FEATURED CASES

WITH LINKS TO THE OPINIONS

Trial court improperly dismissed prisoner's lawsuit claiming that reduced access to prison law library resulted in him losing in an action to obtain certain "credit time" that he was entitled to. Appeals court rejects the reasoning that the right of access to the courts merely requires "access," the ability to file a complaint or appeal. "Lenient" standards should be applied in determining whether the prisoner's complaint, which he filed as his own attorney, stated a valid claim, and the trial court acted improperly in denying him the right to amend his complaint before a defendant had responded.

     An Indiana inmate, acting as his own attorney, filed a handwritten federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that the prison's superintendent, as well as other unnamed prison employees, violated his right of access to the courts by impeding his access to the law library at the facility. Before any of the defendants were served with his complaint, the prisoner filed a document he labeled "Petition To Amend Complaint And To Include The Submission of Exhibits and Affidavits." The trial court, acting without any further proceedings, summarily denied the inmate's petition to amend his complaint, and later dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim, under the screening procedures of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915A(b)(1).

     A federal appeals court reversed, ruling that inmates acting as their own attorneys ("pro se") should be given more "leeway" in amending their complaints, and that the prisoner's claims were sufficient to satisfy the "lenient" pleading requirements which should be applied to such pro se complaints.

     The prisoner's complaint asserted that access to the law library had been "diminished" and had lately been "non-existent," and that this had interfered with his ability to prepare for certain litigation, resulting in him being denied "credit time that I was entitled to," as well as interfering with his ability to act as his own attorney in a post-conviction challenge to his criminal conviction which was still pending, which he stated might result in him losing that case. His petition to amend the complaint asked for the court to appoint him "legal aid," which the appeals court understood to be a request for appointed counsel, and asked for leave to make four changes to his initial complaint.

     Specifically, he asked to name as defendants four specific prison employees, to increase his claim for damages from $5000 to $10,000, to demand a jury trial, and to attach several exhibits and affidavits. The petition also contained new factual allegations suggesting a claim for retaliation--specifically that, after he filed his federal civil rights complaint, he was removed from his prison job assignment and placed on "idle" status with no pay, and was denied educational and vocational opportunities, denied a transfer to a minimum security facility he claimed he was eligible for, and he was placed in a cell with violent offenders. Other inmates were also allegedly given the "authority and discretion" to charge him fees of money or commissary items to use the prison library.

     The trial court's denial of the petition to amend the complaint came in a one-sentence order with no explanation. The dismissal of the initial complaint was based on the trial judge's interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), and stated that prison officials have no duty to ensure that prisoners can litigate their claims effectively once they have been raised in court, and that the right to access "goes no further than access." The trial judge believed that because the prisoner had not claimed that he was prevented from filing a complaint or appeal because of his inability to gain access to legal assistance, he had no valid claim.

     The appeals court did agree that prisoners, in claims for violation of the right of access to the courts, must make specific allegations about some "prejudice" suffered because of the actions of prison officials. The "mere denial of access" to a law library or other legal materials is not, standing alone, a violation of a prisoner's right to access the courts. The prisoner must claim that the defendants' conduct prejudices a potentially meritorious challenge to the prisoner's conviction, sentence or conditions of confinement.

     In this case, the prisoner's initial complaint did assert that defendants had greatly diminished his access to the law library, and that this adversely affected his attempt to challenge the length of his incarceration. In considering whether to dismiss the complaint, the trial court was obligated to accept those allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prisoner, the appeals court stated.

     Apply that "lenient" pleading standard to the prisoner's complaint, the appeals court found that he sufficiently stated a claim for denial of access to the courts, making dismissal improper.

We do not agree that Lewis confines access-to-courts claims to situations where a prisoner has been unable to file a complaint or an appeal. Indeed, Lewis explained that a prisoner could prove a denial of access to the courts by showing that a complaint he prepared and filed "was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. So a prisoner's simple ability to file a complaint is not dispositive. A prisoner states an access-to-courts claim when he alleges that even though he successfully got into court by filing a complaint or petition challenging his conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement, his denial of access to legal materials caused a potentially meritorious claim to fail.

     The appeals court agreed, however, that the prisoner's complaint was insufficient in basing his claim on "speculation" that he would suffer some unspecified future harm during his pending post-conviction proceedings, which did not show an "actual or imminent injury."

     Further, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), "a party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served," and even after a defendant has responded, a plaintiff can amend a complaint by seeking the court's permission, which should be "freely given when justice so requires." Because the prisoner filed his petition to amend before the prison superintendent had answered, he had a right to amend his complaint at that point, so that the court's summary denial of his petition was improper.

     Marshall v. Knight, No. 04-1062, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 10395 (7th Cir.).

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Juvenile facility in Hawaii ordered to take steps to remedy "pervasive" sexual, physical, and verbal abuse of lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender juvenile wards, and to stop, except in emergencies, using isolation as a means of "protecting" such wards against abuse and harassment. Court rejects, however, the claim that staff members violated the First Amendment rights of the juveniles by quoting from the Bible or discussing religion with them, when there was no evidence that these actions were based on the facility's policies.

     Three juveniles who either are or are "perceived as" lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender, and who have been confined at a state juvenile correctional facility in Hawaii claimed that various practices there violated their rights to due process, equal protection of law, and under the Establishment of Religion clause of the First Amendment.

     They claimed that they were subjected to harassment and abuse on the basis of their actual or perceived sexual orientation.

     Based on the evidence presented, the federal trial court found that the facility's use of isolation to "protect" lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender juvenile wards was improper and constituted punishment in violation of their due process rights. The court stated that such isolation, which effectively punished the wards based on the actual or possible reaction of others to their sexual orientations, was not an acceptable professional practice.

     The court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs' claims were moot because none of them were currently incarcerated at the facility, as they showed a likelihood of repetition of their injuries, since each of them had previously been incarcerated at the juvenile facility two or three times, so that each of them was likely to return at some time.

     The court also found that officials at the youth facility had acted with "deliberate indifference" to pervasive sexual, physical, and verbal abuse of lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender juveniles, which included threats of violence, physical and sexual assault, the constant use of "homophobic slurs" against them, and imposed social isolation.

     The court rejected, however, the claim that the staff members at the facility violated the plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by promoting religion through discussion and quoting from the Bible, since there was no evidence that they did so pursuant to an explicit policy, that the facility ratified their actions, or that the employees in question had any policy-making powers.

     In a subsequent preliminary injunction order, the court ordered the facility and its employees not to discriminate against, abuse, or harass any juvenile ward because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation, and to counsel or discipline employees who did so.

     The injunction bars the use of isolation against such wards as a means of keeping them "safe," except for temporary emergency protective segregation in certain instances, as opposed to its use as a routine practice.

     The court further ordered the defendants to develop policies and procedures to help protect gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgender ward against abuse and harassment and to hire a consultant to guide their compliance with the court's injunctive order.

     R.G. v. Koller, No. Civ.05-00566, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Hawaii 2006). Subsequent decision at 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21254.

    » Click here to read the text of the court's first opinion on the AELE website. Click here to read the text of the court's preliminary injunctive order.

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Prison rules limiting inmates to one free stamp a month for non-legal mail, and prohibiting them from receiving stamps in the mail from friends and family did not violate prisoner's rights and was reasonably related to legitimate security concerns.

     A New York prisoner filed a lawsuit challenging a correctional directive that prevented certain inmates in keeplock from receiving stamps through the mail and providing that they can receive only one free stamp per month for personal use. He argued that because he does not have sufficient funds to purchase stamps from the prison commissary, the directive violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to write letters to his family.

     Upholding summary judgment for the defendant correctional officials, a federal appeals court found that the prisoner had no constitutional right to free postage for non-legal mail, and that the prison directive regulating possession of stamps in the prison was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in maintaining security and order in the prison.

     A prisoner's right to receive and send mail may be regulated, the court noted, and is valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The appeals court stated its agreement with prior cases in two other federal appeals circuits holding that an "indigent prisoner does not have a constitutional right to unlimited free postage for non-legal mail." See Van Poyck v. Singletary, 106 F.3d 1558, 1559-60 (11th Cir. 1997); Hershberger v. Scaletta, 33 F.3d 955, 957 (8th Cir. 1994).

    As for the limitations on possession of stamps, the appeals court found the directive reasonably related to valid penological interests. Stamps, it noted, can be used as a "form of currency" in prison, and can become the object of "unregulated prisoner transactions," and therefore cause conflicts among inmates. A valid, rational connection therefore existed between the regulation and the interest in maintaining security and order.

     The appeals court further noted that, as an alternative to receiving only one free stamp per month, the prisoner could have his friends or family send money, which can be used to purchase stamps from the commissary. Also, the prisoner's proposed alternative--that his friends and family be permitted to send stamps through the mail--would have a "detrimental impact" on prison officials, other inmates, and the prison system, because it would require more use of "already limited prison resources" for inspection of those mailings.

     Receipt by inmates of "embossed envelopes and stamps," the court further reasoned, presents a security concern because the adhesives on those items could contain "virtually undetectable amounts of drugs." Testing for such substances would be expensive and would result in delays in the processing of mail.

     Johnson v. Goord, No. 03-249, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 9887 (2d Cir.).

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Federal pre-trial detainee's lawsuit, claiming inadequate medical treatment resulting in various injuries at several county jails and federal prisons, was properly dismissed, both for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies, and because the facts alleged, if true, constituted only negligence, which is insufficient to state a claim for violation of federal civil rights.

     A federal pre-trial detainee was held in several county jail facilities and also spent time in two federal facilities. During his incarceration, he claimed that a doctor at one county jail negligently prescribed the medication Elavil for arm pain due to over-tight handcuffs, and that another doctor, after he was transferred to a second county jail, "abruptly terminated" that prescription. At a third county jail, he allegedly suffered a seizure which he claimed was caused by the Elavil treatment and its abrupt termination, causing him to fall from a top bunk and fracture his skull. He was then treated for the skull fracture at a private medical center, where he claimed that improper treatment caused him to suffer a seizure just prior to being discharged.

     This was followed by a transfer to a federal facility, where he claimed that, under the care of a doctor there, he suffered another fall, broke a finger, and was "mistreated." When he was sent to another county jail, he allegedly suffered a new foot injury which he claimed was initially ignored by the prison staff and then "mistreated" by a private doctor, leading to "permanent impairment." Subsequently, he was transferred to another federal facility, where he claims a staff doctor "improperly treated" a skin rash.

     The prisoner filed a federal lawsuit asserting federal civil rights claims, a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2000) ("FTCA"), and a state law negligence claim. A federal trial court dismissed some of the federal claims for failure to state a claim, and others for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a). The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law negligence claims.

     The appeals court upheld this result. It found that the sending of a claim form to the U.S. Marshals Service, which was the only procedure the prisoner followed prior to filing his lawsuit, was inadequate to exhaust available administrative remedies. Claims as to the counties had to be directed to the county facilities responsible for the supposed wrongdoing, and complaining to the Marshals Service could not serve either as adequate notice to the county jails or "otherwise encourage administrative resolution of the matter." The claim form directed to the Marshals Service was also inadequate to constitute exhaustion of administrative remedies at the federal facilities. The court further noted that claims against the federal government under the FTCA also have an exhaustion of remedies requirement, and limits lawsuits to claims fairly previously made to a federal agency, which in this case should have been the Bureau of Prisons, not the Marshals service, at least for some of the claims.

     The claims for supposed "deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's serious medical needs, in purported violation of his federal civil rights, were "bare and conclusory," the appeals court found, and the prisoner's claim of a "conspiracy" were also "pure boilerplate, unsupported by any factual allegations." Mere negligence or medical malpractice cannot be the basis of a federal civil rights lawsuit.

     Acosta v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. 05-1733, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 9882 (1st Cir. April 19, 2006)

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Doctor's alleged failure to provide adequate treatment for detainee's heart condition, resulting in permanent heart damage, may have been medical malpractice, but there was no evidence that he knew about and failed to treat that heart condition or "consciously disregarded" his medical needs, barring a claim for violation of constitutional rights.

     A detainee in Colorado claimed that he suffered permanent heart damage from a medical condition that worsened while he was in the Denver County jail. He sued the treating physician there for deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the defendant doctor, ruling that the plaintiff did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the doctor either knew about and failed to treat his condition or otherwise "consciously disregarded" his medical needs.

     Upon incarceration, the detainee complained of fever, aches, chills, cough, shortness of breath, as well as redness and swelling in his left calf, and he attributed his symptoms to a possible bite by a brown recluse spider, which he believed happened prior to his arrest. After examination by nurses, he was referred to a contract physician assigned to the jail, who examined him. Suspecting a respiratory tract infection, he examined only the prisoner's ears, nose, throat, and lymph nodes, but did not listen to his heart. Based on the examination and the prisoner's vital signs, the doctor prescribed aspirin and cough medication to alleviate fever and cough, and ordered that the prisoner stay in the infirmary for continued observation. He did not diagnose a cause of the symptoms, other than to exclude the spider bite. The prisoner's fever responded to the aspirin and fell that evening.

     The doctor examined him again, and kept the prisoner in the infirmary, while ordering lab work on his blood and urine, telling the nursing staff to check his vital signs every eight hours, and scheduled time to re-evaluate the prisoner when the lab work was available. The prisoner's condition did not improve over the weekend, and on Monday, the doctor noted, for the first time, the prisoner's history of cocaine use, and listened to his lungs. After hearing what he though was evidence of pneumonia. He prescribed an antibiotic and sent him to the hospital for x-rays and, if necessary, emergency treatment. The prisoner himself objected to going to the emergency room, but was told that if he did not improve by morning, he would be sent there.

     The hospital diagnosed the prisoner with a pronounced heart murmur and a possible bacterial infection of the heart, later identified as endocarditis. Antibiotics were administered, but surgery was found to be necessary, and he was transferred to another hospital for repair of his aortic valve. During the surgery, doctors decided that they needed to implant a pacemaker. The surgeon allegedly told the prisoner that had the endocarditis been caught earlier, the damage to his heart might have been less severe, and the surgery might have been avoided.

     While the prisoner's medical condition of endocarditis was a serious one, the appeals court ruled that, given these facts, a jury could not reasonably find that the doctor had either actual knowledge or that he acted in conscious disregard of his condition.

     The prisoner cannot argue that he was "denied" medical treatment. His symptoms were consistent with a variety of conditions, including respiratory infection, and the doctor plainly attempted to provide what he believed was appropriate treatment. The mere possibility that the symptoms could point to other conditions, including endocarditis, was not sufficient to create an inference of deliberate indifference. Indeed, the record showed that when the doctor was presented with evidence that the prescribed treatment was not succeeding or that the prisoner may have contracted pneumonia, he sent him to the hospital.

     At worst, the evidence showed that the doctor misdiagnosed the prisoner's condition. But that, even if it rose to the level of medical malpractice, was insufficient to show deliberate indifference to a known serious medical need.

     The appeals court also rejected the argument that the doctor consciously disregarded a substantial risk of harm either because he failed to listen to the prisoner's heart, or that he knew that the prisoner was an intravenous drug user, a risk factor for endocarditis. The decision not to listen to the prisoner's heart was an issue of "medical judgment" which the court said it would not ordinarily "second-guess," and there also was no evidence that the doctor would have altered his treatment or diagnosis if he had known the prisoner was an intravenous drug user, since that, while a "risk factor" for endocarditis, would not positively identify it as the prisoner's problem.

A treating physician's failure to connect-the-dots is by itself insufficient to establish a culpable state of mind.

     Since the record showed that the doctor did not know that the prisoner suffered from endocarditis, he could not be found liable for deliberate indifference to that condition.

     Self v. Crum, No. 04-1037, 439 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2006)

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Federal appeals court reverses trial court's dismissal of prisoner's claim that his rights were violated when he did not receive prescribed blood pressure monitoring or his high blood pressure medication for a nine-day period.

     An Arkansas prisoner serving time in a super maximum security unit claimed that the unit warden and two correctional officers were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, when they allegedly caused him not to receive his blood-pressure medication for nine days. He asserted claims for both missing his medication and based on the failure to adequately monitor him and his condition during that time period.

     The prisoner claimed that he had told prison personnel that he had high blood pressure treatment, and that a nurse had issued a treatment order requiring that his blood pressure and heart rate be checked twice on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays for a period of time. Prison personnel subsequently stated that he had not been taken to the infirmary for blood-pressure checks because he had not shown a prescription to an officer. The prisoner claimed that he had requested that he be taken to the infirmary to have his blood pressure checked and to see if he needed to take one of his blood-pressure pills because he was experiencing headaches, dizziness, and cramps. The officers allegedly denied the request, and when he finally received treatment nine days later, his medication was increased.

     The trial court ruled that the missed-medication claim was not properly before it, because the prisoner's filed grievance seemed to only complain about not receiving prescribed blood-pressure checks, rather than being denied medication. The prisoner had argued that his grievance stated that the defendants had interfered with "prescribed treatment," referring to both the blood-pressure checks or monitoring, and the need for the medication. The trial court also ruled that, absent physical injury, the missed-monitoring claim was barred by the provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(e), which states that there can be no recovery for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. The prisoner had argued that, as he was in isolation at the time, the only way for him to receive his blood pressure medication was to be sent to the infirmary, and that he did suffer physical injury from the missed medication.

     A federal appeals court overturned the trial court's rulings, finding that the prisoner, in grieving that he did not receive prescribed "treatment," had incorporated the treatment included in the treatment orders, including both the blood-pressure checks and the medication.

     As for the missed-monitoring claim, the appeals court ruled that it did not fail under section 1997e(e) for lack of physical injury. The prisoner had alleged and testified that he experienced headaches, cramps, nosebleeds, and dizziness while he was denied treatment. The statute cited, the appeals court noted, is "merely a limitation on damages," and, at a minimum, the prisoner could recover nominal damages for the defendants' admission that they did not comply with the prescribed blood-pressure monitoring. The statute, the court noted, does not bar recovery of nominal and punitive damages, or declaratory and injunctive relief, so to simply reject the claim altogether on the basis of the possible inability to receive compensatory damages was improper.

     Munn v. Toney, No. 05-1320, 433 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 2006)

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Federal appeals court rules that statute restricting attorneys' fees awards in prisoner lawsuits to 150% of the damage award applies to lawsuits filed by prisoners over incidents that occurred before their incarceration. Plaintiff prisoner awarded $1 in nominal damages in excessive force case was therefore only entitled to $1.50 in attorneys' fees, rather than the $9,680 awarded by the trial judge. Court rejects the argument that this result, following the "plain language" of the statute, caused an "absurd" result.

     A prisoner who was awarded $1 in nominal damages in federal civil rights lawsuit against off-duty police officer who allegedly violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in smashing the window of his car with a baton during confrontation prior to his incarceration was also awarded $9,680 in attorneys' fees and $915.16 in expenses by trial court. On appeal, a federal appeals court panel upheld this result, ruling that the provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act's which limits attorneys' fee awards in prisoner suits to 150% of the money judgment, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(d), did not apply to civil rights claims that arose before the prisoner was incarcerated. Robbins v. Chronister, No. 02-3115, 402 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 2005).

     The opinion of the majority of the divided panel, stated that it would be "absurd" to apply the fee limitation to suits on claims arising before the prisoner was incarcerated. The full appeals court granted a rehearing en banc, and held that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(d) and its 150% of damages cap on attorneys' fees did apply, based on the "plain language of the statute," so that the plaintiff prisoner's attorney-fee award is limited to $1.50.

     The statute states that:

(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under section 1988 of this title, such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that-

(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's right protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 of this title; . . . . (2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)

     The full appeals court decision commented that this language "may be inartful," but that other courts had consistently interpreted the statute as limiting a defendant's liability for attorneys' fees to 150% of the money judgment.

     The plaintiff was clearly a prisoner when he filed his lawsuit, and the trial court granted him only one dollar in nominal damages and "reasonable attorneys' fees" under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988(b). The plain language of the statute accordingly applied.

     The plaintiff repeated the argument of the trial judge and the majority of the appeals panel that it would be "absurd" to apply the plain language to his case, as the intent of Congress was to control " the torrent of litigation by prisoners concerning their treatment by prison authorities, not to deter prisoner suits arising from allegations of preincarceration misconduct."

     The plain unequivocal language of a statute, the court stated, could only be rejected as "absurd" in its application when it "would have been unthinkable" for Congress to have intended the result commanded by the words of the statute, that is, when the result would be "so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it."

     In this case, the court found, even if it could be argued that applying the PLRA cap to cases like this "is not the most rational means for controlling litigation," the result from doing so was "certainly not outside the bounds of legitimate legislative compromise." There is simply nothing bizarre, the court found, "about treating prisoner suits alleging preincarceration civil rights violations the same as prisoner suits alleging violations of civil rights during incarceration."

     The ordinary "American Rule" is that the losing party in a lawsuit is not required to pay the prevailing party's attorneys' fees. An award of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 is therefore a "departure" from the usual practice, and an incentive to plaintiffs to engage in litigation to vindicate their civil rights. In attempting to limit this exception in prisoner lawsuits, the Prison Litigation Reform Act "reduces that incentive" in civil rights lawsuits by prisoners, at least for claims with a low dollar value which are unlikely to result in a significant award of damages, by limiting attorneys' fees awards from the defendant to 150% of the damage award.

     The court found nothing "absurd" about reducing the incentive of attorneys' fees awards for all civil rights claims filed by prisoners, not just those involving prison conditions.

The balance of incentives and disincentives for filing suit is quite different for prisoners than for free persons, regardless of the subject matter of the claim, whether it be prison conditions or preincarceration conduct. Free persons must weigh the value of a possible victory in court against the burdens on their time and wallets in pursuing litigation. Prisoners, in contrast, have time in abundance, do not need money for their own necessities, and are entitled to free legal assistance or access to legal materials. And what may be perceived as burdens to free persons, such as taking time for depositions or court appearances, may well be considered an attractive change of scenery for prisoners. Given these circumstances, there is nothing absurd about applying the restriction on attorney-fee awards to prisoner civil-rights claims arising before incarceration as well as to such claims arising during incarceration.

     The attorneys' fee award, therefore, would be reduced to $1.50.

     Robbins v. Chronister, No. 02-3115, 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006)

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While it was a mistake to deny inmate's request to call as a witness a correctional officer present during an incident for which the inmate was charged with inciting to riot, this error was harmless when his testimony would not have altered the resulting imposition of punishment.

     A Kansas inmate claimed that his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights were violated by his disciplinary conviction in a prison administrative hearing for incitement to riot and for possession of less dangerous contraband because he was prevented from presenting a witness.

     The case involved a fight in the prison's dining room, which resulted in the inmate being charged with incitement to riot. His cell was then searched and prison guards found "tattoo drawings" on "skin paper." He was charged with violating regulations against possessing the tattoo drawings which are classified as "less dangerous" contraband.

     At the disciplinary hearing, the prisoner requested to have a specific correctional officer, who was present at the time of the dining room incident, appear at the hearing. The request was denied for being "untimely," although in the course of the prisoner's subsequent lawsuit, the government conceded that the request was actually filed in a timely manner.

     At the hearing, the disciplinary board received a report by another correctional officer, who was not present at the incident, which included a summary of the observations of the correctional officer that the prisoner sought to call as a witness. This included a statement that he observed the prisoner participating in the banging of food trays and "calling for an Aramark Food Service Supervisor to put on a hairnet." The report's author also summarized his own interview with the prisoner regarding the incident, in which he stated that he had an argument with the food supervisor concerning her not wearing a hairnet and that several inmates were disruptive in the dining hall during the incident.

     The disciplinary hearing board found the prisoner guilty on both charges, imposing a punishment for incitement to riot of 45 days disciplinary segregation, 60 days of restriction time, a $20 fine, and the loss of six months of good time credits. He also was sanctioned to seven days disciplinary segregation and 30 days restriction time for possession of the contraband drawings.

     The disciplinary hearing board, the appeals court found, improperly denied the request to have the correctional officer testify at the hearing as untimely. The request was timely, and those denying the request did not make a required individualized determination that having the officer as a witness was "unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals," so their decision "was clearly made in error."

     Despite this, the appeals court found, the error was harmless. Based on a post-conviction request for information from the officer, in which he stated that "I am unsure of your actual involvement in the incident [...] but I do recall you being verbally disruptive at that time," the written report of the incident accurately summarized his observations, and the officer's testimony would not have aided in the prisoner's defense or altered the result. Accordingly, although the punishment for the incitement to riot charge involved the loss of good time credit, there could be no relief on the prisoner's claim regarding the denial to present a witness on that incident.

     As for the punishment on the contraband drawings, which did not involve the loss of good time credits, and therefore did not increase the length of the prisoner's incarceration, the appeals court further found that it did not involve a protected liberty interest. The punishment of seven days in disciplinary segregation and 30 days of restriction time did not "impose atypical and significant hardship" on him "in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life," so that he was not entitled to constitutional procedural due process protections before imposition of that punishment, as no liberty interest was involved.

     Grossman v. Bruce, No. 05-3155 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 11194 (10th Cir.).

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Parolee's claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was required, during a mandated sex offenders' program, to recite a prayer with the word "God" in it should have been analyzed under the Establishment Clause, prohibiting coercion to participate in religious activity, rather than on the basis of whether his belief that he should only say "God" while praying at home at night was a "serious" religious belief.

     An Arkansas prisoner was granted parole in June of 2000 with the condition that he complete a specific one-year sex offenders' class, the Reduction of Sexual Victimization Program (RSVP), because he had been convicted of a sex crime. He began the class in January of 2001, but was removed from it in September of 2001. While in the program, he allegedly refused to admit to certain charges that the prosecuting attorney had included on an information sheet, arguing that requiring to do so violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.

     A counselor in the program allegedly told him that she disapproved of his interracial marriage and would use her power to remove him from the class. He also claimed that his First Amendment rights had been violated when he was required to recite a prayer, a requirement allegedly approved by various correctional officials and authorities in the program. He further claimed that the refusal to alter the requirements of his parole violated his right to due process.

     He filed a lawsuit asserting all these claims, which the trial court dismissed as frivolous. A federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of the due process claim, but ordered further proceedings as to whether the prisoner had stated a Fifth Amendment claim, whether he had sufficiently alleged a First Amendment claim based on his required religious participation in the RSVP, and a 14th Amendment equal protection claim based upon his alleged removal from the program because of his interracial marriage. Munson v. Norris, 67 Fed. Appx. 383 (8th Cir. 2003) (unpublished per curiam).

     During an evidentiary hearing, only the plaintiff testified, stating that he refused to make the requested admissions of past misconduct because the report contained a false statement, and that he disliked being required to recite a "serenity prayer" during the program's afternoon meetings, as he did not wish to use the word "God" during the day and preferred to pray only in the evening. He was allegedly told that if he did not say the prayer, he would be expelled from the program. When he skipped the prayer, he was allegedly placed on extra work detail. The counselor allegedly told him, on two occasions, that she did not believe that he, being white, should be married to a black woman.

     Two weeks later, the prisoner stated, he was told that all of the RSVP therapists and counselors had voted to remove him from the program for "failing to make sufficient progress."

     The trial court found that the prayer did not violate his First Amendment rights because he had not testified that using the word "God" only in the evenings was a serious belief, and he had not been written up or removed from the program because of his refusal to pray, and that his 14th Amendment claim was unsupported because only one counselor criticized his interracial marriage and all of the counselors decided to remove him from the program.

     The appeals court agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim failed, and that the plaintiff had not been removed from the program on the basis of his interracial marriage.

     On the First Amendment religion claim, however, the appeals court found that the trial court, by deciding whether the plaintiff's preference to say "God" only at night was a "serious belief," wrongly analyzed the claim under the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment rather than the Establishment Clause.

     The Free Exercise clause protects the right to practice one's religion, while the Establishment Clause prohibits government from coercing anyone to participate in religion or its exercise. The issue of whether a challenged governmental action infringes upon a sincerely held religious belief is only an issue in a Free Exercise clause claim.

     The appeals court ordered further proceedings, therefore, to decide whether requiring the plaintiff at the RSVP meetings to recite the serenity prayer was in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

     Munson v. Norris, No. 04-3938, 435 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 2006), rehearing denied, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 5248.

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet.

     Editor's Note: For prior decisions analyzing Establishment Clause claims, see, Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1075-76 (2d Cir. 1996) (county government agency violated Establishment Clause by conditioning plaintiff's criminal probation on his participation in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA); noting considerations would have been different had plaintiff been offered reasonable choice of therapy providers so that he was not compelled by state's judicial power to enter religious program); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1996) (prison violated Establishment Clause by requiring attendance at Narcotics Anonymous meetings, which used "God" in its treatment approach, where refusal to attend could negatively impact inmate's security-risk rating and consideration for parole); Griffin v. Coughlin, 88 N.Y.2d 674, 673 N.E.2d 98, 101-05, 649 N.Y.S.2d 903 (N.Y. 1996) (conditioning desirable privilege--family visitation--on prisoner's participation in religious program that incorporated AA doctrine, without alternative, was violation of Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1054, 117 S. Ct. 681, 136 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1997).

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A misdemeanor charge of being under the influence of a drug, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the strip search and visual body cavity search of a woman at a county jail who never entered the jail's general population. Individualized reasonable suspicion of possession of drugs, other contraband, or weapons was required before conducting such a search, but officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the law on the subject was not clearly established at the time of the search.

     A police officer arrested a female bartender based on his belief that she was under the influence of cocaine or methamphetamine, a misdemeanor offense under California law. A blood sample taken from her at a hospital on the night of the arrest later showed that the officer's suspicion was incorrect. Prior to the receipt of these test results, however, the officer took the arrestee to a pretrial detention facility for booking. The Ventura County Sheriff's Department then required a visual body cavity search of all persons arrested on fresh misdemeanor drug charges, with the search to be performed by a deputy of the same sex, and no touching allowed. Such searches were carried out immediately upon booking, without a waiting period for posting bail.

     The search, which was carried out, involved a visual inspection of the arrestee's unclothed body cavities and it took place in a private room with only a female employee present. The arrestee was required to remove all her clothing, to remove her tampon, and to tear it and discard it in a wastebasket, and then to ""bend forward, spread the buttocks, and cough to allow for a visual inspection of the anal area" as well as to "spread her labia at the same time to allow a check of the vaginal area." No contraband, weapons or drugs were found. She subsequently posted bail after being placed in a holding cell, and was released without entering the jail's general population.

     She filed a lawsuit claiming that the body cavity search violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The trial court ruled that the search did violate the arrestee's constitutional rights because individualized suspicion of possession of drugs or contraband is required for arrestees who are not admitted to the general jail population. The court also denied qualified immunity to individual defendants, finding that a reasonable officer reviewing the Sheriff Department's policy and the established law would have recognized that it was unconstitutional and did not further any legitimate penological interests.

     The appeals court also believed that the search in question, carried out solely on the basis of the charges on which the plaintiff was arrested, violated her constitutional rights.

     It reasoned that the scope of the intrusion at issue was a "frightening and humiliating" invasion, even when, conducted with "all due courtesy."

This leaves the question whether the intrusion was justified. We recognize the difficulty of operating a detention facility safely, the seriousness of the risk of smuggled weapons and contraband, and the deference we owe jail officials' exercise of judgment in adopting and executing policies necessary to maintain institutional security. . However, this does not mean that a blanket policy is constitutionally acceptable simply by virtue of jail officials' invocation of security concerns. Rather, the policy must be "'reasonably related' to the [detention facility's] interest in maintaining security."

     The court found that the defendants failed to show the connection between the blanket strip search policy and legitimate security concerns for detainees such as the plaintiff who were not entering the general jail population, and who are generally only detained for a brief period before being released on bail. The appeals court stated that the defendants were, in effect, asking "us to take security implications on faith," and "this we cannot do."

     The defendants argued that all drug crimes "inherently heighten security concerns" because of the risk that such arrestees will bring drugs with them, but the appeals court found that they failed to present any evidence concerning the jail's experience with arrestees arrested on misdemeanor charges for being under the influence of drugs.

We cannot see how the charge of being under the influence of a drug necessarily poses a threat of concealing (and thereby using or trafficking) additional drugs in jail during the limited time between booking and bail, or booking and placement in the general population. If not, it was unreasonable to assume that [the arrestee] harbored drugs in some cavity or other.

     In this case, the arrestee was under the control of the arresting officer from the time she was taken into custody at the bar at which she worked until she was booked, and the officer, according to the court, perceived no indication that she was carrying drugs or contraband. Once booked, she was held with several other detainees but was not in the jail for long and was never in the general jail population. In such circumstances, the court found, an arrest for being under the influence of a drug did not supply reasonable suspicion that drugs are concealed in a bodily cavity.

     The court also stated that, because there was no evidence that security concerns required strip searching all arrestees on all drug offenses before placement in the general jail population, and none that all persons arrested for being under the influence of drugs are likely to have concealed more drugs in a bodily cavity, the Sheriff Department's blanket strip search policy could also not substitute for the reasonable suspicion requirement. As there was no individualized suspicion that the plaintiff had concealed drugs, subjecting her to a strip search with visual body cavity inspection violated her constitutional rights not to be unreasonably searched.

     The appeals court ruled, however, that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because it had never before addressed the constitutionality of a body cavity search policy based on the nature of "this or any other drug offense." Additionally, prior case law indicated that the nature of an offense alone, in some instances, may provide reasonable suspicion, in cases where there were charges involving drugs, contraband and violence.

     In conclusion, the appeals court found that the "undocumented security needs of the jail" did not outweigh the invasion of the arrestee's personal rights, and could not be justified solely on account of an arrest on a charge of being under the influence of a drug, without individualized reasonable suspicion. But the individual defendants would not have understood, at the time, that following the jail's policy was unconstitutional because the law on the subject was not then clearly established.

     Way v. County of Ventura, No. 04-55457, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 9878 (9th Cir.).

    » Click here  to read the text of the opinion on the Internet.

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Access to Legal Info/Courts

     Prisoner failed to show that he suffered any actual injury to his right of access to the courts from a correctional officer's alleged confiscation of some legal materials from him. Asad v. Crosby, No. 04-13825, 158 Fed. Appx. 166 (11th Cir. 2005).

Drugs and Drug Screening

     Substantial evidence supported a disciplinary determination that a prisoner had violated rules against drug use. Court rejects argument that positive urinalysis drug test results were caused by "residual traces" of earlier drug use for which he had already been disciplined, especially since the prisoner himself admitted that he had used marijuana at some time after the prior urine sample was collected. Callender v. Goord, 809 N.Y.S.2d 218 (A.D. 3rd Dept. 2005).

Freedom of Information

     Prison records requested by inmate under New York Freedom of Information Law, relating to an investigation of his claim that a correctional officer sexually assaulted him, were not subject to disclosure based on an exemption in the law for information that could endanger a person's life or safety, based on court's review of the documents at issue. John H. v. Goord, 809 N.Y.S.2d 682 (A.D. 3rd Dept. 2006).

Jail & Prison Fires

     North Carolina appeals court upholds rejection of state agency's motion to dismiss claims for liability for the death of four inmates and serious injuries to another in a fire at a county jail. State agency had a specific responsibility, under state law, with respect to fire safety inspections at local detention facilities, and the "public duty doctrine," the basis of the agency's motion to dismiss, had no applicability to claims that the agency's inspector was negligent and that the agency was also negligent in training the inspector. Multiple Claimants v. N.C. Dept. of Health and Human Services, No. COA04-808, 626 S.E.2d 666 (N.C. App. 2006).

Medical Care

     Prisoner's personal belief that his penile pain could be relieved by circumcision was insufficient, under the Eighth Amendment, to require the Wisconsin Department of Corrections to make arrangements to have the procedure performed for free. Adsit v. Kaplan, No. 05-C-579-C, 410 F. Supp. 2d 776 (W.D. Wis. 2006).

     County detention facility did not act with deliberate indifference to detainee's medical problems. While the medical care provided for his complaint of a broken ankle was not always what he desired, he was examined when admitted to the facility, given pain killers, and medically examined on eleven subsequent occasions, with the staff responding to his medical needs each time. Redd v. Conway, No. 05-12337, 160 Fed. Appx. 858 (11th Cir. 2005).

     Prisoner raised possibly viable claims as to whether correctional officers acted with deliberate indifference, after he had surgery, to his need for pain medications and pillows for his injured hand. Additionally, there was a factual issue as to whether the total exclusion of physical therapy equipment prescribed for the prisoner was actually justified by legitimate security concerns, barring summary judgment for correctional defendants. Prewitt v. Roos, No. 03-35874, 160 Fed. Appx. 609 (9th Cir. 2005).

     Prisoner's claim that doctors at three different prisons, without evaluating his complaints of severe pain in his shoulder and back, both of which had been operated on, failed to consider another doctor's suggestion that he undergo spinal fusion surgery, and instead merely provided pain medication, could, if true, constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition. Medrano v. Smith, No. 05-1092, 161 Fed. Appx. 596 (7th Cir. 2006).

Prison Litigation Reform Act: Exhaustion of Remedies

     Requirement, under Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a), that a prisoner exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing a federal civil rights lawsuit applies to prisoners held in a privately-run state prison. Federal appeals court upholds dismissal, without prejudice, of a prisoner's claim that he had been denied needed medical treatment, based on his failure to complete all of a privately-run prison's four-step grievance procedure. Bias v. Cornell Corrections, Inc., No. 04-6353, 159 Fed. Appx. 868 (10th Cir. 2005).

     Prisoner's federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that prison's non-smoking policy was unconstitutional was barred by his failure to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a). Harmon v. Gallegos, No. 05-3209, 158 Fed. Appx. 87 (10th Cir. 2005).

Prisoner Discipline

     Substantial evidence, including a misbehavior report, testimony by the author of the report, and the inmate's own admission that he had another prisoner's legal papers, supported a disciplinary determination that the inmate was guilty of the unauthorized exchange of property. Kalwasinski v. Goord, 810 N.Y.S.2d 224 (A.D. 3rd Dept. 2006).

     The allegation that a prison hearing officer violated Kansas state Department of Corrections procedural regulations was insufficient, by itself, to state a constitutional claim for violation of the right to fundamental fairness of a disciplinary proceeding. Further, there was sufficient evidence to support the determination that prisoner was guilty of introducing contraband into the facility and violated rules concerning telephone access. Starr v. Bruce, No. 94,061, 129 P.3d 583 (Kan. App. 2006).

     Prisoner's right to call witnesses in disciplinary proceeding was violated, requiring the setting aside of the finding that he was guilty of violating disciplinary rules. Efforts made to either secure the testimony of a requested inmate witness or else determine his reasons for refusing to testify were inadequate. The requested witness did not sign a form refusing to testify, and a prison employee who sought to obtain the witness's testimony did not testify at the hearing concerning the circumstances of the witness's refusal or any investigation into the reason for the refusal. Crosby v. Selsky, 807 N.Y.S.2d 666 (A.D. 3rd Dept. 2005).

Racial Discrimination

     Prisoner failed to establish a valid claim for racial discrimination. While he filed grievances stating that "racism is prevailing" at the correctional facility, and accusing white employees of being "racist" and "hateful," he failed to allege that he had suffered any "specific hardships" as a result of such racism. He also failed to show that he had been punished for prior lawsuits and grievances or that an officer filed false disciplinary reports against him, in violation of his First Amendment rights. Jackson v. Madery, No. 04-1805, 158 Fed. Appx. 656 (6th Cir. 2005).

Religion

     While inmate's belief that "the Creator Yahweh" mandated that he should not cut his hair was a sincerely held religious belief, a prison policy which limited "Afro style" hair length to four inches was reasonably related to legitimate prison interests in preventing the concealment and transportation of contraband, aiding in the identification of inmates, and improving inmate hygiene. These legitimate interests outweighed any rights the prisoner had to wear his hair in long dreadlocks. Meggett v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 892 A.2d 872 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

     If a prison chaplain intentionally left a prisoner's name off of a list of those allowed to attend Native American religious ceremonies, he would have violated the prisoner's rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc. Additionally, punitive damages could be awarded if, as the prisoner asserted, the chaplain threatened to prevent him from attending such services if he continued to threaten to institute litigation. An award of compensatory damages, however, was barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act's, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(e), prohibition on the award of compensatory damages for mental or emotional injuries in the absence of a showing of physical injuries. Meyer v. Teslik, No. 05-C-269, 411 F. Supp. 2d 983 (W.D. Wis. 2006).

     Rights of Shiite Muslim inmates were not violated by the availability of only an allegedly Sunni Muslim service at a state prison. The services were considered "unified" Muslim services by prison authorities, and prisoners were also allowed to engage in individual prayers. Additionally, there was also doubt that interested Shiite Muslim prisoners could gather the necessary seven persons required for a valid Shiite service. Orafan v. Goord, No. 00-CV-2022, 411 F. Supp. 2d 153 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).

Segregation: Administrative

     Inmate's placement in administrative segregation for a period of nineteen days was insufficient to involve a possible violation of a due process protected liberty interest. Gilmore v. Goord, No. 02-CV-6560, 415 F. Supp. 2d 220 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).

Smoking

     Prisoner's allegations concerning smoking by correctional officers on several occasions were insufficient to state a claim for a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by exposing him to environmental tobacco smoke. These individual incidents did not demonstrate exposure to an unreasonably high level of such smoke. Bacon v. Taylor, No. CIV.A. 02-431, 414 F. Supp. 2d 475 (D. Del. 2006).

Strip Searches

     Factual issues as to whether visual body cavity searches were needed on all incoming detainees at county jail, and whether the urethral swabbing of all detainees violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights precluded summary judgment for defendant correctional officials. Thompson v. County of Cook, No. 03C7172, 412 F. Supp. 2d 881 (N.D. Ill. 2005).

     Federal trial court preliminarily approves $12 million settlement of class action lawsuit challenging D.C. Department of Corrections policy of conducting suspicionless strip searches of detainees who were ruled releasable after court appearances. Court also finds that attorneys' fee award of one-third of the settlement fund, or $4 million, was reasonable. Bynum v. D.C., No. CIV.A.02-956, 412 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2006).

Stun Belts/Guns

     Prisoner's complaint, alleging that corrections officers repeatedly stunned him with a stun gun to compel him to obey orders that they knew he was unable to comply with should not have been dismissed. If the prisoner's allegations were true, this would state a valid claim for excessive use of force with "malicious and sadistic intent to harm him," rather than a "good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline." Brown v. Thompson, No. 05-14042, 159 Fed. Appx. 119 (11th Cir. 2005).

Voting

     Federal appeals court dismisses appeal from denial of claim that New York Election Law section 5-106, denying the right to vote to incarcerated or paroled felons, violates section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. section 1973, finding that the plaintiff lacked standing because he was a resident of California before becoming incarcerated in New York, and therefore had never been eligible to vote in New York. Muntaqim v. Coombe, No. 01-7260, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 11167 (2d Cir. 2006).

     The Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973, does not apply to statutes barring voting by incarcerated or paroled prisoners, because Congress did not intend for the statute to cover such provisions of state law. Hayden v. Pataki, No. 04-3886, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 11187 (2d Cir. 2006).

Work/Education Programs

     Inmate suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease from dust and smoke accompanying his work as a welder failed to show that he had informed the supervisor of the prison unit overseeing prison jobs of the risk to him allegedly posed by his working conditions. Since the supervisor was not shown to have known of and disregarded the risk to him, he could not be held liable for injuries allegedly suffered by the prisoner. Additionally, the prisoner failed to file grievances concerning the work conditions and also refused to wear a dust mask he was given. Flanyak v. Hopta, No. 3:04-1634, 410 F. Supp. 2d 394 (M.D. Pa. 2006).

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     Annual Report: Kentucky Department of Corrections, Division of Corrections Training (DCT) 2005 Annual Report. (35 pgs.).

     Annual Report: Oklahoma Department of Corrections, 2005 Annual Report. (32 pgs.).

     Annual Report: Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Annual Report 2005. (30 pgs.).

     Death Penalty: A History of the Death Penalty in Georgia, Executions by Year 1924-2005, Georgia Department of Corrections, Office of Planning and Analysis. (15 pgs. January 2006).

     Death Penalty: Bureau of Justice Statistics publications on capital punishment, including annual reports, from year 1993 through 2004 of the characteristics of persons under sentence of death and of persons executed during each year, as well as a summary of the movement of prisoners into and out of death sentence status during the year.

     Female Prisoners: Amnesty International USA's website has a page presenting a report "Abuse of Women in Custody: sexual misconduct and shackling of pregnant women," on current laws, policies and practices in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and the federal Bureau of Prisons regarding custodial sexual misconduct, and the practice of shackling of inmates who are pregnant or giving birth.

     Report: Dignity Denied: The Price of Imprisoning Older Women in California, by the California group Legal Services for Prisoners with Children. (December 15, 2005). Full Report (82 pgs., 2 MB). Executive Summary (50 KB). Discusses issues related to the conditions of confinement for the more than 350 women over the age of 55 in California state prisons, the impact of the "Three Strikes" law, and the annual cost of imprisoning an older person, estimated to be at least $70,000, or twice that of a younger prisoner. The report questions the wisdom of committing "such vast economic resources" for continued punishment of older prisoners, which it contends is the group with the lowest recidivism rate of any segment of the prison population. The report also estimates that by 2022, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation will incarcerate approximately 30,000 elderly prisoners.

     Report: When “Free” Means Losing Your Mother The Collision of Child Welfare and the Incarceration of Women in New York State, (73 pgs., February 2006), a report by the Correctional Association of New York. "This report examines the damaging, far-reaching and often overlooked consequences of maternal incarceration on children and families. It includes interviews with caregivers, foster care caseworkers, formerly incarcerated mothers and young people with mothers in prison, and offers practical recommendations for reforms that would help rebuild families affected by incarceration, reduce recidivism and interrupt the intergenerational cycle of crime and prison."   

     Statistics: Sheriffs' Offices, 2003. Presents data collected from a representative sample of sheriffs' offices nationwide on a variety of agency characteristics based on the 2003 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey. National estimates for sheriffs' offices are provided for such issues as staff and financial resources, technologies and equipment in use, and agency policies and practices covering a wide array of law enforcement and administrative concerns. Highlights include the following: In 2003 starting salaries for entry-level deputies ranged from an average of about $23,300 in the smallest jurisdictions to about $38,800 in the largest. From 1990 to 2003 the percentage of sheriffs' offices using infield computers increased from 6% to 55%. Ten percent of sheriffs' offices, employing 31% of all officers, maintained or created a written community policing plan during the 12-moth period ending June 30, 2003. 04/06 NCJ 211361 Acrobat file (729K) | ASCII file (34K) | Spreadsheets (zip format 60K)

Reference:

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.