner's version of the events was true, the court ruled, the officers' actions constituted deliberate indifference to his safety under clearly established law, so that they were not entitled to qualified immunity.

     Odom v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, #02-7086, 349 F.3d 765 (4th Cir. 2003).

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U.S. Supreme Court rules that prisoners may pursue federal civil rights lawsuits for damages over prison discipline despite the fact that the disciplinary conviction has not been set aside, so long as the lawsuit challenges only the conditions of confinement, rather than the fact or duration of the confinement.

     A federal appeals court held that a prisoner could not pursue a federal civil rights claim for damages against a correctional officer who he alleged falsely charged him with misconduct, resulting in disciplinary action in retaliation for prior grievances and lawsuits that the prisoner had asserted against the officer. The court based this on the principles in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), barring federal civil rights lawsuits for damages for any harm that would render conviction or sentence invalid unless prisoner has already succeeded in having the conviction or sentence overturned on direct appeal or called into question by a court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.  Muhammad aka Mease v. Close, 47 Fed. Appx. 738 (6th Cir. 2002)

     The U.S. Supreme Court, acting unanimously, reversed, finding that the principles in Heck do not bar a federal civil rights lawsuit for damages which challenges only the "conditions" of confinement, rather than the fact or duration of confinement--in other words, in which success in the pursuit of damages would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner's underlying conviction or sentence, In this case, the prisoner was previously in administrative segregation, but no longer was by the time the federal civil rights case was filed. In summary, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:

[In Heck], we held that where success in a prisoner's [42 U.S.C.] §1983 damages action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence. Accordingly, in Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U. S. 641 (1997), we applied Heck in the circumstances of a §1983 action claiming damages and equitable relief for a procedural defect in a prison's administrative process, where the administrative action taken against the plaintiff could affect credits toward release based on good-time served. In each instance, conditioning the right to bring a §1983 action on a favorable result in state litigation or federal habeas served the practical objective of preserving limitations on the availability of habeas remedies. Federal petitions for habeas corpus may be granted only after other avenues of relief have been exhausted.

Heck's requirement to resort to state litigation and federal habeas before §1983 is not, however, implicated by a prisoner's challenge that threatens no consequence for his conviction or the duration of his sentence. There is no need to preserve the habeas exhaustion rule and no impediment under Heck in such a case, of which this is an example.

     The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the amended complaint filed by the plaintiff prisoner did not seek to expunge the misconduct charge from his prison record, but sought only money damages. The Court clarified that rather than Heck applying "categorically to all suits challenging prison disciplinary proceedings," the principles of the case do not apply in cases in which no good-time credits were eliminated by the pre-hearing action (placing him into segregation) which the plaintiff called into question. His federal civil rights lawsuit challenging this action, "could not therefore be construed as seeking a judgment at odds with his conviction or with the State's calculation of time to be served in accordance with the underlying sentence. That is, he raised no claim on which habeas relief could have been granted on any recognized theory, with the consequence that Heck's favorable termination requirement was inapplicable."

     Muhammad aka Mease v. Close, # 02-9065, 124 S. Ct. 1303 (2004).

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Prisoner stated a claim for deliberate indifference to his safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, by alleging that correctional officers transporting him refused to fasten his seatbelt while he was unable to do so because of shackles. Prisoner could pursue claims both for injuries in subsequent vehicle accident and for alleged inadequate medical care following accident.

     A Missouri inmate was injured in an accident while being transported to a correctional facility. Three vans all contained inmates and were being driven by correctional officers, and the prisoner claimed that the drivers were all speeding up to 70 to 75 miles per hour, and following closely, as well as passing cars "even if the road markings suggested otherwise." At the time of the accident, all three vans were in the passing lane and had just started to pull back into the right, when the driver of the second van in the caravan slammed on the brakes to avoid hitting the first van and was rear-ended by the third van.

     All inmates traveling in the second van were thrown up against the seats in front and then knocked out of their seats and onto the floor. The plaintiff prisoner was taken by ambulance to an emergency room where he was diagnosed with lower back trauma and whiplash. The prisoner sued the state Department of Corrections and various correctional officers, alleging that there was deliberate indifference, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, to his safety in the van and to his serious medical needs following his injuries in the accident.

     The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, but a federal appeals court has reversed in part, reinstating the claims against the correctional officers, while upholding the dismissal of the state Department of Corrections, which it agreed was, as a state agency, not a proper party in a federal civil rights lawsuit for damages, based on the principles set down in Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, #87-1207, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

     The appeals court found that the prisoner adequately asserted a claim for deliberate indifference to his safety by the five correctional officers in the van transporting him, based on his allegation that they refused to fasten his seatbelt despite his request that they do so. He was also unable, at the time, to do so himself because he was shackled with "bellychains, handcuffs, blackbox, and leg chains." The officers allegedly responded to his request by saying "aw hell you all will be alright," and "what you all don't trust our driving? You don't think we're gonna wreck do you?"

     The prisoner also adequately asserted a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by three correctional officers. He claimed that in the days following the accident, he asked three different correctional officers separately to see the medical staff because he was "having severe complications" from the accident, and each time, his request was allegedly ignored. The prisoner asserted that at the time, he was having difficulty seeing and standing and had "weak shaky legs."

     Brown v. Missouri Department of Corrections, #03-2193, 353 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2004).

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Detainee's action of hanging himself to death with shoelace in his holding cell less than two hours after being placed there on DUI charges did not subject facility to liability under Pennsylvania state law for negligence. Neither "personal property" nor "real estate" exceptions to sovereign immunity under state law applied.

     A detainee being held on charges of driving under the influence was placed in a holding cell and a state trooper removed his boots and placed them four to five feet outside the cell. In the next hour or so, state police later asserted that they checked on the detainee six to eight times, and observed him, each time, seated quietly on his bed. An hour and fifteen minutes after he was placed in the cell, a state trooper discovered him dead, hanging in his cell from the laces of his boots that he had retrieved.

    The decedent's parents brought wrongful death and survival actions against the State Police. They claimed that the troopers had received information that their son was drinking alcoholic beverages, was behaving abnormally and irrationally, and had expressed suicidal intentions. Their lawsuit claimed that it was negligent not to have a facility where their son could be observed continuously during his confinement, and to have failed to properly remove and secure all of his belongings which could "be dangerous to him."

     The defendant agency argued that none of the alleged negligent conduct fell within any of the exceptions to sovereign immunity under Pennsylvania state law found in the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa. C.S. Sec. 8522(b).

     A trial court found that the claims fell within both the personal property and the real estate exceptions to sovereign immunity found in the statute. It reasoned that the defendant failed to properly secure the decedent's property, his shoelaces, allowing him to use them to hang himself, and that the real estate exception applied because the agency had a duty to ensure that the conditions of its holding cells were safe for the activities for which they were regularly used.

     An intermediate Pennsylvania appeals court reversed, rejecting both exceptions as inapplicable under these circumstances. The personal property exception, the court ruled, only applies when the personal property itself caused the person's injuries, rather than merely serve to "facilitate" them. In this case, it was the decedent's action of hanging himself that caused his death, and at most the shoelace "facilitated that outcome." In other words, it could not be argued that the shoelace itself caused the death.

     Similarly, the absence of a video camera focused on the cell or other steps which were not taken to observe the decedent merely "facilitated" the suicide attempt, they did not cause it. There was no "dangerous condition" of the cell which itself caused the death, so the real estate exception to the sovereign immunity, which is the general rule under state law, did not apply. In the absence of any exception to sovereign immunity, summary judgment for the defendant agency was ordered.

     Pennsylvania State Police v. Klimek, 839 A.2d 1173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).

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Even if three female inmates in a nearby cell could have viewed a male prisoner on the toilet at times, he had no valid claim for violation of his right to privacy when this was unknown to jail officials and he did not complain to shift supervisors during fifty-one opportunities to do so, prior to filing a formal grievance. Jail officials, upon notification of the issue, promptly furnished a solution.

     A male prisoner in Maine was placed in administrative segregation at a county jail because of incidents in which he was allegedly in possession of a "shank" or homemade knife, and in which he threw his food tray at another inmate, and charged at staff members and prisoners, including a prisoner who had reported his possession of the shank. A number of other restrictions were placed on him, including having at least two correctional officers present whenever his cell door was opened, allowing mace to be drawn when serving him his meals, and requiring a search of his cell once a day.

     In a federal civil rights lawsuit he subsequently filed, the prisoner claimed that his was the only holding cell that did not have a partition next to the toilet to provide privacy, and that the toilet was situated in a manner that three female inmates in a nearby cell could, at separate intervals, have a direct view of him while he was performing bodily functions.

     Evidence in the case showed that the prisoner's cell was one of three cells in the holding area that allow complete visual access to the inmate anywhere in the cell. The other two cells did not have toilets, and were used to house special management inmates or inmates in crisis, such as suicidal inmates or others placed in the cell for their own protection or the protection of others. The plaintiff prisoner was kept in the cell he was placed in because of his perceived threat to jail staff members. The cell he was in was the only one there which allowed staff to view him before entering the cell or prior to opening the door to let him out, regardless of where in the cell he was.

     Other cells in the area were deemed unsuitable because they had either a privacy partition or a toilet situated behind a half wall. The court found that the defendant jail officials had no notice of the prisoner's privacy concerns about using the toilet until he submitted a grievance, and that he had not previously complained about it to officers or shift supervisors, and that he would have had at least 51 opportunities to complain to shift supervisors while he was in administrative segregation in the cell. After receipt of his grievances, the facility investigated whether an inmate housed in the nearby cell would have been able to view the plaintiff on the toilet, and it was then discovered that an inmate housed there who went to the far right side of the cell door window could have a partial view of someone sitting on the toilet in the plaintiff's cell. A remedy was then applied, using the placement of a removable piece of magnetic paper over the lower door window, which blocked the view.

     In light of the valid reasons for the placement of the prisoner in the cell for safety reasons, the lack of complaints by him about the alleged privacy concern, and the prompt remedy provided once he did file a grievance concerning the issue, the court found that the prisoner failed to state a valid claim for violation of his right to privacy.

     The trial court also rejected claims that the prisoner was denied access to the jail's grievance procedures or that jail officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, since neither the jail staff nor the prisoner himself were aware of any mental health problems in need of treatment while he was in the jail, or the possible need for medication to address anxiety and panic attacks, post-traumatic stress syndrome, or depression.

     Simpson v. Penobscot County Sheriff's Department, 285 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Me. 2003).

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U.S. Supreme Court to review issue of whether California prison practice of routinely segregating prisoners by race during initial period of incarceration is permissible for purposes of preventing racial violence, as federal appeals court ruled, or unconstitutional discrimination in violation of the right to equal protection.

     A federal appeals court previously held that a California prison policy under which race is taken into account when double-cell assignments are made in a reception center where new prisoners are confined for their first 60 days while awaiting full classification is not a violation of equal protection but rather is justified under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) because it is "rationally related" to a legitimate penological goal of reducing the possibility of racial violence among inmates. Indeed, the court stated that this possibility might be sufficiently great that the prison officials might be engaging in deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment if they failed to take the racial factor into account. The federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for defendant prison officials in a lawsuit filed by a prisoner challenging what he argued was unconstitutional racial discrimination in initial cell assignments. Johnson v. California, #01-56436, 321 F.3d 791, rehearing denied, (9th Cir. 2003). [PDF].

     The U.S. Supreme Court has now granted review of this case to determine whether the relatively deferential standard of review applied under Turner governs such claims of racial discrimination under these circumstances, or whether the more usual "strict scrutiny" standard ordinarily applied to racial classification claims applies. Under the "strict scrutiny" standard, a "compelling" governmental interest must be shown, rather than merely a rational relationship to a legitimate goal, for the racial classification to be upheld. The Court will determine whether the alleged practice of routinely racially segregating state prisoners for at least a 60-day period is a violation of equal protection of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.

     A report of the U.S. Supreme Court's future decision will appear in a subsequent issue of this publication.

     Johnson v. California, #03-636, 72 U.S. Law Week 3551 (March 1, 2004).

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Punishment of Muslim prisoner for failing to respond to officer's order until he completed his prayers might violate his rights if, as he claimed, the officer intentionally gave the order then in order to interfere with his exercise of his religion. Prisoner was subsequently fed food "loaf" rather than "properly blessed" (Halal) food for a week, allegedly interfering with his celebration of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

     A federal appeals court has reinstated the religious freedom claim asserted by a New York Muslim inmate who alleged that he was punished for refusing to respond to a correctional officer's order while he was praying after breaking his dawn-to-dusk fast during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. The officer ordered him to return his food tray and cup, and the prisoner later stated that he did not do so immediately as he was not yet done with his prayers.

     The prisoner was subsequently charged with misconduct for disobeying the order and pending a disciplinary hearing, the prisoner was served food loaf, which he claimed also violated his right to religious freedom, as his beliefs allegedly required him to break his Ramadan fast each day with properly blessed (Halal) food. The food loaf diet continued for a week, and he also claimed that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of his due process rights. He also claimed that the food loaf caused him to lose three pounds and suffer severe stomach pain.

     A federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of the "cruel and unusual punishment" and due process claims. The food loaf was nutritionally adequate and correctional officials acted with the intent to maintain discipline and order in the facility.

     At the same time, the appeals court ruled, the trial court should not have dismissed the prisoner's religious freedom claims. The prisoner contended that the failure to supply him with "Halal" food substantially interfered with his observance of Ramadan. He also claimed that this action itself was the product of deliberate religious discrimination by the correctional officer, who he contended knew that he was at prayer at the time, and deliberately issued his order when he did, knowing that the prisoner's beliefs would not allow him to respond before finishing his prayers. If these assertions were true, the court found, the prisoner stated a claim for violation of his right to exercise his religion.

     The appeals court also suggested that, on remand, the trial court reconsider whether to appoint a lawyer to assist the prisoner with the presentation of his case. The inmate has, to date, acted as his own lawyer.

     McEachin v. McGuinnis, No. 02-0117, 357 F.3d 197 (2nd Cir. 2004).

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Prisoner classified as a sexual offender in prison, and compelled to participate in a treatment program in order to earn good time credits, despite not having been convicted of a sexual offense, was entitled to procedural due process before classification, but hearing held was adequate when determination was made because of a detailed account of the sexual assault based on statements from the victim.

     A Colorado prisoner who pled guilty to robbery after a sexual assault charge was dismissed was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. The state Department of Corrections subsequently informed him that, as a result of the sexual assault charge, he would be required to complete a treatment program for sexual offenders, one of the requirements of which was that he admit that he had committed the previously charged sexual assault.

     The prisoner initially stated that he had committed the sexual assault and completed the first phase of the treatment program, but he was subsequently removed from the program because of two violations of prison rules. He was later released on parole, and his parole officer informed him that he was required to register with the local police as a sex offender and attend a community treatment program, or he would return to prison for violation of his parole. The prisoner later claimed that he was denied employment when background checks revealed that he had been classified as a sex offender. He was later convicted of a drug possession offense and sentenced to participate in a drug treatment program, but his classification as a sex offender allegedly made him ineligible to participate.

    He then served a sentence on the drug charge, and when released on parole again, was ordered to again participate in a treatment program for sex offenders. His parole was later revoked because he refused to do so. While in prison, the Department of Corrections held an administrative hearing to determine whether he should be classified as a sex offender, and the prisoner chose not to attend, submitting a written statement instead. The hearing panel determined that his classification as a sex offender was appropriate, based on his statement and a summary of an interview with the victim of the alleged sexual assault.

     The prisoner then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that correctional and parole officials had violated his constitutional right to due process by failing to provide him with an adequate hearing before initially classifying him as a sex offender, in requiring him to register as a sex offender, and in revoking his parole for failing to participate in a treatment program. He also claimed that it violated his Fifth Amendment rights to deny him the opportunity to earn good time credits at a higher rate after he refused to participate in the treatment program, and that his punishment was improperly enhanced retroactively because the registration requirement was imposed based on a statute passed after the alleged commission of the sexual offense. A number of other purported constitutional claims were also asserted.

     A federal appeals court agreed with the prisoner that his ultimate classification as a sexual offender while incarcerated, when he had not been convicted of the sexual assault charge, did involve a due process liberty interest, since his classification reduced the rate at which he could earn good time credits, so he was entitled to pre-classification procedural due process. This requires notice of charges, opportunity to present witnesses and evidence in defense, an impartial decision-maker, and a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the classification decided on.

     The court found, however, that the prisoner received procedural due process in the administrative hearing, since the hearing panel relied on a detailed written account of the alleged sexual assault based on statements by the victim, and the prisoner presented nothing other than a general denial that he did it. The prisoner had no right to a lawyer, either retained or appointed, in the hearing.

     The appeals court found the record inadequate, however, to determine whether the prisoner was properly classified as a sexual offender required to register under Colorado state law while he was out on parole, precluding summary judgment on his claims concerning this issue.

     The court rejected the prisoner's argument that the requirement, for participation in the sexual offender treatment program, that he admit to committing the offense violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition on self-incrimination, even though refusal to make such an admission resulted in the denial of good time credits and other privileges.

     Gwinn v. Awmiller, #00-1485, 354 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet.

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Defenses: Governmental Immunity

     State, county, and individual officials were entitled to immunity for criminal actions of one mentally ill offender in assaulting another in a conditional release program. State statute provides absolute immunity for any liability for the criminal actions committed by persons in the Forensic Conditional Release Program, including persons on parole or judicial commitment status. Cal. Penal Code Sec. 1618. Ley v. State, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist. 2004). [PDF]

Defenses: Notice of Claim

     Prisoner's notice of his intent to file a claim against the state concerning injuries inflicted on him during his removal from his cell by correctional officers was inadequate when it failed to specify the nature of his medical negligence claim. Motion to dismiss claim upheld. Cendales v. State, 770 N.Y.S.2d 174 (A.D. Dept. 3 2003). [PDF]

Defenses: Qualified Immunity

     Sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity on claims that pre-trial detainee who suffered head injuries was improperly denied medical attention. There was no showing that sheriff inadequately supervised his subordinates, and there was no claim that there were any prior incidents in which jail employees failed to give needed medical care to detainees. Layman v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 2d 784 (W.D.N.C. 2003).

Diet

     Serving a prisoner a sack lunch rather than a hot meal did not violate his rights when the food provided was nutritionally adequate and met his medical and religious needs. Amos v. Simmons, 82 P.3d 859 (Kan. App. 2004).

DNA Tests

     Prisoners incarcerated after their convictions for armed bank robbery had no constitutional privacy right against their correct identification, and therefore the gathering of DNA samples from them for inclusion in a federal database maintained by the FBI, pursuant to the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 14135-14135e, was reasonable. Groceman v. U.S. Department of Justice, No. 02-10810, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004). [PDF]

     Georgia DNA law requiring convicted felons to provide DNA samples did not violate prisoners' rights under either the U.S. or Georgia constitutions. Any right of privacy in the identification of such felons was "substantially outweighed" by the government's interest in having a DNA database for use in solving crimes and exonerating innocent persons. Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2003).

False Imprisonment

     Federal jury awards $750,000 to man incarcerated for 15 days after misidentified as person sought in outstanding warrant. Sheriff's department argued, in defense, that there was no duty for it to have a procedure in place to investigate a detainee's claim that he was not the suspect sought in a warrant. Hernandez v. Sheahan, No. 99C-6441, U.S. District Ct., N.D. Ill, Nov. 25, 2003, reported in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, p. 25, February 20, 2004.

Federal Tort Claims Act

     Mother of federal prisoner shot and killed while residing in a halfway house could not pursue her claims that the Bureau of Prison violated his constitutional right to protection under the terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346, 2671 et seq. The FTCA does not waive the sovereign immunity of the U.S. government for constitutional claims, but rather for negligence. Phillips v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 271 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2003).

Medical Care

     Jail guards who referred detainee to a nurse one day after he complained about foot pain were not shown to have acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Reynolds v. Barnes, No. 03-1108, 84 Fed. Appx. 672 (7th Cir. 2003).

     Prisoner's claim that a prison doctor prescribed a different medication for treatment of his high blood pressure than the drug he requested was insufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and only showed a "mere disagreement" over the best appropriate treatment. Jenkins v. Lee, No. 03-40573, 84 Fed. Appx. 469 (5th Cir. 2004). [PDF]

    Female prisoner's pregnancy was a serious medical condition, and genuine issues of material fact concerning whether nurses and guards knowingly disregarded risks to her when they failed to transport her to a hospital and placed her in segregated confinement precluded summary judgment in her federal civil rights lawsuit. Doe v. Gustavus, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (E.D. Wis. 2003).

Prison Litigation Reform Act: Exhaustion of Remedies

     Prisoner showed that he exhausted his available administrative remedies on his claim that inadequate medical care was provided for his Crohn's disease and diabetes when prison officials failed to respond to his filed grievance during the subsequent four-year time period. Woulard v. Food Service, 294 F. Supp. 2d 596 (D. Del. 2003).

     Prison officials granted summary judgment on prisoner's claim that he was beaten by correctional officers after defendants presented evidence supporting their contention that he had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a). Arnold v. Goetz, 245 F. Supp. 2d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

     Prisoner's claims against 26 correctional employees and officials for alleged denial of adequate medical care and unconstitutional conditions of confinement dismissed based on his failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. McCoy v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Prisoner Assault: By Officers

     Plaintiff prisoner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing concerning claims that correctional officials stripped and beat him, when claims were properly dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity and the statute of limitations. Cesspooch v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 02-1538, 84 Fed. Appx. 30 (10th Cir. 2003).

Prisoner Discipline

    Prisoner who pled guilty to the violations of prison rules asserted in a misbehavior report could not subsequently challenge the finding that he in fact violated those rules. Cross v. Goord, 770 N.Y.S.2d 245 (A.D. Dept. 4 2003). [PDF]

     There was insufficient evidence to support a finding that a prisoner made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to be present at his disciplinary hearing. Court upholds ruling annulling determination finding prisoner guilty of violating prison disciplinary rules. Rush v. Goord, 770 N.Y.S.2d 191 (A.D. Dept. 3 2003). [PDF]

Prisoner Transfer

     Prisoner's alleged transfer to a higher security correctional facility based on his refusal to cooperate with a federal corruption investigation concerning prison guards did not violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination or any other constitutional right. The prisoner did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights when he was initially was questioned, and, since the prisoner asserted that he was not involved in the offenses being investigated, the statements sought from him would not have been incriminating. McBayne v. Pugh, No. 03-1228, 85 Fed. Appx. 109 (10th Cir. 2003).

Procedural: Discovery

     Prisoner accused of heroin possession did not show good cause to obtain personnel files of correctional officers who obtained information which tipped them off that he might be selling drugs when there was no factual basis for his claim that they engaged in misconduct which led to the discovery of the drugs. Officers were not personally involved in the search that led to the discovery of the heroin. People v. Collins, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 731 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2004). [PDF]

Sexual Offender Programs & Notification

     State trooper who provided community notification of the presence of out-of-state sexual offender who transferred his parole to Pennsylvania was entitled to qualified immunity, as a reasonable officer could have believed that such notification did not violate the offender's constitutional rights. Lines v. Wargo, 271 F. Supp. 2d 649 (W.D. Pa. 2003).

Smoking

     Prison officials who supervised residential unit were entitled to qualified immunity from liability on prisoner's claim that they improperly exposed him to second-hand tobacco smoke when smoking was prohibited but non-smoking policy was "imperfectly" enforced. Moorer v. Price, No. 03-1429, 83 Fed. Appx. 770 (6th Cir. 2003).

     "Vague and speculative" assertions that permitting other prisoners to smoke exposed the plaintiff inmate to an unhealthy environment were not sufficient to state a claim for violation of his constitutional rights. Harrison v. Smith, No. 03-40924, 83 Fed. Appx. 630 (5th Cir. 2003). [PDF]

     Pre-trial detainee failed to show that prosecutor was individually involved in his confinement in a facility permitting tobacco smoking which allegedly aggravated a pre-existing medical condition. Prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity in both her official and individual capacity, as the prisoner's detention was part of the initiation and presentation of criminal charges against him. Reid v. Schuman, No. 03-0031, 83 Fed. Appx. 376 (2nd Cir. 2003).

Strip Search: Prisoners

     Male prisoner's strip search in the presence of a female sergeant was not a violation of his Eighth Amendment or privacy rights, even assuming that the sergeant laughed at his nakedness. The search, conducted in response to allegations of smoking marijuana, was reasonably related to legitimate security concerns, and verbal insults of an inmate were not violations of his constitutional rights. Roden v. Sowders, No. 02-6427, 84 Fed. Appx. 611 (6th Cir. 2003).

     Prisoner's claim that correctional officers grabbed his genitals during pat down searches and then subjected him to "slow, exaggerated and humiliating" strip searches were sufficient to state a claim for assault under New Hampshire state law. Silva v. Warden, No. 2003-196, 839 A.2d 4 (N.H. 2003).

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

     AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.

     "Code of Silence" Memo: The California Department of Corrections has issued a memo to all correctional employees announcing "zero tolerance" towards any "code of silence" concerning misconduct by fellow employees. (February 17, 2004). [PDF].

     Drug Use: Oregon Department of Corrections: Inmate Drug Usage in the Institutions During January 2004. 2 pgs. [PDF] Presents information about recent results of three different types of drug testing of inmates in Oregon correctional facility--random drug testing, suspicion based drug testing, and testing of inmates involved in the Alcohol and Drug treatment programs who are tested for drug use every month.

     Foreign Language Proficiency: Español for Law Enforcement: An Interactive Training Tool February 2004 This CD-ROM (NCJ 201801) was developed to help law enforcement officers obtain a working knowledge of Spanish and apply it to law enforcement situations. The video walks viewers through English translations, phonetic spellings, and pronunciations of Spanish words in situations involving interviews, crime scenes, motor vehicles, and domestic violence. To obtain a copy of this CD-ROM, visit NCJRS's Online Store or call or write to NCJRS at: NCJRS P.O. Box 6000 Rockville, MD 20859-6000 Fax: 301-519-5212 Phone: 800-851-3420 (toll free).

     Policies & Procedures: Official policies of the California Department of Corrections are published in the Department Operations Manual. [PDF]. Rules of general applicability adopted by the Department in accordance with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) are contained in Division 3 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations (CCR), commencing with Section 3000 and ending with Section 3901.35.2. These regulations of the Department of Corrections are commonly referred to as the Director’s Rules. [PDF]

     Prison Review Board: California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has appointed an independent review board to make recommendations for "fundamental reform within California's youth and adult correctional systems." The panel, which is to present findings by the end of June 2004, will be chaired by George Deukmejian, former Governor of California and a former California attorney general. (Click here to read the Governor's March 5, 2004 press release announcing the appointments).

     Publications: DOCS Today, monthly publication of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, Vol. 13, No. 4, 16 pgs. (April 2004) [PDF]. This month's cover story is "Inmates paid $37M in '95-'03 fees, fines." According to the article, from their earnings, which average one dollar a day, inmates in the state have been assessed more than $4 million a year in fees and fines since 1995 that go to the state's general fund, courts, or crime victims. One of the sources is fees assessed when inmates are found guilty at disciplinary hearings. The publication asserts that inmate misconduct drops in the face of fines. A chart on inmate rule violations from 1992-2003 states that the infraction rate per 1,000 inmates was 1,721 in 1992, and has been reduced to a low of 1,307 in 2003. 1992 was the first year that the New York department first announced fines for inmate misconduct. Another article in the publication of possible interest is "Rapid HIV test gives inmate status quicker, allows earlier treatment," concerning a new way of testing inmates for HIV infection for which test results are available on-site within a half hour, compared with older testing methods which required an outside lab test that provided results in approximately two weeks. The more rapid test is now, according to the article, available in half the state's prisons, and is expected to be expanded to all 71 facilities by the end of 2004. For more information on rapid HIV testing by the Centers for Disease Control, click here.

     Publications: Law Enforcement & Corrections Technology News Summary, published on-line weekly by the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC), a program of the National Institute of Justice.

     Research Reports: "Annotated Listing of Research Studies And Legislative Reports" (Year 2003). New York State Department of Correctional Services. (Includes a link to a request form to obtain full copies of individual studies and reports). A total of 35 such studies and reports are briefly summarized, including documents on such subjects as a "shock incarceration program," "merit time program," "comprehensive alcohol and substance abuse treatment," "psychological screening program for correction officer candidates," "recidivism research," statistical reports on inmate population, inmate suicide, "the impact of foreign-born inmates on the New York State Department of Correctional Services," female inmates and offenders, and inmate grievance programs.

     Statistics: Quick Fact Sheet on Oregon Corrections (January 2004). 2 pgs. [PDF] Summaries of quick facts and statistics regarding employees, inmates, departmental finances, community supervised offenders, inmate work, inmates in youth authority custody, and projections concerning prison population from today (12,852) to July 2013 (16,481). A list of Oregon correctional facilities, their superintendents, their addresses, and the amount of their annual budgets is also provided.

     Reference:

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.