FEATURED CASES

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California prison ban on mail containing printed-out downloads from the Internet violated the First Amendment.

     An inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison in California claimed that his First Amendment rights were violated by the prison's enforcement of a policy prohibiting inmates from receiving mail containing material downloaded from the Internet. A federal trial court agreed and entered a permanent, statewide injunction against the enforcement of the policy.

     A federal appeals court has now upheld that result.

     The policy, adopted in 2001, provided, "No Internet Mail. After reviewing staffing levels and security issues internet mail will not be allowed. To do so would jeopardize the safety and security of the institution." The policy prohibited only mail containing material that has been downloaded from the Internet but was not violated if the information from the Internet was retyped or copied into a document generated in a word processor program. Further, the policy prohibited photocopies of downloaded Internet materials, but not of non-Internet publications. The prison at Pelican Bay allegedly receives at most 500 pieces of mail containing Internet materials, the court stated, out of 300,000 total letters per month.

     At least eight other California prisons adopted similar policies. Since prisoners are not allowed to access the Internet directly, the plaintiff prisoner had argued that the policies effectively prevented inmates from accessing information that is available only on the Internet, or is prohibitively expensive and time-consuming to obtain through other methods.

     The appeals court stated that there was evidence in the record that several non-profit groups, such as Stop Prison Rape, publish information only on the Internet, and that many legal materials are readily available only there.

     The appeals court agreed with the trial court that prison officials had failed to show a rational or logical connection between the policy and its legitimate security interests. The prison officials had argued that permitting the receipt of materials downloaded from the Internet would drastically increase the volume of mail that the prison had to process and that it would be easier to insert coded messages into Internet material than into photocopied or handwritten material and that Internet communications are harder to trace than other, permitted communications.

Prohibiting all Internet-generated mail is an arbitrary way to achieve a reduction in mail volume. [...] CDC did not support its assertion that coded messages are more likely to be inserted into Internet-generated materials than word-processed documents.

     Indeed, there was expert testimony in the case that it is usually easier to determine the origin of a printed email than to track handwritten or typed mail.

     The appeals court rejected the argument that the injunction entered by the trial court was too broad, finding it "no broader than the constitutional violation." The plaintiff prisoner produced "uncontroverted evidence" that at least eight California prisons have adopted a policy banning all Internet-generated mail, and that more are considering it, the appeals court stated. "Because a substantial number of California prisons are considering or have enacted virtually identical policies, the unconstitutional policy has become sufficiently pervasive to warrant system-wide relief."

     The appeals court noted that while the injunction prohibited banning Internet materials simply because their source is the Internet, "it does not prohibit restrictions for any legitimate penological or security reason," such as imposing page limitations, "or a ban on recipes for pipe-bombs."

     Clement v. California Department of Corrections, #03-15006, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 7576 (9th Cir.).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet. [PDF]

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Prison policy of requiring inmate to get a court order to obtain an elective abortion did not violate her constitutional rights.

     A pregnant inmate in Louisiana challenged a prison's policy of requiring her to obtain a court order to receive an elective medical procedure, including an elective abortion.  The prisoner claimed that the court order policy frustrated her decision to abort her pregnancy, her constitutional right, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment through deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. She also argued that the policy was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests because:

(1) inmates are often moved without a court order for emergency medical care, so the policy cannot further inmate security; (2) she would have paid for the procedure and for the costs associated with her custodial release, so no prison resources would have been lost; and (3) there were alternatives to the court order policy.

     A federal appeals court rejected these arguments, and upheld summary judgment for the defendant prison officials.

     The defendants' insistence that the prisoner receive a court order to obtain temporary release for the abortion stemmed from the prison's general policy governing elective medical procedures. While it was unwritten, it was the policy that an inmate who wishes to obtain an elective medical procedure must obtain a court order allowing transport or temporary release. By contrast, emergency medical situations that cannot be managed in the prison are transported to a hospital without a court order. The policy governing emergency medical situations listed examples, including severe internal/external hemorrhage, loss of consciousness, difficult or labored breathing, heat stroke, chest pains, labor pains less than seven minutes apart, and excessive vaginal bleeding. Inmates seeking an elective medical procedure were always required to get a court order, but the plaintiff was the first inmate who sought an abortion.

     It was undisputed that the abortion was not medically necessary, but was sought for emotional and financial reasons, and that the prisoner could not obtain an abortion locally, but would have to be transported elsewhere for one.

     The prisoner's attorney, rather than requesting release or transport in order to obtain an abortion, filed a motion with the court seeking her release from the remainder of her sentence based on an assertion of the prison's inadequate prenatal care.

     She was ultimately released too late to obtain a legal abortion in Louisiana, carried the child to term, and placed it for adoption.

     Summarizing the issues, the appeals court stated:

At issue here are the rights to an abortion and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. The Fourteenth Amendment protects a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability. Government regulation of abortions is allowed so long as it does not impose an undue burden on a woman's ability to choose. A state regulation constitutes an undue burden if it "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."

     Such rights, however, may be limited in the prison context if reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, the court stated.

We are persuaded that the policy of requiring judicial approval of elective medical procedures is here reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The policy was not promulgated with deliberate indifference to its consequences and was not the direct cause of Victoria's injury.

     There are, the court found, valid, rational connections between legitimate interests in ensuring inmate security and avoiding unnecessary liability and the policy requiring inmates to obtain court orders allowing elective medical procedures. Transportation of prisoners outside the facility for such elective procedures places the prisoner "in a less-secure environment and increase the chance of escape." To minimize these risks, the court found, there was nothing unreasonable in insisting upon judicial approval, which "places an unbiased judge between the prison officials and inmates seeking off-site transport for purely elective procedures."

     Further, rather than singling out abortion for special burdens, the court noted, the policy in question applied to all elective medical procedures. "The policy's aim is to maximize inmate security and avoid liability. Nothing suggests that its purpose or effect was to deter abortions."

     The appeals court also rejected the argument that the policy, as applied in this case, amounted to deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs. It noted that the prisoner received prenatal care three times during the first nine days of her imprisonment, and information about the court order policy and the procedures that she needed to follow if she wanted to obtain an abortion. The failure to seek such an order was the responsibility of the prisoner's attorney. "Her attorney's action, not the policy, denied Victoria an abortion."

     Victoria W. v. Larpenter, No. 02-30598, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 8602 (5th Cir.).

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Far from showing that court ordered privatization of inmate medical care in Puerto Rico should be ended, correctional official's own evidence showed that consent decree relief was still necessary to remedy ongoing problems.

     The Secretary of the Department of Health of Puerto Rico filed a motion with a federal court under the Prison Litigation Reform Act to vacate or terminate prior court ordered relief mandating the privatization of the correctional health program of the department. In support of that motion, he offered extensive evidence, including both expert witness testimony and documentary evidence, concerning the supposed lack of current and ongoing constitutional violations in inmate medical care..

     The order at issue was part of a stipulation or consent decree entered into by the Department in September of 1977, which is detailed in a prior court opinion. Feliciano v. Gonzalez, 13 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.P.R. 1998). It involved the defendants' responsibility to set up a private not-for-profit corporation which would eventually contract with the Administration of Correction to provide medical care to persons in custody in Puerto Rican correctional facilities.

     In requesting termination of the consent decree, the Secretary claimed that prisoners' federally protected rights are no longer being violated, so that the decree was no longer necessary. Rejecting this argument, a federal court found that the "Secretary, on his own evidence, is wrong."

     The evidence presented by the defendant's own witnesses established by fully one fourth of the inmates who request sick call do not get it, only 55% of the ambulatory care appointments in fact occur, and only 49% of the "extra-mural" appointments are met (which involve specialist consultants for serious conditions, surgery, etc). Indeed, these statistics were found to be a few points below 1996-1997 averages, and in the case of outside specialist or hospital appointments, the "drop is significant, from 61.8% completion in 1996-1997 to 49% at present."

All of this is enough to find that there is still a present and ongoing systematic and massive denial of health care to the inmate population in the care of the Correctional Health Program.

       Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), “Prospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3).

      The trial court found that the defendant, in this case, had not met that standard, and was therefore not entitled to the termination of the consent decree. Indeed, the evidence presented by the defendant "shows that there currently continue to be ongoing constitutional violations of the rights of Plaintiff Class in the areas of medical and mental health care." The trial court found, based on the record and evidence, that the relief previously ordered "was and continues to extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right, and is narrowly drawn and constitutes the least intrusive means to correct the violation."

     Feliciano v. Serra, 300 F.Supp.2d 321 (D. Puerto Rico 2004).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the AELE website.

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Trial court failed to adequately show that an injunction was required to remedy fire safety issues at correctional facility.

     A federal appeals court has found that a trial court erred in issuing an injunction in a long-pending case dealing with general conditions of confinement in a state prison in Michigan. The Defendant correctional officials argued that the trial court erred in finding the failure to modify the long-existing structures and to take other steps to protect prisoners from injury or death by fire resulted in a constitutional violation.

     The case began in 1980 when prisoners incarcerated at the facility brought a class action lawsuit claiming that the conditions of their confinement violated the Eighth Amendment. On April 4, 1985, the parties entered into a Consent Decree covering most aspects of health care, fire safety, sanitation, safety and hygiene, overcrowding and protection from harm, volunteers, food service, management, operations, access to courts, and mail. Although the state officials admitted no liability on the claims, the Consent Decree explicitly stated that it was intended by the parties to assure the constitutionality of the conditions under which prisoners are incarcerated at the facility.

     Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3626, prospective relief in prison conditions cases “shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs," and a defendant in such a case is entitled to "the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right," but shall "not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary[, narrowly drawn, and the least intrusive means] to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right.”

     In the immediate case, on October 29, 2002, the trial court entered an injunction finding that the defendants' failure to protect prisoners from heat-related illnesses and the risk of injury from smoke and fire for prisoners with disabilities and chronic diseases resulted in "current and on-going violations" of the Consent Decree and Constitution. It concluded that termination of the remaining portions of the Consent Decree was inappropriate and ordered the defendants to submit by December 31, 2003 a synopsis of their intended facilities and process modifications, detailed architectural plans and construction schedule for approval by the court as a remedy for fire safety issues.

     A federal appeals court agreed that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment forbids conditions which would subject prisoners to an unreasonable threat of injury or death from fire.

     But it noted that the trial court did not state, in its prior opinions, "the standard it is applying to find that the conditions relating to fire prevention and fire safety are inadequate. It does not state in what particular ways Defendants’ deficiencies were unconstitutional in 2002, merely reciting that it had found those conditions unconstitutional in 2000 and that they had not been remedied." The appeals court therefore concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that the current prison conditions at the facilities in question "are so unsafe as to violate the Constitution and when it issued an injunction."

     "The deficiencies in fire safety found at the facility," the court reasoned, "do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, either alone or in combination with the other conditions in its prisons. Indeed, the fire safety problems have little connection with the other conditions found to violate the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, although the standards set by private organizations’ safety codes may be instructive in certain cases, they simply do not establish the constitutional minima; rather they establish goals recommended by the organization in question."

     The appeals court found that the trial court erroneously seemed to assume that the opinions of experts as to "desirable prison conditions" were sufficient to establish a constitutional claim.

We understand that the judicial supervision over prison conditions is a daunting task. We cannot, however, accept the approach taken by the district court in this case, namely, providing a laundry list of all the things that were wrong in the [...] facilities, declaring a constitutional violation, and ordering a highly expensive, and potentially ineffective, solution. This approach renders it impossible for this Court to review on appeal the legal conclusions of the lower court. We owe deference to the district court’s decision to issue an injunction to remedy the constitutional violations. However, we must review de novo its legal conclusion that there were constitutional violations. Absence of a clear constitutional analysis in the present case by the lower court renders this task impossible. Accordingly, we remand this case for a more detailed analysis of how the current conditions in the Hadix facilities continue to be deprivations denying “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” rather than potentially minor deviations.

     The appeals court also ordered a more detailed analysis by the trial court of why the steps taken by the prison officials, "which the lower court may disagree with, constitute 'deliberate indifference,'" rather than a "mere difference of opinion."

     Hadix v. Johnson, No. 03-1334, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 8889 (6th Cir. 2004).

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Prisoner's lawsuit concerning complaints about his medical treatment, when most of the complained of treatment took place after he filed his administrative grievance, was properly dismissed in its entirety for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.

     A prisoner claimed that he did not receive appropriate medical care after he fell on an allegedly slippery shower floor which he argued was unreasonably dangerous.

     A federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit without prejudice for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), and ruled that a "total exhaustion rule applied," requiring the dismissal of the entire lawsuit because most of the complained of treatment took place after he filed an administrative grievance.

     On the same day that the prisoner fell, he submitted an inmate grievance form complaining primarily about having been transferred to administrative segregation to administrative segregation, and a "lack of medical treatment for serious injury to shoulder." His grievance was rejected on the grounds that it presented a non-grievable issue.

     The prisoner did see a doctor for treatment of his shoulder three days after his fall, and submitted a number of subsequent sick call requests seeking pain medication or additional medical treatment. He did not, however, again seek to invoke the prison's grievance process with respect to any alleged inadequate medical care.

     The appeals court found that his failure to do so, at this point, barred him from pursuing claims in a federal civil rights lawsuit over the adequacy or inadequacy of that medical care.

     Ross v. County of Bernalillo, No. 02-2337, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 8362 (10th Cir. 2004).

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Correctional officers were entitled to qualified immunity for failing to protect prisoner from an attack by his cellmate when there was no evidence that anyone, including the plaintiff himself, believed that he was in danger from the cellmate until the attack actually occurred.

     A federal appeals court has reversed a trial court's denial of qualified immunity to a number of correctional employees on claims that they violated a Missouri prisoner's rights by failing to take action to protect him from assault by his cellmate.

     The prisoner had actually complained to correctional officials previously that he and his prior cellmate did not get along, in response to which they moved the plaintiff to a new cell with a new cellmate. The two prisoners had not met before they were assigned to the same cell, and the plaintiff did not declare the new cellmate an "enemy" or name him on his "enemies" list.

     He did, however, at one point complain about his new cellmate's personal hygiene, in response to which officers advised him to submit a cell-change request. He declined to do so, or to seek protective custody. The plaintiff did state a preference for celling only with Caucasian prisoners and complained that his new cellmate, who is African-American, was "unsanitary," but he never stated that he feared for his safety with the new cellmate.

     The two cellmates subsequently fought outside their cell, with two other prisoners joining in the altercation, and the plaintiff claimed that the cellmate and his friends attacked him without provocation.

     Rejecting the failure to protect claim, the appeals court noted that before the attack occurred, no one, including the plaintiff prisoner himself, believed that he was at risk of harm from his cellmate. Given that, there could be no finding that the defendants acted (or failed to act) with deliberate indifference to a known substantial risk of harm to the prisoner's safety.

     Berry v. Sherman, No. 03-2828, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 7927 (8th Cir. 2004).

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Prisoner who had been convicted but not yet sentenced should be treated the same as a sentenced prisoner for purposes of whether he had a liberty interest in procedural due process before being punished for alleged violation of prison rules against possession of contraband, rather than being treated as a pre-trial detainee. Federal appeals court upholds dismissal of prisoner's due process lawsuit over his placement in a punitive cell for eight hours without first being given a hearing.

     A prisoner who had been convicted, but not yet sentenced, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against correctional officials and employees, claiming that his cell was randomly searched, various items alleged to be contraband were seized, and he was punished by being confined in punitive cell for eight hours and suffering the loss of telephone privileges, loss of visitation privileges, and loss of recreation. The plaintiff alleged that prior to being punished, he was not given an administrative hearing, the opportunity to make a statement, the right to present documentary evidence, the right to call or confront witnesses, a copy of the infraction report, or the assistance of a staff member.

     He claimed that he was approached by a correctional sergeant who asked him to sign a disciplinary report for the infraction for which he had been punished, and that the next day an investigation was conducted which revealed that the items seized were not contraband. The prisoner claimed that if he had been given a hearing and due process prior to being punished, he would have had the opportunity to demonstrate that the items were not contraband.

     The trial court ruled that he was not entitled to due process under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (due process claim only viable for convicted prisoners when restriction on prisoner was "atypical and significant hardship" in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison confinement).. The plaintiff argued that Sandin was inapplicable, citing Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 2000), in which that court held that a convicted inmate awaiting sentencing has the status of a pretrial detainee, an argument that the trial court rejected.

     The Fuentes case involved a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim by an inmate who was convicted but awaiting sentencing, just like the plaintiff. He alleged that he was denied a hearing before being placed in a restraint chair for eight hours. The Fuentes court found that the prisoner's status was that of a pretrial detainee, for whom the right to remain at liberty continued until the pronouncement of sentencing.

     Upholding the trial court's rejection of Fuentes, the federal appeals court stated that

In our view, the adjudication of guilt, i.e., the conviction, and not the pronouncement of sentence, is the dispositive fact with regard to punishment in accordance with due process. The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have recognized this principle.

     Punishment of convicted prisoners, the court reasoned, is governed by the Eighth Amendment and its prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, in contrast to that of pretrial detainees, who cannot be punished without the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.

We hold that a prisoner who has been convicted but has not yet been sentenced has the same status as a sentenced prisoner for purposes of analyzing whether the prisoner has a liberty interest in having certain procedural protections apply before being punished in connection with prison disciplinary proceedings. Because Tilmon was a convicted prisoner, he had no liberty interest implicated by his confinement in a punitive cell for eight hours pursuant to Sandin v. Conner. The district court did not err in dismissing Tilmon's action for failure to state a claim.

     Tilmon v. Prator, #03-31071, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 8961 (5th Cir.).

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Federal prison officials were not liable for the death of a prisoner beaten to death by two fellow inmates with a fire extinguisher. Their decisions regarding where to house the prisoner and how to protect his safety fell within the "discretionary function" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, as those decisions were discretionary and "grounded in policy," since there was no mandatory course of conduct for officials to follow.

     A federal prisoner at the Federal Medical Center prison in Lexington, Kentucky was found dead in a housing unit of the prison in the early morning hours by a corrections officer. He had been beaten to death with a fire extinguisher, in an assault that prison employees were allegedly unaware of until the body was discovered. Two fellow prisoners were later convicted of the murder. His mother, as the administratrix of his estate, sued the U.S. government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, seeking damages for alleged negligence by prison officials in failing to adequately protect her son.

     The trial court dismissed the claim on the basis that prison officials' decisions regarding the prisoner's safety fell within the "discretionary function" exception to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The FTCA, in general, consents, on behalf of the U.S. government, to lawsuits for damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of government employees acting within the course and scope of their employment. The "discretionary function" exception provides that the United States has not consented to suit where the claim is "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."

     The plaintiff claimed that because the prisoner had been in protective lock-up prior to the attack, prison employees and officials "knew or should have known" that he was in imminent danger of likely injury and knowingly failed to provide him with reasonable protection. The plaintiff further claimed that the prisoner had been placed in a facility that prison officials knew or reasonably should have known was "so inadequate" that he could not be adequately protected from the risk of assault by fellow prisoners.

     The beating took place in an allegedly unsupervised area of the facility where inmates watch television. The prison was allegedly aware of the prisoner's past fights with other inmates, which was the reason for the prior protective lock-up. No prison official however, the court stated, had knowledge of any "specific, imminent threat" to the prisoner. In fact, the prisoner himself had agreed with a decision by prison officials one month before the fatal attack to release him from protective lock-up back into a housing unit designed for inmates with mental health problems or other special needs.

     Upholding the dismissal of the lawsuit under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, a federal appeals court found that prison officials' decisions regarding the prisoner's safety involved an "element of judgment or choice." Relevant statutes and regulations, the court found, allow Bureau of Prisons officials to exercise judgment in making decisions regarding the prisoner's safety, including what facility and what housing unit to place him in. The appeals court also found that the judgment involved in such decisions was "of the kind" that the discretionary function exception "was designed to shield," because such decisions are "grounded in policy."

As a general principle, a complaint that alleges the existence of a specific and immediate threat against an inmate is more likely to survive a motion to dismiss than a complaint that either alleges a nonspecific threat or provides only conclusory statements regarding the existence of a threat. This follows from the fact that decisions by prison officials to ignore specific and immediate threats against inmates are less likely to be the type of decision that can be said to be grounded in the underlying policy of the BOP, which requires prison officials to provide for the safekeeping and protection of inmates.

     Here, the mere fact that the prisoner was in protective lock-up a month earlier did not demonstrate the existence of a specific and immediate threat against him that was still present after he was released from such lock-up. The allegation that prison officials placed the prisoner in a facility that they "knew or reasonably should have known was so inadequate" that he could not be adequately protected, the court found, simply alleges that BOP officials were negligent in making a decision as to where to house the prisoner, without addressing the nature of that decision, and as a result was insufficient to show that the decision was not "grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime." Aside from that, the plaintiff had merely made a "bare assertion" that the "discretionary function exception does not apply," which is insufficient to rebut the presumption that the decisions were of the type that can be said to be grounded in policy.

     There was no showing that there was any "mandatory course of conduct" for prison officials to follow in making decisions regarding where to house the prisoner and how to protect him. The plaintiff having failed to rebut a presumption that the decisions by prison officials regarding the prisoner's safety were based on BOP policy, the court concluded that the discretionary function exception barred liability in the case.

     Montez v. U.S., No. 02-6303, 359 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 2004).

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Prisoners' claims against federal Bureau of Prisons challenging an alleged practice of retaining second copies of photos taken of prisoners and their visitors reinstated. Plaintiffs claimed that this practice violated their rights under the Privacy Act as well as constituting a misuse of Inmate Trust Fund money when the photos were paid for by the Fund.

Summary judgment was improperly granted to defendant on allegations that the Federal Bureau of Prisons' receipt and retention of duplicate prints of photographs taken under the "Inmate Photography Program" violated of the Privacy Act and the statute that created the Inmate Trust Fund.

     Three federal prisoners claimed that the Federal Bureau of Prisons maintained a secret file of photographs of inmates and their visitors in violation of their privacy rights in violation of several provisions of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a, as well as the federal statute that created the Inmate Trust Fund, 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1321. A federal trial court granted summary judgment to the government. A federal appeals court has reversed as to all but one of the claims.

     The BOP permits individual institutions to operate the "Inmate Photography Program," which gives prisoners the opportunity to have photos taken with their visitors. The prisoners pay $1 for each picture into the Inmate Trust Fund, consisting of money spent by inmates nationwide at prison commissaries and on other Trust Fund programs. The Fund pays for the cameras, film, processing, and administrative costs associated with the Inmate Photography Program, and prisons can offer inmates duplicate prints as long as doing so does not increase processing costs. Because many developing services often offer free "double prints," the court noted, most BOP institutions gave inmates the second print.

     The plaintiff prisoners noticed that several prisons were giving inmates only single photographs, even though the prison allegedly actually received double prints. At several prisons at which the plaintiffs were incarcerated, prison officials allegedly admitted that they did in fact develop and keep duplicate photographs, and used them for such purposes as their "investigative or informative value," including reviewing the photos for "gang-related activities," or scanning photos into computer systems, and reviewing the photos to make sure that nothing in the photo posed a threat to institutional safety or security and that no obscene gestures were made in the photos. Some officials allegedly admitted that on a few occasions, inmate trust funds were used to develop duplicate prints that, instead of being given to inmates, had been used or retained by the BOP for these purposes.

     The appeals court found that the trial court improperly concluded that the alleged actions violated no provisions of the Privacy Act which establish rules of conduct for government employees who develop or maintain systems of records. The trial court had reasoned that the institutions at which the plaintiff prisoners were incarcerated did not "maintain the photographs in a system of records." The appeals court found, however, that incorporation of a "record" such a photograph into a "system of records" was not required to trigger protections of the Privacy Act, and that further, there were also contested issues of fact as to whether BOP facilities actually maintained the photos in a "system of records" anyway.

     The appeals court further found that there was at least some indication that some trust fund money, used to obtain second sets of prints for investigative purposes, violated 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1321 by being used for purposes other than for the benefit of inmates. The BOP may not use trust fund proceeds to fund security programs, according to the court. The mere fact that the BOP may have subsequently reimbursed the trust fund after the alleged misuse, the appeals court stated, would be insufficient to show that no violation took place.

     Additionally, because the second prints were not actually "free," even if no additional cost was paid to obtain them--but rather could only be obtained by paying the cost for the first set of prints, "simply reimbursing extra amounts paid for second sets of prints does not reflect their actual value."

     The appeals court therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings as to both the Privacy Act and Trust Fund Act claims. It only upheld the trial court's disposition of the plaintiffs' claim under Sec. 552a(b) of the Privacy Act, prohibiting agencies from disclosing records to any person or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by or with the written consent of the person to whom the record pertains. The appeals court noted that there was an exception to that section for disclosure of records to agency employees "who have a need for the record in the performance of their duties," and found that the plaintiffs had offered no reason to think that there was anything inappropriate about "disclosing" photos to BOP officials so that they could decide whether to release them to inmates.

     Maydak v. U.S., No. 02-5168, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 7542 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

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Texas prisoners, members of the Church of Christ, did not show that Texas correctional officials violated their rights to religious freedom by providing a chaplain who they had doctrinal differences with. Prisoner who allegedly caused a disturbance and walkout by 50 prisoners at services by reading a statement denouncing the chaplain did not show that he was unlawfully transferred in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights.

   A group of Texas prisoners challenged the adequacy of Church of Christ religious services provided for them. They claimed that the Texas department of Criminal Justice's religious accommodations policy violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For reasons that a federal appeals court found puzzling, the prisoners "chose not to bring a cause of action under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA")," under which the defendant officials would have been required to show that its regulation: "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(2000), resulting in the court applying the test of rational relationship to legitimate penological objectives in examining the policy.

     The prisoners believed that the Church of Christ chaplain assigned to provide services to them had teachings which were "too ecumenical," and which departed from "established Church of Christ doctrine." The prisoners had requested that the prisoners be permitted to conduct their services "free from" the chaplain's "interference," and that worship time which had been cut from two-hours for services to one hour and a half be restored. One of the leaders of the prisoner group subsequently circulated a statement to fellow inmates denouncing the chaplain as having "departed from the faith" and demanding that he be removed and withdrawing "spiritual fellowship" from the chaplain. He was later transferred and subsequently claimed that this was in unlawful retaliation for his disagreements with the chaplain. (The transfer also following a disturbance involving 50 prisoners after this prisoner read a statement at services, which the chaplain gave him permission to do. Following the reading of the statement, 50 prisoners walked out of the service).

     The trial court rejected the plaintiffs' claims, finding that the religious accommodation policy did not violate the inmates' right to free exercise of their religion, and also held that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the retaliation claim.

     Upholding this result, the appeals court found that there was no evidence that the policy at issue was targeted toward the Church of Christ or favored one religious group over another. Staff and space limitations, as well as financial burdens, the court noted, are valid penological interests, so that the decision to offer worship services to five broad faith sub-groups, augmented by supplemental religious services to the other groups, including the Church of Christ, was "eminently reasonable." While some Church of Christ members, as a result, might not be able to attend a service "perfectly suited" to their faith, the court commented, "this limitation is dictated by the demands of administering religious services to tens of thousands of inmates representing widely divergent faiths."

     Many of the Church of Christ inmates, the court found, are given "alternative means" of exercising their religious beliefs. While the plaintiffs argued that the policy effectively barred many of then of the right to attend a Sunday service "that includes communion, singing without instruments, teaching, and an opportunity for baptism by full immersion," the court found that this argument was "without merit." While denied specific religious accommodations, the prisoners were given opportunities to exercise their faith.

     Further, some of the prisoners did reside in units that scheduled supplemental worship services conducted by Church of Christ volunteers which included communion, and a cappella singing. The Department also permitted Church of Christ members to arrange for immersion baptism services and permits the possession of religious literature. These programs, "offered in addition to the weekly Christian/non-Roman Catholic worship services," the court found, furnished the prisoners with "alternative means" of exercising their religion.

     The appeals court rejected the argument that the fact that distinctive Church of Christ worship services were offered in some housing units demonstrated the "feasibility, much less constitutional imperative," of offering them in all 100+ units, since demands of security, architecture, number of religious adherents, and schedule conflicts all potentially limited the grant of specific accommodations in every unit.

     The appeals court also rejected the retaliation claim, noting that "prison officials may legitimately punish inmates who verbally confront institutional authority without running afoul of the First Amendment."

     Freeman v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, #03-10443, 2004 U.S. App. 8998 (5th Cir).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet. [PDF]

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Federal appeals court upholds certification of class action lawsuits in two jailhouse strip search cases.

     A federal appeals court has upheld orders certifying class action lawsuits in two jailhouse strip search cases, targeted at two different Maine counties (Knox and York). In each case, a named plaintiff sought to represent others who were allegedly improperly strip searched.

     In the first case, brought against Knox County, its sheriff, and unidentified officers, a female prisoner filed a federal civil rights claim, asserting that she had been arrested for witness tampering after having been previously charged with violating an anti-harassment order. One in custody at the jailhouse, alleged that she was taken to a shower area, ordered by a female corrections officer to disrobe, and required to "squat and cough" while the officer could see her vagina and anal area. The judge in the trial court characterized it as a . a "strip and visual body cavity search." 

     In the first case, the class certified by the trial court was:

All people who after November 19, 1996, were subjected to a strip search and/or visual body cavity search without evaluation for individualized reasonable suspicion while being held at the Knox County Jail:

(1) after having been arrested on charges that did not involve a weapon, drugs, or a violent felony; or

(2) while waiting for bail to be set on charges that did not involve a weapon, drugs, or a violent felony; or

(3) while waiting for an initial court appearance on charges that did not involve a weapon, drugs, or a violent felony; or

(4) after having been arrested on a warrant that did not involve a weapon, drugs, or a violent felony.

     In the second case, against York County, the plaintiff was arrested for failing to report for probation and allegedly was strip searched with the same strip, squat and cough procedure as in the first case. As in the first case, the plaintiff here also alleged that this was done in accordance with a policy or custom of the county that was applied widely to arrestees including those charged with unthreatening offenses. The trial judge in that case also certified a class, defined as:

All people strip-searched at the York County Jail after October 14, 1996 under a policy or custom of conducting strip-searches without evaluating for individualized reasonable suspicion: (1) while waiting for bail to be set or for a first court appearance after being arrested on charges that did not involve a weapon or drugs or a violent felony; or (2) while waiting for a first court appearance after being arrested on a default or other warrant.

     The appeals court found that the issues in the cases were what rule, policy or custom as to strip searches was in force in each county during the periods in question; was it lawful as applied to groups or individual class members; if unlawful as to some categories of arrestees, were there still facts as to particular arrestees that justified a strip search; and if liability exists, what are the damages to each person injured? The appeals court found that, under the circumstances, in both cases there was at least no abuse of discretion by the trial courts in certifying the classes, and rejected the counties' arguments that individual lawsuits were a preferable method of adjudicating any claims arising out of the allegedly unlawful strip searches.

     The appeals court noted that even if all persons searched based on individual evaluations were readily excluded from the class, regardless of the soundness of the evaluation, it might still be necessary in at least some cases within the defined class to consider whether individualized suspicion could have justified a search.

     But the appeals court believed that threats of "undue complications as to liability" were limited. If the counties actually had a rule, custom or policy of strip searching every arrestee or a substantially overlarge category, "then it is a fair guess that most arrestees so classed were strip searched on this basis."

     While the counties argued that individual law suits for damages were "feasible," and should be utilized instead of class actions, the appeals court believed that "only the limited number of cases where serious damage ensued would ever be brought without class status and that the vast majority of claims would never be brought unless aggregated because provable actual damages are too small. This is a conventional argument for a class action, and it applies here.

     Tardiff v. Knox County, No. 04-1065, 04-1165 (1st Cir.).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet. [PDF]

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Federal appeals court rejects Voting Rights Act challenge to New York's felon disenfranchisement statute, removing the right to vote from currently incarcerated felons and parolees, rejecting argument that it infringes on the right to vote on the basis of race. Three-judge panel, however, unanimously suggests resolution of the issue by the United States Supreme Court.

     A federal appeals court rejected the claim that the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1973, which prohibits voting qualifications that result in the abridgment of the right to vote on account of race, could be applied to a New York State statute that disenfranchises currently incarcerated felons and parolees. At the same time, the appeals court stated that the question was a "difficult one" that "can ultimately be resolved only by a determination of the United States Supreme Court.

     Because the statute is "silent on the topic of state felon disenfranchisement statutes," the appeals court found, its application to question the validity of New York's disenfranchisement statute would "infringe upon the states' well-established discretion to deprive felons of the right to vote."

     The plaintiff argued that the disenfranchisement statute results in a denial of the right to vote on the basis of race, and was brought by an African-American inmate currently serving a maximum sentence of life imprisonment in New York. The complaint argued that even if the New York State legislature did not intend racial discrimination in enacting the disenfranchisement statute, it has resulted in unlawful dilution of voting rolls in the African-American and Hispanic communities of New York City. The plaintiff claimed that while black and Hispanics are less than thirty percent of the voting-age population in New York State, they make up over 80% of the inmates in the state prison system.

    Regardless of whether this is true, the appeals court concluded that the application of the Voting Rights Act "would alter the constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government if it were construed to extend to state felon disenfranchisement statutes."

     Despite this, all three judges on the panel stated their belief that "the issues presented in this case are significant and, in light of the differing perspectives among and within the courts of appeals, warrant definitive resolution by the United States Supreme Court."

     Muntaqim v. Coombe, #01-7260, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 8077 (2nd Cir).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet. [PDF]

     Editor's Note: In another recent federal appeals court case, a hearing was ordered in a lawsuit challenging Florida's ban on felons voting. The plaintiffs claimed that the imposition of the ban was motivated by intent to discriminate against African-Americans, and a claim was made under the Voting Rights Act as well as for violation of equal protection. Johnson v. Governor of the State of Florida, #02-14469, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 25859 (11th Cir. 2003).[reported in 2004 JB Feb] Additionally, in Farrakhan v. Washington, No. 01-35032, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003), rehearing en banc denied 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004), a panel of the Ninth Circuit held that a claim of vote denial based on Washington State's felon disenfranchisement scheme could be pursued under the Voting Rights Act.

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Access to Courts/Legal Info

     Private company develops "Touchsonic Legal Research Kiosks for Inmates" as a possible alternative for facilities without adequate space or budget for law libraries.

Criminal Conduct

     The Justice Department announced that Kevin Clark, a former Sergeant at the Dougherty County Jail in Albany, Georgia, was sentenced to six months imprisonment for obstructing justice in connection with a civil rights offense committed at the Dougherty County Jail.

     Former Wilson County Tennessee correctional officer pleads guilty to criminal charges related to an ongoing federal criminal civil rights investigation into allegations of excessive force and obstruction of justice at the Wilson County Jail in Lebanon, Tennessee.

     Former employee of a Tennessee state mental facility sentenced to 31 months in prison for repeatedly beating and physically abusing a patient with severe mental retardation.

Defenses: Eleventh Amendment

     Prisoner's negligence claims against state prison officials in their official capacity in federal court seeking money damages but not injunctive relief were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The enactment of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, M.G.L.A. ch. 258 Sec. 1 et seq., did not waive the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court. Tort Claims Act's provisions barred negligence claims against correctional officials in their individual capacities. Caisse v. Dubois, No. 3-1176, 346 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 2003).

Disability Discrimination: Prisoners

     The U.S. Department of Justice entered into a settlement agreement with the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services regarding the provision of services required by the Americans with Disabilities Act to juveniles with hearing disabilities.

DNA Tests

     Iowa statute requiring inmates convicted of certain offenses to submit a blood specimen for DNA profiling was intended to promote public safety, rather than to punish prisoners, and therefore was not an unconstitutional retroactive enhancement of their punishment. Schreiber v. State of Iowa, #01-1192, 66 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 2003).

Expert Witnesses

     Hemophiliac detainee was not entitled, in his lawsuit against county sheriff and jailer for allegedly failing to provide him with timely medical care for a nosebleed, to an extension of time to designate his expert witness. Trial court therefore properly excluded the testimony of the plaintiff's expert, and granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Summey v. Barker, No. 632A02, 586 S.E.2d 247 (N.C. 2003).

First Amendment

     Prisoner's claim that he was charged with a disciplinary violation in retaliation for leading a religious group meeting which discussed whether the group should file a grievance against a prison employee adequately stated a claim for unlawful retaliation. Samuels v. Hammond, #03-30589, 78 Fed. Appx. 314 (5th Cir. 2003). [PDF]

Frivolous Lawsuits

     Prisoner who had been involved in at least forty-seven prior state court civil and criminal appeals, all of them unsuccessful and all directly or indirectly related to his arrest, prosecution, conviction, or confinement for burglary, rape, and criminal deviate conduct, is enjoined against continuing to file meritless complaints. Court places detailed restrictions on his filing of additional complaints concerning the same subject matter. Sims v. Scopelitis, No. 50A03-0211-CV-399, 797 N.E.2d 348 (Ind. App. 2003).

Medical Care

     Jail nurse who took incoming prisoner's medical history was not liable for any damage allegedly resulting from 51-day delay in eye examination and resumption of medication which worsened his glaucoma when she had no further contact with him after intake process. Prisoner also failed to show that sheriff had any knowledge about his condition or was personally involved, in anyway, in the 51-day delay in scheduling his eye examination. Richardson v. Nassau County, 277 F. Supp. 2d 106 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).

Medical Care: Dental

     Prisoner's claim of a "great deal" of suffering as a result of a tooth extraction which did not "go well" was insufficient to support a lawsuit for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Prisoner's claim, at most, amounted to possible negligence or medical malpractice, which is insufficient for a constitutional claim. Majors v. Ridley-Turner, 277 F. Supp. 2d 916 (N.D. Ind. 2003).

Parole

     Parole Board official was entitled to absolute immunity in federal civil rights lawsuit over 65 day delay in scheduling parole revocation hearing (during which the plaintiff remained detained pending a hearing). Following the hearing, the hearing officer found no parole violation. Parole Board Chairman acted in a "quasi-judicial" capacity in determining when to schedule the hearing. Pate v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2003).

Prison & Jail Construction and Closing Issues

     Governor of Ohio and director of state Department of Rehabilitation & Correction had authority, under state law, to make a decision to close a correctional facility in response to budgetary problems, and employees' union was not entitled to an injunction against the closure. State ex rel. AFSCME v. Taft, #1-03-56, 804 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio App. 3d Dist. 2004).

     Washington state statute requiring community notice and hearing before the building of a community based corrections facility only applied to residential facilities and not to community justice center which was non-residential and would provide supervision for community-supervised offenders. Citizens group's rights were not violated by denial of hearing. Citizens for Fair Share v. State of Washington Department of Corrections, No. 281-38-4-II, 72 P.3d 206 (Wash. App. 2003).

Prison Litigation Similar State Statutes

     Louisiana state statute prohibiting prisoner from seeking damages for mental injury without a showing of physical injury only applies to claims arising after it was enacted. A retroactive application to the plaintiff prisoner's claim against sheriff for unsanitary conditions in disciplinary cells would violate due process, as the prisoner had a vested right to assert the claim not impacted by the statute. Bourgeois v. Wiley, #2002 CA1420, 849 So. 2d 632 (La. App. 2003). [PDF]

Prison Rules/Regulations

     Establishment of new guidelines governing security classifications, work release, and family leave were not unconstitutional "ex post facto" laws increasing prisoners' punishment retroactively. They were not laws, but merely guidelines promulgated as an exercise of discretion and correctional officials had the authority to modify them. Watkins v. Secretary, Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, No. 118, 831 A.2d 1079 (Md. 2003). [PDF]

Prisoner Assault: By Inmate

     Mere fact that two inmates were of different races was insufficient to put corrections officer on notice that white inmate posed a threat of physical assault to black inmate in exercise yard. Officer, who had no knowledge of white inmate's alleged membership in racist gang or that anyone had threatened the black inmate, could not be held liable for alleged failure to protect him against assault. Jones v. Bernard, #02-1349, 77 Fed. Appx. 467 (10th Cir. 2003).

Prisoner Discipline

     Prisoner's claim that several correctional officers physically assaulted him was not relevant to whether he was guilty of disobeying a direct order from an officer concerning keeping his hands in his pockets while being escorted from his cell. Prisoner therefore had no right to present such a "defense" at the disciplinary hearing. Claudio v. Selsky, 772 N.Y.S. 2d 424 (A.D. 3d Dept. 2004). [PDF]

     Substantial evidence was present to support prisoner's disciplinary conviction for being disruptive during an interview, using obscene language towards an officer, and refusing to return to his cell when directed to do so. Branch v. Goord, 772 N.Y.S. 2d 426 (A.D. 3d Dept. 2004). [PDF]

     Warden of parish jail did not have power, under Louisiana law, to classify a cell phone and charger as contraband. Statute defined what items were contraband in correction facilities in the state. State of Louisiana v. Miller, #2003-KK-0206, 857 So. 2d 423 (Louisiana 2003). [PDF]

     California prisoner's violation of the rule against disrespect of prison staff was not a "serious" rule violation sufficient to support a loss of conduct credits, since it was not a "repeated pattern of administrative rule violation for the same offense." The prisoner's previous violations were of different offenses. In Re Smith, No. B166178, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887 (Cal. App. 2d Dist 2003).

     Notice that prisoner received informing him that he was being charged with "rioting" and had been identified as an active participant in a dormitory riot on a particular date was sufficient to give the prisoner adequate notice of the charges against him for due process purposes. Subsequent finding that prisoner was guilty of the offense was adequately supported by some evidence, including statements of confidential informants and a conduct report identifying the prisoner as having participated in the disturbance. Hite v. Davis, #02-2818, 70 Fed. Appx. 352 (7th Cir. 2003).

Prisoner Suicide

     Jailer who decided to finish feeding other inmates rather than immediately checking on pretrial detainee he observed lying nude and apparently sleeping in a "peculiar" position was entitled to qualified immunity from liability for prisoner's successful suicide. The detainee's use of his jail jumpsuit to strangle himself was not foreseeable and the cell was padded, lacking fixtures that could be used by a prisoner seeking to hang himself. Gray v. Tunica County, Mississippi, 279 F. Supp. 2d 789 (N.D. Miss. 2003).

Religion

     Native American inmate was entitled to injunctive relief against grooming regulation requiring him to cut his hair short, to the extent of allowing him to grow a "kouplock," a two-inch square of hair at the base of the skull. Allowing a prisoner with sincere religious beliefs to grow such a limited area of hair "is not likely to result in the delayed capture of an inmate in the event of an escape," as it "cannot be manipulated to alter the appearance of an inmate's face or his profile." Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 276 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Ohio 2003).

Sexual Assault

     Overturning dismissal of criminal charges against corrections officer on three counts of institutional sexual assault under 18 Pa. C.S.A. Sec. 3124.2 (prohibiting sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or indecent conduct with an inmate by a corrections employee), Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejects arguments that the statute was void for vagueness, overbroad, or violated due process. Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418 (Pa. 2003). [PDF]

Smoking

     It is clearly established, for purposes of qualified immunity, that a prison could violate the Eighth Amendment by deliberate indifference to a prisoner's exposure to unreasonable levels of environmental tobacco smoke (second-hand smoke). Genuine issue of fact as to whether a reasonable corrections officer could disagree as to whether officer's alleged smoking in law library violated prisoner's rights barred summary judgment for officer in prisoner's lawsuit. Gill v. Smith, 283 F. Supp. 2d 763 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).

     Prison officials were not entitled to dismissal of former prisoner's lawsuit concerning his allegedly unreasonable exposure to high levels of environmental tobacco smoke on the basis of the  Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine after he failed to return to Delaware for arrest for a probation violation under an order that he allegedly knew about. The doctrine is found not to apply as there was not a connection between the plaintiff's alleged fugitive status and his pending civil lawsuit. Atkinson v. Taylor, 277 F. Supp. 2d 382 (D. Del. 2003).

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     AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.

     Foreign Prisoners & Vienna Convention: Mexico v. United States of America (March 31, 2004) The World Court decision that under the Vienna Convention the United States violated the rights of more than 50 convicted Mexican Nationals on death row by not providing them with access to their country's consular officials when they were accused of serious crimes abroad. [.html and PDF files both available].

     Hepatitis: "Hepatitis Testing and Treatment in State Prisons." Presents facility policies related to hepatitis C testing and treatment and hepatitis B vaccinations, based on the 2000 Census of State and Federal Adult Correctional Facilities, which gathered data from 1,584 State institutions. This report also includes data on the number of hepatitis C tests conducted, the number of tests confirmed positive, and the number of inmates treated for hepatitis C. The report provides information on hepatitis B, the number of 3-dose series hepatitis B vaccination policies, and the number of inmates who received vaccinations in the 12-month period ending June 30, 2000. Highlights include the following: At midyear 2000, 1,113,035 inmates (94% of all inmates) were held in facilities that reported having a testing policy for hepatitis C. 33% of tests in facilities that tested only targeted groups were positive compared to 27% of those in facilities that conducted broad tests (random basis or all inmates). Of the 1,033 facilities that provide hepatitis B vaccinations, 680 (66%) had a policy to vaccinate inmates in high-risk groups. 4/04 NCJ 199173 Acrobat file (12K) | ASCII file (161K) | Spreadsheets (zip format 12K)

     Prison Industry: "Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program" (NCJ 203483), Bureau of Justice Assistance, March 2004. PDF or HTML Describes a program that exempts certified state and local departments of corrections from normal restrictions on the sale of inmate-made goods in interstate commerce. A total of 50 jurisdictions may be certified under this program by demonstrating to BJA that they meet statutory and guideline requirements..

     Religion: "A Review of the Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers, April 2004," a report by the Inspector General's Office of the U.S. Department of Justice. [PDF]. It is also available in .html format.

     Websites: Boot Camps is a site dedicated to help troubled teens, and provide information to parents with troubled teens on juvenile boot camps for troubled teens, and juvenile boot camp alternatives. Provides information, state by state, on existing state and privately run juvenile boot camps, as well as military schools.

     Reference:

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.