FEATURED CASES

WITH LINKS TO THE OPINIONS

Prisoner in psychiatric housing unit asserted a valid claim for unlawful retaliation against him for reporting that a correctional officer exposed his penis to him and made vulgar remarks, and then falsely accused him of misconduct after he refused to refrain from reporting the incident.

     A California prisoner housed in a prison's psychiatric medical housing unit got into an argument with a correctional officer when he asked that inmates there be allowed to keep their cell doors open because of the heat. While still in a control booth, the officer allegedly unzipped his pants, exposed his penis to the prisoner, who is black, and said "come suck this white dick, boy," while shaking his exposed penis at the prisoner. The prisoner allegedly attempted to report the incident, but other officers on duty allegedly ignored his complaints.

     The officer later allegedly apologized to the prisoner for his conduct and asked that it not be reported. When the prisoner insisted that he would report it, the officer threatened to cite the prisoner for misconduct. When a supervisor learned of the incident, he questioned the officer about it, and the officer allegedly lied about what happened, as a result of which the prisoner was placed in administrative segregation for six weeks. The prisoner pursued grievances against the officer, which ultimately resulted in a determination that the officer had exposed himself as the prisoner claimed, and a 30-day suspension without pay for the officer.

     The prisoner then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit alleging that the officer unlawfully retaliated against him for reporting, or attempting to report his inappropriate behavior, in violation of his rights under the First Amendment.

     A federal appeals court found that the facts alleged, if true, were sufficient, although not expertly stated, to assert a valid First Amendment claim for unlawful retaliation against the prisoner for exercising his right to pursue grievances.

     The appeals court rejected, however, the claim that the officer's actions in exposing himself to the prisoner for 30-40 seconds was serious enough to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. There was no medical evidence in the record to show that the officer's conduct worsened the prisoner's mental health condition, or that the officer acted intentionally to deny, delay, or interfere with the prisoner's mental health treatment. Claims for assault and intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress were also rejected.

     Austin v. Terhune, #02-16546, 367 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Federal appeals court rejects California inmates' claim that governor and Board of Prison Terms engaged in an unconstitutional conspiracy to enforce an "unwritten policy" of denying parole to prisoners serving life sentences. Prisoners' damage claims were barred and federal courts cannot enjoin state officials on the basis that their actions or policies allegedly conflict with other state law.

     A number of California prisoners claimed, in a federal civil rights lawsuit, that the state's governor and the Board of Prison Terms, which administers the state's parole system, conspired together to achieve an unwritten, unconstitutional policy of denying parole to inmates convicted of certain offenses, and serving life sentences. All of the plaintiff prisoners were serving life sentences with the possibility of parole for offenses of kidnapping, attempted murder, or first or second degree murder.

     The plaintiff prisoners sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief aimed at removing the governor from the parole process or ordering him to comply with state statutes regarding eligibility for parole.

     A federal appeals court has upheld the rejection of these claims.

     The court found that the plaintiffs claims for damages for their harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, were barred unless they could show that their conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, under the principles set for in Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645, 137 L. Ed. 2d 906, 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that Heck could limit a federal civil rights claim seeking damages for using the wrong procedure, not only for reaching the wrong result.

     In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that the governor and his co-defendants willfully conspired to "inaugurate an illegal 'underground' policy" to "block paroles in perpetuity of term-to-life prisoners such as plaintiffs." As in Balisok, the appeals court stated, the plaintiffs' damage claims rely on "deceit and bias" on the part of the decision-makers, and imply the invalidity of their confinement insofar as their prolonged incarcerations "are due to the purported bias of state officials."

     The appeals court also found that bias on the part of the governor, the Board and its members, or the state's attorney general could not be redressed by an injunction "ordering those state officials to comply with state law," even assuming that the plaintiffs had a protected liberty interest in parole eligibility. Further, the plaintiffs had not alleged anything that would indicate that state statutes giving the governor a role in parole determinations were unconstitutional. Federal civil rights law, the appeals court noted, does not give federal courts authority to enjoin the administration of, or to declare invalid, state laws on the grounds that they are "incompatible with other state laws," much less to rule that state laws "are contrary to the state legislature's intent," or to put into place "prophylactic rules of our own making where the underlying state laws are not themselves contrary to federal law. That, the court concluded, is the job of state courts and state legislatures.

     The plaintiffs could, the court pointed out, pursue federal habeas proceedings, and the state of California also provided a procedure for attacking either an unfounded rescission or denial of parole by the Board or the Governor.

     McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, No. 01-16037, 369 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Federal appeals court upholds injunctive orders requiring the remedying of "filthy" conditions, inadequate mental health care, inadequate ventilation, and malfunctioning toilets on death row in Mississippi prison, but rejects a number of other injunctive orders by trial court, including requirement of a preventative maintenance program, as not supported by the evidence or improper micro-management.

     A Mississippi prisoner sued state correctional officials on behalf of himself and other prisoners confined to death row in the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi. He claimed that that certain conditions of confinement on death row violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, he claimed that prisoners there were knowingly and deliberately subjected "to profound isolation, lack of exercise, stench and filth, malfunctioning plumbing, high temperatures, uncontrolled mosquito and insect infestations, a lack of sufficient mental health care, and exposure to psychotic inmates in adjoining cells."

     Upholding injunctive relief on some of these claims by the trial court, a federal appeals court found that the exhaustion of available administrative remedies by the named plaintiff as a representative of the class of prisoners was sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion of remedies requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e.

     The appeals court also upheld the trial court's finding that some of the conditions on death row in the prison violated the Eighth Amendment.

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones. Prison officials must provide humane conditions of confinement; they must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measure to ensure the safety of the inmates. Id. This circuit has worded the test as requiring extreme deprivation of any "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Further, mental health needs are no less serious than physical needs. The Supreme Court has made clear that the standards against which a court measures prison conditions are "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" and not the standards in effect during the time of the drafting of the Eighth Amendment.

A prison official has violated the Eighth Amendment when he 1) shows a subjective deliberate indifference to 2) conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate. Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.

     The trial court found that prisoners on death row had been subjected to cells that were "extremely filthy with chipped, peeling paint, dried fecal matter and food encrusted on the walls, ceilings, and bars," as well as water from both flooded toilets and rain leaks, and were routinely moved from cell to cell and forced to clean their new cells that may have been left in "horrendous sanitation" by the prior occupants, especially those who were mentally ill. They were allegedly not provided with adequate cleaning supplies and equipment, and the filthy conditions contributed to the infestation of pests and played a role in the mental well-being of the prisoners.

     The trial court further found that summer temperatures in the area averaged in the nineties with high humidity, that death row is "primarily not an air-conditioned facility," but that relief from the heat can be obtained by keeping windows open in the cell and using fans, but that this increased the mosquito population in the cells, and that ventilation was inadequate during the summer months. "The probability of heat-related illness is extreme on Death Row," the trial judge wrote, and "is dramatically more so for mentally ill inmates who often do not take appropriate behavioral steps to deal with the heat."

      The trial court also found problems with pest-control, and inadequate plumbing, and that "no one in civilized society should be forced to live under conditions that force exposure to another person's bodily wastes." It additionally found the lighting in the cells to be "grossly inadequate," and commented that the inmates' laundry is often returned "foul-smelling."

     The trial court further found the mental health care provided, especially to extremely psychotic prisoners, to be grossly inadequate, essentially "warehousing people with severe mental illness," and treating some with medication, but "essentially no other mental health services." Such prisoners are sometimes prescribed psychotropic drugs "with only sporadic monitoring," which can result in life-threatening situations, the court commented, due to the toxicity of these drugs.

     The appeals court ruled, based on the record, that these conclusions were not clearly erroneous and upheld injunctive relief requiring the remedying of the dirty cell conditions. Living in "such filthy conditions," the appeals court stated, would present the prisoners with a risk of serious harm to which the defendant officials have displayed a deliberate indifference. The ordered upgrading of mental health services was also approved.

     The appeals court also upheld injunctive orders directing the prison to provide fans, ice water, and daily showers when the heat index is 90 degrees or above, or during the months of May through September, based on the danger of death from heat-related illness as indicated by medical testimony, directing improved pest control efforts, and requiring the remedying of inadequate and malfunctioning toilets resulting in exposure to raw sewage, including the feces of one inmate "bubbling up in the neighboring cell," and overflowing. It also upheld an order requiring the upgrading of cell lighting. It limited these orders to death row, however, finding that the trial court had overstepped by extending these orders to other housing units in the prison.

     The appeals court overturned, however, injunctive orders concerning prison laundry, as death row prisoners are allowed to wash their clothes with bar soap, and an order allowing inmates to wear sneakers instead of flip-flops while exercising, which the court found did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and which the defendants argued was necessary as a security measure because inmates previously used boots and shoes to kick other inmates and to throw at staff members, and flip-flops make escape more difficult.

     The appeals court also overturned a portion of the injunctive orders, however, which compelled the adoption of a written preventive maintenance program. "While federal courts can certainly enter injunctions to prevent Eighth Amendment violations, they are not to micromanage state prisons." While the adoption of a written preventive maintenance program might be "desirable," it went beyond what was required.

     Russell v. Johnson, #03-60529, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 13890 (5th Cir. 2004).

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Prison Litigation Reform Act's cap on attorneys' fees at 150% of damage award does not apply in cases where the parties privately settle the lawsuit, and subsequently enter a stipulation of dismissal of the claim in the trial court.

     The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2), put a cap of 150% of the damage award on attorneys' fees in prisoner civil rights actions that result in a "monetary judgment." A federal appeals court has held, however, that this limit does not apply in cases where the parties privately settle the case, and then enter a stipulation in the trial court dismissing the lawsuit.

     In the case before the appeals court, a New York prisoner claimed that corrections officers used excessive force against him, and that "while being interrogated about a fire that was set at the prison, he was verbally threatened with racial epithets, punched in the face, choked, severely beaten until he lapsed into unconsciousness, and then dragged back to his cell." He claimed that he was later treated at the prison hospital for a broken nose, two black eyes, and multiple contusions and lacerations. The complaint sought $200,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs.

     The parties reached a settlement, however, and the trial court entered a stipulation of dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. Procedure 41(a), memorializing the private settlement agreement providing for payment of $1,000 to the plaintiff and the payment of his "reasonable attorneys' fees." The trial court subsequently held that the attorneys' fee cap was applicable, and declined to award attorneys' fees in excess of the cap, awarding $1,500 in attorneys' fees.

     A federal appeals court rejected this conclusion. It found that this was not a case in which a judgment for money was entered. Indeed, the stipulation of dismissal, entered under Rule 41, "did not even require the approval" of the trial court. Further, the stipulation "expressly disclaimed any liability" on the defendants' part for any violation of the prisoner's rights, so that it could not be said that the attorneys' fees "were directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of his statutory rights."

Accordingly, we see no reason to apply the PLRA fee caps to this action, in which a money judgment never was entered.

      In the stipulation, the parties provided that the defendants would pay to the plaintiff's lawyer his "reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to be determined by the court upon the submission of the parties." The appeals court rejected the argument that this incorporated by reference the PLRA fee cap. The court ordered further proceedings to determine the proper amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded without limitation by the PLRA fee cap.

     Torres v. Walker, No. 03-102, 356 F.3d 238 (2nd Cir. 2004).

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Prisoner was excused from having to exhaust administrative remedies before filing federal civil rights lawsuit against jail employees' alleged use of excessive force against him both in reliance of then applicable case law later rejected by U.S.  Supreme Court, and also because his transfer to another facility made administrative remedies at the county jail no longer "available" to him.

     A federal appeals court has held that "justifiable circumstances" may sometimes excuse a prisoner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies when filing a lawsuit challenging conditions of confinement, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and that the plaintiff prisoner in the case before it should be excused on that basis.

     The plaintiff prisoner claimed that personnel in a New York county jail beat him and that he was subsequently denied proper medical treatment for his injuries. He filed a federal civil rights lawsuit over these incidents in 1998, and, in response to motions for summary judgment by the defendants, acknowledged that he had not exhausted administrative remedies. He argued, however, that this should be excused because he did not think exhaustion was required for a single episode of prisoner mistreatment, as distinguished from continuing prison conditions, and also that by the time the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983 (2002), that all prisoner complaints required exhaustion, he had been transferred from the jail, so that administrative remedies were no longer available to him.

     The trial court rejected these arguments and entered judgment for the defendants on the basis of the plaintiff prisoner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

     Reversing, the federal appeals court pointed out that one of its panels had previously interpreted the PLRA not to require exhaustion for claims of excessive force, so that the prisoner could reasonably have believed that he did not have to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit on his claims, even though that view was later rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. Additionally, the prisoners transfer from the jurisdiction of the defendant county officials prior to the filing of the lawsuit precluded dismissal of his complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, because the transfer "rendered administrative remedies no longer 'available,' a condition of the exhaustion requirement of section 1997e(a)."

     Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail Corr. Dept., No. 02-0325, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 12488 (2nd Cir. 2004).

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Prisoner's federal civil rights lawsuit against correctional officials for allegedly keeping him locked in a cell without adequate heating and ventilation was improperly dismissed for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Under prison's grievance policy, these issues were non-grievable since they involved many prisoners.

     A Michigan prisoner filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against correctional officials, complaining that they had held him in a cell with inadequate heating and ventilation. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit on the basis that the plaintiff prisoner had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as he was required to do under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a).

     A federal appeals court vacated the trial court's decision, finding that the record showed that the prisoner's complaints involving the heat and ventilation in his cell were non-grievable under prison policy because they involved a significant number of prisoners. The prison grievance coordinator had advised the plaintiff that his complaints would be rejected as a "group issue."

     In response to a letter of complaint the plaintiff sent to the warden about these conditions, a deputy warden sent him a form letter in which he did not indicate that the matter should be grieved. Further, an unrelated grievance that the plaintiff filed concerning ventilation in his cell was rejected as non-grievable.

Although the record reflects that plaintiff filed grievances that were apparently accepted in error, plaintiff nonetheless cannot be required to exhaust administrative remedies regarding non-grievable issues. Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint was not subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

     In light of this decision, the appeals court noted, the plaintiff also should not be assessed a "strike" against him under the "three strikes" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

     Figel v. Bouchard, #03-1567, 89 Fed. Appx. 970 (6th Cir. 2004).

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Disciplinary hearing officer's decision in maximum-security prison to deny prisoner's request to call inmate he allegedly beat as a live witness in the hearing was not a denial of due process. Other prisoner's written statement was received, and officer reasonably exercised his discretion to protect the witness against possible reprisal in case his testimony was not as the accused prisoner wanted.

     A Virginia prisoner was found guilty, following a prison disciplinary hearing, of assaulting a fellow inmate. The hearing officer in the maximum security facility denied the prisoner's request to call his alleged victim as a witness, but allowed him to submit the other prisoner's written statement in lieu of live testimony. He subsequently claimed that this ruling deprived him of due process of law.

     A federal appeals court disagreed, stating that "prison officials have the discretion, indeed the duty, to protect the inmates committed to their care." Among other concerns, the court noted, prison officials "justifiably feared" reprisal against the witness in the event that his testimony was not as the accused prisoner hoped, and they were not "constitutionally required" to expose the alleged victim of the beating to the threat of a second beating.

     The alleged victim's submitted written statement denied that the accused prisoner had assaulted him in any way. In addition, the hearing received testimony from an officer who had seen the accused prisoner enter the alleged victim's cell prior to the injuries, a nurses' report on the alleged victim's injuries, and the alleged victim's prior statement to the nurses that he had been hit with an adapter wrapped in a sock, as well as testimony that the accused prisoner's adapter was found in the cell after the fight, and that the alleged victim had previously told a lieutenant that the accused prisoner had assaulted him.

     Prison regulations allowing a disciplinary hearing officer to deny a request to call a live inmate witness protects against the possibility that inmates will forcefully coerce testimony from their fellow prisoners, and protects inmates' safety. It also attempts to reduce the "shuffling" of inmates inside maximum security prisons, the court noted, reasonably attempting to minimize the "substantial disruption and administrative burden" that would follow from an "unrestricted right to live witness testimony." The court pointed out that the state had not sought to limit live testimony from all kinds of witnesses or even to limit live testimony from inmate witnesses at all kinds of facilities, but had merely vested prison officials with discretion to decide whether some relatively few inmates--those held at maximum security facilities--should testify in person or in writing.

Secondly, the State has tailored its regulation to meet its penological concerns. The twin dangers of retaliation and disruption are present to some degree whenever inmates are allowed to call their fellow prisoners as witnesses in disciplinary proceedings. Yet the Virginia Department of Corrections has not sought to limit live testimony from all kinds of witnesses, nor has it sought even to limit live testimony from inmate witnesses at all kinds of facilities.

In sum, the State has tailored its regulation to meet its most pressing needs by placing limits on the live testimony of its most dangerous inmates - those inmates who pose the severest threat to personal and institutional safety. The bounds that prison authorities have placed on live witness testimony thus represent a sensible "mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution. ..."

     The court further argued that in this case, where numerous officers witnessed the fight between the prisoners, both were treated for their injuries, physical evidence at the scene substantiated the officers' account, and the victim himself initially said that the accused prisoner had attacked him, "why then would" the victim change his story, other than because he feared what would happen to him if he did not recant.

     Under these circumstances, the hearing officer did not act unreasonably in denying the request to call the live witness and reading the written statement into the record. He was amply aware that the victim denied the assault, as well as of the ample evidence that the written statement was an after the fact falsification.

     Brown v. Braxton, No. 03-6763 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 13626 (4th Cir. 2004).

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Prison did not violate prisoners' First Amendment right to exercise their religion by disallowing a request for group worship by a religious group which advocates racial separatism. Rejection of request was reasonably related to legitimate security concerns. Further proceedings are ordered, however, on whether the denial of group worship was the "least restrictive means" available to prevent racial violence, as required by federal statute.

     A Missouri prisoner is a practicing member of the "Christian Separatist Church Society (CSC)," a religious group that holds as a central tenet the belief that its members must all be Caucasian because they are uniquely blessed by God and must separate themselves from all non-Caucasian persons. He sought formal recognition of the group and accommodation in the prison for group worship services.

     The prison decided to allow members of the group accommodation for individual worship, but to refuse the request for group worship services, stating that this decision was necessary to preserve security and to reduce the likelihood of racial violence, which officials said they believed can be "easily fueled by racial separation and inflammatory rhetoric." The prison therefore allowed individual members to worship privately in their cells, to keep a "sacred religious text," to receive other literature, subject to normal procedures and censorship guidelines, to receive clergy visits, and to adjust their activities to observe holy days. They were also allowed to wear a religious symbol, subject to certain guidelines.

     The prisoner filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that this improperly denied privileges that had been given to other separatist groups, including communal worship, religious funding, and institutional TV airtime for religious videos.

     A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the defendant officials on First Amendment claims, but ordered further proceedings on claims asserted under a federal statute which requires that the "least restrictive means" be used when a substantial burden is placed on prisoners' religious freedom rights.

     It found that the decision not to grant group worship rights was rationally connected to a legitimate interest in safety and security, based on concerns that racial segregation will spark violence. Additionally, the prison offered sufficient alternative means for a member of the group to practice their faith without group worship. Granting the request would place increased demands on correctional staff and "could lead to even greater division and violence among all the prisoners," and there were no "obvious, easy alternatives" to solitary practitioner status that would further both the group's interest in group worship, and the prisons interest in preventing escalated security concerns and costs.

     The appeals court also rejected the plaintiff's equal protection claim, accepting the prison's explanation that the group at issue was not in fact similarly situated to other racially polarized groups he cited, the Moorish Science Temple of America and the Nation of Islam, because "separatism is not central to their faith," so that the different treatment was based on security concerns, rather than discrimination. While the plaintiff provided evidence that these other groups did not allow Caucasians at their services, he provided no evidence, the appeals court found, that separatism is a "central religious tenet" of either group.

     The appeals court ordered further proceedings, however, on the prisoner's claim that his rights were violated by prison officials withholding an issue of the religious publication The Way, since an examination of the issue, the court found, did not show that it espoused violence. It also ordered further proceedings on the prisoner's claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., which provides that no substantial burden can be put on the religious exercise of a prisoner without a showing of a compelling governmental interest and the use of the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. This is a more stringent test than the general test, without that statute, for permissible burdens on prisoners' religious freedom rights.

     The appeals court ruled that the trial court, in addressing this latter claim, improperly concluded that the prisoners' religion was not substantially burdened by the denial of group worship and discussion. While the prison has a compelling interest in institutional security, the court stated, under the RLUIPA's higher standard of review, it must "provide some basis for their concern that racial violence will result from any accommodation" of the group's request, and that the denial of the request was the least restrictive means available to further that interest.

     The only evidence presented previously by prison authorities was testimony that suggested that the plaintiff prisoner is a racist, and that his religion requires that only "Anglo-Saxon individuals may participate," which the court found was insufficient to meet the burden of showing that the denial of group worship constituted the least restrictive means necessary to ensure the prevention of racial violence within the prison.

     Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corr., No. 02-3874, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 12239 (8th Cir).

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Jail booking procedures, including a pat-down search, the collection of personal property, and the detention and handcuffing of the person being booked, were reasonable, even when applied during one hour detention of individual being processed pursuant to criminal summons for an offense only punishable by fine.

     A Utah man was served with a criminal summons concerning a charge of criminal trespass, which is punishable by a fine and not by imprisonment. The summons required him, prior to appearing in court on the designated date, to appear at the county jail at least a day before, and to submit to booking on the offense, after which the jail personnel were to immediately release him. Failure to comply would result in the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.

     He appeared at the jail, and was booked according to standard jail procedures, which are employed regardless of whether a defendant is being released or confined following booking. A deputy performed a pat-down search and ordered the man to remove his shoes, belt, wallet, watch, keys, glasses, pocket knife, and his outer shirt, and then escorted him to the booking area where he was photographed and fingerprinted, and his belongings were inventoried, while another deputy performed a check for outstanding warrants.

     During part of the process, he was locked in a holding cell alone, and he was also briefly handcuffed to a bar attached to the booking counter. He did not get placed in the general jail population and did not come into contact with jail inmates, and he was subsequently released, with his belongings returned, and he filed a federal civil rights lawsuit challenging the reasonableness of the procedure.

     A federal appeals court has rejected the claim that the application of the booking process at the jail in these circumstances violated the man's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, when applied to defendants appearing on criminal summonses.

     It noted that it was uncontested that a summons was issued after a judicial determination of probable cause to believe that the man had committed a crime. Based on this, the defendants had authority to detain him for booking. The court also found that the restraints employed by the defendants were justified by a concern for the plaintiff's safety and the safety of others during the booking process. Police officers, other criminal defendants, and jail visitors pass through the booking area, the court noted, that there was no evidence that the defendants used any extraordinary amount of force in applying the handcuffs or in placing the plaintiff in a holding cell. The detention only lasted approximately one hour.

     While the plaintiff argued that individuals being booked for non-violent and non-jailable offenses should be booked in the non-secure area of the jail, the court found nothing unconstitutional in failing to do so, and also found that the searches conducted were reasonable under the circumstances.

     The defendants had legitimate interests in verifying the plaintiff's identity, in ensuring that he did not bring any dangerous items into the jail, and in making an inventory of the items taken from him to deter theft of those items and to deter false claims of theft. This case did not, the court pointed out, involve a strip search.

     Petersen v. Farnsworth, No. 03-4032, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 11711 (10th Cir).

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Federal prison officials were improperly granted summary judgment in pretrial detainee's lawsuit claiming that he was placed in administrative detention in extremely harsh conditions for over 500 days purely for the purpose of punishment and without required procedural due process.

     A federal prisoner sued prison officials concerning the conditions of his confinement as a pretrial detainee at the U.S. Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, where claims he was placed in administrative detention -- the "hole" -- in conditions constituting solitary confinement for more than five hundred days while he was awaiting trial.

     He claimed that this "lengthy and harsh" pretrial detention violated his due process rights in two ways--first because these conditions were solely for the purpose of punishment of him, which violated his right, as a pretrial detainee, not to be punished. Second, he claimed that 28 C.F.R. § 541.22, which governs the federal Bureau of Prison's placement and review of inmates in administrative detention, creates a protected liberty interest, and that his placement and continued confinement in administrative detention --in the absence of the notice, hearings, and assorted reviews § 541.22 requires --violated his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.

     A federal appeals court found that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the defendants, in light of the plaintiff's claims that his harsh treatment was solely for the purpose of punishment or retribution and that the defendants retaliated against the plaintiff for his co-defendant's exercise of constitutionally protected conduct by ordering the plaintiff back to the "hole" without cause because his co-defendant had initiated habeas corpus proceedings.

    The prisoner also alleged that other pretrial detainees were not treated as harshly and that it was unreasonable for any official to believe that it was constitutional to hold him for over 500 days in solitary confinement without any of the required hearings and that the defendants' actions in doing so lacked good faith. The appeals court noted that for purposes of appeal, it had to make all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and therefore had to infer that he was confined in this manner not because of "any concern about escape risks," as the defendants claimed, but rather for no legitimate reason and only for the sake of punishment.

     If the facts were as the plaintiff asserted, then the defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity, the court ruled, as to both the plaintiffs claims. The court found that it was clearly established that the alleged conduct would violate the plaintiff's right not to be punished as a pretrial detainee and that 28 C.F.R. Sec. 541.22 gives rise to a liberty interest which is violated if its procedures are not followed, and that the alleged conditions of confinement would amount to an "atypical and significant hardship as compared to the ordinary incidents of imprisonment to be expected by a pretrial detainee."

     Magluta v. F.P. Sam Samples, No. 03-11667, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 14116 (11th Cir).

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Appeals court orders further proceedings on whether woman should be allowed to proceed on lawsuit concerning her alleged gang rape in county jail over thirty years ago. Plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations should be extended because of her mental illness, and trial court made improper inferences, in the appeals court's opinion, in ruling on that issue.

     A woman filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that she was gang raped over thirty years earlier, at age twenty-one, while she was incarcerated for a traffic violation in a county jail in Maine. She alleged that a trustee prisoner who had keys to her cell entered the cell, raped her, and then let in other prisoners to the cell who also raped her.

     Faced with the "obvious question" about why she had waited so long to bring suit, a federal appeals court commented, the plaintiff argued that she had suffered from "pervasive mental illness for years," entitling her to the tolling (extension) of the Maine statute of limitations on the basis of that mental illness.

     The defendants presented an affidavit from an expert psychiatrist who had examined the plaintiff and reviewed her records, and who stated that she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder due principally to childhood abuse and neglect, but that since the alleged rapes in 1971, these disorders had not resulted in an inability to function in society "in a way that prevented her from protecting her legal rights." The plaintiff presented an affidavit from her own expert psychiatrist, who had qualified as an expert in prior sexual abuse cases, and who contended that she suffers from a bi-polar disorder with a current depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and mixed-personality disorder with borderline, dependent, and anti-social features.

     He expressed his opinion that, due to these conditions, her response to the rapes, "like many victims, was to blame herself," and that her "low self esteem, shame, guilt and fear contributed to her difficulty taking any action at the time of the rapes." He contended that it was only with the help of treatment that she was able in 2000 to be "strong enough to contemplate bringing a lawsuit for the rapes."

     The trial court, finding an ambiguity in the affidavit of the plaintiff's expert as to whether she suffered the required degree of mental illness before the rapes, which would be sufficient for tolling the statute of limitations, or that her mental illness reached that level only after and because of the rapes, which would not be sufficient, granted summary judgment for the defendants, since the plaintiff had the burden of proof on the issue.

     The plaintiff then sought reconsideration, submitting a supplemental affidavit from her expert, making it clear that he believed that she was mentally ill within the meaning of the statute at the time of the rapes, and that the rapes had exacerbated the mental illness. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, and granted a motion to strike the supplemental affidavit because it "could easily" have been provided earlier.

     The appeals court found that the trial court's decisions were improper. First, in addressing the motion for summary judgment, it should have made all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, in this case, the plaintiff, regardless of who bears the ultimate burden of proof. Therefore, to the extent that there was an ambiguity in the affidavit, it should have been construed in the plaintiff's favor, rather than in the defendants' favor, as the court did.

     The appeals court also ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration, and that the court should have applied an "interests-of-justice" test. The trial court had "injected a new issue" into the case--when the plaintiff's alleged mental illness had occurred--whether before or after the rapes--which was not previously focused on by the parties, and did so without adequate warning, so failing to accept the prompt presentation of material relevant to that issue--the supplemental affidavit, was improper.

     The appeals court therefore ordered further proceedings on the issue of whether the statute of limitations should be tolled on the plaintiff's claims.

     Douglas v. York County, No. 03-2086, 360 F.3d 286 (1st Cir. 2004).

     » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet.

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U.S. Supreme Court rules that foreign nationals detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, captured in Afghanistan hostilities, have a right to access to U.S. courts to challenge the legality of their detention, and that U.S. citizen detained as an "enemy combatant" for allegedly fighting against the U.S. in Afghanistan, also had a due process right to access to a "neutral decision maker" to challenge the factual basis for his detention. In a third case involving a U.S. citizen detained as an "enemy combatant" on U.S. soil for alleged involvement in terrorist conspiracy, Court does not reach ultimate issues because of procedural defects in court filing.

     The U.S. Supreme Court, in three recent cases, grappled with issues arising out of the war against terrorism, ruling that prisoners in U.S. military prisons overseas, specifically the one in Guantanamo, Cuba, have a right of access to the courts to challenge the legality of their confinement, and that a U.S. citizen detained as an enemy combatant for allegedly fighting against U.S. forces in Afghanistan also may challenge in the courts the factual basis for his designation and confinement. In a third case, involving a U.S. citizen captured in the U.S. and designated an "enemy combatant," the Court did not reach the ultimate issues involved in his challenge to his confinement without criminal charges, based on procedural defects in the case.

     In Rasul v. Bush, No. 03-334, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4760, the Court addressed challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad during military hostilities in Afghanistan, and alleged to be either al Qaeda terrorists or fighters for the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These foreign nationals are being held in military custody at a Guantanamo Bay, Cuba naval base which the U.S. occupies under a lease and treaty. They filed lawsuits challenging the legality of their detention, and argued that they should have been provided access to the courts or other tribunals and to counsel. The lower courts construed the lawsuits as habeas petitions and dismissed them for want of jurisdiction, stating that aliens detained outside U.S. sovereign territory may not seek habeas relief.

     By a 6-3 majority, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detentions, because jurisdiction over habeas applications extends to aliens held in a territory over which the U.S. exercises exclusive jurisdiction, even if not "ultimate sovereignty." The majority also found that the federal courts could address complaints by the detainees raising issues of federal law under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 and claims under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, the Alien Tort Statute. The majority opinion was written by Justice Stevens, with Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joining. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence, and Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas dissented.

    In a second case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4761, a U.S. citizen whom the government classified as an "enemy combatant" for allegedly fighting with the Taliban during the war in Afghanistan was captured in Afghanistan and then detained at a naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina. His father filed a habeas petition on his behalf, claiming that the detention violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the detainee actually went to do "relief work" and was not a combatant.

     A four-Justice plurality, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer, found that, although Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the circumstances alleged in the case, a U.S. citizen held in the U.S. as an enemy combatant must be given a due process right--a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, stated that the detention of Hamdi is unauthorized, and joined with the plurality to order that on remand he should have a "meaningful opportunity" to provide evidence that he is not an enemy combatant. Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas dissented.

     A third case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, No. 03-1027, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4759, involved a U.S. citizen brought to New York for detention in federal criminal custody after federal agents apprehended him in the U.S. while executing a material witness warrant issued in connection with a grand jury investigation into the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The President then issued an order to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld designating the detainee Padilla an "enemy combatant," and directing that he be detained in military custody. He was later moved to a Navy brig in Charleston, S.C., where he has been ever since.

     A habeas petition challenging this detention was then filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, and the government argued that the commander of the South Carolina brig was the only proper respondent (the habeas petition also named the President and Secretary Rumsfeld as respondents), and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over her because she was located outside of the district.

     The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the commander of the brig was the only proper respondent, since she, and not Secretary Rumsfeld, is the detainee's custodian. It further ruled that the federal trial court in New York did not have jurisdiction over the brig commander, and that habeas relief, if any were available, would only be addressable in a federal district court in South Carolina. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion, which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence, which O'Connor also joined, and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.

     » Click here to read the text of the Rasul opinion on the Internet.

     » Click here to read the text of the Hamdi opinion on the Internet.

     » Click here to read the text of the Padilla opinion on the Internet.

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Access to Courts/Legal Info

     Prisoner could not pursue federal civil rights claim over alleged interference with his right of access to the courts based on warden's decision to end his telephone access to legal personnel. The prisoner failed to show that this resulted in prejudice to his ability to pursue non-frivolous litigation. Additionally, the prisoner was not denied access to a telephone system which was monitored, and failed to show that he had submitted a request form to make an unmonitored phone call to legal personnel on that system. Robinson v. Gunja, #03-1262, 92 Fed. Appx. 624 (10th Cir. 2004).

Defenses: Collateral Estoppel

     Prisoner was barred, by collateral estoppel, from relitigating in federal court his civil rights lawsuit claims arising from the first of two fires in his cells, based on a prior state court proceeding rejecting his claim that the state was negligent in connection with that fire and therefore responsible for the loss of his property. Under collateral estoppel, since the prisoner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue once, the decided issue could not be revisited. No such bar existed as to claims arising from a second cell fire which he claimed was an "attack" on his life by a correctional officer, or subsequent alleged retaliatory actions against the prisoner, since these were not addressed in the prior state court proceeding. Hernandez v. Goord, 312 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

Defenses: Notice of Claim

     California state officials could raise defense that plaintiff prisoner failed to show compliance with notice of claim provision of state Tort Claims Act, Cal. Gov. Code Sec. 911.2, after merely stating that the prisoner failed to state a claim, since compliance with the six month notice requirement was an element of any claim for money damages against a public entity in California. State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde), No. S114171, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 90 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2004). [PDF]

Defenses: Statute of Limitations

     "Mailbox rule," considering documents filed with the court when submitted to correctional officials for mailing, applied to a prisoner's lawsuit against county officials for allegedly failing to protect him from physical attack by other prisoners in the county jail. Lawsuit was therefore considered timely filed when presented to officials for mailing within the applicable two-year statute of limitations, since the plaintiff prisoner had no control over what happened to his papers once they were submitted. Halladay v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Okmulgee, No. 99,801, 90 P.3d 578 (Okl. Civ. App. Div. 4 2004).

Disability Discrimination: Prisoner

     Prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to insulin dependent prisoner's need for a proper diet in prescribing a "self-monitored" diabetic diet in which the prisoner was responsible for choosing the proper food, and he was given counseling and education on how to do so. Additionally, substitutes for certain foods for diabetic inmates were made available. Court also rules that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12132, and Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794, and their prohibition on "disability discrimination" did not give the inmate a general federal cause of action for challenging the medical care provided for his insulin dependent diabetes. These statutes provide a basis for challenging discriminatory treatment or denial of benefits on the basis of a disability, and do not provide a basis for challenging the medical treatment of underlying disabilities. Carrion v. Wilkinson, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Ohio 2004).

Filing Fees

     Louisiana prisoner's lawsuit seeking damages and injunctive relief concerning alleged improper retaliation against him for challenging the results of a disciplinary hearing would be stayed until all accrued filing fees and costs are paid, since there was no indication that he was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury. Nichols v. Cain, 871 So. 2d 654 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2004). [PDF]

First Amendment

     Former prisoner could pursue claims for nominal damages for alleged violations of his First Amendment rights while incarcerated despite provision in Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(e) preventing him from pursing claims for compensatory damages in the absence of physical injury. Further, the fact that the prisoner had been released did not make his claim moot, as nominal damages are past damages. McDaniels v. McKinna, #03-1231, 96 Fed. Appx. 575 (10th Cir. 2004).

Frivolous Lawsuits

     Inmate's lawsuit claiming a "massive conspiracy" against him by nineteen correctional officials or employees was frivolous, and he did not show an exhaustion of available administrative remedies as required under Texas law prior to filing suit. Additionally, his affidavit of prior civil litigation history merely described three prior lawsuits as "dismissed," without informing the court that they had been deemed frivolous or malicious, and he had a pattern of filing frivolous lawsuits which had previously resulted in a federal court barring him "for life" from filing further civil lawsuits against correctional officials and employees without prior written court permission. Bishop v. Lawson, #2-03-076-CV, 131 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004).

Inmate Funds

     Alabama correctional officials did not violate prisoner's rights by withholding part of the monetary benefits paid to him for injuries suffered while participating in a work-release program, and using that money to pay for part of the cost of the prisoner's incarceration. The prisoner was not an "employee" within the meaning of the state's workers' compensation statute, so that the protections of the statute against garnishment or seizure of benefits awards did not apply. Further, even if he had been interpreted to be an "employee," the benefits were in lieu of wages, and therefore the seizure of them to pay for part of the cost of incarceration was authorized under state law. Gober v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, No. 2020064, 871 So. 2d 838 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).

Medical Care

     Prison doctor's decision to discontinue prior course of treatment of prisoner for gastrointestinal problems and to prescribe allegedly "less effective" medications was insufficient to show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Doctor's removal of prisoner from "chronic care" list, even though it resulted in prisoner having to make a $3 co-payment each time he requested medical care, was not a violation of his rights when it did not result in any denial of medical care because of the fee. White v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., No. 03-2097, 94 Fed. Appx. 262 (6th Cir. 2004).

     Failure of prison medical employees to surgically repair prisoner's bilateral inguinal hernia was not deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition when prison physician examined prisoner thirteen times over an eighteen months, wrote "numerous" prescriptions, and ordered several tests. Lawrence v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections, 308 F. Supp. 2d 709 (E.D. Va. 2004).

Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Retention and Training

     Female former inmates of federal community confinement center operated by a private company failed to show that company was negligent in failing to uphold a one-year security experience requirement when transferring an employee to a "resident advocate" position, since they failed to demonstrate that there was any connection between the employee's lack of security experience and his alleged sexual abuse of inmates. Company could not be held vicariously liable for the alleged abuse simply on the basis of the employer-employee relationship. There was, however, a triable issue of whether the company was negligent in retaining the employee after it received a report of his alleged sexual harassment of one female prisoner. Adorno v. Correctional Services Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2004 ).

Overcrowding

     Alleged failure of city to alleviate overcrowding in jail, resulting in unsanitary conditions, could possibly be a basis for liability for prisoner's death from bacterial meningitis. Doctor's failure to treat prisoner for this condition, however, did not show deliberate indifference, when he testing the prisoner for meningitis and concluded that he did not have that condition. Brown v. Mitchell, 308 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Va. 2004).

Prison & Jail Construction and Closing Issues

     Mississippi governor's purported veto of a portion of a state statute addressing the funding of state prisons was unconstitutional and therefore a "nullity, so that purported termination of contract for the private housing of prisoners in Delta Correctional Facility was improper. Barbour v. Delta Corr. Facility Authority, No. 2002-CA-01510-SCT, 871 So. 2d 703 (Miss. 2004). [PDF]

Prison Litigation Reform Act: Exhaustion of Remedies

     Trial court improperly dismissed prisoner's lawsuit concerning prison officials' alleged failure to protect him from another inmate on the basis of failure to exhaust available administrative remedies without considering prisoner's claim that prison officials prevented him from exhausting his administrative remedies by beating him, threatening him, denying him grievance forms and writing implements, and transferring him to another facility. Trial court could also have considered his claim that complaints to the FBI constituted an informal exhaustion of his administrative grievances sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e.  Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an "affirmative defense," and is subject to "estoppel" barring the defense if prison officials actually did prevent a prisoner from pursuing a grievance.  Ziemba v. Wezner, No. 02-0340, 366 F.3d 161 (2nd Cir. 2004). [PDF]

     Prison officials could assert a prisoner's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies as a defense in a second summary judgment motion in his federal civil rights lawsuit after having failed to do so in a first summary judgment motion, and even after the time period for filing such a motion had expired. First, the defendants had also alleged this defense in their answer to the complaint. Second, since the defendants could have asserted the same defense at trial, allowing the summary judgment motion to be filed saved the prisoner the expense of preparing for a trial that he would have lost. Summary judgment for prison officials upheld. Villante v. Vandyke, No. 03-0044, 93 Fed. Appx. 307 (2nd Cir. 2004). [PDF]

Prisoner Classification

     Federal Bureau of Prison's changed interpretation of statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3621(b) as limiting its authority to place prisoners in community confinement centers (CCC) to only the final ten percent or six months of a sentence, whichever was less, was not entitled to deference, as it was a legal interpretation of a statute, rather than a regulation adopted pursuant to the BOP's rule-making authority. Court rules that the interpretation was invalid, since the statute grants the BOP the authority to designate or transfer prisoners to a CCC at any time prior to the end of their sentence. Further, any application of this policy to the plaintiff prisoner's sentence was an improper retroactive enhancement of his punishment, violative of the "ex post facto" clause of the U.S. Constitution. Crowley v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 312 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

Prisoner Discipline

     Determination that prisoner was guilty of violating rules against violent conduct, assaults against correctional staff, refusing direct orders, and property damage was supported by substantial evidence, including officers' testimony and video surveillance tape. Nothing in the record showed that the hearing officer was biased against the prisoner or based the determination of guilt on anything aside from the evidence presented at the hearing. Porter v. Goord, 776 N.Y.S.2d 355 (A.D. 3d Dept. 2004). [PDF]

     Finding of guilt on charges of assaulting another inmate and related charges was adequately supported by substantial evidence at disciplinary hearing. The absence of the assault victim from the hearing, who the prisoner wanted to call as a witness, was adequately explained by the hearing officer and by the victim's signed witness refusal form. Lebron v. Goord, 775 N.Y.S.2d 434 (A.D. 3d Dept. 2004). [PDF]

Prisoner Restraint

     Prison official was entitled to qualified immunity against prisoner's claim that he used excessive force against him when handcuffing him, resulting in a lacerated wrist and injured thumb. The prisoner admitted that he violated facility cuffing procedures by withdrawing his uncuffed hand and disobeying the officer's orders, and defendant reasonably believed that the plaintiff prisoner was trying to pull the cuffs into his cell in order to possibly use them as a weapon. Avery v. Anderson, No. 03-4213, 94 Fed. Appx. 735 (10th Cir. 2004).

Prisoner Suicide

     Alleged failure of correctional employees to attempt to resuscitate an inmate found hanging in his cell did not violate any clearly established constitutional right in the absence of any evidence that the inmate had a pulse or was breathing at the time a corrections officer arrived at the cell. Dipace v. Goord, 308 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

Racial & National Origin Discrimination

     African-American inmate did not show that he had been subjected to racial discrimination in work assignments. Prisoner's "rambling" statement concerning what occurred demonstrated, "at most," that there may have been a "personality clash" between the prisoner and some officers. Additionally, the prisoner had no property right to his job or to working any particular number of hours, so his claim that he was given fewer hours of work than some other inmates was not relevant. Miles v. Wiser, 847 A.2d 237 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).

Religion

     Prison did not violate "Charismatic Christian" inmate's right to religious freedom by failing to use his new "religiously inspired" name and by failing to honor his religious vegetarian dietary requests. Use of his commitment name in prison computers used when preparing money orders and official documents was justified by legitimate penological interest in holding down costs, since computers were programmed with commitment names. Prisoner was offered a vegetable option in lieu of the meat main course on meals, and a legitimate concern about controlling costs justified denying his requests for raw vegetables, fresh fruit, nuts, honey, whole wheat bread, cheese and grains. Ephraim v. Angelone, 313 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2003).

Visitation

     Maximum security prison did not violate prisoner's rights under either U.S. Constitution or Alaska State Constitution by ordering him not to hold his wife's hand during prayers when granted a contact visit. His right to religious freedom did not require prison to allow hand-holding, kissing, or embracing during such a visit, and the rule was reasonably related to legitimate interests in keeping the prison free of contraband. Temporary suspension of contact visits after prisoner allegedly violated the rule did not violate his right to due process. Larson v. Cooper, #S-10327, 90 P.3d 125 (Alaska 2004).

Work/Education Programs

     Washington state statute, RCWA 72.09.100(1), under which Department of Corrections entered into contract with private company allowing them to employ convicts in its business, violated a state constitutional provision, Art. 2, Sec. 29, concerning the employment of prisoners by private entities, and prohibiting such transactions. Washington Water Jet Workers Association v. Yarbrough, No. 70814-2, 90 P.3d 42 (Wash. en banc., 2004).

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

     AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.

     Publication: The Jailhouse Lawyer's Handbook: How to Bring a Federal Lawsuit to Challenge Violations of Your Rights in Prison. (4th Edition, revised 2003). 113 page handbook providing instructions and legal discussion for prisoners interested in suing correctional institutions and officials, available for free download at the link given. Published by the Center for Constitutional Rights and the National Lawyers Guild. [PDF]

     Report: "Reforming California's Youth and Adult Correctional System" a 350-page report by a 40-member Independent Review Panel headed by former California Gov. George Deukmejian (July 1, 2004). Contains 239 recommendations concerning the operations, policies, and procedures of youth and adult correctional systems in the state, including reorganizing the California Youth and Adult Correctional Agency and its component entities, and replacing it with a new Department of Correctional Services run by a ten-member Civilian Corrections Commission. The report also recommends more detailed screening before hiring of correctional officers, a code of conduct for officers to receive and sign, and increased discipline against correctional employees if they retaliate against whistleblowers. New emphasis is also placed on issues concerning prisoner rehabilitation and education. Major chapter headings in the report are: A Reorganization Plan for Corrections, Ethics and Culture, Employee Investigations and Discipline, Use of Force, Personnel and Training, Risk Management and Health Care, Inmate and Parolee Population Management, Ward and Parolee Population Management, Closures, Labor Contract, and Information Technology. Appendices to the report include discussions of implementation, legal issues, proposed statutory and constitutional changes, a bibliography, and a listing of over 400 persons interviewed or submitting suggestions for the report.

     Report: "The Sexual Abuse of Female Inmates in Ohio," by Stop Prison Rape (SPR), 18 pgs, December 2003. [PDF]

     Statistics: California Department of Corrections: Facts and Figures (2nd Quarter 2004). Facts about the budget, staff, and offenders in California's correctional facilities, as well as community corrections and parole.

     Statistics: Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2003. Presents data on prison and jail inmates, collected from National Prisoner Statistics counts and the Annual Survey of Jails in 2003. (May 27, 2004). Highlights include: Prison population increased by 40,983, the largest increase in 4 years; At midyear 2003, a total of 3,006 State prisoners were under age 18; Adult jails held a total of 6,869 persons under age 18; Local jails were operating 6% below their rated capacity. In contrast, at yearend 2002, State prisons were operating 1% and 17% above capacity, and Federal prisons were 33% above their rated capacity. In the year ending June 30, 2003, the smaller State prison systems had the greatest percentage increase: Vermont (up 12.2%), Minnesota (up 9.4%), and Maine (up 9.1%). NCJ 203947. Report is available in both .PDF and plain text versions, and spreadsheets of data are also downloadable at the link given.

     Statistics: State Prison Expenditures, 2001 Presents comparative data on the cost of operating the Nation's State prisons. The study is based on institutional corrections elements of the Fiscal 2001 Survey of Government Finances which State budget officers reported to the U.S. Census Bureau. (June 2004). State-level spending is presented on prison employee salaries and wages; employer contributions to employee benefits; supplies, contractual services, and other operating costs; and capital expenditures, e.g. building construction, renovations, major repairs, and land purchases. Additional data reveal amounts spent on food, inmate medical care, utilities, and contractual services. Highlights include the following: Prison operations consumed about 77% of State correctional costs in FY 2001. State correctional expenditures increased 145% in 2001 constant dollars from $15.6 billion in FY 1986 to 38.2 billion in FY 2001; prison expenditures increased 150% from $11.7 billion to $29.5 billion. Spending on medical care for State prisoners totaled $3.3 billion, or 12% of operating expenditures in 2001. 06/04 NCJ 202949. Report is available in both .PDF and plain text versions, and spreadsheets of data are also downloadable at the link given.

     U.S. Military Prisons Overseas: Documents and correspondence in the legal debate on the interrogation of prisoners in U.S. Custody. Newly released documents from the U.S. Department of Justice and Department of Defense on the legality and use of certain interrogation techniques on prisoners and detainees in U.S. custody. (Both PDF and .html files).

     Websites: United States Marshals Service. This website was restructured on June 7, 2004, with additional features, including expanded information on the major duties and services provided by the Marshals Service, more information on fugitive investigations, a list of local U.S. Marshal district office contacts and information, and a new section on the story of the U.S. Marshals Service. Other features include information on prisoner health care (including the U.S. Marshals Service Prisoner Health Standards), court productions, and a public defender handbook, as well as a U.S. Marshals for Kids page with a variety of information and activities.

     Reference:

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.