CONTENTS

Officers alleged continued use of physical force after a man was subdued and restrained violated clearly established law and, if as plaintiff described, was excessive as used against a man who had committed no crime. Officers also lacked probable cause to restrain him for an involuntary mental evaluation solely on the basis of a neighbor's 911 call reporting that he was suicidal.

     North Carolina police officers took a man involuntarily out of his parents' home to a hospital for an emergency mental evaluation after he fell down while riding his bike while intoxicated. Police arrived on the scene after a 911 call by a neighbor reporting that the man had said he was "going home to commit suicide. He is intoxicated and has been depressed." When officers arrived, he denied plans for suicide, and attempted to close the door on them, and an officer placed his foot in the doorway to prevent this, grabbing the man's arm and pulling him onto the porch, where a fight allegedly ensued, after which the officers restrained the man and took him to the hospital.

     Once there, according to the man's version of events, the officers falsely told doctors that he had attacked them and that his father had already petitioned to have him involuntarily committed. One of the officers then proceeded to procure a commitment order from the county magistrate without disclosing that the man was already in custody.

     The man filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the officers and the city. The trial judge denied the officer's motion for qualified immunity on excessive force and unreasonable search and seizure claims.

     A federal appeals court upheld this result. It found that it was clearly established that the officers would not have probable cause to detain the plaintiff for a mental health evaluation solely based on the 911 call that he was suicidal, when the officers were unable to observe anything indicating that the man was a danger to himself or others. He denied being suicidal and there were no weapons visible to the officers or anything other than the call to indicate any suicidal intentions.

     If the incident was as the plaintiff described, the appeals court found, the amount of force used by the officers in subduing him was excessive. He had not committed any crime, and there was no evidence to support a belief that he was a threat to himself or others, including the officers.

Here, Michael [the plaintiff] was unarmed, and the use of force continued even after he was secured with flex-cuffs around both his hands and his feet, and lying face down on the floor, alone in a room of his parents' house.

     The plaintiff alleged that one of the officers then lifted him up by his arms, while they were bound behind his back, thereby wrenching his shoulder, and the other officer kicked him in the back when he cried out in pain. Such conduct, if true, violated clearly established law. The plaintiff's alleged injuries included cuts that left a two-foot diameter pool of blood on the foyer floor, the court noted, and later required stitches, and he also claimed that the incident caused him shoulder injuries requiring repeated surgeries to repair.

     Bailey v. Kennedy, No. 02-1761, 349 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2003).

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Police officer was not shown to have used investigative techniques in child abuse investigation that were "so coercive and abusive" that he knew or should have known that they would yield false information. Officer had probable cause for arrest of suspect even if portions of his affidavit supporting the arrest were inaccurate as to the number of child victims who had told the officer the arrestee had sexually abused them.

     A police officer's foster daughter told him that she had been sexually abused by members of the community. The officer and a child protective services employee drove his foster daughter through the area and asked her to identify homes in which she had allegedly been abused. One of the homes she identified belonged to a man who she said had sexually abused her and her three siblings, as well as his own three children and his girlfriend's child, who lived with them.

     The officer interviewed a number of the man's children, and one of them, a child suffering from cerebral palsy, stated during a two-hour interview that he had been sexually abused by his parents and his parents' friends. The other three children in the man's household denied being sexually abused during the interviews. Medical examinations indicated that the results on two of these children were suggestive of sexual abuse, and a third was "consistent" with sexual abuse. An examination of the fourth child found test results consistent with rectal penetration.

     The officer then arrested the man and submitted an affidavit of probable cause to the trial court, stating that the arrestee "has been identified by at least 8 child victims as having been sexually abused by [him]" and also stating that all of the four children in his household tested positive for abuse.

     The county prosecutor charged the man with sexual abuse of the child with cerebral palsy. Two of the other children in the household subsequently stated that they had also been sexually abused by the man, so the charges were amended. The arrestee was convicted at trial after all three of these children testified against him, and sentenced to 260 months in prison. His conviction was subsequently overturned after he served five years in prison for a hearing on the reliability of the victims' accusations. The prosecutor then dismissed all charges, and the arrestee filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the officer, the city, and various other officials.

     The officer sought qualified immunity, which was denied by the trial court, which found that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the officer used investigative techniques that were so coercive and abusive "that he knew or should have known those techniques would yield false information." 

     A federal appeals court reversed. It found that the arrestee failed to establish that the investigating officer deliberately fabricated evidence and also found that the information he had at the time of the arrest gave him probable cause to make the arrest. It also rejected the argument that his investigative techniques were so coercive that he knew or should have known that they would elicit false information.

     "Overbearing tactics" in interviewing the children, standing alone, do not establish a deliberate fabrication of evidence claim, the court noted. Additionally, while the officer stated in his affidavit that three of the children tested "positive" for sexual abuse, while in fact the tests were only "suggestive" or "consistent" with sexual abuse, he did have positive statements by two children, his foster daughter and the child with cerebral palsy, both identifying the arrestee as having sexually abused them.

     Accordingly, there was no showing that the officer continued the investigation despite knowing that the suspect was innocent. Further, while his affidavit may have been careless or inaccurate in stating that eight children, as opposed to two, had accused the arrestee of sexually abusing them, his foster daughter had, in fact, told him that the suspect abused at least eight child victims.

     Under the circumstances, the officer did have probable cause for the arrest, the appeals court found, even without considering the contested portions of his affidavit. There was no showing that any inaccuracies in the affidavit were "intentional or deliberate." The officer was therefore entitled to qualified immunity from liability.

     Gausvik v. Perez, No. 02-35902, 345 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Officers acted unlawfully in seizing a man at a gas station when they were on the way to executing a search warrant at his residence and transporting him to the site of the search, without probable cause to arrest him. Arrestee awarded $4,000 in actual damages and punitive damages of $20,000 by jury.

     A federal court jury in Connecticut awarded an arrestee $4,000 in actual damages and $20,000 in punitive damages on federal civil rights claims arising out of his seizure by police officers at a gas station while they were executing a search warrant for his residence elsewhere. The officers then allegedly transported him to the site of the search, without an arrest warrant for him, a search warrant for his person, or probable cause to place him under arrest.

     The trial judge rejected the defendant officers' claim that they were entitled to qualified immunity or that they should not be held liable because what they had done was consistent with training that they had received. The court found that "it is clearly not the law that police officers may, as a matter of course, seize and transport targets of investigations whenever they have a search warrant related to that investigation."

      Indeed, to make matters worse for the defendant officers, the specific facts of the case precluded any finding of qualified immunity, the judge stated, noting that the defendants had actually applied for a warrant to search the plaintiff, and that application was denied, with the state court judge finding that there was no probable cause to search him. Given this, it was "not objectively reasonable to arrest" him en route to the search of the apartment. The officers themselves testified that they did not believe they had probable cause to search or seize the plaintiff, so it was unreasonable for them to believe that, despite being denied a search warrant as to the plaintiff, they had the authority to arrest him so that they would have the authority to search him incident to arrest.

     The trial judge also rejected arguments that the amount of compensatory or punitive damages awarded was excessive under the circumstances.

     Pappas v. New Haven Police Department, 278 F. Supp. 2d 296 (D. Conn. 2003).

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Deputy sheriff's action of removing man's 12-year-old daughter from his custody during court ordered visitation was not reasonable, when based on deputy's knowledge of pending charges against father for allegedly sexually abusing a fourteen-year-old female. Deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity in father's civil rights lawsuit, as his action was not justified as an emergency removal based on reasonable suspicion of child abuse.

     A father was having a two-week court ordered visitation with his twelve-year-old daughter. A deputy driving by a house where he observed the man, his daughter, and his current wife sitting on the front porch. The deputy became concerned for the child's safety, because he knew that the father was then charged with sexually abusing a fourteen-year-old female, and he also believed that the man's current wife had serious mental and substance-abuse problems rendering her unable to provide adequate supervision.

     The deputy then discussed the situation with the County Attorney's office and went to the man's residence, where he removed the daughter and returned her to her mother's custody.

     The father filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the deputy, asserting violations of his constitutional and statutory rights. The deputy argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity because an emergency removal of the child was necessary because of an imminent danger that she would be abused. The trial court denied the deputy qualified immunity, ruling that the emergency removal was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

     A federal appeals court has upheld that result.

     Parents, the court noted, have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. This interest can be limited by the state's compelling interest in protecting a child, and when a governmental official is pursuing a child abuse investigation, such a removal might entitle a defendant to qualified immunity if the removal was "properly founded upon a reasonable suspicion of child abuse."

     In this case, however, the plaintiff father retained the right not to be separated from his child in the face of the deputy's suspicion that he might abuse his daughter. The court found that, under the circumstances specified, it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that removing the daughter would violate the father's parental liberty interest.

     Swipies v. Kofka, No. 03-1274, 348 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 2003).

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Denial of Ku Klux Klan's application to join state highway commission's "adopt-a-highway" was improper whether justified on the basis that the Klan discriminates on the basis of race or on the basis of "judicial notice" that the organization has a history of violence. Denial overturned by federal court on First Amendment grounds.

     The state of Missouri, through its state Highway and Transportation Commission, created an "adopt-a-highway" program, under which various organizations volunteer to clean up litter along the highway and receive recognition for their efforts, including signs acknowledging their identity on the highway area they adopt. The signs are paid for by the Commission, and list only the name of the participating organization, without any symbols, logos, advertising or other statements on the signs.

     A local chapter of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) applied to participate, and the application was denied. In subsequent litigation, a federal appeals court held that the application could not be rejected solely on the basis of the Klan's viewpoint. Cuffley v. Mickes, #99-2334, 208 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2000).

     As a result, the program adopted new rules, under which applicants could be rejected if "state or federal courts" have taken "judicial notice of a history of violence" by the individual or organization, or if an organization denies membership on the basis of race, color, or national origin. The KKK again applied under the new rules, and was again denied participation in the program.

     The latest denial was based on the Klan's barring of members on the basis of race, color or national origin, and a finding that courts "have taken judicial notice of a history of violence" by the organization.

     A federal trial court found that denials on this basis also violated the Klan's First Amendment rights. The First Amendment, the court noted, includes freedom of association, including the freedom "not to associate," and the open membership requirement "contravenes this freedom by essentially requiring the Klan to alter its message of racial superiority and segregation by accepting individuals of other races, colors, and national origins."

     The court also found that the Klan's desired participation in the adopt-a-highway program is "speech" protected by the First Amendment, a desire to promote itself by recognition of its participation. In creating the program and the signs associated with it, the state had created a limited nonpublic forum, and could not regulate those participating in it in an unreasonable manner in an "effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view."

     The Commission claimed that it denied the Klan's application because thirty-two federal and state court cases, some dating back to the 1920s, have taken judicial notice of the Klan's history of violence, including the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).

     The court found the "judicial notice" inadequate, however, to show that the Klan was intentionally attempting to "elicit a violent response or has directed at a particular individual so-called 'fighting words'" in connection with the adopt-a-highway program. As for any possible liability concerns arising out of the Klan's participation, should violence occur, either by the Klan or by those objecting to the Klan, the Commission's own rules required the Klan, if allowed to adopt a highway, to indemnify the Commission from any claim or lawsuit which might arise. This, the court found, added credibility to the Klan's argument that the judicial notice regulation was "simply a pretext to prevent its participation in the program," and this conclusion was bolstered by the fact that no other organization had been denied participation based on this regulation.

Based on the undisputed evidence, I find that the judicial notice regulation, as applied to the Klan, is not reasonable in light of the purpose of the Adopt-A-Highway program, which is to reduce litter along the highways and beautify Missouri's roadsides. The Klan's expressive speech of picking up trash along a highway right-of-way cannot be trumped because some people may disagree with its beliefs and advocacy, especially when the Klan agrees to indemnify the Commission. Even 'those with viewpoints as thoroughly obnoxious as those of the Klan' are entitled to First Amendment protection.

     The Commission was therefore enjoined from denying the KKK's application to participate in the program.

     Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 281 F. Supp. 2d 989 (E.D. Mo. 2003).

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Arrestee could not successfully seek damages based merely on a custodial interrogation without Mirada warnings when none of her elicited statements were ever used against her at trial. Federal appeals court also overturns $80,000 malicious prosecution award to arrestee, who claimed that officers filed false charges against her and maliciously pursued them in order to assist her officer boyfriend, who she accused of domestic abuse. Plaintiff's opening statement at trial put the question of the defendant officer's truthful character into issue, so it was prejudicial error to exclude evidence of that character.

     A federal appeals court, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's recent holding in Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003), has rejected an arrestee's claim that police officers violated her constitutional rights by engaging in a custodial interrogation without providing Miranda warnings. It noted that, under the principles set down in that decision, a plaintiff in a federal civil rights case may not base liability solely on the mere fact that she was questioned in custody without Miranda warnings, when there is no claim that her answers were ever used against her at trial. The trial court in the federal civil rights lawsuit brought by the plaintiff, therefore, properly refused to allow the custodial interrogation claim to go to the jury.

     While the jury did hear evidence on the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim, and award her $80,000 in damages against one defendant officer, the appeals court overturned this result because of the erroneous exclusion by the trial court of evidence of the defendant police officer's truthful character.

     The case arose out of a investigation of the arrestee's complaint of alleged domestic violence by her boyfriend, a police officer. The appeals court found that evidence of the defendant police officer's truthful character was "rendered admissible" by the plaintiff's opening statement in the trial that the defendant officer, during the investigation, "maliciously harassed" her, "attempted to coerce" her into making false confessions, "used illegal investigative techniques" and "terrorized" her before filing false charges, all for the alleged purpose of trying to help her officer boyfriend. This, the court found, amounted to a suggestion of "corruption" rather than a mere accusation of bias.

     Since the main issue in the case was the credibility of the parties, the exclusion by the trial court of the officer's truthful character was not harmless, and a new trial was required on the malicious prosecution claim.

     Renda v. King, #01-2421, 347 F.3d 550 (3rd Cir. 2003).

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Arrest of a 12-year-old girl for eating a french fry in a D.C. rail transit station in violation of a rule prohibiting eating and drinking there did not violate her rights. Federal trial court rejects "equal protection" attack on alleged policy of mandatory arrest for juveniles violating the rule in lieu of issuing citations that might have been issued to an adult violating the rule. "Zero tolerance" rule towards juvenile violators of the rule was rationally related to rehabilitating delinquent juveniles and notifying and involving their parents in the process.

     A 12-year-old girl was arrested for eating a french fry in a rail transit station in the District of Columbia, in violation of a rule prohibiting eating there. Her mother filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that this violated the girl's right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as constituting a violation of equal protection, since it was argued that an adult might have instead been issued a citation. Under District of Columbia law, according to the plaintiff, juveniles could not be issued a citation instead of being arrested for violating a statute making it unlawful to consume food or drink in rail stations owned by the metropolitan transit authority.

     The transit authority itself had allegedly adopted a "zero tolerance" policy towards violations of this rule by juveniles.

     A federal trial court rejected the plaintiff's arguments and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that the policy of not issuing citations to juveniles and taking a "zero tolerance" approach to their violations of the no eating or drinking rule was rationally related to an interest in effectively enforcing the law and rehabilitating juvenile delinquents, as well as notifying and involving parents in rehabilitation measures.

     The trial court also noted, in addressing the purported equal protection claim, that there was no indicating that the policy was in any way motivated by animosity towards children. Additionally, no "fundamental right" of the juvenile was involved. Policies providing for mandatory arrest for particular offenses, the court found, are not in and of themselves unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, and the arrest of the juvenile, in this case was supported by probable cause.

     Hedgepeth v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 145 (D.D.C. 2003).

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Whether or not police officers initially decided to stop a motorist on the basis of impermissible "racial profiling," once he refused to stop, they had probable cause to seek to stop him and arrest him for the crime of fleeing, and they were therefore entitled to qualified immunity from liability for the death of a vehicle occupant caused by a collision with the pursued car and injuries to another occupant of that vehicle.

     A motorist fleeing from Minneapolis police officers ran a stop sign at high speed and then struck a car in an intersection, seriously injuring one occupant and killing a second. The injured motorist and the estate of the decedent filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the officers and the city, asserting claims for substantive due process and conspiracy claims. They argued, among other things, that the officers were pursuing the vehicle on the basis of improper "racial profiling."

     The trial court denied the officers qualified immunity but a federal appeals court reversed.

     The appeals court rejected the argument of the plaintiffs and the trial court that the officers would be guilty of "conscience-shocking misconduct" if a jury found that they attempted to stop the pursued motorist based upon his race without probable cause or reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. The appeals court found that this "theory is fatally flawed."

     The plaintiffs, the court ruled, lacked standing to assert a federal equal protection claim based on their racial profiling allegation. Similarly, only the pursued motorist had standing to raise the Fourth Amendment issue of whether the attempted stop was constitutionally reasonable. The injured motorist and the decedent were injured because the pursued motorist did not stop but fled at high speed, the court reasoned.

     When the motorist refused to stop, he committed a traffic violation, and arguably a felony under Minnesota law, knowingly fleeing a police officer "acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty." At that point, the officers "clearly" had probable cause to pursue and the subsequent injuries to the plaintiffs resulted from this "criminal flight," rather than from their initial decision to stop the motorist, whatever its motivation. As a result, these injuries were "simply too remote a consequence to permit the imposition of substantive due process liability based upon the officers' initial decision to stop" the motorist.

     The qualified immunity analysis, therefore, revolved around whether the officers were entitled to such immunity for their pursuit of the motorist after he refused to stop. In Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), the appeals court noted, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender," only a "purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit subsequently ruled that this "intent-to-harm" standard in Lewis applied to all Sec. 1983 substantive due process claims based upon the conduct of public officials engaged in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender. Helseth v. Burch, 258 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1115 (2002).

     The appeals court found no such intent to harm here. When the pursued motorist refused to stop after the officers activated their emergency lights, they had probable cause to arrest him for committing a felony in their presence, regardless of the initial reasons for the attempted stop.

Thus, the pursuit was "aimed at apprehending a suspected offender" and did not objectively evidence "a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest."

     As for the plaintiff's "conspiracy claim," the court noted that in the absence of an underlying constitutional violation, "there is no actionable conspiracy claim."

     Slusarchuk v. Hoff, No. 02-3601, 346 F.3d 1178 (8th Cir. 2003).

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Differences in officer's version of incident in charges filed after arrest and in affidavit filed in civil rights lawsuit, along with other circumstances, such as his unexplained accusation that arrestee was "on crack," provided an adequate basis for motorist to proceed with his claim that he was targeted for a traffic stop and arrest on the basis of his African-American race.

     A New Mexico police officer stopped an African-American motorist for an alleged traffic violation and administered field sobriety tests, following which he took him to a local hospital for a blood test. The motorist subsequently filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that the traffic stop and arrest were made on account of his race and without probable cause, and that the coerced blood test violated his Fourth Amendment rights and state law.

     The officer later claimed in criminal charges that the motorist failed to stop at a stop sign, and then sped away at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour when he activated his emergency lights, drove through a four way stop sign, and weaved from lane to lane. The motorist denied this, although he did say that he evaded the officer for several miles when asked to stop because he was fearful to stop his vehicle outside of the presence of witnesses because of an alleged reputation of the local police department for "racist practices," and that he came to stop in front of his residence. The officer did not mention the alleged 100 mile per hour chase, however, in the affidavit filed in the federal civil rights case concerning the incident.

     The motorist admitted to having had one alcoholic drink, but denied being drunk, and the officer allegedly accused him of being a crack cocaine user. At the hospital, while waiting for the blood test, the officer allegedly interrogated the handcuffed motorist for twenty minutes, again accusing him of being on crack. The motorist told medical personnel that they did not have his consent to take his blood, but that he would not resist, and an officer told the nurse to go ahead and take the blood. The officer filled out the consent form, listing "refused to sign. gave verbal consent," according to the plaintiff. The blood test came back negative for alcohol or other illegal drugs, but revealed the presence of THC, the active ingredient in marijuana, in the motorist's bloodstream.

     Charges in the case, including possession of marijuana, resisting an officer, possession of a firearm while intoxicated, reckless driving, and running a stop sign were all subsequently dropped because the evidence in the case was suppressed.

     The motorist's civil rights lawsuit asserted claims also against the police chief for negligent hiring, training and supervision of the officer, and against the city for a policy of deliberate indifference to civil rights violations.

     The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and a federal appeals court reversed in part.

     The appeals court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact presented by the plaintiff as to whether he was targeted for a pretextual traffic stop and arrest on the basis of his African-American race, even if there would have otherwise been probable cause for the arrest, based on the motorist's admitted failure to stop when ordered to do so.

     The appeals court noted that the motorist testified that he did not fail to stop at the first stop sign or commit any other traffic violation in the officer's presence before being ordered to stop. The motorist also stated, and the officer did not contradict his statement, that the officer made eye contact with him while stopped at an intersection prior to activating his emergency race, from which the court found "it might reasonably be inferred" that the officer was ascertaining the motorist's race. The defendants, the court noted, provided no evidence that would supply a nondiscriminatory explanation for this behavior.

     The court also pointed to the alleged fact that the "first words" out of the officer's mouth when he confronted the motorist after the stop were a "cryptic accusation" that he was on crack. The officer then allegedly reiterated this accusation during interrogation at the station house and at the hospital, and neither the officer nor any other witness to the events denied that these exchanges took place or dispute the motorist's description of their content. The defendants also failed to offer any evidence to explain why the officer "made the accusations."

     In the context of the case as a whole, the appeals court found, a jury might reasonably infer from these exchanges that the officer was acting "on the basis of stereotype or prejudice rather than evidence." The record also showed that on the citation form, in the space designated for the gender of the driver, the officer wrote "B/M" for "black male," making a racial designation where none was called for. While the court acknowledged that this might reflect "unwritten police policy" or have "some other nondiscriminatory explanation," none of the defendants in the case offered any explanation.

A jury might also think it significant--at least as it bears on Officer Porter's credibility-that the officer wrote on the original criminal complaint that Mr. Marshall [the motorist] accelerated to 100 miles per hour, drove through a four-way stop, and weaved from lane to lane, but later made no mention of these remarkable corroborating facts in his sworn affidavit in this case about what happened that day.

     Taken together, the court found, there was sufficient, although disputed, evidence to require that the defendants go to trial on the allegations of racial discrimination.

     Additionally, as to the officer in question, he had been terminated by another police department for failure "to treat people fairly and equally under the law," although he was then allowed to resign, and there were documents provided by this prior employer's internal investigation providing alleged evidence that in more than thirty cases, the officer had falsely charged arrestees with possession of narcotics, seriously mishandled narcotics evidence, or both. He was also accused in other cases of planting evidence on arrestees and using evidence to barter for sexual favors, denying these charges until after failing a polygraph test, when he admitted mishandling evidence. The plaintiff argued that the defendants in the overwhelming number of cases in which this officer had not logged in drug evidence were black, and that virtually all of them were supposedly stopped for minor traffic violations such as seat belts, failing to signal a turn, etc.

     The officer was also allegedly the defendant in several other lawsuits alleging civil rights violations against African-Americans in his current jurisdiction and was accused in a newspaper article of making an allegedly racially motivated arrest at a high school football game which resulted in a riot.

     The appeals court also found that the warrantless administration of the blood test on the driver was not justified by exigent circumstances under New Mexico state law and that there were disputed issues of fact as to whether the motorist actually consented to the blood test.

     Finally, based on the officer's prior record, the appeals court also found that there were genuine issues as to whether the police chief had acted negligently in hiring, training, and supervising the officer, and whether the city had an official policy or custom of deliberate indifference to civil rights violations by its officers.

     The appeals court upheld, however, summary judgment for the hospital and medical personnel arising out of the allegedly unlawful warrantless blood test, since they acted "at the behest" of the police and not on their own.

     Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hospital, #02-2184, 345 F.3d 1157 (10th Cir. 2003).

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Even if officers did forcibly enter a home without a warrant, this was not a Fourth Amendment violation when the entry was explicitly authorized by the conservator of the homeowner's estate after the homeowner was found incompetent and removed by a state agency. Officers, in entering and responding to resident daughter's objection to the removal of her father's property and documents, also did not act in a manner justifying an award of damages for emotional distress under Connecticut state law.

     After a woman's father was found to be incompetent and he was removed from the home he owned (where he resided with his daughter) by a state social agency, the conservators of his estate and person authorized entry into the house to retrieve and remove some of his belongings. His daughter, who was present at the time, objected to the entry of one of the conservators and the police officers accompanying her, and also allegedly attempted to interfere with or object to the removal of certain items of property and documents.

     She subsequently alleged, in a federal civil rights lawsuit, that the officers had engaged in an illegal search and seizure in entering the home, allegedly forcibly, and had used excessive force against her. She also asserted various state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress or negligent infliction of emotional distress, and claimed that the officers' actions had exposed portions of her body to third parties present.

     A federal trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant officers, finding them entitled to qualified immunity. Whether the officers entered the home forcibly, as the plaintiff claimed, or only after she opened the door to them, as they asserted, was not actually relevant. The officers alleged forced entry into the residence without a warrant was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures because the entry was explicitly authorized by the father's conservators--and the father both owned the home and had, until just then, resided there.

     The court also found that the plaintiff did not show that the officers' actions created emotional distress severe enough under Connecticut state law to justify an award of damages, and further found that their conduct, even if as the plaintiff asserted, was not so extreme and outrageous as to exceed "all bounds" usually tolerated by "decent society." The alleged "exposure" of the plaintiff's body supposedly resulted after an officer, responding to her alleged interference with the removal of her father's documents, grabbed her by the upper arms, which caused her to "pass out for a bit," and when she came to, she had "slumped down" while her shirt was pulled up, exposing her breast to plain view.

     Finally, the appeals court found that the trial court was correct in finding that there could be no issue of punitive damages in the case, since there was no evidence that the officers were motivated by "evil motive or intent" or by "reckless or callous indifference" to the plaintiff's rights in acting as they did.

     Ehrlich v. Town of Glastonbury, No. 02-7839, 348 F.3d 48 (2nd Cir. 2003).

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Officers had probable caused to arrest the driver for obstruction of traffic and search the vehicle when he was found "asleep" at the wheel of his car in the street at an intersection during rush hour. There was no violation in arresting him for both obstruction of traffic and possession of a controlled substance even if they didn't know what the powdery substance found in the vehicle was.

Two officers encountered a man who appeared to be either asleep at the wheel or passed out at a light in his vehicle, blocking traffic. His head was down, the gear of the car was in "drive," and his foot was on the brake. The window was open and the driver did not respond to the officers' verbal attempts to wake him. One of them then reached in through the open window, shifted the gear into "park," and tried to wake the driver by shaking him. He allegedly did not wake up entirely, but kept waking up and then nodding off to sleep again.

The officers asked the man to get out of his vehicle and escorted him to the rear of the car, where they observed that his speech was "slurred" and that they could not understand what he was saying. One of the officers observed a backpack in the passenger compartment of the vehicle. It was disputed later whether the backpack was open or closed. The officer later testified that he saw a clear "Ziplock" bag sticking out more than halfway from inside the backpack. Inside was a white powdery substance. The officers removed the backpack from the car. Further inside it, the officer discovered a brown bottle labeled in Spanish, which did not show prescription information, such as a doctor's name or a pharmacy.

The officers handcuffed the motorist, put him in their squad car and took him to the station, where he was charged with obstruction of traffic, possession of a controlled substance, and forging or altering a prescription. He was subsequently given supervision and a fifty-dollar fine on the obstruction of traffic charge, and the other two charges were dismissed due to a negative lab result on the powdery substance.

The motorist filed a federal civil rights lawsuit contending that the officers searched his vehicle and backpack without probable cause, a warrant or other lawful justification, and also that they arrested him without a warrant and without probable cause for possession of a controlled substance and for the forging or alteration of a prescription. The trial court found that the officers had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest under the circumstances. It also found that evidence relating to the driver's alleged treatment for Hodgkin's disease was not relevant to the issue of whether the officers had probable cause to arrest him at the time they did so, and was therefore to be excluded. Additionally, the issue of whether Cynomel, Cytomel, and Synthroid were controlled substances was irrelevant to the probable cause inquiry, and therefore any evidence as to whether those substances were controlled substances would be excluded.

The court also held that as long as the officers had probable cause to believe that the driver had committed any offense, including a minor traffic offense of obstructing traffic, they were entitled to arrest him, without violating the Fourth Amendment. The search was also upheld.

     A federal appeals court affirmed this result. It found that the driver was not under custodial arrest at the time of the search, but that the officers had probable cause, under the circumstances, to search the vehicle for possible evidence of an intoxicant, even if the drivers' backpack was closed, which was disputed. The driver was passed out for several minutes at an intersection during rush hour, the court noted, and it was difficult to awaken him even though his window was open and numerous cars were honking at him, and even though an officer verbally tried to wake him, shook him, and reached in and put the vehicle into park.

     When awoken, the driver both appeared impaired, and was seemingly unable to give a coherent explanation for the powder. Subsequent lab tests regarding what the powdery substance was were irrelevant to the issue of what the officer had objectively reasonable grounds to do at the time, as these future tests were not within his knowledge at the time.

     Ochana v. Flores, #02-2227, 347 F.3d 266 (7th Cir. 2003).

   » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet. [PDF]

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County and sheriff were not liable, under either Ohio state law or federal civil rights law, for a deputy's sexual advances made towards a minor girl while off duty, even though he was in uniform and using a county-owned van to transport his daughter and her friends home from a movie. Deputy acted outside of the scope of his employment and did not act "under color" of law.

     A deputy sheriff who was assigned as the county's Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) officer, while off duty, transported his minor daughter and some of her friends home from a movie in a marked D.A.R.E. van while wearing his uniform. After taking most of the girls home, he allegedly was left in the van alone with one minor girl. This girl later stated that he took her to a secluded spot, made sexual advances towards her, and inappropriately touched her. He pled guilty to a criminal charge of gross sexual imposition.

     A lawsuit was subsequently filed on behalf of the minor against the deputy, the county, its sheriff, and a number of other defendants, asserting both state law claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress and a federal civil rights law claim. The lawsuit also claimed that the county and a number of other defendants were liable for damages on the basis of vicarious liability for the deputy's actions and their alleged negligence in the hiring, training, and supervision of the deputy.

     The trial court ruled that the other defendants were not vicariously liable for the deputy's actions, as he acted outside the scope of his employment, and that he had not acted under color of law as required for federal civil rights liability. A default judgment for $40,000 in compensatory and punitive damages was entered against the deputy, who did not appear for trial.

     An intermediate Ohio appeals court upheld the result against the plaintiff's appeal on the issue of the liability of the county, its sheriff, and other governmental defendants. The deputy's actions were not within the scope of his employment or designed to benefit his employer in any way, and he was not on duty at the time.

     The court also noted that the plaintiff had failed to show that the deputy acted under color of state law when he made sexual advances towards her or that the county or sheriff were aware of or condoned this behavior. The mere fact that the deputy was in uniform and using a van owned by the county did not alter the result.

     Ramey v. Mudd, No. 02CA14, 798 N.E.2d 57 (Ohio App. 2003).

     » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet. (Microsoft Word .Doc format).

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Administrative Liability: Training

     Genuine factual issues as to whether mayor and police commissioner adopted proper regulations regarding the use of firearms and whether officers were properly trained on those regulations barred summary judgment on lawsuit against them by arrestee who was shot twice while running away from parking ramp while allegedly unarmed. Whitfield v. Municipality of Fajardo, 279 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. Puerto Rico 2003).

     The manner in which a city trained its police officers did not show deliberate indifference which could support a municipal liability claim by a woman arrested for public intoxication who claimed that officers were not adequately trained to tell the difference between intoxication and panic disorders or certain physical infirmities. There was no showing that the plaintiff's arrest was the result of the city's alleged policies or inadequate police training. Newell v. City of Salina, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (D. Kan. 2003).

Assault and Battery: Physical

     Videotaped footage of incident was sufficient to confirm police officers' testimony and contradict enough of the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses to entitle defendant police officers to summary judgment on lawsuit claiming that they improperly used excessive force which resulted in store patron's injuries and death. Videotape which showed other store patrons walking calmly by at the time plaintiff's witnesses claimed officers were beating decedent in store aisle indicated that there was not actually an altercation going on when and where the plaintiff's witnesses testified. Stewart v. Prince George's County, Maryland, #02-2071, 75 Fed. Appx. 198 (4th Cir. 2003). [PDF]

Bankruptcy: Defense and Procedural Issues

     A plaintiff acting as her own attorney claimed that police officers had improperly beaten her without justification, but a bankruptcy trustee was substituted for her as the real party in interest after she filed bankruptcy. She subsequently failed to file answers to requests for admissions in the case, because she believed that the trustee had submitted the requested information, but the trustee had not. Summary judgment was later granted because the unanswered requests were deemed admissions. The Supreme Court of Alaska held that the plaintiff, now substituted back in following the withdrawal of the trustee, should be allowed to withdraw the admissions, reinstating the case. Genaro v. Municipality of Anchorage, No. S-10681, 76 P.3d 844 (Alaska 2003).

Defenses: Absolute Immunity

     Prosecutors who advised a deputy sheriff that he could make an arrest for "attempted solicitation of murder," despite the fact that no such crime existed under Washington state law, were not entitled to absolute immunity from liability, since prosecutorial immunity does not apply to the function of providing legal advice to the police, but individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The arrest ultimately violated no constitutional rights because the same conduct supplied probable cause to arrest the plaintiff on a charge of felony harassment. Dillberg v. County of Kitsap, No. 02-35565, 76 Fed. Appx. 792 (9th Cir. 2003).

Defenses: Governmental Immunity

     County could not be held liable under Tennessee state law for a deputy's alleged use of excessive force in carrying out an arrest. The plaintiff's "negligence" claims were actually claims for intentional wrongful conduct for which a county has governmental immunity under the state's Governmental Tort Liability Act, T.C.A. Sec. 29-20-205(2). Brooks v. Sevier County, 279 F. Supp. 2d 954 (E.D. Tenn. 2003).

Defenses: Issue Preclusion

     An arrestee was precluded from pursuing a state court lawsuit against a city and its police officers claiming harassment and excessive use of force where he had previously filed a federal lawsuit against the city raising the same claims based on the same facts and circumstances, which the federal court found to be frivolous. Black v. City of Tupelo, No. 2002-CA-01919-SCT, 853 So. 2d 1221 (Miss. 2003). [PDF]

Defenses: Official Immunity

     Police officer was acting in good faith in performing normal law enforcement duties in ticketing motorist in no-parking zone and in accompanying "belligerent" motorist to his home to retrieve his license, entitling him to official immunity from liability for alleged negligently caused injury to motorist's wrist. Motorist fell when officer pushed house door when motorist attempted to close it with officer in the way. Cherqui v. Westheimer Street Festival Corp., No. 14-02-00731-CV, 116 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. App. 2003).

     Negligence claim against deputy sheriff arising out of motor vehicle accident could not be dismissed on the basis of official immunity when there was evidence from which the plaintiff motorist could possibly show that at the time of the incident the deputy was engaged in a personal errand or otherwise had departed from the scope of his official duty. Ex parte Haralson, No. 1012071, 853 So. 2d 928 (Ala. 2003).

False Arrest/Imprisonment: No Warrant

     Probable cause existed to arrest store customer for disorderly conduct when he repeatedly attempted to devise a way to "thwart" store's policy granting only store credit for returned merchandise and refused store manager's request to leave the property and police officers' orders to move away. Epstein v. Toys-R-Us Delaware, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (S.D. Fla. 2003).

     Report prepared by employer's loss prevention executive, detailing his lengthy investigation into suspected employee theft provided police detective with enough information to establish probable cause to arrest employee. Means v. City of Atlanta Police Department, No. A03A1384, 586 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. App. 2003).

Federal Tort Claims Act

     Police officer's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies barred his bringing a lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2675(a) against federal officers seeking emotional distress damages for their alleged failure to protect him from reprisals by targets of an investigation of police corruption. Russo v. Glasser, 279 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D. Conn. 2003).

First Amendment

     Public library's eviction of patron for refusal to wear shoes did not violate his First Amendment rights. Requirement to wear shoes was rationally related to legitimate government interests in protecting public health and safety and protecting public funds against personal injury claims of barefoot patrons. Neinast v. Board of Trustees of Columbus Metropolitan Library, #02-3482, 346 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2003).

Freedom of Information

     Television station was entitled to disclosure of audiotape of minor's 911 call under a Michigan state freedom of information statute, and was a prevailing party entitled to an award of costs, attorneys' fees, and punitive damages for city's refusal to disclose the audiotape. City's actions, based on the belief that the release would interfere with the minor's right to a fair trial in a pending family division court case charging the minor with voluntary manslaughter for shooting his uncle was arbitrary and capricious. Meredith Corp. v. City of Flint, 671 N.W.2d 101 (Mich. App. 2003).

Governmental Liability: Policy/Custom

     African-American hospital patient's alleged unlawful detention by deputy sheriffs for psychiatric evaluation after she purportedly became "unruly" in hospital emergency room while awaiting treatment was not caused by any county policy of inadequate training on "diversity" or "communication skills, barring claims for governmental liability. Harvey v. Alameda County Medical Center, 280 F. Supp. 2d 960 (N.D. Cal. 2003).

Insurance

     Insurer of parked police cruiser assisting motorist with stalled motor vehicle was liable for the payment of no-fault benefits to surviving spouse of motorcyclist and motorcyclist's passenger, after motorcyclist's collision with police car. Police cruiser's status as an emergency vehicle did not bar insurer's liability under Michigan law, and police cruiser was "involved in the accident" as defined in the no-fault statute. Amy v. MIC General Insurance Corp., No. 237055, 670 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. App. 2003). [PDF]

Negligence: Vehicle Related

     Officers who followed stolen vehicle, but were not engaged in pursuit of it, were not liable for injuries to a motorist whose vehicle was struck by the stolen car. Officers' purpose was to provide other officers with information as to the location of the stolen car, and not to actively attempt to apprehend his vehicle, since their unmarked car was not equipped with lights and sirens required to engage in active pursuit. Lalley v. City of Omaha, No. S-02-966, 670 N.W.2d 327 (Neb. 2003).

     Police officer did not act recklessly in striking a motorist's vehicle from behind at a traffic light, even though he was reading a warrant while stopped at the light and was not paying attention to traffic in his lane. The officer acted in reflex in moving his car forward when he saw traffic in the adjacent lane starting to move forward, and he did apply his brake when he looked up and saw the vehicle in front of him was still stationary. Officer and city were therefore immune from liability for the motorist's injuries under Mississippi state law. Joseph v. City of Moss Point, No. 2002-CA-00872-COA, 856 So. 2d 548 (Miss. App. 2003). [PDF]

Parking Tickets & Traffic Offenses

     City's action in imposing late fees for those who do not timely pay parking tickets, even if unauthorized by any municipal ordinance, was not a violation of federally protected civil rights, such as due process. Tickets did provide recipients of the time within which to pay and the amount of the late fee, and the city's action did not involve any fundamental rights or constitute conduct shocking to the court's conscience. Rector v. City and County of Denver, #02-1434, 348 F.3d 935 (10th Cir. 2003).

Police Plaintiff: Vehicle Related

     City was not liable to family of police officer who died from injuries when hit by auto on an open highway. Plaintiff's claim that had the officer had cones and flares in his patrol car, he would have followed proper police procedure and placed his vehicle at a different location, avoiding the injuries, "was speculative." Plaintiff could not use an alleged violation of the department's Patrol Guide as the basis to establish a violation of state labor law for purposes of imposing liability. Forster v. City of New York, 765 N.Y. Supp. 2d 598 (A.D. 1st Dept. 2003).

Public Protection: Crime Victims

     Police officers who failed to arrest a sex offender after he came to a police station to surrender on a bench warrant for parole violation for failing to attend a mandated sex offender treatment class could not be held liable for his subsequent actions of murdering his landlady and raping her thirteen-year-old daughter. While police inaction may have constituted "conscience shocking deliberate indifference," the police did not create or increase the danger posed by the parolee, and his particular victims were not more foreseeable victims than the female public at large. Leidy v. Borough of Glenolden, 277 F. Supp. 2d 547 (E.D. Pa. 2003).

Pursuits: Law Enforcement

     Jury awards $2 million to family of woman killed in collision with vehicle being pursued by police officers. The lawsuit claimed that police policy required that the pursuit stop after the pursued vehicle struck a truck, but there was evidence that the pursuit continued until the subsequent collision occurred when the pursued vehicle crossed the center line in the road, killing the plaintiff's decedent. Santillana v. City of Chicago, No. 00L8327, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, reported in Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, pg. 3 (December 15, 2003).

Racial Discrimination

     Several African-American women subjected to pat-down and strip searches by airport security officers satisfied the requirements for showing discriminatory purpose and effect by presenting evidence of officers' false statements in their incident logs (such as falsely stating that a canine had alerted to the presence of drugs) and that the searching officers conducted intrusive searches on more than twice (and as high as three times) as many African-American women as white women. Anderson v. Cornejo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2003).

Search and Seizure: Home/Business

     Municipal building inspector was not entitled to qualified immunity in lawsuit objecting to his numerous warrantless entries in lessees' offices when there was evidence that his actions were motivated by an intent to harass or unfairly target them because of their political association with the mayor. Mimics, Inc. v. The Village of Angel Fire, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (D.N.M. 2003).

     Police officers were entitled to summary judgment on unlawful search claims when they entered an apartment while executing a valid search warrant. Confidential informant's error in mistakenly identifying plaintiff's apartment number rather than the correct apartment number next door did not alter the result. Hellmann v. Gugliotti, 279 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Conn. 2003).

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       AELE's list of recently-noted civil liability law resources.

     Conference: 5th Annual National Conference on Science and the Law March 14-17, 2004 Tampa, Florida. For more information: http://www.ilj.org/wvu What are the emerging trends in the use of scientific evidence in the courtroom? This conference has two primary goals: (1) improve the understanding between scientists, attorneys, and judges; and (2) identify and develop questions for future research surrounding science and scientists in the criminal justice system. Cosponsored by the American Bar Association; American Academy of Forensic Sciences; National Center for State Courts; the National Clearinghouse on Science, Technology and the Law at Stetson University College of Law. In collaboration with the National Academies, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the Federal Judicial Center.

     Publication: "Building a 3-1-1 System for Non-Emergency Calls: A Case Study of the City of Austin Police Department." [PDF] U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). This case study documents the 311 system implementation process of Austin Police Department. The Austin Police Department was awarded funding under the 311 Technical Assistance for Start-Ups Program (FY’00) to implement a 311 system and document the implementation process. This case study describes the challenges the department encountered and strategies it used to set up the 311 system, and provides lessons learned for other agencies wishing to develop similar systems. Readers of this document are also recommended to read The Law Enforcement Tech Guide: How to plan, purchase and manage technology (successfully!).

     Publication: Federal-Local Law Enforcement Collaboration in Investigating and Prosecuting Urban Crime, 1982–1999: Drugs, Weapons, and Gangs, by Malcolm Russell-Einhorn, Shawn Ward, and Amy Seeherman. Research Report for the National Institute of Justice. 1/2004, NCJ 201782. 210 pages. [PDF]

     Publication: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Reference Guide, U.S. Department of Justice. (Updated November 2003).

     Publication: "How to Correctly Collect and Analyze Racial Profiling Data -- Your Reputation Depends On It!" (158 pgs., 532K) – [PDF]. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) 5/23/2003. This publication is the result of a COPS-funded project conducted by the CNA Corporation (CNAC) to help law enforcement agencies collect and analyze data. As part of this project, CNAC worked with the Baltimore (MD) Police Department, the Phoenix (AZ) Police Department, the Chattanooga (TN) Police Department, and the St. Paul (MN) Police Department, all of which are highlighted in the document along with the Oakland (CA) Police Department.

     Publication: State Legislative Approaches to Funding for Victims' Services. (December 2003) [PDF] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office for Victims of Crime. Discusses alternatives such as offender-based funding, funding through fees, state-facilitated funding by private citizens, and miscellaneous approaches including specialized taxes, special license plates, and sale of inmate arts and crafts.

     Publication: The Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security. Prevention and Deterrence. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness. June 2003. 31 pgs. [PDF].

     Publication: "Police Use of Force: Addressing Community Racial Tensions," by the U.S. Department of Justice Community Relations Service. (September 2003). [PDF] [Microsoft Word .Doc] [HTML]

     Publication: Resource Guide: 2004 National Crime Victims' Week: April 18-24, 2004. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office for Victims of Crime. Full guide also available in .PDF format (1.3 Megabyte file). Contents include victimization statistics, sample Public Service Announcements (PSAs) and speeches, special event ideas, contest guidelines, National Crime Victim Rights Week highlights on DVD, and camera-ready art files. To obtain the DVD and a CD with the camera-ready art, use the NCJRS Online Ordering System. Ask for NCJ 202045. (Free, but shipping may apply).

     Publication: "Responding to Incidents Involving Allegations of Excessive Use of Force: A Checklist to Guide Police Executives," by the U.S. Department of Justice Community Relations Service. (September 2003). [PDF] [WordPerfect] [HTML]

     Reports: The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information. Report Number 04-10 (December 2003). Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice. (HTML format; also available in PDF format).

     Reports: Top Management Challenges Facing the U.S. Department of Justice. (Nov. 5, 2003). An annual memorandum by the Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice.

     Statistics: "Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2000" Bureau of Justice Statistics. Presents data collected from a representative sample of felony cases filed in 40 of the Nation's 75 largest counties during May 2000. The cases are tracked for up to one year to provide a complete overview of the processing of felony defendants. Data collected includes current arrest charges, demographic characteristics, prior arrests and convictions, criminal justice status at arrest, type of pretrial release or detention, bail amount, court appearance record, adjudication outcome, and sentence received if convicted. This periodic report is published every two years. Highlights include the following: Since 1990, the proportion of defendants charged with a violent offense has remained at about a fourth. Thirty-eight percent of all defendants were detained until court disposed of their case, including 7% who were denied bail. At the time of arrest, 35% of defendants had an active criminal justice status such as probation (14%), release pending disposition of a prior case (13%) or parole (6%). 12/03 NCJ 202021 Acrobat file [PDF] (335K) | ASCII file (40K) | Spreadsheets (zip format 63K)

     Statistics: Lauritsen, J.,. "How Families and Communities Influence Youth Victimization." 12 pgs. [PDF] Bulletin. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Released: December 15, 2003. Examines how individual, family, and community factors influence the risk for nonlethal violence among U.S. youth ages 12–17. Drawing on data from a special release of the National Crime Victimization Survey, this Juvenile Justice Bulletin studies risk factors among youth of different racial and ethnic groups and analyzes which risk factors are the most significant for understanding violent victimization. By examining the connection between such factors and the risk for violent victimization, the Bulletin shows that disadvantaged communities with high proportions of young people and single-parent families experience the greatest difficulty in protecting youth from victimization.

     Reference:

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted civil liability law resources.