CONTENTS

Police chief and SWAT team leader were entitled to qualified immunity on claims for supervisory liability in case where SWAT officer entering residence shot and killed a man inside the home within two seconds, and the plaintiffs claimed that the decedent was unarmed. Nothing showed that they made a deliberate choice to inadequately train or supervise the officer, which caused the alleged deprivation of the decedent's rights.

     A police officer allegedly shot and killed a man during the execution of a no-knock search and arrest warrant at the residence he shared with his mother. The decedent's estate and his mother sued the police chief, the shooting officer, and another officer involved in the incident. The shooting officer was the first member of a SWAT team to enter the home, and allegedly shot the man within his first two seconds there.

     The plaintiffs claimed that the decedent was then in his living room, unarmed, with his arms outstretched, and repeating "don't hurt us." The police officers, on the other hand, stated that the shooting officer was immediately confronted by the armed decedent standing at the end of a hallway, pointing a gun at him. The plaintiffs' lawsuit contended that the police chief, and the second officer, two of the shooting officer's supervisors, should be held liable for their allegedly inadequate supervision and training of him, resulting in the use of excessive force during the raid.

     The plaintiffs argued that these supervisors knew, prior to the incident, that the shooting officer was "prone to use excessive and/or deadly force without cause," had a reputation for "displaying lewd and criminal behavior while on and off-duty," and that his employment history showed that he was "dysfunctional and unfit for police work." Neither the police chief nor the other officer actually participated in the raid, while the other officer, the SWAT Team commander, was present outside the home at the time of the shooting.

     The trial court denied summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to the two supervisors, finding that there was evidence presenting a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they were deliberately indifferent to the shooting officer's alleged propensity to use excessive force, and whether their conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

     The trial court based this, in part on testimony that the shooting officer had fired his weapon on three occasions during training exercises when the scenarios did not call for firing, that a background investigation indicated that he had a tendency to act "too aggressively," and testimony by a motorist pulled over by the shooting officer for a traffic violation who characterized the officer's behavior as "like a psycho," as well as evidence that the officer had a reputation for exposing himself, including during a team photo at SWAT team training, which had earned him the nickname "Penie."

     A federal appeals court disagreed, and found that these allegations were insufficient to deny the two supervisors qualified immunity. Even if all the allegations were true, and they were viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the appeals court ruled, they were insufficient to demonstrate supervisory liability.

     Such liability must be based on a failure to supervise or train, a "causal link" between those failures and the alleged violation of the plaintiff's rights, and a showing that the failure to train or supervise amounted to "deliberate indifference," the court summarized. Deliberate indifference, the court noted, is more than negligence or even gross negligence.

     Deliberate indifference must be based on a showing that the inadequacy of the supervision or training is "obvious and obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation."

     The appeals court found inadequate evidence of a prior pattern of conduct by the shooting officer of violating constitutional rights by employing excessive force, and noted that proof of a single violent incident is ordinarily insufficient for supervisory liability. Prior indications of the officer's violent propensities cannot simply be for any and all "bad" or "unwise" acts, the appeals court pointed out, but rather must point to the specific violation in question.

     While the shooting officer's "over- 'exposed' photography stunt" and his nickname might demonstrate a lack of judgment, crudity, and perhaps illegalities, the court commented, they did not point to a past use of excessive force. And the traffic stop, regardless of the details, did not involve excessive use of force with a deadly weapon resulting in harm to a citizen.

     While the past inappropriate use of the officer's weapon during training, the court stated, was, "at first blush, more troubling," since it was a training exercise, no one's constitutional rights were violated, and they did not show that the officer had previously used excessive force against a third party.

Furthermore, we hesitate in analyzing supervisory liability to place too much emphasis on mistakes during training. We are wary of creating incentives to conduct less training so as to minimize the chance that a subordinate will make a training mistake that can be used against the supervisor if that subordinate later makes a mistake in the course of duty. More to the point, in training mistakes are the fodder and "adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the training program or the legal basis" for holding a supervisor liable. Even if a fact finder were to infer that Hill's training did not stick or that he resisted it, the incidents in training did not effect a violation of a third party's rights. On this record, Appellants cannot be deemed deliberately indifferent by failing to supervise or train differently.

     As for the "background report," there was no evidence that the two defendant supervisors were even aware of it.

     In summary, there was no conduct from which it could be reasonably concluded that these supervisors made a deliberate or conscious choice to endanger constitutional rights, so they were entitled to qualified immunity from liability.

     Estate of Davis v. City of North Richland Hills, No. 04-10036, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 5893 (5th Cir.).

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City could be liable for on-duty officer's mistaken shooting and killing of an off-duty officer also responding to a disturbance at a restaurant while out of uniform. Federal appeals court finds sufficient evidence to send to a jury the question of whether the city was deliberately indifferent to the risk of "friendly fire" incidents by failing to provide adequate training on identification of off-duty officers, in light of the risks of its "always armed/always on-duty" policy.

     Two Providence, Rhode Island police officers, while responding to a call reporting a disturbance at a restaurant, shot and killed an off-duty police officer who was attempting to respond to the same incident under a city policy, the "always armed/always on-duty" policy, that required him to act despite being off-duty and out of uniform. The two on-duty officers, both of whom are white, apparently mistook the third officer, who was an African-American, as a threat rather than a fellow officer. He was shot and killed while armed and after allegedly yelling "freeze" at a suspect.

     The deceased officer's mother sued the City and various police department supervisors, claiming that they were responsible for the officers' use of excessive force against her son due to alleged deficient training, hiring, and discipline of these two officers.

     In the first phase of a bifurcated trial, a jury found that one officer, but not the other, had violated the deceased officer's constitutional rights by using excessive force against him. The trial court then granted summary judgment to the city and the supervisors, holding that there was insufficient evidence that these defendants caused the underlying constitutional violation, and had the required level of fault (deliberate indifference) to allow the case to go to the jury.

     A federal appeals court upheld the determination that only one of the officers violated the decedent's constitutional rights. But it reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the city on a claim that it was responsible for inadequately training that officer "on how to avoid on-duty/off-duty misidentifications in light of the department's policy that officers are always armed, and always on-duty."

     The appeals court found that there was enough evidence that the city was deliberately indifferent in its training and "lack of protocols" in this area, and that the training deficiencies and absence of protocols were causally linked to the use of excessive force in this case so that a reasonable jury could find in the plaintiff's favor. The appeals court therefore ordered a jury trial on the claim that the city inadequately trained the officer who was found to have violated the decedent's rights.

     There was some testimony that there was no training, in connection with the always armed, always on duty policy, about officers identifying themselves while off-duty in such circumstances, although this was disputed.

     There was also some testimony from an expert witness that the "always armed/always on-duty" policy was "inherently dangerous," and that specific training and a protocol were therefore necessary to avoid "friendly fire" shootings of off-duty officers. There was also some evidence of past misidentifications of off-duty personnel, particularly involving minority officers.

     The appeals court also pointed to some evidence that officers were sometimes unclear as to what exactly the policy required, including whether or not it only required action when there was a life threatening situation, pointing to the need to train on the policy.

     The appeals court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this training "ever took place," and it noted that some of the described training was "not documented," and the testimony of some witnesses concerning it was in conflict. While there was evidence that the general policy of the police department was to document training, for "unclear reasons any on-duty/off-duty training was evidently undocumented." In summary, there were substantial unresolved factual issues as to the amount of training the department actually gave to the officers, including the officer found to have used excessive force in this case, on avoiding misidentifications of off-duty officers.

The jury could find that there was, at best, very minimal training on these issues, and no real program of training on them at all. [...] A finding of deliberate indifference requires also that the City have disregarded a known or obvious risk of serious harm from its failure to develop a training program that dealt with off-duty identifications in the context of its always armed/always on-duty policy. We think the jury could reasonably make such a finding here. Such knowledge can be imputed to a municipality through a pattern of prior constitutional violations. [There was] some evidence from which a jury could find that it was common knowledge within the PPD that misidentifications of off-duty officers responding to an incident often occurred in Providence, particularly misidentification of minority officers. It is clear that a jury could find a pattern of knowledge of prior misidentifications and that this was likely to pose a significant risk of harm.

     While there was no evidence of a prior "friendly fire" incident, a jury could find from the evidence that the department knew there was a high risk that in the absence of particularized training on avoiding off-duty misidentifications, and given the always armed/always on-duty policy, friendly fire shootings "were likely to occur," so that a failure to adequately provide training to avoid this would be deliberate indifference.

     Young v. City of Providence, No. 04-1374, 404 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2005).

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Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on their alleged use of excessive force while executing a search warrant on the home of a dentist and his wife based on suspicion of growing marijuana, when there was no belief that the home's occupants were armed or would resist or flee. Appeals court also finds that, if alleged lies by deputy were removed from affidavit for search warrant, there would be nothing left justifying the issuance of the warrant.

     An officer assigned to a sheriff department's marijuana eradication team (MET) obtained a search warrant for the home of a dentist and his wife on the basis of information that the dentist was possibly growing marijuana. A group of five officers subsequently entered the home, encountering the dentist as he came into the house from the back door, and pointing a gun at him, ordering him to lie down.

     The officer then pushed his gun at the rear of the dentist's head and placed his knee in the small of his back. Another officer allegedly encountered the dentist's wife, who was just getting up, and allegedly sharply poked his fingers five to seven times at her throat, forcing her back into the bedroom, and telling her to get on the floor. A gun was allegedly pointed at her and then brought into contact with her head for 30 seconds, and an officer allegedly "kneed" her in the small of her back and handcuffed her. Nothing in the search warrant indicated that any weapons were being sought in the search.

     The homeowners sued, and the trial court denied qualified immunity to the defendant officers on claims of excessive use of force and deception in obtaining the search warrant.

     A federal appeals court upheld this result. It found that on the conceded facts, there was no "emergency" justifying the alleged batteries on the plaintiffs. There was nothing to suggest that the practicing dentist who was the suspect in the case would resist or flee, and the officers stated no belief that the plaintiffs would be armed, or had criminal histories. There was also no reason not to identify themselves before giving orders to the plaintiffs as they invaded their home in the early morning, the court stated.

     The appeals court found that the officer's use of fingers at the throat of the dentist's wife, if true, constituted a "separate battery that a reasonable officer would know was excessive."

     The appeals court also found that if the alleged lies were removed from the affidavit for the search warrant, there would be nothing left to justify a search. What was left, the court stated, "is an unidentified citizen at an unidentified date telling a sheriff's deputy of marijuana growing at an unidentified time; also the presence of a rock and two pots, the uses of which are ambiguous. No magistrate could have authorized a search on this basis, essentially amounting to an informant's tentative tip."

     Baldwin v. Placer County, No. 04-15848, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 6626 (9th Cir.).

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Federal trial court abused its discretion in awarding $23,114.14 in attorneys' fees to two plaintiffs as prevailing parties even though their federal civil rights lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice. The fact that they obtained released from their multi-year prison sentences through post-conviction filings in state court did not alter the result, as the so-called "catalyst" theory is no longer viable as a basis for awards of attorneys' fees in federal civil rights cases.

     Two women were convicted of violating a Mississippi state "bad check" law, and were sentenced to multi-year prison sentences without having lawyers. This allegedly occurred due to a policy of the county prosecutor's office of enforcing the statute in question by taking offenders directly to the justice court, to pay restitution, and having them sign a waiver of attorney form without explanation. The justice court judge allegedly did not conduct independent examinations concerning the waivers of counsel, and those offenders who could not pay the amount indicated by the statute for such violations were incarcerated.

     The two women, while serving their sentences, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit challenging both the constitutionality of the bad check law on the basis of an alleged equal protection violation, and the procedure by which the county enforced the law (claiming deprivation of the right to counsel). A day later, they also filed motions for post-conviction relief in state court, asserting the same constitutional violations. The state court subsequently ruled in their favor, finding that the policies and procedures employed by the prosecutor's officer were unconstitutional and denied the plaintiffs their right to counsel, and ordered that they be released.

     The prosecutor subsequently made several revisions to the policies used to enforce the bad check law to ensure that accused offenders were notified of their right to counsel. The trial court in the federal civil rights lawsuit dismissed claims for injunctive relief as moot, and subsequently found that the bad check law was facially constitutional.

     The plaintiffs were subsequently granted an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $23,114.14 on the basis that they were "prevailing parties" under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, because their lawsuits had forced the prosecutor to change her office's procedures on enforcing the bad check law.

     A federal appeals court has held that this award was erroneous. In Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the so called "catalyst theory" of awarding attorneys' fees, under which plaintiffs were considered prevailing parties even if their cases settled or became moot, so long as the lawsuit itself was a "substantial factor or significant catalyst" that caused the defendants to voluntarily change their behavior to the result plaintiffs desired.

     To qualify as a prevailing party, the appeals court stated, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain "at least some relief on the merits of his claim." The appeals court agreed with the prosecutor that the plaintiffs in this case did not obtain any relief in their federal civil rights lawsuit.

     The fact that they received post-conviction relief in the state trial court, the appeals court found, was irrelevant to an award of attorneys' fees under Sec. 1988.

While Plaintiffs did not corral their arguments for fees under the catalyst theory, and the district court properly memorialized its inability to rely on the catalyst theory to award such fees, this is precisely what occurred. The district court allowed an award where the court itself had effected "no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties" - a key component of catalyst theory-based awards - in violation of Buckhannon.

     Their federal civil rights case was, in fact, dismissed with prejudice, and that did not qualify as action taken by the trial court in their favor sufficient to support an award of attorneys' fees. The appeals court found, therefore, that the trial court abused its discretion in designating the plaintiffs as "prevailing" for purposes of Sec. 1988, and awarding them attorneys' fees.

     Baily v. State of Mississippi, No. 04-60412, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 6794 (5th Cir.).

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Florida sheriff did not act as an arm of the state in attempting to enforce a county dance hall ordinance against the owner of a private nightclub, and was therefore not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity against the club owner's federal civil rights lawsuit.

     The operator of a private nightclub in Florida filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the county sheriff, asserting claims arising out of the sheriff's efforts to enforce a county dance hall ordinance. The federal trial court dismissed the lawsuit against the sheriff as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, barring claims for damages in federal court against states and state entities, and also dismissed claims against the county on the same basis.

     A federal appeals court, finding that the county sheriff, in acting to enforce the ordinance, was not an arm of the state, and therefore was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. It also reinstated claims against the county, which it noted was a municipality, which the Eleventh Amendment does not immunize against suit.

     The ordinance in question required a permit for clubs featuring music and dancing but not licensed to serve alcohol, and prohibits the presence of those under 18 years of age after midnight or those under 21 years of age after 3 a.m. The county, its sheriff, and its fire marshal undertook a series of actions to enforce the ordinance against the club owner, and arrested him ultimately on alleged criminal violations, including violations of the ordinance. Three further arrests occurred, followed by a cease and desist order from the fire marshal, summarily closing down the business, and other instances of alleged harassment of the plaintiff and his employees. The employees were allegedly told to quit their jobs or be arrested, and patrons of the club were also allegedly threatened with arrest. The club owner was found guilty of three counts of operating a dance hall without a permit and also of selling alcohol without a license.

     He subsequently asserted claims for false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and a variety of other violations of his constitutional rights.

     In rejecting the trial court's decision that the sheriff was an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in the lawsuit, the federal appeals court noted that the relevant "function" he was performing, which was the basis of all of the plaintiff's claims, was the enforcement of a county ordinance.

     The appeals court found prior caselaw in both federal and state courts on the issue unambiguous--a Florida sheriff does not act as an arm of the state in carrying out the enforcement of a county ordinance. While it is possible that in carrying out some other functions specified by state law, the sheriff could act as an arm of the state, such as the service of state process, this did not apply in this case. Additionally, the court noted that the sheriff's office was funded entirely through county taxes, so that an award of damages against him was not an award against the state.

     Abusaid v. Hillsborough County Bd., No. 03-16243, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 6341 (11th Cir.).

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Police officers' refusal to issue desk appearance tickets and release arrested gay rights demonstrators immediately after their arrest was not objectively unreasonable, so trial court properly dismissed lawsuit claiming that the prolonged post-arrest detentions violated due process. Appeals court further finds that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard was the proper one to apply.

      During a large demonstration in New York City to "protest anti-gay violence" and honor the memory of Matthew Shepard, a gay college student who had been murdered in Wyoming, police officers arrested a number of the demonstrators. They were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct when they walked or stood in the roadway and failed to return to the sidewalk when ordered to do so by officers. Most were taken to a police station; all were held overnight, or at least until after midnight, and then released, and none were subsequently convicted.

     A number of the arrestees filed a federal civil rights lawsuit arguing that officers, in refusing to simply issue desk appearance tickets to them, and release them immediately after their arrests, acted in an objectively unreasonable manner, and therefore violated their due process rights by prolonging their detention.

     The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding the due process claims untenable because the plaintiffs failed to show either a protected liberty interest or, that if any such interest existed, that the complained of conduct imposed an impact on that interest sufficient to create an "issue of constitutional dimension."

     A federal appeals court agreed that the lawsuit was properly dismissed, but ruled that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, rather than due process, was the proper legal framework for analyzing the plaintiff's claims, and found that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner.

     The appeals court noted that the demonstration in question involved thousands of people and that many of them obstructed traffic and moved into or even sat down in the street. A total of 115 people, including the seven plaintiffs, were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, and the plaintiffs were kept in custody between 5 and 23 hours before their release.

     The appeals court further noted that New York state law did not create a protected right to the issuance of a desk appearance ticket, and that the use of it was purely discretionary.

     The plaintiffs failed to show that the officers' actions in refusing to issue them desk appearance tickets immediately after their arrest was objectively unreasonable, since they had no mandatory right to the issuance of such tickets to begin with. The length of the plaintiffs' detentions, further, did not come close to the presumptively unreasonable 48-hour mark without being brought before a court for a probable cause hearing.

     Finally, in the context of an ongoing mass demonstration in which thousands were disobeying police orders, there was a need for substantial police manpower.

In all the circumstances, we cannot conclude that defendants' refusal to issue desk appearance tickets to plaintiffs on the evening of the Shepard demonstration was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs' denial-of-desk-appearance-tickets claims.

     Bryant v. City of N.Y., No. 04-0199, 404 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2005).

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California city's ordinance allowing the seizure of cars used to solicit prostitution or carry out drug transactions, was violative of due process by failing to provide for a reasonably prompt post-seizure hearing on the probable merits of the city's forfeiture case.

     Noting that "in California, a motor vehicle is practically a necessity of life," an intermediate California appeals court has ruled that an ordinance under which a city there seizes and holds motor vehicles allegedly used to solicit acts of prostitution or to carry out drug transactions was invalid because it failed to provide a mechanism for car owners to seek a reasonably swift hearing on the probable merit of the city's right to detain the vehicle.

     The city's ordinance allows the seizure of a vehicle on the basis of a police officer's determination that there is probable cause that the ordinance has been violated. As worded, the ordinance failed to provide for any judicial determination of probable cause on the validity of the seizure until at a trial on the forfeiture, which, "in practical effect," does not occur for a minimum of several weeks, during which the vehicle owner is deprived of the use of their vehicle.

     This, the court found, violates the car owner's right to procedural due process, based on the significance of the property interest involved. In practice, the court noted, trials on the forfeitures of the vehicles often do not take place "in the real world," for two, three or four months in the vast majority of cases. "Any procedural scheme that permits the City to seize a vehicle off the street without a prior hearing must contain its own provisions for prompt post-seizure review," the court stated.

     O'Connell v. City of Stockton, No. C044400, 2005 Cal. App. Lexis 639;128 Cal. App. 4th 831.

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Deputy who intentionally rammed a speeding motorist he was pursuing, rendering the driver a quadriplegic, was not entitled to qualified immunity when the motorist's only offense was speeding. Supervisor, who authorized a safer "Precision Intervention Technique" (PIT), which the deputy did not carry out, was entitled to summary judgment.

     A county deputy and his supervisor appealed from the denial of their motions for qualified immunity in a lawsuit by a motorist claiming that the deputy violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force during a high-speed car chase and that the supervisor improperly authorized the use of that force.

     A federal appeals court found that the deputy, who rendered the pursued motorist a quadriplegic when he rammed his vehicle from behind at high-speed, was not entitled to qualified immunity. The supervisor, however, was ruled to be entitled to summary judgment, as he had not authorized the action that the deputy took, but instead a different safer maneuver, known as a "PIT," which the deputy did not in fact, carry out.

     After the motorist's vehicle was clocked as going at 73 miles an hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, a deputy flashed his blue lights, but the motorist kept driving at a high rate of speed, passing vehicles on double yellow traffic control lanes, and running through two red lights. The deputy radioed in about his pursuit of the vehicle and broadcast its license plate. The pursued vehicle entered an adjoining county, and continued to flee after encountering two police vehicles there.

     The pursuing deputy radioed a request for "Permission to PIT him." A "PIT" ("Precision Intervention Technique") maneuver is a driving technique designed to stop a fleeing motorist safely and quickly by hitting the fleeing car at a specific point on the vehicle, which throws the car into a spin and brings it to a stop. The deputy had allegedly not been trained in executing this maneuver, and he and fellow officers did not undergo training on it until after the incident. The defendant supervisor responded to the radio call and granted permission to employ the PIT, telling the deputy to "go ahead and take him out."

     At the time, the supervisor allegedly did not know how the pursuit originated, the speeds of the vehicles, the number of motorists or pedestrians on the roadways, or how dangerously the motorist was driving. He allegedly tuned into the transmissions about the pursuit late and did not request additional detail.

     After receiving approval, the deputy determined that he could not perform the PIT maneuver because he was going too fast, and instead rammed his cruiser directly into the motorist's vehicle, causing him to lose control, leave the roadway, run down an embankment, and crash, suffering injuries that rendered him a quadriplegic.

     Under the circumstances, the appeals court found that the ramming of the motorist's car could constitute a use of "deadly force" under the circumstances, although none of the "antecedent conditions" for the use of such force existed in this case, since there was no suspicion that the motorist had committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, and prior to the chase, he did not pose an imminent threat of serious physical harm to the deputy or others.

     His sole crime when the pursuit began was speeding. "The use of deadly force is not 'reasonable' in a high-speed chase based only on speeding and evading arrest," the court stated, and a high-speed chase of a suspect fleeing after a traffic infraction does not amount to a "substantial threat" of imminent physical harm required before deadly force can be used.

     Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that the deputy violated the motorist's rights. The appeals court rejected the argument, however, that the supervisor could also be held liable under these circumstances.

     While the supervisor authorized a PIT, "a driving technique designed to stop a fleeing motorist safely and quickly by hitting the fleeing car at a specific point on the vehicle, which throws the car into a spin and brings it to a stop," which by definition assumes that the maneuver will be executed at lower speeds by properly trained officers, and therefore can terminate a flight "safely," the PIT was not, in fact, carried out.

     The actions the deputy instead took, of ramming the pursued car at a very high speed from behind, was not authorized by the supervisor, so the supervisor could not be held liable for it. The appeals court could not say that the conduct in authorizing a safe PIT that was not executed, violated the motorist's rights. It therefore ordered the entry of summary judgment for the supervisor.

     Harris v. Coweta County, No. 03-15094, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 6721 (11th Cir.).

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Federal appeals court overturns summary judgment in favor of town constable in civil rights lawsuit claiming that he broke into man's apartment unlawfully and left eviction papers on the kitchen floor. Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence supporting his claim that he was not home at the time the constable claimed to have personally served him with the papers to survive a motion for summary judgment.

     A Vermont resident sued the town and the town constable, claiming that the constable's alleged uninvited entry into his apartment violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. He claimed that the constable broke into his apartment one day when no one was home to serve him with eviction papers, which he left on the kitchen floor. His wife allegedly found the papers on the floor when she returned home in the afternoon, after having left in the morning.

     The constable admitted that he went to the apartment that day to serve the eviction papers, but asserted that the man was home, and that he personally served the man with the documents at 10:42 a.m., or approximately 30 minutes after the man claimed to have left for the day.

     The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment by the town and constable, finding that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of showing that the constable had made an unauthorized entry into the apartment, and ruling that none of the evidence submitted demonstrated that the plaintiff was not in fact home at the time the constable claimed to have served him in person. The trial court also ruled that the town could not be held vicariously liable for the constable's alleged actions in any event, in the absence of any showing of an official municipal policy or custom that resulted in the alleged harm.

     A federal appeals court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding an award of summary judgment to the constable. Conflicting statements by the plaintiff, his wife, and the constable, concerning whether someone was home at the time the papers were left there established an issue of material fact.

     Additionally, the plaintiff presented various supporting documents, including receipts and affidavits, that appeared to establish that he and his wife had spent the morning running errands and visiting with relatives before returning in the afternoon.

     On this basis, the court found that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of his claim to survive a motion for summary judgment, based on a disputed issue of material fact.

     The appeals court upheld, however, the dismissal of the claims against the town, finding no allegations sufficient to show the presence of an official policy or custom causing the alleged unlawful entry into the apartment.

     Coon v. Town of Springfield, No. 02-7518, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 6160 (2d Cir.).

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Police officers and sheriff's deputy were not entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly seizing "truckloads" of personal property while executing search warrant at residence for the sole purpose of supporting sentencing enhancement in a pending case by proving that the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club was a gang, or for shooting two dogs at the residence.

     Seven police officers and a deputy sheriff appealed from a decision of a federal trial court denying their motions for qualified immunity in a lawsuit arising out of the simultaneous executive of search warrants at the residences of members of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club and at the Hells Angels clubhouse in San Jose, California.

     While executing one of the search warrants at a residence, the officers shot two of the homeowner's dogs, and while searching another person's property, they shot and killed one of the dogs there. Also, during the searches at all of the locations, at the alleged direction of the deputy sheriff, the officers allegedly seized literally "truckloads" of personal property for the sole purpose of showing in a murder prosecution that the Hells Angels had "common symbols," in order to qualify it as a criminal street gang and therefore support a sentencing enhancement under California law against the defendant in that case. In the course of seizing this "indicia" evidence, the officers allegedly seized numerous expensive Harley-Davidson motorcycles, a concrete slab, and a refrigerator door, causing significant damages to the items seized as well as to other property.

     A federal appeals court upheld the denial of qualified immunity to the officers and sheriff's deputy on Fourth Amendment claims regarding these seizures.

     The court held that the deputy's instructions to seize "truckloads" of personal property, including the motorcycles and a piece of concrete, for the sole purpose of proving that the Hells Angels was a gang was an unreasonable execution of the search warrants in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that a reasonable officer, at the time, would have had notice that this conduct was unlawful.

     The appeals court also held that the shootings of the dogs at both residences were unreasonable seizures and an unreasonable execution of the search warrants. The court found that exigent circumstances did not exist at either residence justifying the shooting of the dogs, as the police officers had a week to consider the "options and tactics available for an encounter with the dogs," but failed to develop a realistic plan for incapacitating the dogs other than shooting them. This, the unnecessary destruction of property during the execution of a search warrant, the court also found, would have been known to have been unlawful by any reasonable officer.

     The search warrants authorized searches to attempt to recover a videotape thought to be relevant to the murder case, notes or records of Hells Angels meetings, and indicia of Hells Angels affiliation or membership. The videotape and meeting notes were not found, but numerous items of Hells Angels indicia were seized.

     Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the appeals court concluded that the authority to seize indicia evidence to support a sentencing enhancement against the defendant in the murder trial "did not justify the level of intrusion and excessive property damage that occurred during the search of the various locations." The search for indicia of Hells Angels affiliation, the court noted, served a limited purpose, and the property seized was not evidence of a crime, but merely support for a sentencing enhancement against one individual.

The indicia warrants, like many warrants, authorized the search of nearly every corner of the residence. Unlike most warrants, these warrants were issued to obtain evidence on just one fact--membership in the Hells Angels. Unlike most warrants, the evidence on this issue would be needlessly cumulative once enough evidence was obtained to establish membership. While additional evidence would usually show the breadth of criminal activity, in the instant case additional evidence would at some point have no additional probative value in determining membership.

     Further, none of the items seized, not even photographs of them, were ultimately presented at the murder trial, according to the court. Despite the lack of prior caselaw on the subject, the appeals court said, the unreasonableness of this would be "apparent" to a reasonable officer.

     San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, No. 02-16329, 402 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2005).

     » Click here to read the text of the court decision on the Internet. [PDF]

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Strip searches of more than twenty male and female students by schoolteachers, seeking to recover stolen money, carried out, in part, at the direction of a police officer, were unconstitutional, but defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from liability because the law on the issue was not clearly established in May of 2000.

     More than twenty students, both males and females, were allegedly subjected to strip searches by teachers at a high school. The searches of the female students were allegedly carried out at the direction of a police officer summoned to the school after a female student in the gym class reported that her prom money, amounting to a few hundred dollars, had been stolen. A number of the students sued both the teachers and the police officer. The stolen money was not recovered.

     A federal appeals court ruled that the "actions of the defendants in this case were unconstitutional," but also found that in May of 2000, the time of the searches, the law regarding the reasonableness of a strip search under these circumstances was not clearly established, so the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

     The appeals court found that it was the scope of the searches in this case that did not "pass constitutional muster." The court found that the scope of the search exceeded what would normally be expected by a high school student in a locker room, and some students were allegedly individually and directly examined as they undressed.

     The court also found that the governmental interest in recovering the stolen money was not as great as in instances where school administrators are searching for items that pose a threat to student health or safety, such as drugs or weapons.

The government may have a comparatively strong interest in searching a particular student reasonably suspected of theft, because of the likelihood that the search will be successful. Such interest is diluted considerably when, instead of one, two, or three students, the school officials search over twenty students, without reason to suspect that any particular student was responsible for the alleged theft. In that case the intrusive search of each individual is that much less likely to be successful.

     The searches of the female students, unlike the males, did not require them to remove their underwear, but the girls, unlike the males, were required to undress in front of one another, which further supported the conclusion that the searches were unreasonable, according to the court.

     Since the law on the subject of student strip searches was not "clearly established" at the time, however, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

     Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., No. 03-1904, 402 F.3d 598 (6th Cir.2005).

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Conducting an investigatory strip search to attempt to discover drugs on persons already arrested for a different offense violated the arrestees' civil rights, federal appeals court rules, in the absence of reasonable suspicion of possession of drugs. Officer was entitled to qualified immunity on carrying out strip searches at all, but not on the clearly unreasonable manner in which he was alleged to have carried them out.

     A three-judge federal appeals panel ruled that a police officer who allegedly subjected two African-American college students to a strip search after stopping them for speeding was entitled to qualified immunity for conducting the searches without reasonable suspicion that they were concealing contraband or weapons, for his alleged verbal abuse of them, and for the "humiliating" way in which the strip searches were allegedly conducted. Evans v. City of Zebulon, No. 02-16424, 351 F.3d 485 (11th Cir. 2003), previously reported on in Liability Reporter (January 2004). [PDF]. The full federal appeals court granted rehearing en banc, and reversed part of this ruling, finding that the strip search violated the arrestees' civil rights.

     The case involved a Georgia police officer who stopped two African-American college students for speeding. He demanded that the driver take a sobriety test, and when he refused, placed him under arrest. The officer later claimed, although it was disputed, that he found a beer can in the car, and a beer can pop-top on the person of one of the students. These items were not displayed for a video camera that the officer had which captured some of the traffic stop. The officer also placed the passenger under arrest, on the basis of an existing warrant for parole violation for a person with the same last name and birth date. The students claim that once at the police station, officers used racial slurs against them, placed them in choke holds, and strip-searched them, allegedly displaying a slender metal object and placing it near their buttocks while talking about the prevalence of prison rape.

     An officer subsequently claimed that he had conducted the strip searches because he had a reasonable suspicion that the arrestees had drugs based on their demeanor (nervousness at the roadside stop), and their prior story to him about being lost.

     The full appeals court concluded that the strip searches, as a post-arrest criminal investigation were unreasonable, because they were not supported by a reasonable suspicion of the existence of drug evidence. It also ruled that even if some strip search might have been lawful, the manner in which these strip searches were performed was also unreasonable as a matter of law.

     The full appeals court also concluded that the right not to be free altogether of a strip search under these circumstances was not already clearly established at the time of the incident, but that the Fourth Amendment, by itself, provided at the time of the search, "sufficient notice" that the manner of these particular searches was "unreasonable" in a constitutional sense.

     The appeals court noted that the plaintiffs were not arrested for drugs, but for DUI refusal and an outstanding arrest warrant for an unspecified offense. Additionally, the officer, who searched their car for over ten minutes, found nothing about drugs, and he also checked their pockets and twice patted them down before he strip-searched them, with these searches revealing nothing. He did not observe them trying to hide anything.

Thus, we decide, bearing all the circumstances in mind, that Officer Stephens violated Plaintiffs' right to be free from an unreasonable search when he performed an investigatory strip search for drugs: he was without the necessary reasonable suspicion that Plaintiffs (arrested on other charges) had drugs -- the asserted ground for the searches -- on their person.

     Most importantly, the appeals court found that the manner in which the strip searches were conducted was carried out in an unconstitutional manner.

Plaintiffs were taken to and searched in an abnormal place (thus, capable of exciting more fear): a broom closet or supply room, not a dedicated search cell, medical examination room, or even a bathroom. Each Plaintiff was forced to disrobe, ridiculed, and penetrated by an object in front of the other. The physical aspects of the searches are also disturbing. Unnecessary force was used. Evans was thrown into Jordan, causing both men to collapse. As Jordan tried to stand back up, Officer Stephens hit him with a baton-like object. It matters that a body cavity search was undertaken. In addition, while conducting the search, Stephens inserted the same baton or club -- without intervening sanitation -- in each Plaintiffs' anus and used the same baton or club to lift each man's testicles. Apart from other issues, this last practice is highly unsanitary.

     The officer's "threatening and racist" language also added to the clear unconstitutional manner in which the strip searches were carried out.

We do not imply that words alone can make the manner of an otherwise properly conducted search unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. But in this case, the totality of the circumstances -- for example, the physical force, anal penetration, unsanitariness of the process, terrifying language, and lack of privacy -- collectively establish a constitutional violation, especially when the search was being made in the absence of exigent circumstances requiring the kind of immediate action that might make otherwise questionable police conduct, at least arguably, reasonable.

     Even though, at the time of the searches, an objectively reasonable officer might not have been clear that any strip search was barred in these circumstances in the absence of reasonable suspicion of possession of drugs or contraband, the appeals court found that the "totality of the circumstances" made the manner in which the searches were carried out clearly unreasonable.

     Evans v. Stephens, No. 02-1642, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 8071 (11th Cir.).

     » Click here to read the text of the court decision on the Internet. [PDF]

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Assault and Battery: Baton/Nightstick

     Officer's use of baton against individual in the course of attempting to clear an intersection following receipt of an anonymous bomb threat was reasonable when individual failed to comply with orders to leave, and the baton was only used to push him away from the officer and in the direction of the crowd leaving the intersection. Zavala v. Parks, No. 03-55839, 124 Fed. Appx. 527 (9th Cir. 2005).

Assault and Battery: Physical

     Jury instructions stating that a mistaken but reasonable belief that the use of force was justified in a situation as a state trooper perceived it were not improper and did not change the applicable legal standard as to whether force was reasonable from an objective to a subjective one. Jury verdict in favor of trooper in lawsuit by arrestee claiming excessive use of force upheld. Hung v. Evanko, No. 03-4475, 115 Fed. Appx. 553 (3rd Cir. 2004). [PDF]

Attorneys' Fees: For Plaintiffs

     Prisoner who was awarded $1 in nominal damages in federal civil rights lawsuit against off-duty police officer who allegedly violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in smashing the window of his car with a baton during confrontation prior to his incarceration was properly also awarded $9,680 in attorneys' fees and $915.16 in expenses by trial court. Federal appeals court rules that provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act's which limits attorneys' fee awards in prisoner suits to 150% of the money judgment, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(d), did not apply to civil rights claims that arose before the prisoner was incarcerated. Robbins v. Chronister, No. 02-3115, 402 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 2005).

Defamation

     Release of information about parents suspected of child abuse, but later exonerated, did not constitute libel under Nevada law when release was limited to a state registry for substantiated cases of abuse and neglect, since such a release and publication of the information was privileged. Neason v. Clark County, Nevada, No. CV-S-02-1110, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Nev. 2005).

Defenses: Sovereign Immunity

     Claims by an arrestee's daughter for his death based on the alleged use of excessive force during the arrest were based on alleged intentional misconduct, rather than negligence, and therefore were excluded from the scope of a Texas state statute waiving sovereign immunity, so that complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. City of Garland, Texas v. Rivera, No. 05-04-00516-CV, 146 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. App. 2004).

Defenses: Statute of Limitations

     While a two-year Illinois statute of limitations for personal injury cases applied to federal civil rights claims against a municipality and its police officer, a shorter one-year statute of limitations applied to state law claims against the same defendants joined with the federal civil rights lawsuit. Both federal and state law claims were time barred and were therefore properly dismissed. Williams v. Lampe, No. 04-1497, 399 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2003). [PDF]

     In a lawsuit concerning the death of an Ohio resident allegedly caused by the distress the Ohio father suffered over the purported wrongful arrest of his son by California police officers, a California state six-month statute of limitations applied, rather than a two-year Ohio statute of limitations. The federal trial court, applying the California statute to the father's federal civil rights claim, therefore properly dismissed the lawsuit as time barred. Estate of Darulis v. Garate, No. 03-16580, 401 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2005).[PDF]

Domestic Violence

     The Illinois Domestic Violence Act, 750 ILCS 60/305, which waived liability against municipalities for officers' willful and wanton misconduct, rather than the absolute immunity allegedly provided to officers under the Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/4-102, applied to a lawsuit brought by the estate of a domestic abuse victim seeking damages for wrongful death against officers who allegedly failed to adequately investigate a 911 call reporting domestic violence and left the scene of the disturbance only minutes before the husband shot the wife to death. Moore v. Green, #1-03-2651, 822 N.E.2d 69 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2004).

False Arrest/Imprisonment: No Warrant

     Officers lacked probable cause to arrest woman on two-month old tip from an informant concerning alleged drug transactions and police chief's belief that she had lied when asked about her prior whereabouts. Observation of arrestee for eight consecutive Friday evenings failed to corroborate informant's claim that she had been making a drug buy each Friday. Travis v. Village of Dobbs Ferry, No. 02 Civ. 6155, 355 F. Supp. 2d 740 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

     Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on false arrest claims asserted by wife and daughter they arrested for obstructing legal process after they allegedly screamed at the officers and attempted to intervene as the officers allegedly physically assaulted their husband and father. Facts alleged made it at least arguable that the actions of the arrestees constituted such obstruction. Demster v. City of Lenexa, No. 04-2420, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Kan. 2005).

     Officers were entitled to qualified immunity for arresting juvenile murder victim's brother for her killing based on the facts, which included the murder victim being found dead in her clothes and none of the other members of the household hearing the victim scream, suggesting that she knew her attacker, and inconsistencies in the arrestee's statement. Crowe v. County of San Diego, No. 99CV0241, 359 F. Supp. 2d 994 (S.D. Cal. 2005).

False Arrest/Imprisonment: Warrant

     Deputy sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity on claims that she omitted material exculpatory facts from an affidavit used to obtain an arrest warrant, including an alleged failure to note that an outstanding bench warrant was for a firearms citation rather than a stalking incident, and that the deputy had a letter from the prosecutor stating that no charges were currently pending. Melessa v. Randall, No. 03-4237, 121 Fed. Appx. 803 (10th Cir. 2005).

Federal Tort Claims Act

     Liquor store owners stated a viable possible claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b) based on alleged conduct of FBI agents who allegedly passed their names on to racketeers after they reported to police that they were victims of extortion by the racketeers, resulting in damage to their businesses. The racketeers were allegedly being protected by the FBI agents as confidential informants, and the agents acted within the scope of their employment under the FTCA in taking their alleged actions. The actions did not come within the "discretionary function" exemption to the FTCA, because the agents had "no room" for the exercise of discretion under extensive FBI regulations concerning how to handle confidential informants. The claims asserted, however, were time barred under the applicable statute of limitations, so the complaint was dismissed. Rakes v. United States, No. CIV.A.02-10480, 352 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D. Mass. 2005).

Freedom of Information

     Information pertaining to police officers and former officers, including names, birth dates, department names, appointment dates, appointment status, termination dates, and reason for termination, obtained by the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards from officer personnel records, are exempt from disclosure to a newspaper under the California Public Records Act. While the information did constitute public records which could be made available to litigants in a lawsuit via the discovery process, it was not available to non-litigants via a simple request for public records. Cal. Comm'n v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento County, No. C045494, 2005 Cal. App. Lexis 541 (Cal. 3d App. Dist.) [PDF]

Governmental Liability: Policy/Custom

     Police department and city could not be held liable for officers' alleged unconstitutional actions in making an arrest, in the absence of any showing that there was an official policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional deprivations. Grays v. City of New Rochelle, No. 03 CIV.1356, 354 F. Supp. 2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

Insurance

     Liability insurance policy issued to city did not provide coverage for police officer and another city employee on claims that they allegedly sexually assaulted arrestees because their alleged conduct was outside the scope of their employment. Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Mallard, No. 02-10786, 402 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2005). [PDF]

Negligence: Vehicle Related

     Jury's verdict in favor of an officer who allegedly ran over a victim who was lying in the road, resulting in his death, was not so clearly against the weight of the evidence in the case as to justify granting a new trial, in light of conflicting evidence as to whether the officer would have had a chance to avoid the accident, even if he had not fallen asleep. Hayes v. Garcia, No. 04-2009, 123 Fed. Appx. 858 (10th Cir. 2005).

Police Plaintiff: Firefighters' Rule

     Police officer's claim for injuries he suffered while exiting from a commercial truck he helped move after an accident in which it became wedged under a viaduct was not barred by the firefighters' rule under Illinois law. The police officer, in assisting in moving the truck, could claim to have acted in his capacity as an ordinary citizen with experience with tractor-trailers and not within the scope of his official duties, so that his injuries arguably did not arise from negligence causing an emergency requiring his presence as an officer. Knight v. Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc., 03-C-9019, 350 F. Supp. 2d 775 (N.D. Ill. 2004).

Public Protection: Crime Victims

     County and deputy sheriff to whom a deputy surrendered his weapon under the terms of an order of protection obtained by his wife were not liable for his subsequent killing of his wife with another weapon he allegedly stole from a weapons locker. The Defendants did not have any special relationship with the wife imposing a duty to protect her under New York state law. Farley v. County of Erie, 791 N.Y.S.2d 251 (A.D. 4th Dept. 2005). [PDF]

Public Protection: 911 Phone Systems

     Police department was not liable for the death of a man who became ill at another person's home based on alleged failure to timely respond to a 911 call for assistance. The claims asserted were barred by governmental immunity under Connecticut state law in the absence of knowledge that a failure to act would be likely to expose an identifiable person to an imminent harm. Glorioso v. Police Department of the Town of Burlington, No. X01CV02-01684818, 867 A.2d 160 (Conn. Super. 2004).

Pursuits: Law Enforcement

     Factual issue as to whether state trooper had acted with gross negligence in beginning and failing to end a high-speed pursuit of a motorist suspected of driving under the influence (DUI), resulting in the death of the pursued driver, was an issue for the jury, so that award of $250,000 in damages (reduced from jury's $3.75 million award under applicable limits under state law) was proper. Officer was not entitled to discretionary immunity for his decision to start or continue the immediate pursuit of a suspect. Clark v. South Carolina Department of Public Safety, No. 25926, 608 S.E.2nd 573 (S.C. 2005).

Search and Seizure: Home/Business

     Officers were not justified in entering a home without a search warrant to purportedly search for persons who might be in need of assistance after they were informed that a number of gunshots had allegedly come from the home's backyard, since they had no specific facts which would give a reasonable officer a basis to believe that someone inside had been wounded. Causey v. City of Bay City, No. 02-CV-10318, 353 F. Supp. 2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2005).

Search and Seizure: Media Presence

     Subjecting a homeowner, following a search of his home and his arrest for dealing in harmful materials to a minor and a drug offense, to a "perp walk" resulting in him being photographed as he was led from his home to a police vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. The media representatives did not enter the homeowner's property, and the officers' actions were reasonable, since the residence may have been used to victimize young women and expose them to sex and drugs. Publication of the photos of the arrestee's face could help alert other possible victims and encourage them to provide information to aid the investigation. Gibbons v. Lambert, No. 2:02 CV 01244, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. Utah 2005).

Search and Seizure: Person

     Officers acted reasonably in conducting a protective weapons search that resulted in the discovery of a gun. The officers, while questioning the suspect on reports that he had threatened to shoot people, observed an object under his clothing which appeared to be "weapon-like," after he refused to tell them whether he had a weapon, and initiated physical contact with them. Feinthel v. Payne, No. 04-3057, 121 Fed. Appx. 60 (6th Cir. 2004). [PDF]

Search and Seizure: Search Warrant

      Officers could not have reasonably believed that supervising officers were not violating arrestee's civil rights during execution of no-knock search warrant on home in allegedly conducting invasive body cavity searches of two women in front of male officers and visual body cavity searches of three men, or by allegedly physically assaulting persons present during the search without provocation. Defendants were not, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity. Officer who allegedly misled the magistrate into issuing the warrant by omitting material facts was also not entitled to qualified immunity. Bolden v. Village of Monticello, No. 04 CIV.1372, 344 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

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     Article: "Implementing a Cold Case Homicide Unit," by Vivian B. Lord, 74 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, No. 2, pgs. 1-6. (February 2005). [PDF] [HTML] "Cold case homicides present unique challenges to the investigators attempting to solve them."

     Article: "Revoking Consent to Search," by Jayme W. Holcomb, 74 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, No. 2, pgs. 25-32. (February 2005). [PDF] [HTML] "Officers must be aware of both the context in which the consent to search is withdrawn and the exact manner in which the individual revoked consent to search."

     Article: "Suicide by Cop," by Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, and Charles E. Miller III, 74 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, No. 2, pgs. 8-21. (February 2005). [PDF] [HTML] "The adoption of a national definition of suicide by cop, criteria to determine what constitutes such acts, and a reporting mechanism to record them must occur to effectively address the devastation brought about by this phenomenon."

     Publication: Anti-Trafficking News Bulletin, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Volume 2, Issue 1 (April 2005) 10 pgs, PDF. Provides recent news and analysis concerning law enforcement efforts to combat human trafficking. Additional information on the evils of human trafficking and the latest anti-trafficking efforts is available on the Internet at: http://www.usdoj.gov/trafficking.htm

     Publication: 2005 National Gang Threat Assessment. (2005, 74 pages, PDF). The purpose of the 2005 National Gang Threat Assessment is to provide a national and regional picture of the threat posed by gangs. It is anticipated that this document will help federal, state, and local policymakers and law enforcement administrators to better understand the dimensions of the gang problem and assist them in formulating policy and allocating resources most wisely. The National Alliance of Gang Investigators Associations (NAGIA), with funding and guidance from the Bureau of Justice Assistance and its partner agencies within the Department of Justice including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Drug Intelligence Center, conducted this threat assessment and prepared this report. NAGIA is a cooperative organization currently composed of representatives from 16 regional gang investigators associations representing over 15,000 gang investigators across the country, as well as federal agencies and other organizations involved in gang-related matters.

     Publication: Screening and Assessing Mental Health and Substance Use Disorders Among Youth in the Juvenile Justice System: A Resource Guide for Practitioners (NCJ 204956) December 2004 Report, 88 pages Grisso, T., Underwood, L. A. Presents information on instruments that can be used to screen and assess youth for mental health- and substance use-related disorders at various stages of the juvenile justice process. The Guide includes profiles of more than 50 instruments, guidelines for selecting instruments, and best practice recommendations for diverse settings and situations. It is intended as a basic tool for juvenile justice professionals working toward the goal of early, accurate identification of youth with mental disorders. Once identified, these youth can receive the services required to improve their lives, reduce recidivism, and promote community safety. Available online only. PDF(1.85 MB).

     Terrorism & Homeland Security Issues: U.S. Customs and Border Protection has published, in the Federal Register, the Final Rule for the CBP Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS). It finalizes the requirement for all commercial air and sea carriers to submit advanced information on all passengers and crewmembers prior to entry to or departure from the U.S.

     Website: Operation FALCON (“Federal And Local Cops Organized Nationally”), which was conducted April 4–10, 2005, resulted in Deputy U.S. Marshals and their law enforcement partners in local law enforcement arresting a total of 10,340 fugitives and clearing more than 13,800 felony warrants. Nearly 960 federal, state, and local agencies helped the USMS identify thousands of the nation’s most dangerous fugitives during Operation FALCON. The Marshals Service’s five regional fugitive task forces and three foreign field offices joined forces with their counterparts to put more than 3,000 law enforcement officers on the street during each day of the operation. The members of the task force prioritized for arrest those involved in homicides, sexual assaults, gang-related crimes, kidnappings, major drug offenses, crimes against children and the elderly, and unregistered sex offenders. In the honor of the victims, Operation FALCON was conducted in conjunction with National Crime Victim’s Rights Week.

     Reference:

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted civil liability law resources.