FEATURED CASES

WITH LINKS TO THE OPINIONS

Hawaii prisoner was entitled to a hearing on his claim that he was unlawfully punished for assisting other prisoners with legal matters, Hawaii Supreme Court holds, noting that a prisoner may not be punished for assisting other prisoners in gaining "meaningful access" to the courts.

     An inmate in a Hawaii prison sought post-conviction relief from a disciplinary proceeding imposing 14 days lockdown in a special holding facility on him for his alleged failure to obtain authorization prior to helping fellow inmates with legal matters. In particular, he was punished for being in possession of other inmates' legal documents.

     The Supreme Court of Hawaii found that the inmate stated a viable claim for relief, entitling him to a hearing based on his argument that he was illegally confined. The prisoner claimed that in requiring him to obtain authorization to help fellow inmates with legal matters, the prison was enforcing a rule that had previously been repealed, that it was improper to punish him for assisting other prisoners in gaining meaningful access to the courts, and also that he was assisting the other inmates with the warden's permission.

     The court stated that a prisoner may not be punished for violating a regulation or restriction that unreasonably obstructs the right of access to the courts. It noted that the issue before it at the moment was not to decide whether the prisoner was indeed illegally held in the special holding unit based upon an unreasonable regulation, but rather merely whether the prisoner had set forth a "colorable claim," thereby entitling him to a hearing.

     Hutch v. State of Hawaii, No. 25711, 114 P.3d 917 (Hawaii 2005).

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Prisoner should be allowed to proceed with his federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that the State's refusal to allow him post-conviction access to DNA evidence used to convict him of kidnapping and sexual assault violated his constitutional rights. Prisoner was not barred from proceeding with this lawsuit before his criminal conviction was set aside, as success in the lawsuit would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

     An Alaska prisoner filed a federal civil rights lawsuit seeking to compel the State to release certain biological evidence that was used in 1994 to convict him of kidnapping and sexual assault. Maintaining his innocence, he hopes to subject this evidence, at his expense, to more sophisticated DNA analysis than was available at the time of the his trial. He claimed that by refusing him post-conviction access to the evidence, the State has violated his First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

     The trial court, without addressing the issue of whether there is a constitutional right of post-conviction access to DNA evidence, dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim. It held that because the plaintiff was seeking to "set the stage" for an attack on his underlying criminal conviction, his civil rights lawsuit was barred by the principles set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck bars federal civil rights lawsuits which would call into question, if successful, an underlying criminal conviction that has not yet been overturned or set aside. The trial court therefore ruled that a petition for habeas corpus was the prisoner's sole remedy.

     Reversing, a federal appeals court agreed with the plaintiff prisoner that the trial court applied a more restrictive legal standard than was required in Heck, and that success on the merits of the plaintiff's federal civil rights claim would not "necessarily imply" the invalidity of his criminal conviction.

     In this case, the lawsuit itself did not raise a direct challenge to either the prisoner's imprisonment nor its duration. Success in the lawsuit would guarantee only access to the DNA evidence. While the prisoner hopes that such evidence will prove his innocence, the additional DNA test may in fact, inculpate him, exculpate him, or even be inconclusive. Further, even if the testing exonerates him, release would come through an entirely different proceeding, either habeas or clemency.

     The appeals court therefore adopted the reasoning of another federal appeals court decision, Bradley v. Pryor, No. 01-16442, 305 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 999 (2003), which held, that a § 1983 action seeking post-conviction access to DNA evidence is not Heck-barred. The court therefore held that the prisoner's civil rights lawsuit should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the proceedings. The court expressed no opinion as to whether the prisoner had been deprived of a federally protected right, leaving that issue to the trial court.

     Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, No. 04-35126, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 19369 (9th Cir.).

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Plaintiff assistant wardens of Illinois state prisons are policymaking officials and therefore can be fired by the governor on the basis of their political affiliation.

     Two assistant wardens of Illinois state prisons claimed that they were fired by the Democratic governor because they are not of his political party, but instead Republicans. They argued that they were not policymaking officials or confidential employees, and that the governor's firing of them on the basis of their political affiliation violated their right of free speech. Both assistant wardens filed separate federal lawsuits and sought both compensatory and punitive damages.

     In one of the two lawsuits, the trial judge denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding no right to qualified immunity. In the second case, a different federal judge granted summary judgment for the defendants.

     A federal appeals court noted that a public official cannot be fired on he basis of political affiliation unless the nature of their job makes political loyalty a valid qualification, either because the job involves the making of policy and therefore the exercise of political judgment, or the providing of political advice to an elected superior, or because it is a job, such as speechwriting that gives the jobholder access to confidential, politically sensitive thoughts, citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).

     The court also noted that identifying such jobs is difficult, since almost all jobs in government above the lowest level require the exercise of at least some discretion. The issue, therefore, is not discretion versus no discretion, but the amount of discretion.

     The court relied on the job descriptions of the two assistant warden positions, which included assisting in the development, establishment and implementation of rules, regulations, directives, policies and procedures of the institution. Additionally, when the warden, the top official in a prison, is sick, on vacation, or simply off duty, one of the assistant wardens is in charge, which occurs much of the time since a prison is a 24 hour a day, seven day a week operation.

     The court concluded that the assistant warden positions were policymaking jobs in the operation of the state's prisons, an operation costing more than a billion dollars a year, and constituting one of the major functions of state government.

     There was therefore no bar on the governor firing the assistant wardens on the basis of their political affiliations. The appeals court therefore reversed the decision of the trial court which declined to dismiss the claims against the defendants on the basis of qualified immunity, and upheld the decision of the judge in the other case in which summary judgment was granted to the defendants.

     Riley v. Blagojevich 04-3085, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 20631 (7th Cir.).

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Ten hour delay in releasing a prisoner from a county detention facility after she had posted bail was insufficient to show a violation of her constitutional rights when it was not based on deliberate indifference by anyone to her right to release, but rather on mere negligence, including a problem with a new computer system in which she was allegedly "lost" for several hours.

    A Minnesota woman appeared before a state court judge on a felony fraud complaint. While the court continued the criminal proceeding, it ordered that she be booked at the Hennepin County Detention Center before her release. Once there, detention center officials discovered that she had two outstanding warrants, requiring her to post bail before she could be released.

     As a result, she remained in custody for thirty-two hours, including ten hours after her father had posted the required bail. She filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that constituted an excessive period of detention in violation of her constitutional rights. While she initially named other defendants, she later dismissed all defendants except the county and the county sheriff.

     The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and a federal appeals court upheld this result.

     The plaintiff did not challenge the state court judge's decision to have her booked before her pre-trial release on the felony fraud charges, and conceded that, after her outstanding warrants were discovered, there was probable cause to detain her until she posted the required bail. The remaining issue, therefore, was whether her rights were violated because she was allegedly not allowed to use a phone for seventeen hours to call her parents to arrange for bail, or because she was detained an additional ten hours after the bail was posted.

     The appeals court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the length of her detention should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard. That standard does apply, the court acknowledged, when the issue is whether a detainee was provided a prompt probable cause hearing following a warrantless arrest.

     That was not at issue here, as her seizure was based on her appearance before a court on a felony charge and on the discovery of outstanding warrants. Her seizure was therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without the need for further judicial process. The real issue was whether the subsequent delay was excessive, and was to be analyzed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

     To impose liability, therefore, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that the sheriff or county was deliberately indifferent to her liberty interest in a timely release.

     The court noted that the sheriff himself was not "deliberately indifferent," and had no personal involvement in her booking and subsequent detention. Further, there was evidence that there was a temporary problem with a new computer system during the time that the plaintiff was detained, and that this "undoubtedly contributed to the length of her detention." Both the prisoner and her father were told by detention staff members that she was "lost" in the new computer system for several hours.

     This showed, according to the appeals court, that the delay in processing and releasing the prisoner was, at most, mere negligence, which cannot satisfy the standard of "criminal recklessness" needed to prove that the sheriff, county, or any other county employee was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

     Golberg v. Hennepin County, No. 04-2756, 417 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2005).

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Correctional officer was properly denied summary judgment on prisoner's claim that he had him transferred to another facility in retaliation for his complaint about the officer to his supervisors concerning the officer's alleged refusal to authorize the payment of funds from the prisoner's account to pay his lawyer for work in connection with his criminal appeal. If true, this would be violative of his First Amendment right of access to the courts.

     A Michigan prisoner claimed that a correctional officer had him transferred to another facility in retaliation for complaining to the officer's supervisor that the officer had improperly failed to authorize disbursements of money from his prison account to make certain payments to his lawyer. The payments were allegedly necessary to have the attorney review his appeal brief and file and to meet with him concerning his criminal conviction.

     The officer had allegedly refused to authorize the disbursement of the prisoner's money to his lawyer after learning that the prisoner's lawyer was both black and a part of his religious organization, commenting that the prisoner would "probably have a better chance with a white lawyer," and stating that "my brother-in-law is a lawyer," as well as that "most crimes are committed by blacks," so that "judges tend to associate black lawyers with crime."

     A federal appeals court upheld the denial of the defendant officer's motion for summary judgment.

     It found that the prisoner, in complaining about the officer to his supervisors concerning the failure to authorize the release of the funds, was engaging in conduct protected under the First Amendment. The prisoner was then attempting to exercise his right to access the courts in connection with an appeal of his criminal conviction, which he had a constitutional right to do.

     Additionally, the officer's performance of a security screen of the prisoner "set in motion" his transfer to another prison, which constituted "adverse action" against the prisoner. There was a factual issue as to whether this security screen was actually "routine," otherwise necessary, or rather carried out for retaliatory reasons.

     If it was retaliatory, the court found, a reasonable officer would have known that the right to access the courts was clearly established, and that an officer would be liable if he retaliated against a prisoner for pursuing that right in a manner which would deter a reasonable person in the prisoner's position from pursuing that right.

     Siggers-El v. Barlow, No. 03-2291, 412 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2005).

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Detainee's allegations that her appendicitis remained essentially untreated for five days, until it ruptured and became gangrenous adequately stated a claim for violation of her Eighth Amendment rights. Detention officers, if her version of the events were true, ignored her requests for medical assistance for two of those days despite symptoms of severe pain, vomiting, and nausea.

     A North Carolina detainee sued the county, the facilities medical director, the jailer, the sheriff, and a number of detention officers, claiming that they denied her adequate medical attention, specifically adequate treatment for her ruptured appendix.

      Rejecting motions by the defendants for summary judgment, including a motion for qualified immunity, an intermediate North Carolina appellate court found that if the plaintiff's allegations were true, the actions of certain detention officers would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

     The prisoner claimed that during her incarceration at the county detention facility, she made repeated requests for medical attention because of severe pain she was experiencing, along with vomiting and nausea that continued for approximately two full days. Detention officers allegedly ignored these requests even though they knew of her symptoms. If true, the court found, this would be a basis for liability.

     Liability could not be avoided based on the fact that she received some care--including emergency surgery--when her requests for medical attention were finally acknowledged, in light of the two days of unrelieved pain she allegedly suffered. The prisoner had previously been taken to see the nurse and the doctor several times, and was given Tylenol. She allegedly asked the doctor if the problem might be with her appendix, but he allegedly responded that she was suffering from a virus. When she asked to go to a hospital or see another doctor, she was allegedly told that inmates can only go to a hospital for an emergency. The plaintiff claimed that it was after this exchange that officers essentially ignored her complaints for two days when her pain and symptoms continued.

     When she finally was taken elsewhere, an ultrasound procedure revealed acute gangrenous appendicitis with peritonitis, and that her condition was consistent with an appendicitis left untreated for five days. Following her surgery, she twice suffered a bowel obstruction requiring two additional surgeries, and there was medical testimony that there was a direct connection between the alleged delay in removing her appendix and the complications that were experienced.

     The court found that a reasonable officer at the time of the incident, 1998, would have had fair warning that ignoring an inmate's requests for medical care to address severe pain, vomiting, and nausea over two full days would violate clearly established law. The officers were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity

     Boyd v. Robeson County, No. COA03-1222, 615 S.E.2d 296 (N.C. App. 2005).

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Prisoner with prior leg injury from pre-incarceration motorcycle accident did not show that prison staff acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs during his twelve hour placement in a "strip cage," when whatever discomfort or injuries he allegedly suffered while there were evidently not significant enough for him to even mention to medical staff on the day of his release from the cage or two days later.

     An Ohio prisoner who was placed in a "strip cage" in a segregation unit for twelve hours, sued various prison officers and officials, claiming that they violated his Eighth Amendment right by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs during the period he was in the cage.

     The defendants were granted summary judgment by the trial court, and a federal appeals court affirmed that decision.

     The plaintiff prisoner was in the segregation unit for fighting with another inmate, and went on a hunger strike to protest various prison conditions. He was placed in the strip cage for the twelve-hour period after he and his cellmate were suspected of various infractions, including possibly having stored food in the cell, and possessing a gang related picture.

     The prisoner subsequently claimed that during the entire time he was in the cage, he made it clear to all the officers that he had a bad leg and should not be standing, based on a motorcycle accident he had experienced prior to his incarceration, which resulted in injuries to his right leg and ankle. As a result of the accident, there is a metal rod running from his right knee to his ankle, and the accident was noted on his medical screening sheet when he arrived at the facility.

     Some of the defendants, however, contended that the prisoner did not ask for anything, complain about his legs, or ask to see any medical staff while he was in the strip cage. The prisoner claimed, however, that his leg had swollen up, that he was in terrible pain, and his toes had no sensation. Some of the defendants, however, claimed that the prisoner was "jumping around," "messing around," and "running back and forth in the cage," and also declined an offer to be put in the larger of two cages because he and his cellmate did not want to switch places.

     Following the incident, the prisoner did see the medical staff, and at that time, his only recorded complaint concerned his hunger strike. When he did complain about his right leg and toes on a subsequent appointment, and x-rays were taken, no injuries or conditions were found other than those attributable to his pre-incarceration accident, according to the medical records.

     The appeals court found these facts insufficient on which to base a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition. Any swelling, pain and cramps in the prisoner's legs were evidently not serious enough for him to even mention to the medical staff on the day of his release from the strip cell or two days later. Accordingly, the appeals court agreed with the trial judge that this showed, at most, "de minimis" (minimal) injuries which did not show an Eighth Amendment violation.

     Jarriett v. Wilson, No. 03-4196, 414 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2005).

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Appeals court orders further proceedings to determine whether prisoner, in filing three inmate request forms asking for a change of cell to get away from a cellmate who allegedly threatened him, sufficiently exhausted available administrative remedies to allow him to proceed with a federal civil rights lawsuit for alleged failure to protect him after the cellmate allegedly attacked him and he was moved to a different cell.

     A Connecticut prisoner's lawsuit claimed that prison officials had been deliberately indifferent to his request for a cell change to get away from a cellmate who had threatened him, resulting in the cellmate subsequently assaulting him. He claimed that this failure to protect him violated his Eighth Amendment rights.

     The trial judge granted summary judgment to the defendant officials on the basis that the prisoner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). On appeal, the prisoner claimed that further appropriate remedies were unavailable because prison officials failed to respond to a series of inmate request forms that he filed as part of the prison's informal grievance process.  The prisoner pointed out, further, that the attack on him by his cellmate had occurred before the grievance filing deadline, which was 30 days after the denial of an inmate request. In the alternative, he claimed that exhaustion should be excused because, after he was assaulted, he received the relief he had sought, transfer to another cell, and therefore no longer had a viable grievance which could be filed or acted upon.

     Finally, he claimed that, even if additional administrative remedies were available, he exhausted them by notifying the warden in writing, and by raising his claim during the prison's disciplinary appeals process in response to discipline imposed upon him, not upon his assailant, following the alleged assault. He also raised, during that disciplinary appeals process, the failure of the prison to respond to his three inmate request forms asking for a cell change.

     The federal appeals court ordered further proceedings to consider whether the prisoner, through the filing of the inmate request forms and other materials provided prison officials with sufficient information to permit them to take appropriate remedial measures in response to his grievance, thereby satisfying the Act's exhaustion requirement.

     The appeals court disagreed with the prisoner that after the cell change, there was no possibility of relief from his grievance, since prison officials could have pursued remedial measures such as developing new policies and procedures, or disciplining the relevant officers who allegedly failed to protect the prisoner.

     The prisoner appeared, the appeals court stated, to have a "colorable argument that," at the time of the attack, he was attempting to follow prison regulations with respect to exhaustion of remedies, and prison officials may have had sufficient notice of his concerns to have been able to deal with them administratively. He also appeared to have brought up the prison's unresponsiveness to the prior requests during the disciplinary appeals process, which also might have been sufficient to put prison officials on notice of his concerns.

     Braham v. Armstrong, 03-0153, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 21085 (2nd Cir.).

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While prisoner's partial paralysis following a stroke might have justified his failure to file a grievance concerning his medical treatment within fourteen days as required by prison rules, he failed to explain why he waited almost two years before filing a grievance. His federal civil rights lawsuit, therefore, was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.

     An inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"), underwent a stroke leaving him paralyzed on the left side of his body. Almost two years later, he filed a grievance claiming that a DOCS nurse failed to provide him with adequate medical care at the time of the stroke. The grievance was rejected on the grounds that it was not filed within 14 days of the incident and was therefore untimely under applicable policy. Months after that, the prisoner filed a federal civil rights lawsuit over the alleged inadequate medical care.

     The federal trial court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e. A federal appeals court has upheld this result.

     The plaintiff prisoner argued that the grievance he filed two years after the incident satisfied the exhaustion requirement, even though it was rejected as untimely. The appeals court noted, that it had previously stated that prisoners could not "circumvent" the exhaustion requirement by merely waiting to bring their federal civil rights lawsuit until their administrative complaints are time-barred.

     There may be some circumstances, the court acknowledged, in which a prisoner's failure to grieve "in the normally required way" might be excused. In this case, however, the plaintiff did not claim that he misread DOCS policy concerning when and how to file a grievance. Instead, he claims that it was "both physically and mentally impossible for him to file an institutional grievance within fourteen days" because he was then "partially debilitated, i.e., paralyzed on his left side."

     The appeals court agreed that it might be true that, in light of the stroke and its effects, the prisoner was incapable of filing his grievance within two weeks. But he failed to explain why he waited "nearly two years" to file the grievance, so the court did not finding his "justification persuasive."

     Under these circumstances, the court concluded, the prisoner's failure to timely file a grievance in accordance with the rules amounted to a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, justifying dismissal of his lawsuit.

     Williams v. Comstock, 04-6453, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 21086 (2nd Cir.).

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Federal statute applying strict test prohibiting substantial burdens on prisoner religious freedom except through the "least restrictive means" used to achieve a "compelling governmental interest" upheld as a valid exercise of Congressional power to impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds. Appeals court also finds that the statute is not an unconstitutional assault on the sovereignty of individual states in violation of the Tenth Amendment.

     In three cases consolidated for appeal, Ohio prisoners sued state correctional officials for alleged violations of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc-1. The prisoners, all belonging to "non-mainstream" religious group, claimed that Ohio prisons refused to accommodate their religious beliefs by, among other things, denying them access to literature and ritual items, and failing to provide a chaplain trained in their religions. Defendant prison officials asserted a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the section of RLUIPA that applies to prisoners, claiming that the statute violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment (prohibiting an establishment of religion), was barred by the Tenth Amendment, which reserves certain powers to the states, and exceeded the powers of Congress under both the Spending and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution.

     On appeal, the appeals court initially ruled that the RLUIPA statute was an unconstitutional Establishment of Religion, and did not reach the other issues. The U. S. Supreme Court, in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2125 (2005), reversed, finding no such unconstitutional favoring of religion by the statute. The federal appeals court, on remand, addressed the prison officials' other arguments against the constitutionality of the statute, and rejected them.

     The RLUIPA requires government agencies that seek to impose a substantial burden on prisoners' exercise of religious freedom to show that they act on the basis of a compelling governmental interest and that they use the least restrictive means of serving that interest. In enacting this statute, Congress relied on its powers under the Spending and Commerce Clauses, and the statute applies to correctional institutions which receive federal funds, which the Ohio correctional facilities do. Receipt of such funds is conditioned upon compliance with the statute.

     The federal appeals court noted that Congress has the power to require states to comply with federal directives as a condition of receiving federal funds, pursuant to prior caselaw. The appeals court found that this requirement by Congress, in the statute, was unambiguous, and rejected an argument that the provisions of the statute itself, such as the phrase "least restrictive means" were ambiguous, rendering the requirement improper in failing to give adequate notice of what was required. The appeals court also rejected the prison officials' argument that there was an absence of a sufficient relationship between the conditions in RLUIPA and the federal interest in the projects and programs funded by the federal grants.

In the present case, the conditions set forth in RLUIPA are reasonably calculated to address the federal government's interest in the rehabilitation of state prisoners. As to the purpose of the federal funding, the magistrate judge found that "plaintiffs have identified specific programs within ODRC [that] both receive federal funding and deal specifically with inmate rehabilitation." The Court's Spending Clause jurisprudence does not mandate that the federal funds actually be spent on religious activities, and the prison officials' arguments to the contrary are unavailing.

     The appeals court also rejected the argument that the funding conditions in the statute were independently barred by another constitutional provision, the Tenth Amendment. Conditions on funding, the court reasoned, do not improperly intrude on the sovereignty of the individual states because they leave each state the simple alternative of not yielding to what a state might claim is federal coercion by refusing such funding.

     The statute, the court noted, did not require the states to enact or administer a federal program, or take any affirmative action at all, but instead requires the states to refrain from acting in a way that interferes with inmates' exercise of religion, unless those actions are the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.

     Because the appeals court upheld the statute's validity under the Spending Clause, it found it unnecessary to consider whether the statute was also sustainable under the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.

     Cutter v. Wilkinson, 02-3270, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 19695 (6th Cir.).

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While a prisoner had a legitimate interest in recognition of the new, legally adopted name he obtained for religious reasons, he was not entitled to have pre-existing documents which pre-dated the name change altered.

     A Florida federal prisoner has his name legally changed for religious reasons, and went to court to seek the issuance of a new commitment order to reflect his legal name change. The trial court denied his motion, and he appealed.

     The appeals court upheld the trial court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion.

     While prisoners retain the right to free exercise of their religion, the court stated, a "dual-name" policy under which an inmate is permitted to use a religious name in conjunction with his commitment name is always sufficient to satisfy an inmates free exercise claim involving the use of a religious name.

     The appeals court noted that two other federal appeals courts had previously held that an inmate who legally changes his name does not have a constitutional right to have his pre-existing prison records altered to reflect his newly adopted name. See Barrett v. Va., 689 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1982) and Imam Ali Abdullah Akbar v. Conney, 634 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1980).

     The appeals court agreed with the reasoning of these prior cases. It held that while an inmate is entitled to "prospective recognition" of a legal name change, by means of a "dual-name" policy, the plaintiff was not entitled to have documents which pre-dated his legal name change altered.

     United States v. Baker, No. 05-10525, 415 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005).

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Michigan prison regulation barring almost all visitation for prisoners found guilty of two or more substance abuse violations did not constitute "egregious conduct" sufficient to constitute a violation of procedural due process. Trial court abused its discretion in refusing to dissolve injunction against application of the regulation following a Supreme Court decision that rejected substantive due process, First Amendment, and Eighth Amendment claims, but did not directly address procedural due process issue.

     Incarcerated felons in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) first filed a lawsuit challenging visitation rules when the regulations governing them were modified in 1995, and included a permanent ban on almost all visitation for prisoners found guilty of two or more substance abuse violations. The trial court found that these limitations on visitation, including the substance abuse regulation, violated the prisoners' First and Eighth Amendment rights, and their Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights. After this ruling was upheld by a federal appeals court panel, the trial court issued an injunction barring the Department from implementing the regulations. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review, and overturned the appeals court ruling on the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims in Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003), but did not review the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. On remand to the trial court, the judge declined to dissolve the injunction against the rules, finding that its procedural due process holding was not disturbed by the Supreme Court's decision.

     The MDOC appeals from this refusal to dissolve the injunction, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision implicitly foreclosed any procedural due process challenges. The federal appeals court, however, has ruled that trial judge abused its discretion in failing to dissolve the injunction in light of the Supreme Court's reasoning. It held that summary judgment should be entered for the defendant on facial challenge to the visitation regulation, while not foreclosing the possibility that individual inmates might have valid claims as to the application of the regulations to them.

     The Supreme Court, in Overton, held that the substance abuse regulation adopted by the MDOC was a "regular means of effecting prison discipline" which did not constitute a "dramatic departure from accepted standards for conditions of confinement." This statement, the appeals court reasoned, was contradictory to the trial court's finding of a liberty interest in prison visitation because the regulation imposes on prisoners an "atypical" hardship in comparison to the ordinary incidents of prison life. The appeals court therefore found that there was no basis to find a liberty interest on the face of the substance abuse visitation regulation.

     The appeals court reasoned that this foreclosed a facial procedural due process challenge which could be used to strike down the application of the regulation to all prisoners, while not precluding individual prisoners from challenging a particular application of the substance abuse regulation to them.

     The appeals court also rejected an argument that the due process clause itself provided a right to prison visitation in order to protect an interest in intimate or family association. It stated that it knew of no appeals court that has found an "implicit due process right to prison visitation. While the substance abuse visitation regulation was "severe," the appeals court declined to find that the regulation, on its face, "rises to the level of egregious conduct necessary to implicate the implicit guarantees of the due process clause."

     Bazzetta v. McGinnis, #04-1823, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 19696 (6th Cir.).

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Defenses: Absolute Immunity

     A jail nurse who allegedly took a prisoner's blood without his consent was entitled to absolute immunity in the prisoner's federal civil rights lawsuit when she took the blood under a facially valid warrant authorizing her actions and seeking evidence for purposes of use in his criminal prosecution. Boatner v. Hinds, No. 05-1320, 137 Fed. Appx. 499 (3rd Cir. 2005). [PDF]

Defenses: Eleventh Amendment Immunity

     State correctional agencies were immune from a federal civil rights lawsuit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment as they are not "persons" for purposes of claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Plaintiff prisoner also failed to show that individual correctional officers he sued were individually liable for alleged violations of his rights, since there was no proof that the claimed denial of access to the court resulted in any prejudice to a particular non-frivolous legal claim, and an officer who opened his legal mail did so solely for the purpose of looking for contraband and did so in the prisoner's presence. Kelley v. DiPaola, No. CIV.A.04-11192, 379 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D. Mass. 2005).

Defenses: Qualified Immunity

     Prison mail room supervisor was not entitled to qualified immunity when there were disputed issues of fact as to whether she intentionally did not send the prisoner's legal mail to a court, resulting in the denial of his request that the court appoint him a lawyer in his post-conviction proceeding. This conduct, if true, would violate the prisoner's clearly established right of access to the courts. Geitz v. Overall, No. 04-3999, 137 Fed. Appx. 927 (8th Cir. 2005). [PDF]

Defenses: Release Agreements

     Prisoner was not entitled to reconsideration of a trial court's denial of his motion to set aside his prior settlement agreement in a federal civil rights lawsuit concerning the alleged inadequacy of his medical care, one of the terms of which required him to release his claims then pending in another federal civil rights lawsuit. The trial court's order dismissing the settled case without prejudice subject to dismissal with prejudice when the parties filed an stipulation to that effect was a final order for purposes of appeal, even though the stipulation was never filed. As the settlement occurred in 2003, and he first filed his motion to set it aside in March of 2003, his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion, filed in June 2004, was untimely and could only be considered if filed within ten business days. Holly v. Patrianakos, No. 04-3031, 137 Fed. Appx. 883 (7th Cir. 2005). [PDF]

Freedom of Information

     Investigations by the Washington state Department of Corrections into alleged medical misconduct by prison medical staff were not carried out for purposes of "law enforcement" and therefore were not exempt from disclosure to the press and public as law enforcement investigative records under the state's public disclosure act. Prison Legal News, Inc. v. Department of Corrections, No. 74890-0, 115 P.3d 316 (Wash. 2005).

Mail

     Alleged failure of prison supervisory personnel to properly supervise and train officers in proper distribution of mail to prisoners was not a violation of a prisoner's rights when he failed to show that he had been deprived of his mail, that other inmates' possession of some of his mail caused him any actual harm, or that the alleged violation of the prison's mail policy prevented him from filing a specific legal document with the court. Sandoval v. Fox, No. 04-41251, 135 Fed. Appx. 691 (5th Cir. 2005).

Medical Care

     Prison officials did not act with deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious medical needs when they allegedly were negligent in failing to determine that his medical condition warranted surgery, when his condition was repeatedly treated. Negligence alone cannot be the basis for a federal civil rights lawsuit. Trujillo v. Hobbs, #03-50885, 137 Fed. Appx. 663 (5th Cir. 2005).

     A one-day delay in providing pain medication to an inmate injured in an attack by another prisoner was not sufficient to show deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The prisoner, who received treatment by the prison doctor, and was subsequently referred to an optometrist, ophthalmologist, neurologist, and ear, nose and throat specialist, also could not show that his subsequent medical care for his injuries was inadequate. The record showed that he received surgery on his nose, pain medicine, x-rays, and a CT scan over a 3-year period of time following the incident. His mere difference of opinion concerning the proper treatment of his injuries did not show that the treatment provided was inadequate. The prisoner also failed to show that prison officials violated his rights by failing to protect him from the attack by another prisoner, which occurred during a sex offender treatment program's group meeting, since that attack was not foreseeable. Van Court v. Lehman, #04-35815, 137 Fed. Appx. 948 (9th Cir. 2005). [PDF]

     Prison nurse did not act with deliberate indifference in failing to provide attention to prisoner sooner for his chest pains, and who may have been experiencing a heart attack, when the evidence was undisputed that she was working on another patient at the time he arrived, and he was able to walk into the infirmary without assistance and to speak without apparent difficulty. Turner v. Goord, No. 03CV64011, 376 F. Supp. 2d 321 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).

Medical Records

     Inspection and copying fees imposed on a New York prisoner by correctional authorities did not violate his right to access his medical records when the policy imposing the fees made it clear that access would not be denied solely on the basis of inability to pay and that inmates had a right of access to the records. Pratt v. Goord, 799 N.Y.S.2d 611 (A.D. 3rd Dept. 2005). [PDF]

Parole

     Pennsylvania prisoner's federal civil rights claim for damages from court officials for allegedly mishandling his appeal of the revocation of his parole could not be pursued under the rule established in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), until and unless his allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment for parole violation had been overturned. Thomas v. Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, No. CIV 1:CV050623, 375 F. Supp. 2d 406 (M.D. Pa. 2005).

Personal Appearance

     New York prison regulations prohibiting a prisoner from wearing "corn row" braids if the hair went below the "natural hairline" did not violate his free speech or his equal protection rights as an African-American, but were justified by valid penological interests in security, including preventing prisoners from quickly changing their appearance after an escape and facilitating searches of hair for contraband. Towles v. Eagen, 799 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. 2005).

Prison Litigation Reform Act: Exhaustion of Remedies

     Further proceedings were required to determine whether prisoner's actions in sending multiple letters and request forms to prison officials was sufficient to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e, allowing him to proceed with his federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that prison officials unconstitutionally failed to protect him from violent assault by another prisoner. Aponte v. Armstrong, #03-0186, 137 Fed. Appx. 414 (2nd Cir. 2005). [PDF]

     Prisoner adequately showed that he exhausted available administrative remedies before filing his federal civil rights lawsuit concerning various conditions of his confinement when the defendant prison officials did not dispute his claim that they failed to respond to the grievances he filed and failed to inform him of the grievance procedures. Turner v. Huston, No. 04-1850, 137 Fed. Appx. 880 (7th Cir. 2005).

     Prisoner's claim that his rights were violated when prison officials had him undergo a 2-hour transport to another prison's medical facility, rather than being taken to a local hospital for treatment was a lawsuit about prison conditions subject to the exhaustion of remedies requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e. In this case the prisoner failed to file a grievance concerning the incident and that failure was not excused by his claim that his blood sugar level was "out of control" at the time of the incident. McCray v. First State Medical System, No. CIV. 04-173, 379 F. Supp. 2d 635 (D. Del. 2005).

     While prisoner did not exhaust his available administrative remedies concerning some of his claims against certain defendants, he would be allowed to proceed with the claims on which he had done so. The trial court reached this decision, rejecting the "total exhaustion" rule recently adopted by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Jones Bey v. Johnson, No. 032331, 407 F.3d 801 (6th Cir. 2005) [PDF]. The trial court found that this panel's decision was "void" under Sixth Circuit law because there was also a prior applicable 6th Circuit panel decision in Hartsfield v. Vidor, No. 99a0406, 199 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 1999), holding that in a prisoner's civil rights lawsuit, unexhausted claims should be dismissed without prejudice, and exhausted claims should be allowed to proceed. The trial court found that, in light of these two conflicting panel decisions, the earlier decision remained controlling until overturned by the entire Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, or a decision of the United States Supreme Court. Garner v. Unknown Napel, No. 2:05-CV-79, 374 F. Supp. 2d 582 (W.D. Mich. 2005).

Prisoner Assault: By Officers

     Prisoner's conviction on charges of assaulting a correctional officer did not bar him from pursuing his claim that officers used excessive force against him in connection with the same fight, since his claims of alleged excessive force by the officers was not raised in the criminal proceeding and was not relevant to it. Jeanty v. County of Orange, No. 03 CIV. 8043, 379 F. Supp. 2d 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

Prisoner Discipline

     Refusal to allow inmate's cellmate to testify at his disciplinary hearing did not violate his due process rights when his statement was taken and made part of the record. The prisoner was able to call other witnesses, and the written statements from those who were unable to attend provided written statements. Vasquez v. Peterson, No. 05-6041, 139 Fed. Appx. 77 (10th Cir. 2005).

     Disciplinary decision finding New York prisoner guilty of exposing his private parts, harassing employees, engaging in violent conduct, making threats and disobeying orders was supported by substantial evidence, and his persistent disruptive behavior during the hearing justified his removal from it. Davis v. Goord, 799 N.Y.S. 2d 636 (A.D. 3rd Dept. 2005). [PDF]

     Disciplinary conviction for making threats was adequately supported by both testimony and a tape recording of the prisoner's phone conversation with his stepmother asking her to send him a newspaper article identifying another prisoner as a confidential informant. Thomas v. Colorado Department of Corrections, No. 03CA0503, 117 P.3d 7 (Colo. App. 2004).

     Failure to allow prisoner information about correctional officers' physical condition or medical records in connection with disciplinary hearing against him, based on hearing officer's decision that doing so would compromise institutional security, did not deprive him of due process. The hearing concerned an altercation and the information the prisoner requested concerned the details of the officers' injuries during the incident. Withrow v. Goord, No. 03-CV-6284, 374 F. Supp. 2d 326 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).

     Prisoner was properly convicted of violating disciplinary rules against possession of contraband classified as a weapon, based on the finding, during a search of his cube of a folded can lid attached to a handle made of masking tape. Vines v. Goord, 798 N.Y.S.2d 526 (A.D. 3rd Dept. 2005). [PDF]

Prisoner Transportation

     Correctional officer was not shown to have acted with deliberate indifference when he allegedly backed a van in which a prisoner was being transported into another vehicle, injuring him. The officer had to act quickly to react to unforeseen traffic circumstance and decide how best to move the van away from oncoming traffic. Alexander v. Perrenoud, No. 04-3846, 134 Fed. Appx. 938 (7th Cir. 2005). [PDF]

Religion

     A Pennsylvania inmate could properly pursue his claim that his First Amendment rights were violated by a state parole procedure requiring him to attend a drug program based on religion and a belief in a higher power through a federal civil rights lawsuit. Should he succeed in proving his claim, this would not have shown the invalidity of either his confinement or its duration, but merely demonstrate that the parole board used unlawful factors in making a parole determination, and would have required merely a reconsideration of his parole rather than his immediate release. Accordingly, his claims were not barred under the principles set forth in Wilkinson v. Dotson, No. 03-287, 125 S. Ct. 1242 (2005), stating that a federal civil rights action concerning the unconstitutionality of state parole procedures may not be pursued under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 if "success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration." Nelson v. Horn, No. 03-2284, 138 Fed. Appx. 411 (3rd Cir. 2005). [PDF]

     Inmate stated a possibly viable claim for violation of his rights to religious freedom by alleging that he was denied the right to have a "Celtic Cross necklace," when he asserted that wearing such a necklace was part of the way in which he practiced and expressed his religious beliefs, as well as by alleging that he was improperly denied the right to receive visits from a religious leader of his own faith, and automatically prohibited from attending worship services while in administrative segregation, without an individualized determination of whether he should be eligible to attend group worship. Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc, prison officials cannot impose a substantial burden on a prisoner's religious exercise unless they can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The prisoner challenged whether these denials were either in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest or the least restrictive means of achieving the desired goals. Rowe v. Davis, No. 305CV114, 373 F. Supp. 2d 822 (N.D. Ind. 2005).

Visitation

     Alleged negligence by jail supervisor in mistakenly arresting a visitor and briefly detaining her under an arrest warrant for another person was insufficient to constitute a violation of due process justifying a federal civil rights claim. The court allows, however, a claim by a second visitor to proceed, who claimed that she was improperly arrested on a warrant which had been recalled, when the officer making the arrest had in his hands a document that indicated the recall, but allegedly was unable to read it because he did not have his prescription glasses with him. Detoledo v. County of Suffolk, # CIV.A.03-CV-10834, 379 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. Mass. 2005).

     •Return to the Contents menu.

     Annual Report: State of the Bureau 2004. Annual report on the Federal Bureau of Prisons. [PDF]

     Publication: Correctional Leadership Competencies for the 21st Century: Executive and Senior Levels. National Institute of Corrections. Published Date: 2005. Characteristics that result in the best performance of executive and senior level leaders are identified along with the key skills, knowledge, and attributes of effective and successful leaders which are then linked to a set of specific behaviors. Following an executive summary, this manual provides an exploration of: managerial profiles; self awareness; ethics and values; vision and mission; strategic thinking; managing the external environment; power and influence; strategic planning and performance measurement; collaboration; and team building. [PDF]

     Publications: A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies: Self-Audit Checklists, National Survey Results, Resource Materials, and Case Studies. National Institute of Corrections. 2005. Information regarding prison emergency preparedness is presented. This guide is comprised of the following sections: introduction; conducting an audit; self-audit checklists--emergency preparedness, natural disaster/HAZMAT/fire, and counterterrorism; Report on the National Survey of Emergency Readiness in Prisons; resource materials--leadership issues during crises, prevention of prison emergencies, emergency teams, and prisons and counterterrorism; and case studies. [PDF]

     Statistics: HIV in Prisons, 2003. Provides the number of HIV-positive and active AIDS cases among State and Federal prisoners at yearend 2003. This annual bulletin reports the number of AIDS-related deaths in prisons, a profile of those inmates who died, the number of female and male prisoners who were HIV-positive, and a comparison of AIDS rates for the general and prisoner populations. Historical data on AIDS cases are presented from 1998 and on AIDS deaths from 1995. Highlights include the following: Between 2002 and 2003 the number of HIV-positive prisoners decreased less than 1%, while the overall prison population grew 1.6% during the same period. At yearend 2003, 2.8% of all female State prison inmates were HIV positive, compared to 1.9% of males. In 2003, 282 prisoners died from AIDS-related causes -- 268 State inmates and 14 Federal inmates. 09/05 NCJ 210344 Acrobat file (337K) | ASCII file (34K) | Spreadsheets (zip format 60K)

     Reference:

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.