FEATURED CASES

WITH LINKS TO THE OPINIONS

Refusal to allow a wheelchair bound prisoner to present live witness testimony from inmates during a disciplinary hearing violated his due process rights. Prisoner had a protected liberty interest based on combination of his physical disability and his confinement for two months in administrative segregation in a housing unit which was not designed to accommodate disabled prisoners, and where he was denied access to his wheelchair.

     A wheelchair bound California prisoner asserted that he was denied due process and equal protection because prison officials refused to allow him to present live witness testimony during a prison disciplinary hearing. A correctional officer had claimed that the prisoner disobeyed his order to lockup and to surrender what appeared to be contraband on his lap as he returned from the yard to his cell, and that the prisoner struck him with a closed fist and fell out of his wheelchair when the officer attempted to retrieve the alleged contraband.

     The prisoner claimed that the alleged contraband was non-contraband, a cookie and cake from the prison canteen, and that he merely covered the items with his body to prevent the officer from taking them. He also denied striking the officer, stating that he could not have done so because he had an injured finger in a splint, and also argued that the officer lifted him out of his wheelchair by his t-shirt, forcing them both to the ground.

     After the incident, the officer filed disciplinary charges of battery on a staff member, as a result of which the prisoner was immediately placed in administrative segregation in a special housing unit that was not handicapped-accessible and where he was not permitted to have his wheelchair in his cell. He therefore allegedly had to crawl into his bunk, hoist himself onto the toilet by the toilet seat, and avoid the shower because the facility lacked an appropriate shower seat. He also allegedly had to sit idle during outdoor exercise, and claimed that the special housing unit was infested with cockroaches and vermin.

     During the subsequent disciplinary hearing, he asked to present live testimony from four inmate witnesses and from an investigative officer assigned to gathered brief statements from witnesses. The hearing officer, however, only allowed testimony from the prisoner himself and the investigative officer, allegedly stating that he was "not going to rally your Crip[ple] buddies for this hearing." The prisoner was found guilty and a 12-month special housing unit term was imposed along with a 150-day credit forfeiture.

    A federal appeals court ruled that the prisoner's physical disability, together with his having been in administrative segregation for nearly two months in a housing unit that was not designed to accommodate disabled persons was sufficient to give rise to a due process protected liberty interest. While he did not have an "unfettered right" to call any and all live witnesses, in this case the hearing officer violated the prisoner's due process right to call witnesses in his defense, when he offered no reason for refusing to allow live witness testimony.

     At the same time, the appeals court found that the hearing officer was entitled to qualified immunity from liability, since the scope of the rights violated had not been clearly established at the time of the hearing. The exclusion of witnesses, the court found, must be decided on a case-by-case basis, with reasons specified.

     The court also found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the hearing officer, who was white, was racially motivated in his decision not to allow live witness testimony in the prisoner's disciplinary hearing. The plaintiff prisoner is black and in response to the prisoner's statement that "I wouldn't think of hitting a white officer, do you think that I would do something that stupid, especially while I'm in a wheelchair," the hearing officer allegedly said, "I don't know how black people think, and I'll never know. I don't know why a guy would stab his wife and her friend to death," allegedly referring to the O.J. Simpson case.

     Serrano v. Frances, No. 01-57036, 345 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2003).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet. [PDF]

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Federal appeals court panel finds that federal statute requiring the forced extraction of DNA samples from parolees, in the absence of individualized suspicion of another crime, violated the Fourth Amendment and did not fit within a "special needs" exception. Full appeals court grants a rehearing en banc.

     Under a federal statute, the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 14135a, those in federal custody, on parole, on probation, or on supervised release must provide a DNA sample on a non-consensual basis. The statute does not require any suspicion that an individual will commit or has committed another offense, nor must the sample be taken in order to aid in the investigation of a particular crime.

     Once taken, the DNA sample is turned over to the FBI, which carries out an analysis of it and includes the results in the "Combined DNA Index System" or "CODIS," a DNA information bank, in which the evidence is then permanently available for future use in connection with the investigation and prosecution of crimes. Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials who conduct such investigations are able to compare CODIS information with DNA evidence obtained from crime scenes and, in this manner, to identify perpetrators and subject them to criminal prosecution. (Click here for an FBI brochure in PDF format describing CODIS).

     A California federal parolee appealed from a sentence imposed on him for the refusal to comply with compulsory blood extraction under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act, arguing that the statute violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

     By a 2-1 vote, a three-judge panel of a federal appeals court agreed with the parolee. It noted that blood extractions are "searches" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and are normally subject to Fourth Amendment requirements. The forced extraction of blood from parolees under the statute, the majority of the panel ruled, required individualized suspicion of involvement in additional crime. The individualized suspicion standard, rather than the standard of probable cause applied because of the plaintiff's position as a parolee.

     The court agreed that there is a "special needs" exception to the individualized suspicion standard, but found that this applied when the searches at issue "serve special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." Examples are urine testing of students for extracurricular activities to prevent health and safety risks from drug use, or blood and urine testing of railroad employees to prevent railway accidents, as well as urine tests of U.S. Customs Service employees to insure their fitness to interdict drugs and handle firearms.

      In this case, the panel majority reasoned, the purpose of the searches was a law enforcement purpose, which does not qualify as a special need within the meaning of the special needs doctrine.

     A strong dissent by one judge on the panel argued that the searches at issue were not a Fourth Amendment violation, and that a prior decision by a 9th Circuit appeals court panel in Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th 1995) upholding an Oregon DNA database statute was binding precedent that should apply in this case.

     On January 5, 2004, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en banc in the case. The full 9th Circuit's decision will be reported in a future issue of this publication.

     U.S. v. Kincade, #02-50380, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 20123, 345 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2003), rehearing en banc granted, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 89 (9th Cir. 2004).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet. [PDF] Click here for the order granting rehearing en banc. [PDF].

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Prison officials violated prisoners' rights by requiring them, as a condition of prison employment, to waive any property rights to accrued interest on their inmate trust accounts, and violated prisoners' due process rights by confiscating this interest despite a state statute entitling them to the interest, when no procedure was provided to contest the loss. Officials had qualified immunity from liability for the seizure of interest, however, as prisoners' rights were not clearly established, but not for retaliating against prisoners for refusal to waive the interest.

     Nevada prisoners are required by state statute to keep their money in a personal property trust fund run by the state, including a personal account and a savings account. Money earned by prisoners during their incarceration is credited to the fund, along with any funds sent to the inmate by friends and relatives. By statute, interest earned on the money in the overall fund is credited to the fund, and upon release, the prisoner is entitled to his portion of the overall fund, including the interest.

     State correctional officials imposed a policy requiring all inmates to sign a form related to these funds to be eligible for prison employment. The form authorized prison officials to deduct from the inmates' savings account, funeral expenses, any costs incurred in connection with a prisoner's release and "the cost of any expense" incurred by the department on the inmate's behalf, whether the inmate incurred the expense voluntarily or involuntarily. None of these deductions were authorized by law. The form also required them to certify that the funds in their savings accounts would not accrue interest for their sole benefit. Those who refused to sign were terminated from prison employment.

     Prisoners sued to challenge this policy. A federal appeals court generally upheld the prisoners' challenge. While certain deductions from the prisoners' accounts, authorized by statute, such as costs incurred in creating and maintaining the accounts, were not an unconstitutional "taking," the confiscation of accrued interest was a due process violation. State statutes created a property interest in this interest on the part of the prisoners, and the prison officials provided them with no procedure to contest the loss.

     Prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability for seizing the interest, but injunctive relief was appropriate, the appeals court ruled. The court also found that prison officials unconstitutionally retaliated against prisoners who refused to sign the form waiving their procedural due process rights to receive the interest on their funds, and were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability for doing so. It was clearly established that there could be no retaliation against prisoners were exercising their constitutional rights. And the court reasoned that the refusal to waive their rights was the "same" as affirmatively exercising them.

     Vance v. Barrett, No. 01-15819, 345 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Prison security and rehabilitation goals were not sufficient to justify a complete ban on gifts of periodicals to prisoners.

     An intermediate Kansas appeals court has upheld an inmate challenge to a prohibition by the state Department of Corrections on gift subscriptions to periodical publications, including both magazines and newspapers, to prisoners. The plaintiff prisoners asserted that their family members and friends paid for magazine or newspaper subscriptions in their name, and that the periodicals in question were sent to them directly from the publishers, but that the prison in which they were incarcerated intercepted the publications and prevented them from receiving them, solely because they had not paid for the subscriptions themselves.

     A state statute in Kansas provides that "all books, newspapers and periodicals shall be purchased through special purchase orders" and that only books, newspapers or periodicals received directly from a publisher or vendor shall be accepted. Special purchase orders are forms which authorize payment from an inmate's prison account for the cost of the publication.

     Policy at the prison did not allow for outside family and friends to purchase such subscriptions, and placed a monetary limit on the amount that prisoners could spend for publications. The policy did, however, allow prisoners to receive free publications, with verification that the publication was free.

     Prison officials contended that there was concern about the "barter" value of periodicals among prisoners, and that possession of publications could lead to issues of potential strong-arming or shakedowns. The appeals court, however, noted that prisoners were allowed to receive gifts of cash from family and friends which were placed in their inmate accounts, and reasoned that "strong-arming and shakedowns are just as likely, if not more likely, to occur over cash as over gift publications," so that this particular security justification for the ban on gift publications did not "pass constitutional muster."

     The defendants also argued that the rehabilitative and security goals of encouraging good behavior were also served by the ban, by fitting into a system of providing incentives for good behavior. The court questioned the existence of a rational relationship between the ban and this goal however. If prison officials wish to "press the promise of access to gift periodicals into the service of their security and rehabilitation goals," the court reasoned, it would be rational to permit such access, but only as one of the rewards for good behavior.

It is not rational to eliminate all access to all gift periodicals for all inmates, be they model prisoners or habitual disciplinary rule violators. A blanket ban is too broad a restriction on the First Amendment rights of the well behaved and fails to restrict the ill behaved in any manner designed to promote a change in their ways.

     The court also found that allowing gift periodicals for inmates who earn the privilege of receiving them also would not undermine the legitimate interest in limiting the introduction of contraband into the prison. There was no rational distinction, the court stated, between the risk of contraband if an inmate orders a publication directly from the publisher or if an inmate's family member does so.

     As for monitoring the source of funds and property directed to inmates, the court argued, there was no reason that the prison authorities could not develop an alternative special purchase order from to cover gift periodicals in which the ordering friend or family member would state the cost of the periodical, the source and manner of payment, and "any other data needed for the prison business office and mailroom to perform their monitoring functions."

     In summary, the court found that the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goals of security and rehabilitation was so "remote as to render the [ban] arbitrary or irrational." 

     Rice v. State of Kansas, No, 89,759, 76 P.3d 1048 (Kan. App. 2003).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet.

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California Supreme Court rules that mentally ill inmates, placed in mental institutions after the conclusion of their sentences, may not be forced to take anti-psychotic drugs unless they are found to be an immediate danger to themselves or others or incompetent to refuse treatment.

     Mentally ill inmates in California, having finished their allotted time for their sentences, but also having been found unfit for release are housed at state mental institutions until doctors certify them as fit for release. The California Supreme Court, by a 6-1 vote, has ruled that they may not be forced to take anti-psychotic drugs without a judicial hearing at which they are found either to be mentally incompetent to refuse treatment or to be an immediate danger to themselves or others.

     The immediate case concerned an inmate who was convicted of assault and battery and who was arrested again while on parole on allegations that he had "stalked" a store employee he said was his wife. He was then diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, and challenged his involuntary treatment with anti-psychotic drugs, claiming that he could not bear alleged side effects of the medication.

     In 1997, a court found that the prisoner continued, after the expiration of his parole status, to meet the statutory criteria for involuntary treatment as an Mentally Disordered Offender, and ordered that he be civilly committed for one year, a status that has been extended annually since that date. He was prescribed anti-psychotic medications, but no specific incidents of violence, threats, or property damage are alleged to have occurred on his part. Evaluators insisted, however, that if he were to be released into the community, it was very likely that he would discontinue medication, come into a more disorganized state, and represent a substantial danger to others.

     The majority of the California Supreme Court found that prisoners confined under the Mentally Disordered Offender Act, known as MDO's, had the same rights as those granted to involuntary mental patients generally under the state's general civil commitment scheme, and therefore have the right under Cal. Penal Code section 2972 to refuse anti-psychotic medication in the absence of a judicial determination either that they are incompetent or incapable of making decisions about their medical treatment or that the MDO is dangerous within the meaning of Cal. Welfare and Institutions Code section 5300. The court also acknowledged that the rights of MDO's to refuse medication could be "further limited by State Department of Mental Health regulations necessary to provide security for inpatient facilities." This ruling was based on a reading of the MDO statute itself, which says that MDO's have the same rights as other involuntarily committed patients.

     Under prior caselaw, involuntarily committed patients placed in treatment under California's general civil commitment statute have a right, if competent, to refuse medical treatment under Riese v. St. Mary's Hospital & Medical Center, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303 (1987), which can be set aside by a court determination of incapacity or finding that there is an immediate danger of serious harm if they are not treated.

     In re Qawi, No. S100099, 2004 Cal. LEXIS 1, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 780, 81 P.3d 224.

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet.[PDF] Also available in Microsoft Word .Doc format.

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Federal appeals court rules that a dismissal of a prisoner's civil rights lawsuit for failing to exhaust administrative remedies was improper in the absence of prior notice and an opportunity to respond being provided to the prisoner.

     A New York prisoner claimed that he was assaulted by correctional officers while in custody of the New York City Department of Corrections. When he was treated in the emergency room for injuries allegedly resulting from the altercation, he filled out a form and answered yes as to whether there was a grievance procedure at the prison, and then answered "no" as to whether he had presented the facts concerning his complaint in the state prisoner grievance procedure.

     The prisoner subsequently filed a federal civil rights lawsuit over the incident, and the trial judge, based on the answers on the form, dismissed the lawsuit for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e. The dismissal was allegedly without prior notice to the prisoner, or an opportunity to respond to the argument that he had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.

     Such a dismissal, a federal appeals court found, was improper when the prisoner is not afforded prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before dismissal.

     The issue of whether remedies are available is an issue of law which judges are obligated to establish from a legally sufficient source. Additionally, in this case, as the prisoner was in a city correctional facility, a state grievance procedure may not have been available.

     Mojias v. Johnson, No. 03-0121, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 24693, 351 F.3d 606 (2nd Cir. 2003).

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Corrections employee and prison doctors were not entitled to qualified immunity brought by prisoner who suffered a fractured skull as a result of an attack by his co-defendant in a criminal trial. Prisoner claimed that no action was taken to transfer him or separate him from his attacker, despite knowledge of the hostility between them. Inadequate medical care claims also asserted, based on alleged transfer to facility not equipped to address prisoner's medical needs, and three-week delay of doctor at new facility in examining prisoner.

     A Michigan prisoner suffered a fractured skull as the alleged result of an unprovoked attack that was orchestrated by his co-defendant in the criminal trial that resulted in their imprisonment. The injured prisoner claimed that his resident unit manager and counselor at the prison demonstrated deliberate indifference by taking no action to transfer either himself or his assailant to another facility, even though he told him that the two inmates had a "hostile relationship" and keeping them together was allegedly in violation of departmental regulations concerning "known conflict situations." The counselor claimed that he was unaware of the conflict.

     After the attack, the prisoner was brought to a community hospital for emergency neurosurgery, and treated by a civilian physician, who removed a portion of his skull and recommended continued treatment, including a crainioplasty to replace the removed portion. Rather than authorize further surgery, the prison's medical director recalled the prisoner from the hospital and examined him, prescribing an anti-seizure drug, Dilantin. After a second examination some time later, he transferred the prisoner to another correctional facility, which the prisoner argued the medical director knew was not equipped to properly treat him.

     At this new facility, the prisoner was allegedly not examined by a doctor there until approximately 20 days after he arrived with paperwork calling for an immediate neurosurgical consultation. This doctor, after determining that the prisoner's level of Dilantin was toxic and that his skull was recently fractured, transferred him to another facility, where he allegedly could be cared for better.

     The prisoner's federal civil rights lawsuit alleges that the counselor was deliberately indifferent to his safety and that the two doctors were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs--the first by transferring him to a facility not properly equipped to care for him, and the second, in waiting almost three weeks to examine him.

     A federal appeals court has rejected all three defendants' motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

     The law was clearly established, the court found, that failure to take corrective action in the case of a known risk of assault was improper. Taking the prisoner's claim as true, for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis, that he had informed the counselor of the problem, the counselor was not entitled to qualified immunity.

     The appeals court also found that if the prisoner's version of the doctors' actions were correct, they were also not entitled to qualified immunity. "Transferring a prisoner in need of urgent medical attention to a facility that the official knows is unable to provide the required treatment is conduct that would alert a reasonable person to the likelihood of personal liability," the court found, and the prison medical director failed to submit an affidavit in support of his claim that he did not know of the purported inadequacy of the facility to which he was transferring the prisoner. The prisoner, by contrast, testified under oath that the medical director knew that the other facility was not equipped to deal with his medical problems.

     "In the absence of an explanation for the delay," the appeals court also reasoned, a reasonable inference arises that the doctor at the new facility "purposefully ignored the emergency-treatment report" specifying that the prisoner required an "immediate neuro consult," creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his three-week delay constituted deliberate indifference.

     Scicluna v. Wells, No. 02-2117, 345 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2003).

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Trial court improperly dismissed prisoner's lawsuit claiming that prison officials violated his First Amendment and due process rights by transferring him to administrative segregation in a special housing unit after his appeal of his rule violation resulted in an order for a new hearing.

     A California prisoner appealed the dismissal of his federal civil rights lawsuit for "failure to state a claim." The lawsuit asserted that prison officials violated his rights when they allowed his transfer to administrative segregation in a special housing facility to proceed after his administrative appeal of his rule violation conviction had resulted in an order for a new hearing.

     A federal appeals court agreed.

     It noted that the plaintiff prisoner had asserted that general population inmates where he was before the transfer had access to visitation, movement without restraint, telephone privileges, could have personal property in their cells, could better care for their health needs, get a job, and were able to learn a trade. The transfer allegedly resulted in loss of all these privileges as well as an increased distance from his family and friends, and the court found that these were significant deprivations.

     Prior to the transfer, he had successfully appealed the disciplinary action and he had not been found guilty of the alleged rule violation, so the lawsuit should not have been dismissed, the appeals court ruled. Indeed, the alleged rules violation was never reheard, and was ultimately dismissed after he was transferred. The rules violation report alleged that he had committed a battery by pushing a doctor's hand away as the doctor attempted to place a stethoscope on Jackson's chest, and he was allegedly found guilty at a hearing where he was allegedly not allowed to call witnesses, which was the basis for the order for a new hearing.

     The transfer, which was initially ordered as a result of the disciplinary hearing, went forward despite the successful appeal.

     The appeals court found that the prisoner's complaint sufficiently alleged a violation of his First Amendment right to pursue an inmate appeal of his prison disciplinary conviction, and a "sheer denial of due process claim."

     Jackson v. Carey, No. 01-17126, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26264, (9th Cir. 2003).

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Prison officials were improperly granted summary judgment in Muslim prisoner's lawsuit claiming that his religious freedom rights were denied by refusal to feed him an "Eid ul Fitr" feast in his cell. Trial court improperly inquired into the religious significance of the feast after finding that the prisoner sincerely believed it to be religiously significant even though served to other prisoners on a day delayed from its actual religious observance.

    A New York prisoner who is a practicing Muslim claimed that prison officials violated his right to practice his religion by refusing to allow him to eat an "Eid ul Fitr" feast meal in his cell in January of 2000. This religious feast, held once a year in conjunction with a day-long celebration marks the successful completion of Ramadan, a period of time during which Muslims fast during daylight hours for approximately a month.

     A federal trial court granted defendant prison officials' motion for summary judgment in the prisoner's federal civil rights lawsuit, chiefly on the ground that "the meal, which the prison served over a week after the period prescribed by Muslim law and tradition, had lost all objective religious significance due to its postponement and, therefore, did not warrant free exercise protection." In the alternative, the trial court held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the denial of "one religious meal is, in any event, a de minimis burden" on the prisoner's religious exercise, because the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, as the denial of the meal was not objectively unreasonable.

     Rejecting all these arguments, a federal appeals court ordered further proceedings, reversing the trial court decision. On remand, it ruled, the trial judge must make a specific determination if the denial of the Eid ul Fitr feast to a Muslim prisoner was reasonably related to any legitimate penological interest, as well as whether, if it was not, the defendants still could have reasonably believed that it was (in which case they would be entitled to qualified immunity).

     The circumstances under which the prisoner failed to receive the Eid ul Fitr feast involved his transfer from Rikers Island to Downstate Correctional Facility in New York in connection with a court appearance on the same day on which the Eid ul Fitr feast was observed at Downstate. Eid ul Fitr, according to evidence in the case, is one of two major religious observances. The end of the "holy month of Ramadan," during which observant Muslims fast from sun up to sun down, is signaled by "the sighting of the new moon," and tradition requires that the Eid ul Fitr feast follow within three days, usually beginning with a "sweet breakfast, followed by prayer, and later the Eid ul Fitr feast."

     In 2000, Ramadan ended when the new moon was sighted on January 6, and Muslim prisoners at Downstate awoke on January 7 to a sweet breakfast and were then permitted to congregate for prayer. But the traditional feast was not held on that day, but rather postponed to January 15, because of a "Religious Faith's Holy Day Calendar" issued by the State Department of Corrections, which designated this as the day of the feast. The foods composing the Eid ul Fitr feast were therefore not served at the facility on January 7, but were instead served on January 15.

     The plaintiff was held in a special housing unit at the Downstate facility, and requested that he be on the list to receive the Eid ul Fitr feast on January 15, but this request was allegedly denied.

     The appeals court found that the trial judge, in assessing the "objective validity" of the plaintiff prisoner's belief that the Eid ul Fitr feast carried religious significance even when postponed, "impermissibly confronted what is, in essence, the 'ecclesiastical question' of whether, under Islam, the postponed meal retained religious meaning."

The opinions of the DOCS religious authorities cannot trump the plaintiff's sincere and religious belief. For purposes of summary judgment, we must accept the district court's finding that Ford [the prisoner] "sincerely believes that celebration of the Eid ul Fitr - including the Eid ul Fitr prayer and the Eid ul Fitr feast - is critical to his observance as a practicing Muslim," and hold that any perceived lack of objective validity to Ford's belief did not entitle defendants to judgment as a matter of law. [...]

The relevant question in determining whether Ford's religious beliefs were substantially burdened is whether participation in the Eid ul Fitr feast, in particular, is considered central or important to Ford's practice of Islam. Defendants were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on this question, as the testimony of the DOCS religious authorities that, under Muslim law the feast is not religious once postponed, is not determinative of this issue. The district court credited Ford's claim that he sincerely believed that the Eid ul Fitr feast is "critical to his observance as a practicing Muslim." The DOCS religious calendar recognizes the Eid ul Fitr as one of the faith's important celebrations and makes specific reference to the feast. At least some of the DOCS religious authorities, too, testified that the Eid ul Fitr is a holiday of great religious significance of which the feast, apart from the sweet breakfast and prayers, is an integral part. Regardless of some religious authorities' interpretation of Muslim law on the issue, we do not believe that the mere postponement of the feast renders Ford's insistence that the feast is critical to his religious beliefs "so bizarre . . . as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause."

     The appeals court additionally noted that the defendants had not argued, in the trial court, that the denial of the feast to the plaintiff prisoner served any particular legitimate penological interest, so that it would not decide, on appeal, that the denial was justified on that basis, which could be argued during the further proceedings which will now occur in the trial court. On remand, the issue of qualified immunity can also be further explored.

     Ford v. McGinnis, No. 02-0205, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 25224 (2nd Cir. 2003).

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Inadequate definition of "strip search" in prisoner's civil rights lawsuit required a new trial following jury verdict for county jail officials on claims that he was unconstitutionally strip searched while being processed in after two arrests on misdemeanor charges. Jury instructions defined a strip search as necessarily including a look inside the prisoner's mouth and armpits.

     A Maine prisoner claimed that he was unconstitutionally strip searched by correctional officials at a county jail on three separate occasions. He filed a federal civil rights lawsuit seeking damages from the county, the sheriff, and the jail administrator, but a jury found in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the prisoner argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial judge incorrectly instructed the jury on both the definition of a "strip search" and the applicable law governing routine strip searches of inmates after contact visits.

     A federal appeals court found no error on the law applicable to post-contact visits, but concluded that a "sufficiently misleading definition of a strip search warrants a partial new trial."

     The plaintiff was arrested twice on misdemeanor charges and required to completely disrobe three times in the presence of corrections officers. The first two episodes occurred as part of his processing into the county jail following the arrests. Although the prisoner characterized these events as "strip searches", the defendants argued that the encounters were "clothing searches" and that any observation of the prisoner's naked body was incidental to the correctional officers' purpose to examine his clothing. The third search occurred on the morning after the prisoner's second arrest, following a contact visit with his attorney. The parties agreed that the plaintiff was subjected to a strip search at that time, but disagreed about its constitutionality.

     The trial court's definition of strip search was:

A strip search involves a deliberate, visual inspection of the naked body of a prisoner which includes the examination of the mouth and armpits. A visual body-cavity search is a strip search that includes visual inspection or visual examination of the anal and genital areas. Appellant objected to this instruction and proposed an alternative to the court that more broadly defined such a search, essentially classifying any required exposure of a private body part as a strip search.

     The plaintiff's requested alternative instruction defining strip searches was:

A strip search includes any exposure or observation of a portion of a person's body where that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. This specifically includes prisoners who are watched by corrections personnel while they change from personal clothing into detention clothing.

     The definition of "strip search," the appeals court noted, was crucial to the case. Prior case law by the appeals court indicated that "an individual detained on a misdemeanor charge may be strip searched as part of the booking process only if officers have reasonable suspicion that he is either armed or carrying contraband."

Under the court's instruction, the most deliberate visual inspection of a naked body, even including a look in the mouth, would pass muster, simply because one or two armpits were not inspected. Alternatively, a complete and prolonged viewing of a naked body could survive challenge if a jury were to find that it was not sufficiently "deliberate" because it was designed to examine clothing rather than the body.

     The court's instruction, the appeals court held, was therefore flawed:

By adding the word "deliberate" to the definition we previously have adopted - stating in the first portion of its instruction that "[a] strip search involves a deliberate, visual inspection of the naked body of a prisoner" - the court unduly directed the jurors to the officers' subjective intent. The word "inspection" sufficiently connotes the need for a focused look. [...] Whether or not the officers set out deliberately to inspect a prisoner's naked body is not the question; it is, rather, whether the officers did, in fact, perform such a search. The remainder of the instruction then added specific elements to the definition - scrutiny of the mouth and armpits - that are not prerequisites for finding that a strip search took place.

     In a footnote, the court noted that the plaintiff's proposed alternative "was also flawed, since defining a strip search to include any exposure or observation of private body parts "would seem to extend" the accepted rule by including "incidental viewing of portions of the body.

     A properly instructed jury, the appeals court found, could have decided that both "clothing searches" performed on the plaintiff "embraced a visual inspection of his naked body that - albeit brief - was focused on detecting contraband, and thus amounted to a strip search." Prior cases, the court stated, did not require that a search be either "prolonged or thorough" to be termed a strip search.

The critical question is whether viewing the naked body was an objective of the search, rather than an unavoidable and incidental by-product. Had appellant been allowed to disrobe behind a screen, for example, and directed to enter the shower while officers examined the clothes he left behind, the momentary exposure as he walked from the screen to the shower clearly would have been incidental to the search of his clothing. By contrast, the procedure utilized by the Hancock County Jail in this case, as described by the officers, allowed visual inspection of appellant's body through the progressive stages of his undressing.

     Because the erroneous instruction could have altered the jury's verdict, the appeals court ordered a new trial on claims arising from the first two "clothing searches."

     The appeals court found nothing improper, however, about instructions concerning the reasonableness of strip searches conducted following contact visits, as a means of preventing prisoners' possession of weapons and contraband. "Except in atypical circumstances, a blanket policy of strip searching inmates after contact visits is constitutional," unless the search is carried out in an abusive fashion. The challenged instruction "accurately reflected this state of the law, advising the jury that strip searching appellant following contact visits was permissible unless 'additional facts . . . make the application of a post-contact visit strip-searching policy unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.'"

     Wood v. Hancock County Sheriff's Dept., No. 03-1564, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 26459 (1st Cir. 2003).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet.

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Barring prisoners from making phone calls in languages other than English without prior authorization is not a violation of First Amendment rights.

     A Wisconsin prisoner who is originally from Laos was issued three misconduct reports for speaking to his mother on the phone in his native language, Lao. Under a policy at the prison, inmates are prohibited from speaking on the phone in a language other than English without the prior express approval of a social worker. The prisoner was found guilty on two of the three misconduct reports (with the first downgraded to warning), and was placed in disciplinary segregation with the loss of telephone privileges for a time as a result.

     The prisoner had followed the procedure and asked for permission from the social worker, receiving permission after a three-month delay, but being issued the three misconduct reports during that three-month period. He then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that the policy violated his First Amendment rights.

     A federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of this claim.

     The court acknowledged that "prisoners have a right under the First Amendment to communicate with others outside the prison," but also noted that there was some doubt that this amounted to an "unqualified right for a prisoner to have access to a telephone." Even if there is some First Amendment right to telephone access, there are limits to that right which may be imposed as long as the regulation is "reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest."

     In this case, the policy prohibiting conversations in other languages without prior approval was justified by the prison's need to control "secret means of communication" to help "prevent conspiracies and escapes." This, the court reasoned, "is certainly a legitimate penological concern."

     The court pointed out that the prison policy did not outright ban phone calls in languages other than English, but only required that a prisoner seek permission ahead of time before speaking another language on the telephone.

This would presumably enable the prison to monitor his calls in a manner equivalent to the monitoring of English-language calls, if it thought this was advisable. This policy also incorporates reasonable limits: it does not, for example, affect Boriboune's [the prisoner] ability to receive visits or mail from his family and friends.

     The prisoner pointed to an earlier decision, Kikumura v. Turner, 28 F.3d 592 (7th. 1994), which ruled unconstitutional a policy barring prisoners from receiving materials written in any language other than English. The court found that the rule in that case would only apply when a prison "makes no effort at all to accommodate the constitutional rights of prisoners native in languages other than English."

     In this case, however, the policy includes a reasonable accommodation, permission from a social worker, "that allows a prisoner to speak in a foreign language on the telephone."

     Boriboune v. Litscher, No. 03-1747 , 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 26540 (7th Cir.).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the AELE website.

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Federal appeals court orders hearing in lawsuit challenging Florida's ban on felons voting. Plaintiffs claim that imposition of ban was motivated by intent to discriminate against African-Americans.

     Florida state law prohibits ex-felons from voting unless they have their civil rights restored by the state. Six other states have similar laws. The ban is imposed by art. VI, Sec. 4 of the Florida Constitution, enacted in 1968. Eight Florida residents filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of all Florida citizens who have been convicted of a felony and successfully completed all terms of incarceration, probation, or parole, but who are still ineligible to vote. They claimed that the law violated the First, Fourteenth, Fifteen, and Twenty-Fourth (poll tax) Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Sections 2 and 10 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973 et seq.

     Overturning summary judgment for the State of Florida, a three judge panel of a federal appeals court, by a 2-1 vote, found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the law was adopted with an intentional discriminatory purpose in violation of the right to equal protection and in violation of the Voting Rights Act. The rejection of the poll tax claim was upheld.

     The plaintiffs argued that the state adopted a similar law in the 1800s to discriminate against African-Americans, and that the inclusion of the provision in the 1968 constitution was simply the continuation of the former law, incorporating its discriminatory intent.

    In ordering further hearings on the issue, the panel majority stated that on remand the state of Florida was required to show that it "knowingly and deliberately" adopted the 1968 constitutional provision for a nondiscriminatory purpose. A dissenting judge on the panel argued that there was not enough evidence to show that there was a discriminatory purpose for the law. Even the original law, she noted, was first adopted in 1836, before the Fourteenth Amendment allowed African-Americans to vote.

     Johnson v. Governor of the State of Florida, #02-14469, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 25859 (11th Cir. 2003).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet. [PDF]

     Editor's Note: According to a New York Time's article on the case, (p. A13, National Edition, December 20, 2003), approximately 600,000 persons in Florida are prevented from voting because of the law, of whom more than a third are African-American. The case above does not include presently incarcerated felons in the designated class, but state officials have argued that a decision striking down the law could have the effect of allowing presently incarcerated felons, or those on probation or parole, to vote.

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Access to Courts/Legal Info

     Prisoner could not assert a claim for denial of access to the courts based on refusal to allow him to visit the law library, in the absence of a showing of actual injury in a pending case. He could still pursue, however, his claim that he was denied access to legal materials in retaliation for filing grievances, since he had alleged a "chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred." Westbrook v. Treon, #03-10004, 78 Fed. Appx. 970 (5th Cir. 2003). [PDF]

DNA Tests

     Court rejects Pennsylvania prisoner's challenge to a change in his custody level and visitation status imposed as a penalty for his refusal to provide a DNA sample. State DNA statute, 42 Pa. C.S. Sec. 4701-4741, was constitutional and prisoner was not entitled to an injunction against prison officials obtaining a DNA sample from him by force or by using other methods to persuade him to submit a DNA sample. Singleton V. Lavan, 834 A.2d 672 (Pa. Cmwlth 2003). [PDF]

     Federal DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 14135(a)-14135(e), did not violate federal prisoner's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination or the prohibition against "ex post facto" crimes (retroactive punishment for conduct not previously criminal) even though it was not enacted until after the plaintiff prisoner's conviction and criminalized the refusal to provide a DNA sample. Vore v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Ariz. 2003). Editor's Note: The statute in question requires the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to collect a DNA sample from each individual in custody who is or has been convicted of a qualifying federal offense, among which is bank robbery, the crime for which the plaintiff prisoner in the case reported above was convicted. The statute calls for expunging the DNA record if a qualifying conviction is overturned.

Drugs and Drug Screening

     State statute criminalizing the use of marijuana in a detention facility was reasonably related to legitimate governmental purposes, and provision excluding defendants charged with this offense from eligibility from being ordered into treatment programs available for those charged with use of other drugs did not violate defendants' equal protection rights. Legislature could rationally conclude that such treatment options should be made available to those charged with possession of controlled substances who suffered from addiction, but not available to those charged with marijuana use in detention facilities. People v. Goodale, No. 02SA345, 78 P.3d 1103 (Colo. 2003).

Filing Fees

     Prisoner's application to proceed in his lawsuit against prison officials as a pauper without the payment of filing fees was properly denied when the record failed to support his application, but under Nebraska state law, the trial court acted improperly in then dismissing the lawsuit, since the prisoner was entitled to a 30 day period within which he could decide to proceed with the lawsuit and pay the filing fee and costs. Martin v. McGinn, 657 N.W.2d 217 (Neb. 2003).

Freedom of Information

     Federal Bureau of Prisons properly showed justification for the withholding from disclosure under a freedom of information request of its internal personnel rules and practices, but not for withholding staff manuals, and also failed to show that it had conducted an adequate search for the records which the plaintiff had requested. Maydak v. U.S. Department of Justice, 254 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2003).

Inmate Funds

     Trial court did not exceed its discretion in dismissing a prisoner's claim against prison officials for a refund of $13.05 for "picture tickets" he purchased which he was unable to use after his transfer to a new prison. Basis of dismissal was prisoner's failure to appear in court, and there was no showing that the plaintiff prisoner took any steps to achieve his attendance at the hearing. Under state law rules for small claims, however, the dismissal should have been "without prejudice" to his possibly refiling the claim in the future. Brown v. State of Indiana, No. 62A04-0204-CV-134, 781 N.E.2d 773 (Ind. App. 2003).

     Prisoner was not entitled to an order that the state Department of Corrections stop deducting funds from his inmate account for restitution, fines, and court costs. Such deductions were authorized by statute, 42 Pa. C.S.A. Sec. 9728(b)(5) and the court rejected the prisoner's claim that a 20% deduction from his account created a financial hardship, since he received room, clothing, and board and did not allege what he could not afford as a result of the deductions. Buck v. Beard, 834 A.2d 696 (Pa. Cmwlth 2003). [PDF]

Inmate Property

     Federal correctional officers were exempt from liability for damages to prisoner's eyeglasses, sent to prison laundry in pocket of his coat, during move from his former cell to administrative segregation. Under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680, officers were entitled to immunity under "detention of goods" exception to liability, even though they were not aware that the eyeglasses were in their possession. Bramwell v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, #02-55516, 348 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2003). [PDF]

Medical Care

     Prisoner whose medical condition (chronic hypertension, a serious kidney disorder, and an enlarged prostate) caused him to urinate as often as three to four times an hour, did not state a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs based on difficulties he allegedly experienced when forbidden by regulation to go to the bathroom during head count. Simpson v. Overton, #03-1151, 79 Fed. Appx. 117 (6th Cir. 2003).

    Correctional officers and prison nurses did not act with deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious medical needs by refusing for two days to provide him with prescribed pain pills because he was not wearing pants at the time that the medication was distributed. Court finds that the alleged "no pants, no service" policy did not demonstrate a disregard for the prisoner's health, and the defendants stated that they regarded the plaintiff's action of not wearing his pants as constituting a refusal of the medication. West v. Millen, #02-4055, 79 Fed. Appx. 190 (7th Cir. 2003).

     Correctional policy allegedly denying a prisoner medical treatment for Hepatitis C because he would not participate in a prison substance abuse program was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Court finds that Hepatitis C is a serious medical condition, that physicians had prescribed treatment, and that the plaintiff prisoner had been free of drug or alcohol use for over two years. Domenech v. Goord, 766 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sup. 2003).

Prison Litigation Reform Act: Exhaustion of Remedies

    A genuine factual issue as to whether a prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies concerning his grievance over missing a night-time dosage of prescribed pain medication precluded summary judgment for state Department of Corrections Commissioner in prisoner's federal civil rights lawsuit. Richardson v. Goord, #02-289, 347 F.3d 431 (2nd Cir. 2003). [PDF]

Prison Litigation Reform Act: Similar State Statutes

     Oregon state statute, Or. Rev. Stat. Sec. 30.650, prohibiting an award of non-economic damages to a prisoner who did not establish economic damages did not violate state constitutional guarantees of a remedy for violations of his rights or of a right to trial by jury. Voth v. State of Oregon, #01C-15561, A117697, 78 P.3d 565 (Or. App. 2003).

Prison Litigation Reform Act: "Three Strikes" Rule

     Prisoner who had previous federal civil rights claims dismissed had to supply court with copies of dismissal orders before filing an amended complaint in his current lawsuit, so it could be determined if they were judged to be frivolous, malicious, or to have failed to state a claim, and therefore to bar him from proceeding as a pauper under the "three strikes" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(a). Abreu v. Ramirez, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (C.D. Cal. 2003).

Prisoner Restraint

     Correctional officers did not violate inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by restraining him for approximately 20 hours on a stretcher. Prisoner had kicked a door and assaulted a correctional officer, and after he was placed on a stretcher, the officers loosened his handcuffs and allowed him "numerous" bathroom breaks, as well as food, liquids, and medications. Action in feeding him a disciplinary diet of "nutra-loaf" was also not an Eighth Amendment violation, despite the prisoner's claim that he experienced adverse effects, including vomiting, burning in his chest and throat, and frequent bowel movements. These effects were not "serious medical conditions," and there was no order or instruction from medical personnel to stop the "nutra-loaf" diet. Myers v. Milbert, 281 F. Supp. 2d 859 (N.D.W.Va. 2003).

Privacy

     Assignment of female correctional officers to supervise male prison living areas was not a violation of male prisoner's First, Fourth, Eighth, or 14th Amendment (equal protection) rights. The prisoner's privacy rights were minimal and the state had a legitimate interest in providing equal employment opportunities to female officers and in flexibility in personnel staffing. Sinclair v. Stalder, #03-30456, 78 Fed. Appx. 987 (5th Cir. 2003). [PDF]

Procedural: Evidence

     Admission of hearsay evidence that psychiatrist diagnosed plaintiff prisoner as faking the mental trauma he claimed to have sustained as a result of his solitary confinement without clothing or sustained access to running water was improper. Prisoner was therefore entitled to a new trial in his civil rights lawsuit alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Mahone v. Lehman, #02-35622, 347 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2003). [PDF]

Public Protection

     Correctional agency, officials, and employees had no duty to protect a specific individual from assault by an escaped prisoner. Woman assaulted by inmate who escaped from a technical college at a prison facility therefore could not be awarded damages. Alabama Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 855 So. 2d 1016 (Ala. 2003).

Religion

     Correctional employee's "non-theistic" spiritual belief that he should not cut his hair was not a protected religious belief sufficient to challenge the state correctional department's grooming policy, since it was merely based on his own "personal and philosophical" choices. His desire to "live simply and avoid excessive pride" did not qualify for a possible religious exemption from the grooming policy. Luken v. Brigano, #CA2003-01-007, 797 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio. App. 12 Dist. 2003). (Microsoft Word .Doc format).

     Requiring an Orthodox Jewish prisoner to fill out a standard prison form in order to apply to receive kosher meals was not a "substantial burden" to his right to free exercise of his religion. Resnick v. Adams, #01-56710, 348 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2003). [PDF] Editor's Note: A prior decision in this case, Resnick v. Adams, No. 01-56710, 317 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2003), [PDF], reported in 2003 JB May, was withdrawn, and this opinion substituted.

Segregation: Disciplinary

     Prisoner's transfer to a long-term segregation unit for 120 days in disciplinary custody did not impose an "atypical and significant hardship" on him in relation to ordinary life in prison, so that no liberty interest requiring due process was involved. Brown v. Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). [PDF]

Sexual Assault

     Prison superintendent and assistant superintendent could not be held personally liable for correctional officers alleged sexual assault on female prisoner in her cell, in the absence of any evidence that they were personally involved in the incident, had any actual or constructive knowledge of past violations which they failed to remedy, were grossly negligent in supervising the officer, or were deliberately indifferent to a known risk of harm. Morris v. Eversley, 282 F. Supp. 2d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Strip Searches: Prisoners

     Prison's conducting of visual body cavity searches of sequestered, dangerous prisoners after they left a recreation area was justified by legitimate security concerns and therefore did not violate prisoners' rights. Practice of using only male staff members to conduct search of male prisoners, and taking precautions to avoid unnecessary viewing of prisoners by others not directly involved in the searches adequately protected prisoners' privacy rights. Skundor v. McBride, 280 F. Supp. 2d 524 (S.D.W.Va. 2003).

     Court grants permanent injunction against county jail's policy of strip-searching all newly arrived pretrial detainees without individualized reasonable suspicion that they possessed contraband. Dodge v. County of Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

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     AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.

     AIDS and HIV: "HIV in Prisons, 2001." Bureau of Justice Statistics. Provides the number of HIV-positive and active AIDS cases among prisoners held in each State and the Federal prison system at yearend 2001. The annual report includes data on the number of AIDS-related deaths, a breakdown for women and men with AIDS, and comparisons to AIDS rates in the general population. Historical data on AIDS cases are presented from 1995 and on AIDS deaths from 1991. Highlights include the following: Between 2000 and 2001 the number of HIV-positive prisoners decreased about 5%, while the overall prison population grew 1.1% over the same period. At yearend 2001, 3.2% of all female State prison inmates were HIV positive, compared to 2.0% of males. The number of AIDS-related deaths in State prisons decreased 75% from 1995 to 2001. (January 2004). NCJ 202293 Acrobat file [PDF] (534K) | ASCII file (17K) Spreadsheets (zip format 27K)

     Bibliography: Selected Bibliography on the History of the Bureau of Prisons.

     Drugs and Drug Treatment Program: Outcome Evaluation of the New Mexico Corrections Department Genesis Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program for State Prisoners, Final Summary Report. 12/2003, NCJ 203277. [PDF]

     History: Alcatraz Inmate Regulations, 1956. These "Institution Rules & Regulations" were in effect at the United States Penitentiary, Alcatraz, during Warden Paul J. Madigan's administration (1955-1961). They were issued to all inmates in the form of a typewritten booklet to be kept in the cell.

     History: A short History of the Alabama Department of Corrections. (Taken from the Department's Employee Handbook).

     Publication: Correction News, Alabama Department of Corrections. Official newsletter of the Department, issued quarterly. 16 pages. (December 2003). [PDF]

     Publication: "Elderly Prisoner Profile," Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. A report on the growth rate of the state's elderly prison population, and the consequences of this growth. 6 pgs. [PDF].

     Publication: Quehanna Motivational Boot Camp: Performance Analysis and Evaluation, by Kristofer Bret Bucklen, Research and Evaluation Analyst. A report evaluating the performance of the Quehanna Boot Camp for the period 1993 through 2002. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. 12 pgs. (January 2003). [PDF]

     Publication: Reducing Drug Use in Prisons: Pennsylvania's Approach, by Thomas E. Feucht and Andrew Keyser. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. 6 pgs. [PDF]

     Publication: Research in Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2003). The most recent of a series describing research carried out by the agency or its research partners. This issue includes a long-term outcome evaluation of the Department's alcohol and drug therapeutic communities, and a summary of the process evaluation of the Department's educational and vocation programs. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. 17 pgs. [PDF]

     Statistics: Monthly Statistical Reports: November 1999 - November 2003. A collection of the statistical reports prepared by the Alabama Department of Correction's Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Division. Detailed representations of department trends and activities such as inmate intakes and release, work release salaries, and personnel turnover. [PDF]

     Terrorism: "Supplemental Report on September 11 Detainees' Allegations of Abuse at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, December 2003" issued by the U.S. Department of Justice's Inspector General on Dec. 18, 2003. [HTML format] [PDF]

     Terrorism: "Analysis of the Second Response by the Department of Justice to Recommendations in the Office of the Inspector General's June 2003 Report on the Treatment of September 11 Detainees" (January 2004) [HTML format] [PDF]

     Websites: Women in Policing Institute, National Institute for Women in Trades, Technology & Science. www.womenpolice.com

     Reference:

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.