FEATURED CASES

WITH LINKS TO THE OPINIONS

Prisoner could pursue claim that the failure to forward his legal mail to another facility violated his right of access to the courts when it prevented him from responding to a motion for summary judgment in a pending lawsuit. Prisoner did not have to show that he necessarily would have prevailed on that motion had he been able to respond, merely that he was "hindered" from pursuing a non-frivolous claim.

     A Kansas prisoner filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that his right of access to the courts was violated after he was temporarily transferred to another facility in Colorado and his legal mail, concerning a prior civil rights lawsuit concerning jail conditions, was allegedly held at the original facility rather than being forwarded to him.

     The federal trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant correctional officials on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to show than an injury resulted from his belated receipt of the mail and that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because they had not acted "intentionally or maliciously." A federal appeals court reversed, overturning the summary judgment.

     The appeals court found that the evidence in the case showed that correctional employees did not act "negligently," but rather deliberately, in failing to forward the prisoner's legal mail. A mailroom supervisor indicated that while such mail was forwarded to inmates transferred to other facilities within Kansas, this was not done for inmates transferred out of state to attend court. The evidence therefore showed that the supervisor intentionally held the plaintiff's mail for over a year in violation of the prison's own regulations.

That course of action is not mere negligence; rather, it is intentional conduct violating plaintiff's right of access to the courts.

     The appeals court also found that the principle of "unimpeded transmission of inmate legal mail" is the "most obvious and formal manifestation" of the right of access to the courts, so that the right to receive such mail was "clearly established." Since the prisoner alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, the entry of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity was erroneous, the appeals court concluded.

     Under Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), the appeals court acknowledged, the prisoner, to show a viable claim entitling him to relief for violation of his right of access to the courts, must demonstrate that the non-delivery of his legal mail resulted in "actual injury" by "frustrating," "impeding," or "hindering" his efforts to pursue a legal claim.

     In this case, the appeals court found, the non-delivery of the legal mail resulted in the prisoner not receiving a motion for summary judgment in his previous federal civil rights lawsuit. Since he did not respond to that motion, this resulted in the admission of the defendants' version of the facts in that prior case, the prisoner's inability to argue the legal issues, and the loss of an opportunity to appeal, so that this case "presents a compelling example of an impediment or hindrance demonstrating actual injury under Lewis."

     The appeals court rejected the trial court's reasoning, which suggested that the prisoner had to show that, had he received a copy of the motion for summary judgment in the prior case, he would have "filed a meritorious response," so that the failure to forward his mail caused him to lose the case.

Contrary to the district court's analysis, Lewis does not suggest that the plaintiff must prove a case within a case to show that the claim hindered or impeded by the defendant necessarily would have prevailed. The Court took pains to explain that "depriving someone of an arguable (though not yet established) claim inflicts actual injury," Moreover, the Court explained that cognizable harm arises not only when a claim is lost or rejected on account of the defendant's misconduct, but also when the plaintiff's efforts to pursue a claim are impeded. Consistent with these points, a plaintiff need not show that a claim with which a defendant interfered would have prevailed, but only that it was not frivolous.

     In the underlying prior case, there was no indication that the court had ever considered that case frivolous.

     For these reasons, the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, and the prisoner had a basis to pursue his claim for violation of his right of access to the courts because of the non-forwarding of his legal mail.

     Simkins v. Bruce, No. 04-3072, 406 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2005).

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet.

     •Return to the Contents menu.

Jury was properly instructed that county could not be held liable for alleged injuries prisoner suffered from not receiving prescription medicine unless he could show that the county had a wide-spread policy or custom of failing to pre-approve detainees' prescriptions for administration before they reported for incarceration at the jail.

     An Illinois prisoner sued the County Sheriff and a private company that contracted with the county to provide medical care to inmates in the county jail, claiming that he suffered injuries because the jail's medical policy made no provision for advance verification of a detainee's medications. This omission in the jail's policy, the plaintiff claimed, amounted to deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

     A federal appeals court upheld a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, rejecting the prisoner's arguments that the jury was provided with improper instructions on the issue of municipal liability.

     The plaintiff had been sentenced to serve evenings and weekends at the county jail to satisfy a 120-day sentence for a motor vehicle violation. Prior to reporting to the jail, he contacted the jail to attempt to obtain pre-incarceration approval of his medication, because of a jail policy requiring that medication prescribed to inmates prior to incarceration must be verified and approved by the jail's medical director before it can be administered. He hoped to complete these administrative steps before he actually reported for incarceration.

     His efforts to do so, however, were "rebuffed," and jail personnel told him to just make arrangements when he checked in. When he did so, he handed an officer in the jail's booking area with a bag containing eight prescription medications that he was taking and told the officer that he had to take some of them that night, the Diazepam and Trazodone, and to take the others in the morning. A nurse discussed this with him, and took the medications with her so that she could obtain authorization to administer them.

     Later that evening, a psychiatrist authorized the administration of the Trazodone. The prisoner subsequently needed medical attention, and showed elevated blood pressure, and was taken to a hospital for treatment in an emergency room.

     The plaintiff argued that it was improper for the jury in his subsequent lawsuit to have been instructed that liability on the part of the county required evidence that the circumstances he endured were not an isolated incident, but had been caused by a "wide-spread policy or practice that was so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law."

     The appeals court rejected this argument. This was not a case where an "express policy" explicitly violated a constitutional right when enforced. For example, if the county jail had a policy that directed the sheriff's personnel to "throw away all prescription medications brought in by detainees or prisoners without even reading the label and without making alternative provisions for the affected individuals, the County would be liable assuming that such a policy would, on its face, violate the Eighth Amendment (or the Due Process clause, for pre-trial detainees)." In such instances, even one application of the offensive policy resulting in a constitutional violation would be sufficient to establish municipal liability.

     In the immediate case, however, the prisoner was essentially complaining to "omissions in the policy" that allegedly caused a deprivation of his constitutional rights.

     Evidence must be provided, the appeals court noted, that there was a "true municipal policy at issue," rather than a "random event."

     In the circumstances of the case, the appeals court had no trouble concluding that there was nothing wrong with the jury instructions.

     The prisoner could not point to any language in the jail's policy that was constitutionally suspect, so that he was required to provide enough evidence of "custom and practice" to permit an inference that the county had chosen an impermissible way of operating. The prisoner, having in fact argued that the jail had a "practice of refusing" to pre-verify medication, could not turn around and argue that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on a "custom or usage theory." The county could not be held liable on the basis of the single incident alone, if there was no evidence of such a widespread custom.

     Calhoun v. Ramsey, No. 03-3036, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 8694 (7th Cir.).

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet. [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents menu.

Two officers were not entitled to summary judgment on claim of deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of insulin-dependent diabetic prisoner when they allegedly had knowledge of her condition. Prisoner failed to show, however, that the city had a custom of denying medical treatment to pre-arraignment detainees.

     A woman arrest on charges of retail fraud informed officers during the booking process that she was an insulin-dependent diabetic and would need insulin that night. She claimed that she was denied her insulin and was subsequently hospitalized for diabetic ketoacidosis. She sued the city, its police department, and a number of officers for alleged deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs.

     She claimed that the city had an unwritten custom of not providing medical attention to pre-trial detainees prior to arraignment--a policy or custom of "inaction."

     The appeals court, however, found no evidence that the city or police department had a custom of denying medical treatment to pre-arraignment detainees, or that they had notice of a "clear and persistent pattern" of such treatment demonstrating the existence of a policy of inaction. The city and its police department, therefore, were properly granted summary judgment, according to the appeals court.

     As to the individual officers, the court noted that several of them had no knowledge of the plaintiff's diabetic condition, and therefore could not be found to have acted with deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs. The prisoner alleged, however, that she informed two other officers that she required insulin for her condition and that she was past due for her current dose. If true, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the two officers acted with deliberate indifference in failing to take steps to provide her with the medication. If they knew that she was an insulin-dependent diabetic who was past due for treatment and denied her insulin by either not seeking medical help for her or failing to transfer her to a location where she could receive treatment, they would have violated clearly established law, according to the appeals court. These two officers, therefore, were not entitled to summary judgment.

     Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, No. 04-1046 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 7164 (6th Cir.).

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet. [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents menu.

County, correctional officers, and on-call physician were not deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs of detainee who died of a brain tumor.

     The sister of a pre-trial detainee who died of a brain tumor while in a county correctional facility in Calhoun County, Michigan filed a wrongful death and federal civil rights lawsuit against the county and a number of individual corrections officers. The complaint alleges that the county's policies concerning the provision of medical care to inmates and the training of facility staff members were deliberately indifferent and grossly negligent with respect to inmates' serious medical needs, and that the individual officers had been deliberately indifferent to the decedent's serious medical conditions in the days and hours leading up to his death.

     A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the defendants.

      During the booking process, the detainee indicated that he had sustained a head injury approximately one month earlier, but did not disclose any further details of his injury, and even reported that the injury was not causing him any problems at that time. The prisoner later reported headache and pain, and received non-prescription pain medication.

     When the prisoner experienced further difficulties, falling out of bed and being found lying face-up on the floor of the cell and unresponsive, officers placed him in a wheelchair and transported him to the prisoner intake area for observation. They contacted the on-call physician for the facility, and advised him that the detainee had fallen, was initially unresponsive to questioning, but had later spoken responsively and coherently, and had earlier complained of a headache behind his right eye. The doctor was also told that the detainee had reported sustaining a past head injury.

       The doctor suggested that the detainee be monitored on a half-hourly basis and said that the medical staff would see him in the morning. The officers found him to be responsive and coherent, they gave him a blood sugar test and confirmed a normal reading, and after three hours of observation, he was observed masturbating.

     In the morning, however, he appeared to be having a seizure, and he was transported to a local hospital's emergency room, where he was comatose when he arrived. He subsequently died, with the cause of death found to be a "primary brain tumor--astrocytoma."

     The appeals court upheld summary judgment for the county and its officers, finding no evidence of deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of detainees. The county had policies and procedures in place requiring officers to contact a doctor in the event of a medical emergency, and those procedures were followed during the decedent's period of incarceration.

     All of the officers at the facility received at least basic training in first aid and CPR, and there was no evidence that their training was inadequate. In summary, there was no showing of deliberate indifference by the county.

     The appeals court rejected the argument that the on-call physician was a county "policymaker." There is a difference between policymaking, the court reasoned, and the "mere authority to exercise discretion." Only the former, the court stated, confers civil rights liability on a municipality.

     There was no evidence that the on-call physician had the authority to "set broad goals with respect to the medical treatment" of inmates at the facility. Rather, he was only under contract to provide on-site services for approximately eight hours per week, and to be on call. His deposition testimony did not reveal, the court commented "a single instance" in which he set or influenced medical policy at the facility, so that it was clear that de facto policymaking authority resided with the sheriff, not with the doctor.

     As to the doctor, in his role as on-call physician, there was no evidence that he had provided grossly inadequate medical care based on the facts supplied to him by the facility staff over the telephone. There was a lack of evidence that the doctor in fact knew the prisoner's true medical condition and chose to ignore a substantial risk of serious harm.

     Nor did the individual officers act with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's condition. Instead, they attempted to take steps to assist him, and consulted with the facility's on-call doctor.

     Miller v Calhoun County, No. 03-2434, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 9716 (6th Cir.).

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet. [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents menu.

Michigan law allowing prosecutors and crime victims to file appeals from decisions granting prisoners parole did not violate an inmate's right to equal protection, despite the fact that prisoners were not granted any equivalent right to appeal from denials of parole.

     A Michigan statute passed in 1999 allows prosecutors and crime victims to file appeals in state court from decisions of the state parole board granting inmates parole, but does not provide any equivalent right of appeal to prisoners who are denied parole. A Michigan prisoner claimed that this difference violated his right to equal protection of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

     A federal appeals court has upheld a trial court decision rejecting the prisoner's argument.

     The prisoner, who was imprisoned for drug offenses after previously serving time for unarmed robbery, was denied parole after the parole board concluded that it lacked "reasonable assurance that the prisoner will not become a menace to society or to the public safety." He claimed that the fact that he, unlike state prosecutors and crime victims, could not avail himself of state court remedies to appeal the denial, violated his right to equal protection.

     The appeals court held that, even if prisoners were assumed to be "similarly situated" with prosecutors and crime victims, since all three could be "aggrieved" by decisions of the parole board, prisoners are not a "suspect class" for purposes of equal protection, and there is no "fundamental right" to parole under the federal constitution.

     Given that, the difference in treatment of prisoners from prosecutors and crime victims in terms of ability to appeal from a parole board decision could be upheld as long as there was a rational basis for the distinction in treatment.

     The legislature could rationally conclude that the difference in treatment was justified by a legitimate goal of deterring frivolous prisoner lawsuits, the court stated, noting that in previously allowed appeals in Michigan, only 4% of 3,800 prisoner appeals resulted in a remand by state courts to the parole board for reconsideration, and only 0.6% of the total resulted in parole. By contrast, prosecutor appeals of parole grants from 1996 through 1999 were successful almost 26% of the time.

     Accordingly, there was a rational basis for treating prisoners and non-prisoners differently in relationship to the ability to appeal parole board decisions, because prisoner claims "have inundated the judicial system in a manner that non-prisoners have not." The court recognized that the amendment to the law, eliminating the ability of prisoners to appeal denials of parole, "sweeps away the meritorious along with the frivolous." But a classification does not fail rational-basis review "because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."

     Jackson v. Jamrog, No. 02-2057 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 10035 (6th Cir.).

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet. [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents menu.

A prisoner is not required to allege, in his complaint, that he has exhausted all available administrative remedies, so that the dismissal of a lawsuit on that basis, without giving the prisoner a chance to respond concerning the issue, was improper.

     While the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a), requires that inmates exhaust all administrative remedies before filing lawsuits challenging prison conditions under federal law, a federal appeals court has ruled that this does not impose an obligation on plaintiff prisoners to affirmatively state, in their complaints, that they have exhausted their available administrative remedies. Trial courts, according to this appeals court, therefore should not on their own motion dismiss such complaints for the mere failure to allege exhaustion of remedies.

     In this case, the plaintiff prisoner broke his arm while in a Virginia prison, and claimed that prison officials failed to provide him with proper medical treatment. The trial court dismissed his complaint because the prisoner failed to state in his complaint that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. The prisoner filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that he should have been given an opportunity to address the exhaustion issue, but the trial court denied that motion. A federal appeals court found that this was erroneous:

A majority of the circuit courts of appeals considering the question have concluded that exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be alleged by the plaintiff in his complaint but is instead an affirmative defense to be raised by the defendant. Only two circuits have concluded that exhaustion is a pleading requirement borne by the plaintiff, so that failure to allege exhaustion makes the complaint subject to dismissal by the district court. See Steele v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2003); Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). [...] We agree with the majority approach and conclude that the PLRA does not require that an inmate allege in his complaint that he has exhausted all administrative remedies.

In our view, the language and structure of the PLRA make it clear that an inmate is not required to allege exhaustion of remedies in his § 1983 prison-conditions complaint. Instead, an inmate's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies must be viewed as an affirmative defense that should be pleaded or otherwise properly raised by the defendant.

     The appeals court cautioned, however, that the fact that exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be pled and proved by the defendant did not bar the trial court from dismissing a complaint "where the failure to exhaust is apparent from the face of the complaint," or bar the trial court from inquiring into whether the prisoner exhausted all administrative remedies.

     For the court to dismiss the complaint on such grounds, however, without giving the plaintiff prisoner an opportunity to response to the issue, the appeals court held, was improper.

     Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Serv., No. 04-6885, 407 F.3d 674 (4th Cir. 2005).

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet. [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents menu.

Federal appeals court rules that prisoner's lawsuit, in its entirety, should be dismissed when he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies on any of its claims.

     A federal appeals court held that when a prisoner files a federal civil rights lawsuit asserting some claims on which he has exhausted available administrative remedies, and some on which he has not, dismissal of the entire lawsuit is required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

     The prisoner's lawsuit was against a correctional officer and the prison's grievance coordinator. He claimed that both defendants violated his First Amendment rights and that the officer also violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force. He filed nine grievances against the officer claiming various misconduct, and one against the grievance coordinator, claiming a mishandling of those grievances. He claimed that he was retaliated against for filing his grievances.

     The appeals court held that when a prisoner's lawsuit alleges both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the PLRA requires a complete dismissal of the complaint.

We adopt the total exhaustion rule, in large part, because the plain language of the statute dictates such a result. Section 1997e(a) states that no "action" shall be brought in federal court until administrative remedies have been exhausted.

[...]The policies underlying the PLRA also suggest that Congress intended the courts to apply total exhaustion to a prisoner's petition. One purpose of the act is to reduce the sheer number of prisoner suits, especially frivolous actions. Congress also intended to give increased powers to prisons so that they could solve their problems according to their own internal dispute resolution systems.

     Adoption of the "total exhaustion rule," the court argued, "would also deter prisoners from bringing additional, piecemeal litigation."

     Jones Bey v. Johnson, No. 03-2331 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 7166 (6th Cir).

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet. [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents menu.

Jury instructions by trial court properly excluded prisoner's requested instructions that "malicious" use of force, regardless of amount of force, is always "per se" a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Trial judge also properly dismissed prisoner's racial and religious discrimination claims.

     A New York prison inmate claimed that two correctional officers used excessive force against him during a "knock-down" incident in a prison corridor, and subjected him to racial discrimination and religious retaliation.

     A jury, following a trial, found that the officers used substantial force on the prisoner, but did not use excessive force on him. The trial judge then dismissed the rest of the complaint.

     The officers thought that they saw another prisoner pass something to the plaintiff prisoner, and they chased him down the hallway, and grabbed him by the waist, causing him to fall. One officer placed him in a "figure four" or "cross bent leg" hold while the other officer handcuffed him. The officers allegedly made statements using a derogatory term for African-Americans during the incident, and negative references to Louis Farrakhan, the leader of the Nation of Islam. The prisoner is an African-American and was then a member of the Nation of Islam, allegedly wearing a bow tie at the time to signify that.

     He claimed that he was hit repeatedly on the head and neck, and that his head was slapped during a subsequent strip search following the incident. No contraband was recovered from him.

     Upholding the jury's verdict for the officers, the appeals court held that the trial judge did not err in refusing to add to its jury instructions the statement that "a malicious use of force to cause harm constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment per se because such malicious or sadistic acts always violate the contemporary standards of decency. Accordingly, there is no need to meet the objective test."

     While the possibility is left open that a minimal use of force might be enough to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim, it is the use of force of a sort "repugnant to the conscience of mankind," the court stated, and "no such circumstances are present in this case." The trial court properly instructed the jury that there is "both an objective and a subjective" component to the test for a violation of the Eighth Amendment through the use of force, and that a minimal use of force "will rarely be sufficiently serious or harmful enough" to constitute a violation of the objective component of the test. The force that the plaintiff claimed was used against him was not "de minimis."

     The controlling issue, therefore, was for the jury to determine whether the force was applied in a "good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." The trial judge's instructions also allowed the jury to consider "whether the force was applied in order to retaliate against the plaintiff for his religious expression or to discriminate against him on the basis of his race."

     That instruction allowed the jury to consider the defendant officers' possible motivations and to find that their conduct was malicious and sadistic if it was motivated by the prisoner's race or religion.

     If the jury found, the appeals court reasoned, "as it did," that the officers' use of force did not violate the Eighth Amendment, they necessarily found that it was justified and applied in good faith. Given that, there was no evidence that could have logically supported a finding for the prisoner on either his racial discrimination or religious retaliation claim, and the trial judge properly dismissed those claims, the court stated.

     Baskerville v. Mulvaney, No. 03-0348, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 10190 (2nd Cir.).

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet. [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents menu.

U.S. Supreme Court rules that the use of visible shackles, whether during the guilt phase of a criminal trial or the penalty phase of a capital case, is a violation of constitutional due process unless it is justified by specific findings concerning the need for such restraint of the particular defendant based on "essential" interests like courtroom security.

     The U.S. Supreme Court, with Justices Thomas and Scalia dissenting, has ruled that using visible shackles on a convicted offender during the penalty phase of a capital case, as well as during the guilt phase, is forbidden by the Constitution unless it is "justified by an essential state interest," such as courtroom security, "specific to the defendant on trial."

     The case involved a Missouri man on trial for the robbery and murder of an elderly couple. He was required, during trial, to wear leg braces that were not visible to the jury, and was convicted and sentenced to death, but subsequently granted a new sentencing proceeding. During that new proceeding, from the first day, he was shackled with leg irons, handcuffs, and a belly chain, which his lawyer objected to. The trial court overruled these repeated objections, reasoning that the prisoner should stay in the restraints since he had been convicted. The trial judge also reasoned that the fact that the prisoner was "being shackled" took "any fear" of him out of the minds of the jury. A death sentence was again imposed.

     The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it has long been forbidden to make routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase of such trials, and such restraints are only permitted in the presence of a "special need," such as those concerning the safe custody of the prisoner and danger to others in the courtroom.

Courts and commentators share close to a consensus that, during the guilt phase of a trial, a criminal defendant has a right to remain free of physical restraints that are visible to the jury; that the right has a constitutional dimension; but that the right may be overcome in a particular instance by essential state interests such as physical security, escape prevention, or courtroom decorum. Lower courts have disagreed about the specific procedural steps a trial court must take prior to shackling, about the amount and type of evidence needed to justify restraints, and about what forms of prejudice might warrant a new trial, but they have not questioned the basic principle.

We now conclude that those statements identify a basic element of the "due process of law" protected by the Federal Constitution. Thus, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial. Such a determination may of course take into account the factors that courts have traditionally relied on in gauging potential security problems and the risk of escape at trial.

     The Supreme Court's majority concluded that the same principles apply during the penalty phase of a capital case, despite the fact that the defendant has already been found guilty. While the presumption of innocence no longer applies, there is still concern about "securing a meaningful defense and maintaining dignified proceedings." Additionally, while the jury is no longer making a decision between guilt and innocence, the Court noted, "it is deciding between life and death," a decision that, given the "severity" and "finality" of the sanction, is no less important that the decision about guilt.

     Given the importance of these interests, the Court concluded that defendants cannot routinely be placed in shackles or other physical restraints visible to the jury during the penalty phase of a capital case. A judge may, however, exercise his or her discretion to take account of special circumstances, including security concerns that may call for shackling in a particular case to protect the courtroom and its occupants.

     In the immediate case, the Court found that the record contained no formal or informal findings indicating that the trial judge even saw the matter as one "calling for discretion." When a judge without adequate justification orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, "the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation." Rather, the State must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the shackling did not contribute to the verdict obtained.

     A strong dissent by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, pointed to the fact that the defendant in this case had been convicted of being a double murderer and robber. He argued that the Court's holding "defies common sense and all but ignores the serious security issues facing our courts." He asserted that the Court's decision "risks the lives of courtroom personnel, with little corresponding benefit to defendants," a "risk that due process does not require."

     Deck v. Missouri, No. 04-5293, 2005 U.S. Lexis 4180.

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet.

     •Return to the Contents menu.

     Editor's Note: Another method sometimes used to provide security in a courtroom setting for potentially dangerous criminal defendants, which has also been controversial, is stun belts. Given that the focus of the above decision on the use of restraints seems to be their visibility, rather than the confinement they impose, it seems likely that the Supreme Court would engage in a similar analysis concerning the use of stun belts or stun guns in this context, focusing on whether the devices would be visible to a jury.

     Cases involving stun belts in this setting have included Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, Nos. 99- 55187, 99-55394, 251 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2001) (Injunction that prohibited the use of stun belts to control unruly prisoners in court was overbroad to the extent that it prevented their use for controlling court security, such as to prevent escape or violence; appeals court orders injunction modified and rules that plaintiff prisoner, who was convicted, could not represent the interests of unconvicted detainees, so that case was improperly certified as a class action.); and Sinclair v. State of Louisiana, No. 469,519 Louisiana trial court, (19th JDC Div. N. La.), reported in The National Law Journal, p. 1 (Feb. 19, 2001) (Louisiana trial court denies summary judgment in prisoner's lawsuit over his being required to wear a stun belt for nine hours on a day when he went to court; lawsuit claims that wearing the belt for that period of time was cruel and unusual punishment despite it not having been activated).

D.C. prisoner could pursue his lawsuit alleging that his placement in a detention facility, moving him from the halfway house where courts had ordered him confined, was unlawful without showing that his conviction or sentence had been set aside. His lawsuit only challenged a condition of his confinement, its location, rather than its fact or duration.

      A District of Columbia prisoner challenged the dismissal of his civil rights lawsuit for damages arising out of his allegedly unlawful confinement at a D.C. detention facility. Rather than challenging any conviction or sentence, he argued that his placement at the detention facility was unlawful in light of orders of the federal trial court and the local D.C. Superior Court mandating that he be confined at a halfway house.

     The federal trial court, acting on its own motion, dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a viable claim, concluding that the prisoner failed to satisfy the so-called "favorable-termination" or "prior invalidation" requirement of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which prohibits federal civil rights claims seeking damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment whose unlawfulness would "render a conviction or sentence invalid" unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction or sentence has already been overturned.

     A federal appeals court reversed, holding that Heck's principles only apply in lawsuits that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence--i.e., which challenge either the fact or duration of confinement. Because the plaintiff's complaint challenges only the fact that he was confined at one facility rather than another, and did not challenge either the fact that he was confined or the length of that confinement, the court reasoned, the rule in Heck was not applicable.

     The fact that the prisoner's lawsuit might imply the invalidity of whatever administrative determination caused his removal from a halfway house to the detention facility did not alter the result. His lawsuit was still properly characterized, the appeals court ruled, as a challenge to a condition of his confinement, namely its location, and "not its fact or duration."

     Taylor v. U.S. Probation Office, No. 03-5370, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 10171 (D.C. Cir.).

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet. [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents menu.

Unanimous Supreme Court, in a case filed by inmates belonging to Satanist, Wicca (witchcraft), and white supremacist religions, rejects the argument that a federal statute barring restrictions on religious practice without a "compelling" governmental interest is an unconstitutional "establishment of religion." Court notes that prison safety and security are such "compelling" interests, and expects that courts applying the statute will give "due deference" to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators.

     Three Ohio prisoners who stated that they are members of "nonmainstream religions," named the Satanist, Wicca (witchcraft or pagan), and Asatru (Norse heathen or neo-pagan) religions, and the Church of Jesus Christ Christian (associated with the white supremacist views of the Aryan Nation) claimed that state correctional officials violated a federal statute, Sec. 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 114 Stat. 804, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) by failing to accommodate their religious exercise in a variety of ways.

     Specifically, they claimed that they were retaliated against and discriminated against for exercising their nontraditional religions, denied access to religious literature and denied the same opportunities for group worship that are granted to believers in other, mainstream, religions, as well as forbidding them to adhere to the dress and appearance mandates of their religions, and withholding religious ceremonial items that are substantially identical to those that the members of mainstream religions are allowed to possess. They also complained that they were not provided with a chaplain trained in their faith.

     The statute on which they relied, which applies to all correctional facilities receiving federal funds (which all states currently accept), provides that no substantial burden may be imposed on the religious exercise of an incarcerated person unless the burden both furthers a "compelling governmental interest" and does so by the "least restrictive means."

     The defendant prison officials asserted a facial challenge to the federal statute, arguing that it improperly promotes or advances religion in violation of the clause of the First Amendment prohibiting an "establishment of religion," an argument that a federal appeals court accepted in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. Ohio, 2003).

     A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court reversed in an opinion authored by Justice Ginsberg, and separately concurred in by Justice Thomas, holding that the statute did not, on its face, exceed the limits of permissible government accommodation of religious practices.

     The statute was passed by Congress after the U.S. Supreme Court, in Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) struck down, as applied to the states, the application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000bb, as beyond the powers of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the absence of the RFRA, the applicable test for restrictions by prisons and jails on prisoner religious practices reverted to the prior less burdensome one of needing to show merely a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. The RLUIPA once again imposed a test requiring the showing of a "compelling" rather than merely legitimate governmental interest, and of restrictions imposed through the "least restrictive means." The RLUIPA relied on Congressional authority under the Spending and Commerce Clause powers of the Constitution, and rather than applying to all areas of state and federal law, as the RFRA did, limited its scope to land-use regulation and religious exercise by institutionalized persons.

     The statute further defines "religious exercise" to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief," removing a requirement, imposed by many courts, that plaintiff prisoners show that the restricted practice they complained about had to be one compulsory or "central," according to the established tenets of a religion.

     In upholding the constitutionality of the statute against "establishment of religion" attacks, the Supreme Court noted that Congress itself, in passing the law, had anticipated that courts addressing prisoner lawsuits under RLUIPA would still give "due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators."

     The Court rejected the argument that the law improperly "advances" religion by providing greater protection to religious rights than to other constitutionally protected rights.

     The Court interpreted the statute in a way failing to "elevate" accommodation of religious observances over the need of prisons and jails to "maintain order and safety." It noted that institutional safety and security are, in fact, "compelling" governmental interests. It also pointed to the fact that the statute did not distinguish among bona fide religions, neither giving any particular religious sect "privileged status," nor singling out any religion for "disadvantageous treatment."

     If the appeals court ruling were upheld as the proper meaning of the "establishment of religion" clause, the Court reasoned, all kinds of currently acceptable religious accommodations would need to be struck down, such as Congressional permission for members of the military to wear religious apparel while in uniform, or the State of Ohio's own accommodations for "traditionally recognized religions," which provides inmates with chaplains, but not with "publicists or political consultants," and allows worship assemblies, but not political rallies by prisoners.

     The Court's decision emphasized that it was addressing only the facial challenge that the defendants had presented to the constitutionality of the law, and not the application of the statute to the particular claims asserted by the prisoners, or whether the requested accommodations were outweighed by compelling security and safety interests.

     Additionally, for purposes of the appeal, both the sincerity of the prisoners' beliefs, and their religious nature, were assumed. In a footnote, the Court noted that any concerns that prison gangs use religious activity to conceal unlawful and violent conduct could be appropriately addressed by courts in specific cases by questioning whether a prisoner's "religiosity," asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is legitimate and sincere. While the "truth" of a religious belief is not open to question by the courts, the question of whether the prisoner's beliefs are sincerely held may be.

     The Court also pointed to the fact that the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, for more than ten years, has managed the largest correctional system in the country under the same "heightened scrutiny standard as RLUIPA without compromising prison security, public safety, or the constitutional rights of other prisoners," since the RFRA has widely been held to continue to apply to federal prisons. As a result, the Court rejected the argument that "abusive prisoner litigation" under the RLUIPA would "overburden" the operation of state and local correctional facilities.

     A separate concurrence by Justice Thomas noted that the First Amendment only prohibited Congress from making laws "respecting an establishment of religion," i.e., an official governmental religion, and does not prohibit Congress from making laws which "respect" religion. While the Court's decision did not address the question of whether the RLUIPA exceeded the Spending clause powers of Congress, Thomas stated that the states' "voluntary acceptance" of the conditions imposed by Congress on the receipt of federal funds "undercuts Ohio's argument that Congress is encroaching on its turf."

     Cutter v. Wilkinson, No. 03-9877, 2005 U.S. Lexis 4346.

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet.

     •Return to the Contents menu.

Shiite Muslim prisoner of Iraqi descent failed to show that he was fired from his prison job with private manufacturer on the basis of his sex, race, religion or national origin, when, in fact, at the time of his discharge, he was not able to work at all because he had been placed in segregation. Alleged discriminatory remarks by supervisor were not sufficiently pervasive to create a hostile work environment.

     An inmate at a Nebraska state prison filed a federal civil rights and employment discrimination action against a private corporation which provided him with prison employment, and one of its supervisory personnel. He claimed that he was fired and harassed because of his race, sex, religion and national origin and also subjected to unlawful retaliation.

     The prisoner is a male Shiite Muslim of Iraqi descent serving a prison sentence on a variety of felony charges. The private company operates a manufacturing facility outside the prison, and another one at the prison. Under an agreement with state correctional authorities, it offers private venture employment to approximately 110 inmates at the prison, paying them at least minimum wage, while inmates in other prison jobs receive between $1.50 and $2.25 per day.

     The plaintiff prisoner was employed as a die maker in the manufacturing facility. When he was terminated, he claimed that his supervisor had called him a "camel jockey" and made other discriminatory remarks about him.

     A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the defendants.

     The evidence showed that the prisoner was fired for excessive absences after he was placed in segregation after he was alleged to have been in possession of contraband. Therefore, at the time of his discharge, he was "not qualified" for his position as he was unable to work at all.

     Additionally, the prior record, including the supervisor's consistent favorable evaluations of his work, contradicted his claim that she conspired to set him up so that she could discharge him based on his race, sex, religion, and national origin. Indeed, after he initially failed the test for the die maker job, she allowed him to take it again, in violation of company policy, and then promoted him to die maker when he passed the test on a second try.

     The appeals court found that the evidence failed to show that the workplace was "permeated" with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that was "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to create an abusive working environment. A few "offhand and isolated" comments with a "tenuous connection" to race, sex, religion, or national origin were insufficient to show workplace harassment, even if some of them were "offensive utterances."

     Al-Zubaidy v. Tek Indus., No. 03-3457, 406 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2005).

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet. [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents menu.

Access to Courts/Legal Info

     Department of Corrections' removal of secondary family law materials, inmate created pleadings and forms, and limitation of the availability of inter-library loans did not violate Florida prisoners' right of access to the Florida courts, when the materials remaining in the law library were adequate to research and pursue any claim in the state's courts. Henderson v. Crosby, No. 1D03-2367, 883 So. 2d 847 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 2004). [PDF]

     Prison law librarian's alleged refusal to allow a prisoner to bind, in a timely manner, his petition for writ of certiorari, if true, would violate his First Amendment right of access to the courts. Genuine issues of material fact as to the librarian's motivation in denying the prisoner timely access to the binder barred summary judgment on the prisoner's retaliation claim. Phillips v. Hust, No. 01-1252, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (D. Ore. 2004).

     Inmate's incarceration did not excuse him from compliance with court's procedural rules which apply to all litigants concerning obtaining service of process. Inmate's divorce action against his wife, which he filed while acting as his own lawyer, was therefore properly dismissed when he failed to obtain service on her. Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). [PDF]

AIDS Related

     A county's policy of segregating inmates with contagious diseases did not violate a pre-trial detainee's right to freely exercise his religion by preventing him, because of his HIV status, from attending religious services. The policy served a legitimate purpose and a minister would have visited his cell upon his request. Carter v. Lowndes County, 89 Fed. Appx. 439 (5th Cir. 2004). [PDF]

Defenses: Issue Preclusion

     Prisoner was barred from pursuing, in Indiana state court proceeding, claims challenging prison policies prohibiting him from having more than 25 stamped envelopes and which did not allow him to possess a squeezable hygiene bottle in his cell, when the same claims had previously been rejected by a federal appeals court. He could not relitigate already decided issues. Higgason v. Lemmon, No. 77A01-0402-CV-71, 818 N.E.2d 500 (Ind. App. 2004).

DNA Tests and Databases

     A defendant who initially pled guilty to a felony charge, and therefore lawfully had a DNA sample collected for the California state DNA Database, had no constitutional right to the return of his DNA samples when his conviction was subsequently reduced to a misdemeanor, even though, under state law, the sample would not have been collected had the initial charge been a misdemeanor. Coffey v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco, No. A108693, 2005 Cal. App. Lexis 840 (Cal. 1st App. Dist.). [PDF]

     Florida's DNA collection statute and sex offender registration/notification system do not violate individual's constitutional rights. Doe v. Moore, No. 04-10279 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 10354 (11th Cir.). [PDF]

Employment Issues

     While correctional officer's comments made to female employee of juvenile boot camp were of a sexual nature, they were not severe and pervasive enough to constitute sexual harassment. Moser v. Indiana Dep't of Corr., No. 04-1130 406 F.3d 895 (7th Cir.2005). [PDF]

Frivolous Lawsuits

     Prisoner's "frivolous threat" to file a prison grievance if a guard turned off a TV could not be used as the basis to support a claim that officers improperly searched his cell and took his property in retaliation. Brown v. Craven, No. 03-11273, 106 Fed. Appx. 257 (5th Cir. 2004).

Inmate Funds

     Exemption in Illinois statutes preventing the attachment of payments of up to $7,500 made to inmate because of personal injuries applied in an action by the state seeking to recover the cost of incarceration. People ex rel. Director of Corrections v. Booth, No. 99329, 2005 Ill. Lexis 634 (2005).

Medical Care

     Prisoner did not state a claim against superintendent of county jail for inadequate medical care when there were no facts showing that he was in any way involved in a correctional officer's alleged refusal to call a doctor after the prisoner complained of stomach pain, which turned out to be a condition subsequently requiring surgery for the removal of part of his intestines and colon. Hudson v. Clark, No. 04-CV-0010, 319 F. Supp. 2d 347 (W.D.N.Y. 2004).

     Prison doctor's care and treatment of a prisoner suffering from a hernia condition was not deliberately indifferent, despite the fact that he did not follow an outside doctor's prior prescription, but instead provided alternative pain medication. Guiddy v. Terhune, No. 02-2254, 90 Fed. Appx. 592 (3rd Cir. 2004).

Medical Care: Dental

     Prisoner's allegations against prison dentist and others arising out of difficulties with tooth extraction, while they may be sufficient to show negligence, were inadequate to show deliberate indifference as required for a federal civil rights claim. Finnegan v. Maire, No. 04-4200, 405 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2005). [PDF]

Parole

     Parole Board properly refused to credit a parole violator with the time he spent in an in-patient drug and alcohol treatment facility against the maximum term of his sentence. Although his participation in the program was a condition of parole, residents of the program were not kept there against their will and the program's policy was not to stop anyone from leaving. Accordingly, the time spent there was not "confinement." Willis v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 842 A.2d 490 (Pa. Cmwlth 2004).

Prison Litigation Reform Act: Exhaustion of Remedies

     Special circumstances justified the plaintiff prisoner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies concerning his claim against a prison dentist for deliberate indifference when he did not learn, until he had been transferred to another facility, that his pain resulted from a foreign object and reactive lesion in the part of his mouth from which a dentist had extracted a tooth. Borges v. Admin. for Strong Mem. Hosp., #99-CV-6351, 337 F.Supp.2d 424, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20595 (W.D.N.Y. 2004); prior decis. at 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18596.

Prison Litigation Reform Act: Mental Injury

     Prisoner's claim for alleged mental anguish and emotional distress arising out of a dispute with correctional officials over the alleged retaliatory withholding of two pornographic magazines by the prison mail personnel could not be pursued, in the absence of physical injury under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(e). He claimed that the retaliation occurred because he filed a previously lawsuit against prison employees. Geiger v. Jowers, No. 04-10299, 404 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2005). [PDF]

Prisoner Assault: By Officer

     Officer did not use excessive force in the course of attempting to restrain prisoner who refused to submit to handcuffing, forced his way out of his cell, and kept resisting even after he was tackled in the hallway. Batons were only used to strike the prisoner after he had attempted to hit an officer. Davis v. Agosto, No. 02-6141, 89 Fed. Appx. 523 (6th Cir. 2004).

     Officer did not use excessive force in striking a prisoner in a "reflex action" with a heavy trap-door key after the prisoner grabbed him by his shirt through the trap door and tried to pull him down. Proctor v. Engstrom, #03-2547, 95 Fed. App. 192 (8th Cir. 2004). [PDF]

     Inmate's claim that "some or all" of the defendant correctional officers "may" have participated in his alleged beating was insufficient to provide the officers fair notice of the prisoner's claims against them, as required to support his excessive force lawsuit. Bright v. Gillis, No. 03-1118, 89 Fed. Appx. 802 (3rd Cir. 2004). [PDF]

Prisoner Discipline

     Prisoner was not denied due process when he was excluded from his disciplinary hearing after having previously waived his right to be present. Once he made a valid waiver, the disciplinary committee was not required to allow him to change his mind. Louis v. Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, No. A-03-868, 687 N.W.2d 438 (Neb. App. 2004). [PDF]

     A misbehavior report charging an inmate with harassment and making threats was not invalid for use in a disciplinary proceeding because it omitted specific dates and times or endorsements by particular inmates, when the report was the result of an ongoing investigation and the identity of the informant inmates could not be revealed. Blackwell v. Goord, 784 N.Y.S.2d 244 (A.D. 3d Dept. 2004). [PDF]

Smoking

     Trial court properly granted summary judgment to prison officials on inmate's claim concerning detrimental exposure to second-hand tobacco smoke, when prisoner failed to file any affidavits, by either himself or other inmates, to show that the prison's smoking policy was not enforced. President v. Stadler, No. 03-30669, 90 Fed. Appx. 711 (5th Cir. 2004). [PDF]

Telephone Access

     Woman who voluntarily accepted collect calls from inmates at county detention facilities had no claim for violation of equal protection based on the fact that the county received a 45% commission from the telephone access providers on such calls. Gilmore v. County of Douglas, No. 04-1325, 406 F.3d 935 (8th Cir. 2005). [PDF]

Wrongful Death

     A non-attorney administrator of the estate of a inmate who died from cancer while incarcerated could not pursue a pro se wrongful death and federal civil rights claim against correctional medical personnel when his action constituted the unauthorized practice of law under Arkansas statutes. The court noted that the administrator was not the only beneficiary or creditor of the estate, and his pursuit of the claim therefore constituted the practice of law in the course of representing the interest of others. Jones v. Corr. Med. Serv., No. 04-1985, 401 F.3d 950 (8th Cir. 2005). [PDF]

Youthful Prisoners

     D.C. trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to provide educational services to a youthful offender after he was transferred to BOP custody and outside of the District of Columbia. U.S. v. Crockett, No. 03-C0-749, 861 A.2d 604 (D.C. 2004). [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents menu.

     Drug Abuse and Treatment: Residential Substance Abuse Treatment for State Prisoners (RSAT) Program (NCJ 206269), Bureau of Justice Assistance, April 2005. PDF Presents the Residential Substance Abuse Treatment for State Prisoners (RSAT) Program, which helps states and local governments develop, implement, and improve RSAT programs in state and local correctional and detention facilities. This Program Update describes RSAT and its funding history, program components, national- and state-level RSAT evaluations, and state-by-state activities. It also covers changes made to the program.

     Medical Privacy: U.S. Justice Department, Office of Legal Counsel, opinion on the scope of criminal liability under the HIPAA privacy law for breaches of patient confidentiality. (June 1, 2005). [PDF]

     Reports: Deterring Staff Sexual Abuse of Federal Inmates, by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (May 2, 2005). (27 pgs). [PDF] [HTML] A report examining sexual abuse of federal inmates by correctional staff and the current law's impact on deterrence of staff sexual abuse. The report, which examined statistics and cases from the past five years, ending in September of 2004, notes that it is currently illegal for a federal prison employee to have sex with an inmate, whether "consensual" or not, but says that fewer than half of the 163 such instances which investigators found substantiated, and turned over for possible prosecution resulted in actual prosecutions. Federal law, according to the report, considers such sexual conduct a misdemeanor unless force or threats are used by the prison employee, while the majority of states consider such actions felonies even without the use of force or threats. Additionally, the report states that federal laws currently don't apply to instances of sexual abuse of federal prisoners in facilities which are privately run, numbering 15% of such prisoners. The report recommends that the Justice Department should seek passage of legislation amending 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2243(b) to increase the statutory maximum penalty for sexual abuse of a prisoner, even without the use of force or threats, to 5 years' imprisonment and classifying the act as a felony, and increasing the maximum penalty for abusive sexual contact with a prisoner under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2244(a)(4) and (b) to 2 years' imprisonment from the current 6 months maximum. It also recommends the passage of legislation extending federal criminal jurisdiction to individuals who engage in a sexual act with a federal prisoner housed in a detention facility under contract with the federal government. The text of the proposed changes is contained at the end of the report.

     Sex Offenders: National Sex Offender Public Registry. The U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Administration (BJA) has recently embarked on a National Sex Offender Public Registry (NSOPR). On May 20, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced NSOPR in his “First 100 Days” speech and directed the Office of Justice Programs’ BJA to have at least 20 state public sex offender registries connected and available for use in 60 days. Via web services and the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Global Justice XML which allows systems to “speak” to each other, this national web site will provide parents and concerned citizens with a free-of-charge, reliable national portal to access already existing public state and territory sex offender registries. NSOPR will not collect or retain any control over sex offender data, and there will be no cost to the state or territory to link to the national site. For details on this public safety initiative, contact David Lewis, BJA Senior Policy Advisor for Information Sharing, at 202-616-7829. Press Release. Fact Sheet. [PDF] Major Points.[PDF] FAQ.[PDF]

     Reference:

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.