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Deputy sheriffs were not entitled to summary judgment in an excessive force lawsuit by woman arrested by them in her home pursuant to a warrant. Her version of the events, including that they beat her with a billy club and jumped on her after she was incapacitated by pepper spray and was only passively resisting, if true, showed an excessive use of force. The use of pepper spray was not excessive, however, since she was hiding from them under a blanket in a closet at the time, and could have been thought to be planning to "ambush" them.

     Several deputy sheriffs in Fayette County, Arkansas went to a woman's house to arrest her under a warrant for second degree bail-jumping, a misdemeanor. The woman failed to answer the door, although she knew those knocking and ringing the bell were deputies, because, as she said, "I didn't want to go to jail. The deputies eventually forcibly entered the house around 2 a.m., restraining her male companion and searching for the woman, who hid in the bedroom and put a blanket over her head.

     The deputies then sprayed pepper spray into the closet where she was hiding, and allegedly ripped the blanket off of her head, grabbed her by the hair and wrist, and threw her outside of the closet onto the ground. One of the deputies allegedly began jumping on her back with his knee, and the deputies kept hitting her face and back, including beating her with a "billy club," and allegedly hit her with a stick in the eye and back.

     The deputies denied beating her, although one said he placed his knee on top of her until she was handcuffed. The arrestee said she had not resisted, and the deputies stated that she did not put up a fight, but resisted passively.

     In a lawsuit brought by the woman for alleged excessive force, among other claims, the trial judge found that no rational juror could find that the deputies used excessive force under these circumstances. The court found that the use of the pepper spray was reasonable under the circumstances because of their warning to the woman to leave the closet, which she ignored, and the fact that they sprayed the pepper spray "generally" into the closet rather than directly at her. The trial judge also found that a deputy reasonably placed a knee across the arrestee's back, because she continued to resist arrest by refusing to "provide her hands" for handcuffing. The judge found that there was insufficient evidence of the woman's claim that the deputies beat her with a nightstick, and that a photo of her, while showing some bruising and redness, appeared to show "relatively mild" injuries consistent with a reasonable use of force.

     Finally, the court found that the deputies did not violate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, because they entered the home on the authority of a valid arrest warrant.

     A federal appeals court disagreed. It found that while the evidence "may appear to predominate" against the plaintiff's version of the events, she offered sufficient evidence to survive the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Her account of the events, if true, would constitute the excessive use of force under the circumstances, "Policemen may not strike an arrestee lying on the ground with a stick for about fifteen minutes, nor may they 'jump' up and down on her back repeatedly with a knee-not even if she refuses to produce her hands for cuffing," as the plaintiff claimed they did.

     Additionally, she claimed that, at the time such force was used, she had already been incapacitated by pepper spray, and the appeals court again commented that, if all events occurred as the plaintiff related them, "such a use of force cannot be deemed reasonable."

     While the evidence in support of the deputies appeared "significantly stronger" than that of the plaintiff, the court found, this was not a case where their evidence was so "objectively compelling" that no reasonable juror could believe the plaintiff. They were therefore erroneously granted summary judgment. They were also not entitled to qualified immunity, because, again, if the facts were as the plaintiff claimed, their actions would have violated her clearly established constitutional rights.

     The appeals court did uphold the ruling that the use of pepper spray, as alleged, was not excessive, given the arrestee's hiding and refusal to obey orders to come out of the closet, as the deputies could have believed that she was lying in wait, perhaps seeking to ambush them. The court also agreed that the forcible entry into the home was justified by the arrest warrant.

     Shreve v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court, No. 05-6271, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 16957 (6th Cir.).

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Police chief was not entitled to qualified immunity on a Fourth Amendment claim that he acted unreasonably in shooting and killing a family's pet dog while it was in their enclosed backyard, mistakenly believing that it was a loose dog that he had earlier pursued through the neighborhood.

     A couple in the City of West Branch, Iowa sued the city and its former police chief, claiming that the chief had wrongfully seized and deprived them of their property, specifically, their pet dog, by shooting and killing it. Claims were asserted both for violation of federal civil rights and alleged violations of state law.

     The trial court ruled for the defendants on all of these claims, finding that the chief's actions were lawful under Iowa law. A federal appeals court reversed in part, finding the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim "worthy of consideration by a jury," while upholding the rejection of the plaintiffs' substantive due process claims, and claims against the city.

     The incident at issue arose after the city received a complaint about a large black dog allegedly running through the neighborhood and bothering another dog. The police chief responded to the call, and drove around, attempting to catch the loose dog. He spotted and then lost sight of the loose dog several times during his pursuit. He finally parked his car near the couple's house, after seeing a large black dog in their backyard.

     He walked toward the fenced backyard with a dog leash in his pocket, and fired two shots at the dog. He allegedly immediately realized that he had shot the wrong dog. One of the owners had just let the dog out to urinate in the backyard. The dog had been badly wounded by the chief's first two shots, so he decided to shoot the dog a third time to end its suffering. The dog had not been wearing his collar and tags at the time he was shot, but he was current on his distemper and rabies booster shots, according to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs contended that the police chief gave no warning prior to the shooting, and made no effort to inquire whether their dog had been running loose prior to the shooting, or whether their backyard was completely enclosed by a fence, which it was.

     The appeals court found that the police chief did not have animal control jurisdiction over the dog at the time of the shooting under a city ordinance, because a dog in an enclosed fenced-in area is not "at large" under the terms of the ordinance. The appeals court also rejected the argument that the police chief was justified in shooting the dog under Iowa state law because he was not wearing a rabies tag, noting that the city's procedure and policy provided for the seizure and impoundment of animals running at large, and only authorized the discharge of a firearm as a "last resort." 

     The appeals court stated its belief that a reasonable jury could conclude that it was premature for the police chief to resort to shooting what he believed to be the at-large dog, when it did not appear that he had exhausted all means of capturing the loose dog. While the court acknowledged that "chasing a loose, disobedient dog can be maddening," the defendant's decision to kill the dog did not comply with the requirement under relevant city and state law that a firearm only be used as a last resort.

     A dog, the court noted, is considered property for Fourth Amendment purposes, and a dog's owner is protected, under the Fourth Amendment, against unreasonable seizures of a dog. State and city laws concerning at-large and neglected dogs, enacted to protect life and property, the court found, do not permit an officer to destroy a pet when it poses no immediate danger and the owner is looking on, obviously intent on retaining custody.

     At the time of the shooting, the plaintiffs' dog was merely urinating in their enclosed yard, a few feet away from his owner. He was not on the loose, growling, acting fiercely, or harassing anyone. The appeals court found that a reasonable jury could find that the police chief acted unreasonably when he seized and killed the dog.

     The appeals court further rejected the claim that the police chief was entitled to qualified immunity. It found that, if the facts were as alleged by the plaintiffs, a reasonable officer in the police chief's position could not have concluded that he could lawfully destroy a pet who posed no imminent danger, and whose owners were "known, available," and desired to assume custody.

     Andrews v. City of W. Branch, No. 05-1188, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 18748 (8th Cir.).

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Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding plaintiff's expert witness in a lawsuit over state trooper's alleged excessive use of deadly force against her son when she failed, for approximately a year, to disclose requested information about his qualifications, publications, and prior testimony in other cases. Appeals court also upholds summary judgment for state troopers who shot and killed suspect, who had fired at them and at other police officers, and who was sought under two arrest warrants and an order for a mental health examination.

     The estate of a West Virginia man who died during the second of two arrests, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that state Troopers used excessive force against him during the first arrest and unconstitutionally used deadly force against him during a second attempted arrest. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the civil rights claims, and on appeal, the plaintiff challenged that as well as trial court orders excluding an independent expert witness whose testimony she offered.

     A federal appeals court upheld the trial court's rulings in their entirety.

     The first arrest occurred under an outstanding arrest warrant for suspected arson of a home, and when the arrestee arrived at a jail, he had a cut on his lip, and an abrasion on his right flank or abdomen, but there was no report or complaints of a physical altercation. The arrestee's family members, however, later stated that when they asked him about his injuries, he either pointed to or verbally indicated that a state trooper had inflicted them. While he later sought medical care, he filed no complaint with the West Virginia State Police for any alleged wrongful conduct by its officers.

    A few weeks later, his mother completed an application for her son's involuntary custody for mental health examination, certifying that she had reason to believe that he was addicted to either alcohol or drugs, and that his addiction was likely to cause harm to himself or others. He allegedly had told her that he would "take a bullet in the head before he would go to jail." At the time, there were at least two outstanding warrants for his arrest. A court issued an order for the detention, directing the county sheriff to take him into custody for purposes of a probable cause hearing and mental health exam.

     Officers pursued the man in his vehicle, and he left the car and fired two shots. State troopers responded to a call for assistance and began taking positions to contain him in the area. They observed him approaching in a crouched position with a pistol in his hand, and he fired two or three rounds at a trooper, ignoring orders to drop his weapon, and troopers then shot and killed him.

     The trial court barred the evidence of an expert witness offered by the plaintiff in the lawsuit because the plaintiff had failed to serve an expert disclosure required under court rules. The trial court also granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding insufficient evidence that the decedent had been injured during the first arrest, and that any injuries shown were minimal. The court also found that the deadly force claim did not survive the decedent's death.

     The appeals court upheld the ruling on the use of deadly force, although it did so on the basis of qualified immunity, finding that the troopers acted in an objectively reasonable fashion by using deadly force against the decedent, who was the subject of at least two valid warrants for his arrest, as well as an order for involuntary commitment certifying him as a danger to himself or others, as well as his actions in firing at police officers and at the troopers.

     The plaintiff did not dispute that the decedent had fired at the officers or posed a significant risk to them, but claimed that the troopers had actually tracked him down in the woods, disarmed or incapacitated him, and then placed their pistols against his head and "executed him." The plaintiff's only offered evidence of this was the expert witness testimony, which was excluded.

     The trial court excluded the expert's testimony more than one year after the expert disclosures were due under a scheduling order, at a time when the plaintiff had still failed to provide the information required under the rule. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in excluding the testimony under these circumstances, and rejected the plaintiff's arguments that her failure to provide the information was "inadvertent" or "harmless."

     While the plaintiff claimed the failure was harmless because the expert's reports were attached to the complaint in the case, those reports, the appeals court found, revealed nothing more than that he is an independent medical examiner with "California Autopsy and Consultation," and revealed nothing about his qualifications, publications, compensation, or other cases in which he testified as an expert. The failure to disclose that requested information "unfairly inhibits" an opponent's ability to properly prepare, or to challenge the expert's qualifications.

     The appeals court also upheld the grant of summary judgment on the claim of excessive force during the first arrest.

     Carr v. Deeds, No. 05-1472, 05-2186, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 17461 (4th Cir.).

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Officers acted reasonably, under their community care-taking function, in transporting a man to a hospital where a doctor placed him on a 72-hour hold when they believed he might be hallucinating, but were not entitled to qualified immunity on his claim that they used excessive force against him in restraining him or after he was restrained when he did not resist them.

     A homeowner in New Ulm, Minnesota called the police to report what he believed were intruders breaking into his garage. He went outside, where police officers arriving on the scene mistakenly took him for an intruder, and apprehended him. Because of his behavior at the time, the officers transported him to a medical facility, where a doctor placed him on a 72-hour hold for evaluation. He sued the city and the individual officers, claiming that these actions constituted excessive force and unreasonable seizure.

     The trial court granted summary judgment for the individual defendants on the basis of qualified immunity. A federal appeals court reversed in part, finding that the plaintiff's version of events, if true, was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that the officers had acted maliciously in the use of force against him, but also ruled that the officers acted reasonably under their "community care-taking function" in taking him to the hospital for evaluation.

     The plaintiff contended that he told an officer who arrived on the scene that he owned the garage, and that he lived in the house. Despite this, he claimed, an officer got on top of him, and punched him in the ribs, head, and neck, and then other officers "piled on." He further asserted that when he asked, "What did I do? I am the landowner," that an officer responded, "You know what you did. And you keep it up and you are really going to get a beating." The plaintiff further claimed that he did not retaliate against the officers or attempt to escape from them.

     The officers allegedly only asked for his name after he was handcuffed. He claimed that an officer grabbed him by his pinky fingers at least twice, bringing him to his knees, pushing him to the ground, and picking him up again. He also claimed that officers squeezed the handcuffs, causing pain in his wrists. He stated that he was the one who called, and at that time, an officer took his wallet and examined his driver's license.

     They placed him in a police car, searched the garage, and found no sign of a break-in or any intruders. One of the officers decided to take him to a medical center based on his demeanor. He allegedly arrived at the hospital in a state of severe shock, and a doctor who examined him stated that "his mind would all of a sudden not track. He would be saying one thing, and then he would forget," and that "he does not make any sense." The doctor signed a written application for a 72-hour hold and stated that the plaintiff's fast heart rate and abnormal potassium and creatinine levels were most likely due to high stress levels.

     The plaintiff claimed that the experience caused him various physical and mental injuries and difficulties.

     The appeals court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, found that his version of events would show that he was compliant with the officers' requests and did not resist them, but that they allegedly used force against him which would raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether they used excessive force both in restraining him and after he was restrained. The appeals court also disagreed with a finding by the trial court that the plaintiff's injuries were minimal, given that there were medical evidence showing a shoulder injury serious enough to require surgery, along with continuing shoulder pain a year after the incident.

     The right not to be subjected to such force when not resisting arrest, the appeals court stated, was clearly established, so that qualified immunity for the officers was improper, given a disputed issue of fact about whether the plaintiff resisted at all.

     The appeals court rejected, however, the claim that the officers violated his constitutional rights by transporting him to the hospital against his will where he was placed on 72-hour psychiatric hold. It agreed with the officers that they acted reasonably under their "community care-taking function." The plaintiff, the court noted, was not speaking in a coherent manner even during the 911 call. The officers also believed that he was hallucinating because, although he had reported intruders, the garage was secure and the officers uncovered no traces of a burglary. Additionally, there was a strong odor of varnish in the garage, and he stated that he had varnished some furniture earlier. He also allegedly asked an officer why the wheels were turning on a stationary police car. Under these circumstances, taking him to a hospital for observation was not objectively unreasonable.

     Samuelson v. City of New Ulm, No. 04-3332, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 18167 (8th Cir.).

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Sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity on claim that he improperly ordered a deputy to arrest a truck driver for "careless driving" after he drove a loaded 18-wheel truck over a bridge which collapsed. At the time of the accident, a weight limit sign ordinarily posted there had fallen down.

     A man was driving a loaded 18-wheel Home Depot truck in White County, Arkansas en route to a delivery, and drove across an old single lane steel framed wooden topped bridge. While ordinarily a weight limit sign was posted there, the sign was missing, and the driver was unfamiliar with the bridge. As he drove across, the bridge collapsed, with the truck and bridge falling into the creek, injuring the driver.

     When two county sheriff's deputies responded to the accident, they found the weight limit sign lying obscured in the grass. A county judge was notified of the accident, and, not having visited the accident scene, concluded that the driver had either broken the weight limit law or done something reckless to cause the bridge to fall. He spoke to the sheriff's dispatcher, and told the dispatcher to ask the sheriff to issue the driver a citation. He also allegedly directly called the sheriff, telling him to put the driver "in jail."

     The sheriff, who had also not visited the accident scene, then phoned a sergeant and told him to issue a citation. The sergeant stated that the weight limit sign was missing, so that the "closest thing" he could find to a statute the driver had violated was a general prohibition on "careless driving." The sheriff allegedly responded that this "works for me." The driver was arrested for careless driving and released after posting $150 bond. He was later acquitted on the charge, based on testimony that the weight limit sign was not up at the time of the accident, and that the deputy only issued a citation because he had been instructed to do so.

     The driver sued the county, the judge, and the sheriff for alleged violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, contending that they conspired to violate his right to be free from unlawful arrest. The trial court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of "objective reasonableness," but later granted a new motion on the basis of qualified immunity.

     The appeals court reversed summary judgment for the defendant sheriff on the individual capacity federal civil rights and related state law claims. It found that no reasonable officer would view the "careless driving" statute as prohibiting collision with a bridge that just collapsed from underneath the vehicle, and no evidence that the plaintiff's truck struck the bridge and caused the collapse. Accordingly, ordering the driver's arrest for that offense, under these circumstances, violated his constitutional right to be free from unlawful arrest. The appeals court further found that the right violated was clearly established, so that the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity.

     The appeals court found that the county judge served as the principal executive officer of the county, although called a judge, and his powers included operating the system of county roads, as well as presiding over the body that fixes the compensation of county officers, including the sheriff. He had no authority to order the driver arrested, so the appeals court ruled that, as a matter of law, he could not have directly participated, under color of law, in the unlawful arrest, and was therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

     In the absence of the judge having any actual authority to order the arrest, the appeals court found, there was no civil conspiracy.

     The appeals court, finally, found that the arrest was not carried out under any policy of the county, official or otherwise, of unlawfully arresting persons for careless driving, so claims against the county and against the sheriff or judge in their official capacities were also properly rejected.

     Robinson v. White County, No. 05-3362, 452 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2006).

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Neither police nor sheriff's office were liable for mistaken arrest and detention of man under a warrant for a man with a similar name and identical physical characteristics and birthday. Sheriff's policy of ignoring protests about misidentification after an arrestee appears before a judge and is remanded to the sheriff's custody could not be a basis of federal civil rights liability. $750,000 jury damage award set aside.

     Chicago police officers stopped a motorist for running a stop sign, and found that he was not carrying a driver's license and lacked proof of insurance. A check from the squad car revealed that his license was suspended. The officers, through the check, learned his driver's license number, which they used to search for his possible criminal record.

     The Law Enforcement Agencies Data System database reported that a person with that driver's license number and a similar name (Enrique Hernandez, rather than Emiliano Hernandez) was wanted on an outstanding warrant. At the time, it was not noticed that one digit of the motorist's driver's license had been mistyped on the squad car's terminal. The wanted man was a different person, although he had an identical birthday, a similar name, and similar physical characteristics.

     At the police station, officers allegedly "brushed off" the motorist's claim that he was not the fugitive sought, and took him to court in the morning, where he pled guilty to traffic infractions of failing to stop at a stop sign, driving on a suspended license, and driving without insurance. The judge then remanded him to the sheriff's custody so he could be arraigned on the charge stated in the warrant. Sheriff's deputies also allegedly ignored his protests that he was not the fugitive sought under the warrant, and told him that this was a "matter for the judge."

     He was arraigned in court the next morning on the warrant charges, and bond was set at $5,000. Neither the arrestee nor his attorney argued at that arraignment that he was a different person than the man sought in the warrant. He remained in custody for 15 days, before he posted bail, during which sheriff's deputies continued to ignore his argument that he was not the wanted fugitive. While he was out on bond, the prosecutor realized the error and dismissed the pending charge.

     The arrestee then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit, claiming that both the police and deputies violated his Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by refusing to look into his claims of erroneous identification.

     The trial court granted summary judgment for the city, finding that its policy was lawful, but that the sheriff's alleged policy of refusing to entertain claims of mistaken identification violates the Constitution. A jury awarded the plaintiff $750,000 in damages for the time he spent in the sheriff's custody.

     A federal appeals court agreed that the plaintiff's custody in the hands of Chicago police for twelve hours was proper, since he had committed three traffic offenses, and police were entitled to hold him until his appearance in court. Once he appeared in court, and the issue of the outstanding warrant was raised there, the issue was out of the hands of the police. Additionally, the city's policies require officers to verify that the person in custody is the one named in a warrant, with any discrepancies submitted to a watch commander for resolution.

     It is true, the appeals court acknowledged, that Chicago does not require police to accept identifying documents submitted by relatives, but that "is understandable":

Given the number of people who use aliases, and the ease with which many documents can be faked, a police department is not required to be credulous but may limit its attention to information it deems reliable-especially because detention on the police department's resolution cannot exceed 48 hours. Police are entitled to act on information that may be inaccurate and let the courts determine whether to credit a suspect's claim of innocence. All the police need is probable cause, which is well short of certainty. Like a grand jury, police may act on the basis of inculpatory evidence without trying to tote up and weigh all exculpatory evidence.

     In this case, the police acted reasonably in believing that the arrestee was the person sought under the warrant, given the identical birthdays and physical characteristics.

     The plaintiff, however, was held by the sheriff's staff for 15 days. The sheriff argued that this was after the plaintiff had been to court, so that the deputies were just carrying out the judge's orders.

     The appeals court found that the sheriff's policy was "simple," and was to "ignore all claims of misidentification" after a judge has made a determination. The appeals court found that this was an "entirely lawful policy" unless the custodian of a detainee "knows that the judge refuses to make an independent decision or there is doubt about which person the judge ordered held."

     The appeals court rejected the rule that it reasoned the plaintiff wanted to have the sheriff follow," under which every deputy must be open to persuasion for as long as a person is in custody," which would create a "substantial possibility that by presenting his contention over and over even a guilty suspect would eventually find a deputy who did not understand the weight of the evidence and let him go." In this case, there was no doubt that the sheriff had been told by the judge to keep the plaintiff in custody until either he posted bail or next appeared in court.

     The fact that reliable documents such as a passport demonstrated that his first name was different than the suspect sought did not alter the result, as the name in the warrant could have been an alias. The appeals court found no basis for an award of damages against officials who essentially have a policy of carrying out a judge's orders. The jury's $750,000 damage award was therefore set aside.

     Hernandez v. City of Chicago, No. 04-2246, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 18679 (7th Cir.).

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Police officers, including S.W.A.T team members, were entitled to qualified immunity for surrounding the home of a man who had fired shots into the air and ground nearby, entering the home forcibly without a warrant, and using pepper gas and a flashbang in an attempt to flush him out. Assuming that the use of a second flashbang, which burned down the house, was excessive, it still did not violate any "clearly established right." Factual disputes about whether the suspect was still armed and was threatening officers at the time they shot and killed him, however, barred qualified immunity for the officers on a claim that the use of deadly force was excessive.

     A man in Whitehall, Ohio fired a gun into the air and into the ground near his home one evening, resulting in a number of witnesses to this phoning the police. Upon arriving on the scene, the officers were informed that the man had retreated into his home. The officers, backed up by a S.W.A.T. team, surrounded the house, attempted to communicate with the man, and subsequently tried to force him outside using pepper gas. Eventually, the S.W.A.T. team invaded the house, and killed the man. During the raid, police used a flashbang device, which also burned the house down.

     The decedent's estate and his brother brought a federal civil rights lawsuit under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against the city, the police department, and individual officers. The lawsuit claimed that the police violated the decedent's clearly established rights when they entered the home without a warrant, used excessive force by employing pepper gas and flashbang devices, unreasonably used deadly force when they shot and killed him, and unreasonably destroyed property by burning down the house. The trial court denied qualified immunity to the defendant officers, finding that there were disputed issues of fact that required a trial.

     A federal appeals court reversed in part. It found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for breaking the house's front door, seizing the man inside through an encirclement of his house without a warrant, using the pepper gas and the flashbang devices, entering his home without a warrant, and destroying the house. It upheld the denial of qualified immunity on the deadly force excessive force claim.

     The appeals court reasoned that the officers acted lawfully in effecting a "de facto house arrest" of the man by surrounding the house, despite not obtaining a warrant, because his firing of shots in the neighborhood created a "dangerous emergency." For that same reason, the officers did not need a warrant to enter the house, and the use of pepper gas and a flashbang device as attempts to force the suspect outside were reasonable. The appeals court, assuming for purposes of the appeal, without holding, that the use of a second flashbang device that set the house on fire violated the decedent's constitutional right to be free from excessive force, it found that the right, in this context, was "not clearly established." Accordingly, the defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity on all those claims.

     The appeals court ruled, however, that the trial judge had properly denied summary judgment on the claim of deadly force with regard to the shooting and killing of the suspect. It was disputed, among other things, whether or not the decedent was armed or unarmed after officers entered his home, and whether or not he threatened them in any way as they approached. If he was unarmed and did not threaten the officers as they approached, as the plaintiff claimed, then shooting and killing him would violate his clearly established right not to be attacked with deadly force under those circumstances. Accordingly, further proceedings were required to resolve these factual disputes.

     Estate of Bing v. City of Whitehall, No. 05-3889, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 19287 (6th Cir.).

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The mere fact that an arrested motorist's version of an incident differed from that of the deputy who arrested him was insufficient to defeat summary judgment for the deputy on a malicious prosecution claim. In the absence of a showing that the deputy interfered with the prosecutor's independent judgment in pursuing criminal charges, the prosecutor's decision to file a criminal complaint is the exercise of independent judgment that there was probable cause for the arrest.

     A sheriff's deputy in San Juan Capistrano, Orange County, California stopped a motorist for speeding. The deputy rejected the motorist's plea to give him a warning instead of a citation. When the deputy walked back to his motorcycle and began writing his notes about the traffic stop, the motorist allegedly started his car and accelerated back onto the highway, kicking up rocks and debris that then "peppered" the deputy and his motorcycle. The deputy pulled the motorist over again, and instructed him to get out of his vehicle. The motorist allegedly said, "Why, just because of a little dirt? I don't see any dirt on you?"

     The motorist then got out of his vehicle and the deputy told him he was under arrest. The deputy claimed that the motorist was told to put his hands behind his back, and that as he grabbed the motorist's left arm from behind, he yanked it away and spun to his left, yelling that "you're not going to arrest me for this." An altercation ensued, during which the deputy claimed that he slipped on the gravel while trying to trip the motorist, and then both men fell to the ground, with the deputy on top of the motorist. The motorist was allegedly struggling and attempting to break free. The deputy used pepper spray, but allegedly was unable to accurately spray it on the motorist, so it had little effect. Other deputies arrived to assist, and the motorist was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of a patrol unit.

     The motorist disputed the deputy's version of the events, contending that he merely pulled back into the flow of traffic after receiving his ticket, and that the deputy then pulled him over, whereupon he complied with that order and an order to step out of his car. He says he noticed that the deputy was talking into his radio while standing in a dangerous spot in the road, and yelled and that he yelled at him to "get out of the traffic, you're going to get hit." He claimed that the deputy told him to go sit on the curb, and that he obeyed, but that the deputy began running and spraying pepper spray towards him. He claimed that he only raised his right arm to protect his face, but that the pepper spray got in his face, and he closed his eyes, after which the deputy hit him in the back, knocking him to the ground, after which the other deputies arrived and the arrest occurred.

     The county prosecutor filed a misdemeanor criminal action against the motorist for speeding and for resisting, obstructing, or delaying a police officer. A jury acquitted him of all charges and the motorist sued the deputy and the county for malicious prosecution. The trial court granted summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, finding that the arrestee was unable to overcome a presumption that the prosecutor had exercised independent judgment in deciding to pursue criminal charges against him.

     Ordinarily, a federal appeals court stated, the filing of a criminal complaint by a prosecutor immunizes investigating officers from resulting damages because it is presumed that the prosecutor filing the complaint exercised independent judgment in determining that probable cause for the arrest existed at that time. The plaintiff then has the burden of producing evidence to rebut that presumption.

     The appeals court found that the mere fact that the plaintiff disputed the version of the events presented by the officer was insufficient to rebut that presumption.

     The question is not, the court found, whether the prosecutor, in the face of conflicting accounts, would have filed charges based on the plaintiff's version of the events, but whether he would have done so based on the officer's. Prosecutors, the appeals court noted, generally rely on police reports--not suspect's stories--when deciding whether charges should be filed, and it is presumed that they rely on their independent judgment when deciding whether those reports warrant the filing of criminal charges, unless contrary evidence is presented, such as something to show that the officers interfered with the prosecutor's judgment in some way, such as by omitting relevant evidence, by including false information, or by pressuring the prosecutor to file the charges.

     In this case, while there were some minor differences between the deputy's account of events contained in two separate documents, both of them stated that the motorist reacted violently when the deputy informed him that he was being arrested, and that he hit the deputy with his right arm, with a struggle resulting. Minor discrepancies about what occurred before that were not interference with the prosecutor's independent judgment, because they were not about the conduct for which the motorist was ultimately charged.

     The fact that a plaintiff's version of an incident conflicts with that of an officer is not enough, the court concluded, to defeat the presumption that a prosecutor exercises independent judgment. Since that was all that the plaintiff presented, summary judgment for the deputy was proper on the malicious prosecution claim.

     Newman v. County of Orange, No. 04-56103, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 20130 (9th Cir.).

    » Click here to read the text of the opinion on the Internet.

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Police officer and police chief were not liable under federal civil rights law for injuries U.S. Customs officer suffered when he was struck by a city police department vehicle being driven by an escaped arrestee.

     A U.S. Customs Enforcement Officer at the Del Rio, Texas port of entry was struck and injured by a city police department vehicle being driven by an escaped arrestee. He and his wife and children sued the city, its police chief, and the police officer who had been driving the vehicle, claiming that they were liable for his injuries under federal civil rights law.

     The individual defendants sought qualified immunity, which the trial court denied. A federal appeals court has reversed, finding that both the officer and the police chief were entitled to qualified immunity, as they had not violated any clearly established constitutional right.

     The arrestee was a man with a history of attempting to escape police custody, the plaintiff claimed, and he was allegedly known by the nickname "Houdini" around the police department. The officer placed him under arrest on the evening of the incident, and allegedly improperly left him in the backseat of his patrol vehicle while the keys were in the ignition and the engine was running while he visited with a person in the neighborhood. The arrestee escaped from the rear seat, commandeered the patrol car, and sped away.

     While the police issued an all points alert about the escaped arrestee, which the plaintiff heard, that alert did not clearly inform him that the vehicle being driven by the arrestee was an official marked police patrol car.

     The arrestee, the appeals court noted, is a private person, who was not acting under color of law. The plaintiff argued that the police chief and officer should be liable under the "state-created danger" theory. But the appeals court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has not, to date, upheld liability for private violence on that theory, and that the appeals court itself (for the 5th Circuit) also has not accepted that theory to date. It declined to do so in this case.

     There was no claim by the plaintiff that the officer, in leaving the arrestee unattended in the back of the patrol vehicle knew or believed that he would likely drive the vehicle away or would likely endanger anyone. There was no deliberate indifference to a known risk of serious harm.

     Further, the appeals court noted, the plaintiff's complaint alleged absolutely no facts about the police chief, except that he is the police chief and resides in the city. Under federal civil rights law, there is no vicarious liability for the actions of subordinates, so that the police chief would not have been liable, even if the police officer had been. Given that the appeals court found no underlying constitutional violation by the officer, it was clear that there was absolutely no basis for liability by the police chief.

     Additionally, there was no allegation of any prior similar incident in which an arrestee had ever commandeered or attempted to commandeer a police car, which the appeals court found was yet another barrier to any attempt to impose supervisory liability on the police chief.

     The federal claims against the city, along with state law claims against the police chief and officer remained, as they were not at issue in the immediate appeal of the denial of qualified immunity on the federal civil rights claims against the individuals.

     Rios v. City of Del Rio, No. 04-50774, 444 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2006).

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Federal appeals court approves New York police department's anti-terrorist suspicionless, random searches of subway passengers' baggage and containers.

     The New York City police department instituted an anti-terrorist program of random, suspicionless searches of individual subway passengers' baggage and containers. There had been prior plots thwarted in 1997 and in 2004 to bomb a number of different subway stations or lines in New York, as well as successful terrorist bombings of commuter trains in Madrid and Moscow in 2004 which killed over 240 people, using concealed explosives. On July 7, 2005, terrorists using concealed explosives also killed more than 56 people and wounded another 700 by attacking the London subway and bus systems, which was followed on July 21, 2005 by an unsuccessful terrorist attack on the London subways.

     The New York City subway passenger search program was launched after these events, on the day of the July 21, 2005 attempted attack on the London subways.

     Shortly after it began, a number of passengers who attempted to enter the subway system filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the city and its police commissioner, claiming that the searches violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeking injunctive relief against it. Some of the plaintiff passengers submitted to a baggage search and entered the subway, while others refused to submit to the search and therefore were required to exit the subway.

     After a trial, a federal judge upheld the search program, finding that it was constitutional under the "special needs" rationale. The plaintiffs appeals, claiming that the "special needs doctrine" only applies in situations were the persons searched have a lessened expectation of privacy, and that subway riders have a full expectation of privacy in their bags, so that the trial judge was wrong to apply the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment. They also argued that it was wrong to find that the search program served a "special need," and that, even if it did, the trial judge was wrong in balancing the relevant factors because the searches were intrusive, were not justified by an immediate terrorist threat, and the city failed to provide evidence sufficient, as a matter of law, to show that the search program was effective.

     A three-judge appeals court panel upheld the trial judge's ruling.

     It noted that the New York City subway system is an "icon" of the city's culture and history, has 26 interconnected train lines, and 468 passenger stations, and operates at all times, carrying more than 4.7 million passengers on an average weekday, and approximately 1.4 billion passengers over the course of a year. This makes it the country's largest and busiest subway system.

    Because of that system's enclosed spaces, high passenger volume, and "cultural and economic importance," the appeals court reasoned, it is "undisputed" that terrorists view it as a prime target, and terrorists have actually targeted it before, in both 1997 and 2004, in both instances in plots which police thwarted.

     The random container inspection program which was the subject of the litigation was designed to prevent terrorists from carrying concealed explosives onto the subway system, and also, to a lesser extent to discover such attempts. It involves police establishing daily inspection checkpoints at selected subway stations, and searching the bags and containers of a portion of subway riders seeking to enter the station. The checkpoints are not announced in advance, in a deliberate manner to make them appear "random, undefined, and unpredictable."

     The searches are voluntary, and a large poster close to the officers' table notifies passengers that backpacks and other containers are subject to inspection. Those passengers who wish to avoid the search must leave the station. While declining the search does not, by itself, subject a passenger to arrest, arrests may be made of someone who refuses to be searched and later attempts to reenter the subway station with the uninspected container.

     Police establish a selection rate, such as every fifth or tenth person, based on the volume of passengers and the number of officers conducting the searches, and exercise "virtually no discretion" in selecting who is to be searched, the court commented. Police search only containers thought large enough to carry an explosive device, the court noted, and do not search wallets and small purses. They also do not intentionally look for other contraband, and do not attempt to read written or printed material. Asking for a passenger's personal information, such as name, address, etc. is not part of the search program, and the typical inspection does not last more than a few seconds.

     The appeals court rejected the argument that application of the "special needs" doctrine requires that the subject of the search has a reduced privacy interest. Instead, once a governmental entity shows a special need, the nature of the privacy interest at stake is a factor to be "weighed in the balance."

     The appeals court found that the program was aimed at preventing terrorist attacks on the subway, which constituted a "special need," and was implemented in response to a string of bombings on commuter trains and subway systems abroad, in order to prevent similar occurrences in New York. The scope of the searches was aimed only at seeking explosives. Prior courts, the appeals court stated, have traditionally considered "special" the government's need to prevent and discover latent or hidden hazards in order to ensure the safety of mass transportation such as trains, airplanes, and highways, pointing to highway sobriety checkpoints, drug testing of railroad employees, and airplane baggage searches.

     "Where, as here, a search program is designed and implemented to search out concealed explosives in order to safeguard a means of mass transportation from terrorist attack, it serves a special need."

     In balancing the factors involved to determine whether the search program was reasonable and therefore constitutional, the appeals court found that the government interest involved, that of preventing "enormous dangers to life and property from terrorists" bombing subways, was both "immediate" and "substantial," rejecting arguments that the threat was not "immediate" or real, particularly in light of prior thwarted plots to bomb New York subways, its "continued desirability" as a target for terrorists, and recent bombings of public transportation in Madrid, Moscow, and London.

     The appeals court agreed that subway passengers have an "undiminished expectation of privacy" in their bags and containers, but that the kind of search conducted here "minimally intrudes upon that interest." 

     The appeals court found that the search program was narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose, since passengers receive notice of the searches and may decline to be searched so long as they leave the subway, officers search only those containers capable of concealing explosives, searches typically only last for a number of seconds, uniformed police conduct the searches out in the open, reducing fear and stigma that removal to a hidden area could cause, and police exercise "no discretion in selecting whom to search, but rather employ a formula that ensures they do not arbitrarily exercise their authority."

     The appeals court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that New York's program "must be ineffective," since no other city had previously employed a similar search program.

     Other cities must design programs according to their own resources and needs, which, quite apart from the question of efficacy, may not warrant or make possible such an initiative. Further, the upshot of plaintiffs' argument - that a program must be duplicated before it may be constitutional, strikes us as unsustainable.

     The appeals court found that the trial court properly concluded that the program was "reasonably effective" in serving its purpose.

     It concluded that the program was reasonable and constitutional because "preventing a terrorist attack on the subway is a special need; that need is weighty; the program is a reasonably effective deterrent; and even though the searches intrude on a full privacy interest, they do so to a minimal degree."

     MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05-6754-cv, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 20587 (2nd Cir.).

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 Assault and Battery: Physical

     Arrestee could pursue his complaint of excessive use of force, since it included both the basic facts of what occurred and the claim that this constituted unreasonable action under the Fourth Amendment, but his false arrest and false imprisonment claims were barred by his conviction of a criminal charge against him arising out of his arrest. Lynn v. Schertzberg, No. 05-1857, 169 Fed. Appx. 666 (3rd Cir. 2006).

     A genuine issue of fact about whether the amount of force used by a deputy while attempting to collect on a judgment was unreasonable barred summary judgment for the deputy in a federal civil rights lawsuit. Frobel v. County of Broome, No. 3:03CV528, 419 F. Supp. 2d 212 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).

Defenses: Absolute Immunity

   While a prosecutor's alleged conduct of unilaterally deciding to increase the amount of an arrestee's bond was not prosecutorial in nature, so that he was not entitled to prosecutorial absolute immunity in a federal civil rights lawsuit over this action, he was still entitled to absolute immunity, as his action was judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. Root v. Liston, No. 05-2004, 444 F.3d 127 (2nd Cir. 2006).

     An officer who testified at a grand jury proceeding against an arrestee, and who turned over to a prosecutor all evidence he knew of, including all exculpatory evidence, was entitled to absolute immunity from federal civil rights liability for malicious prosecution. Zamora v. City of Belen, No. Civ. 03-743, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (D.N.M. 2005).

Defenses: Collateral Estoppel

     Prior rejection of federal civil rights claims alleging excessive use of force in the shooting and killing of a man by police while fleeing arrest did not bar a subsequent state law negligence lawsuit arising out of the same incident, under the doctrines of either collateral estoppel or res judicata, as the test for "reasonable use" of force for constitutional purposes is not the same as "reasonableness" for purposes of negligence. Hernandez v. City of Pomona, No. B182437, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2006).

Defenses: Official Immunity

     Minnesota police officer was not entitled to official immunity under state law for the alleged action of loading a shotgun with lethal ammunition which was then used to shoot a suspect when he actually intended to load it with "less-lethal" ammunition. His act of loading the weapon with less-lethal ammunition was not an exercise of discretion or independent judgment, but rather a "ministerial" act, so that he was not entitled to official immunity for his alleged negligence in failing to do so properly. Brown v. City of Bloomington, No. A04-2221, 706 N.W.2d 519 (Minn. App. 2005).

Defenses: Statute of Limitations

     A New Jersey two-year statute of limitations on the plaintiff's false arrest and imprisonment claims began to run, at the latest, on the date when a grand jury declined to indict him on the underlying criminal complaint, or the date when he learned of this or reasonably should have, so that his lawsuit, filed four years later, was time barred. Akinola v. Doe, No. 05-4454, 165 Fed. Appx. 242 (3rd Cir. 2006).

     An arrestee's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against federal prosecutors and a postal inspector under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(b), arising out of his arrest, were subject to a two year statute of limitations in New York. Levine v. Gerson, No. 05-0748, 164 Fed. Appx. 64 (2d Cir. 2006).

     A former convict who received a pardon on the basis of innocence on a rape he was arrested and prosecuted for more than 50 years earlier could pursue a number of federal civil rights claims arising out of his arrest and prosecution. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), federal civil rights claims which would necessarily show the invalidity of a conviction do not accrue until the conviction has been set aside, and the court ruled that the rule in Heck would be applied retroactively to determine whether the statute of limitations period should be tolled (extended) on such claims. Walden v. City of Chicago, No. 04C0047, 391 F. Supp. 2d 660 (N.D. Ill. 2005).

Expert Witnesses

     Experts in the use of deadly force could not provide testimony based on medical evidence or opinions because this was found by the court to be outside the area of their expertise, and there was no showing that such medical reports were the kind of materials that excessive force experts relied on. Richman v. Sheahan, No. 98C7350, 415 F. Supp. 2d 929 (N.D. Ill. 2006).

False Arrest/Imprisonment: No Warrant

     Arrestee could not pursue federal civil rights claims such as false arrest and unreasonable search and seizure which, if successful, would call into question the validity of his criminal conviction, which had not been set aside, under the rule set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Fernandez v. Alexander, No. 3:01CV1807, 419 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D. Conn. 2006).

Family Relationships

     Family members of a man allegedly subjected to unlawful arrest or other civil rights violations do not have an independent federal civil rights claim without a showing that the unconstitutional conduct was directed at their family relationship. Gonzalez v. Vazquez Garced, No. CIV. 04-2114, 389 F. Supp. 2d 214 (D. Puerto Rico 2005).

Firearms Related: Intentional Use

     Police officer's use of deadly force was reasonable when a suspect refused to comply with his requests and continued to move towards the officer, reaching for the officer's gun. Blossom v. Yarbrough, No. 03-5146, 429 F.3d 963 (10th Cir. 2005).

First Amendment

     In a lawsuit filed by a "street preacher" against a state university's rules requiring permits for non-university entities to engage in certain expressive activity on campus, a federal appeals court held that the schools outdoor common areas were a public forum, that the requirement that non-university entities obtain permits did not violate the plaintiff's right to free speech, and that the school's requirement of three-days advance notice was also not a violation of his rights, but that the school's limit of five days per speaker per semester was a violation of the First Amendment.  Bowman v. White, No. 04-2299, 444 F. 3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006).

Malicious Prosecution

     Arrestee was not entitled to injunctive relief against his pending criminal prosecution under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 when he failed to show that the prosecution was being carried out in bad faith and for purposes of harassment. His claim that his prosecution for an alleged bribery was selective, politically motivated and based on the use of false testimony was insufficient to show such bad faith. Olson v. Fajardo-Velez, No. 05-1837, 419 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D. Puerto Rico 2006).

Negligence: Vehicle Related

     $5.75 million settlement reached in lawsuit brought on behalf of the estate of a passenger who died after being thrown from a car struck by a vehicle driven by a sheriff's deputy which allegedly ran a red light at 70 miles per hour while en route to providing back up to officers responding to a call. The plaintiff claimed that the deputy's vehicle did not have its sirens or flashing lights activated at the time of the accident. Grimmett v. Cook County Sheriff, No. 01L-7194, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, County Department, Law Division, reported in Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, pg. 25 (Aug. 4, 2006).

     Motorist was properly found 50% at fault for accident in which his vehicle and police vehicle engaged in high-speed chase through a red light without warning lights or siren collided, since there was evidence that the motorist was intoxicated at the time of the accident.  Award against city of $11,466 upheld, including $1,012 for pain and suffering. Lock v. City of Philadelphia, 895 A.2d 660 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

Police Plaintiffs: Privacy

     The release of a police officer's personnel file after a highly publicized traffic stop could not be the basis of liability for the police chief and city manager in his federal civil rights lawsuit. The release did not violate his constitutional rights to privacy or due process, so the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Additionally, the court finds that the officer's own "penchant" for attention by the media led to the voluntary release of his personal information into the public eye. Hall v. City of Cookeville, Tennessee, No. 04-6133, 157 Fed. Appx. 809 (6th Cir. 2005).

Police Plaintiff: Vehicle Related

     Police officer injured while driving a patrol car in an accident with an uninsured motorist was not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage under his own personal auto insurance policy. The city was self-insured and did not provide officers with uninsured motorist coverage, and the officer's own policy had an exclusion of uninsured motorist coverage under these circumstances because the patrol car was furnished for his regular use. Enforcement of this exclusion under these circumstances did not violate public policy in Tennessee. Shepherd v. Fregozo,  175 S.W.3d 209 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Procedural: Discovery

     In a lawsuit brought by an Inmate pardoned by Governor, claiming that police officers conspired to frame him for a murder he was not involved in, the defendant officers' request to discover, from the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, the material provided to the Governor for consideration in connection with the pardon involved relevant material not protected by work product privilege. Court orders production of requested materials. Evans v. City of Chicago, No. 04C3570, 231 F.R.D. 302 (N.D. Ill. 2005).

Public Protection: Motoring Public & Pedestrians

     City was not liable for damages to injured passenger and estate of deceased passenger injured when their vehicle was struck by participants in an illegal street race. The plaintiffs failed to show that the roadway where the race was conducted was "inherently" defective, and there was no evidence linking the alleged absence or inadequacy of lighting on the road to the conduct of the racers. Additionally, the damages were caused by the conduct of third parties, and were unrelated to the condition of city property. City of San Diego v. Superior Court, No. D046281, 40 Cal. Rptrs. 3d 26 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2006).

Racial Discrimination

     Complaint in lawsuit brought by Hispanic and African-American motorists claiming that county police had a policy of racial profiling in traffic stops was sufficient to meeting the minimum requirements of pleading in federal court, including claims against the county for municipal liability. Feliciano v. County of Suffolk, No. 04-CV-5321, 419 F. Supp. 2d 302 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).

     There were issues of fact as to whether an officer's stop of a vehicle and search of a passenger in it was motivated by racial bias, and whether the stop of the vehicle was justified by reasonable suspicion of a crime, barring summary judgment. Johnson v. Anhorn, No. 03-2424, 416 F. Supp. 2d 338 (E.D. Pa. 2006).

Search and Seizure: Person

     A federal agency's use of its mandatory random drug testing of its criminal investigators to gather evidence given to a federal prosecutor for the primary purpose of deciding whether to initiate criminal proceedings was a violation of the employee's Fourth Amendment rights, but agency officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability because the law on the issue was not clearly established at the time of the tests in early 2000. Freeman v. Fallin, No. 02-0386, 422 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2006).

Strip Searches

     Female high school students subject to a strip search conducted by the school's dean, who was looking for $60 allegedly stolen from a fellow student, stated a viable federal civil rights claim when the dean did not have information sufficient to provide individualized reasonable suspicion needed to conduct such searches. A section of the Illinois School Code, addressing the issue of searches of students, did not provide a private right of action for damages for the students under state law. Carlson v. Bremen High School District 228, No. 05 C 6194, 423 F. Supp. 2d 823 (N.D. Ill. 2006).

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     Article: "Dealing With Employee Stress," by James D. Sewell. 75 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin No. 7, pgs. 1-6 (July 2006). "Managers must recognize how they contribute to employee stress and take specific steps to reduce these practices." [PDF] [HTML]

     Publication: AMBER Alert Best Practices Guide for Public Information Officers. This Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention guide describes the public information officer's (PIO's) job responsibilities and provides tips to maximize the PIO's effectiveness before, during, and after an AMBER Alert activation. It offers recommendations for helping law enforcement agencies achieve a smooth, rapid public warning activation program. (NCJ 212703)

    Publication: National Institute of Justice, NIJ Journal Issue No. 254 Posted July 7, 2006 When a Zylon-based body armor that had passed NIJ standards failed to fully protect an officer in 2003, NIJ began investigating why. The newest NIJ Journal features an article about the findings of the investigation as well as interim changes to the standards and testing program. Another article summarizes findings from an NIJ-sponsored conference about suicide terrorism. The conference brought together experts in the field to discuss findings and share views on suicide terrorism, what compels individuals to join terrorist organizations, and the utility of a central database of research on the topic. Additional stories feature: Biometric-based identification used by a school in New Jersey to keep its students safer. A method for minimizing the costs and risks of conducting evaluations. Ways to better investigate electronic crimes. Methamphetamine use and production. Increased reports of rape involving people who know each other. Full Text HTML

     Statistics: Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2004. Reports the results of a biennial census of Federal agencies employing personnel with arrest and firearms authority. Using agency classifications, the report presents the number of officers working in the areas of police response and patrol, criminal investigation and enforcement, inspections, security and protection, court operations, and corrections, by agency and State, as of September 2004. Data on gender and race of officers are also included. Highlights include the following: Federal officers' duties included criminal investigation (38%), police response and patrol (21%), corrections and detention (16%), court operations (5%), and security and protection (4%). The combined officer employment of CBP and ICE in 2004 was 21% greater than the comparable combined totals of the INS, U.S. Customs Service, and Federal Protective Service in 2002. Women accounted for 16% of Federal officers in 2004. A third of Federal officers were members of a racial or ethnic minority in 2004. This included 17.7% who were Hispanic and Latino, and 11.4% who were black or African American. 08/06 NCJ 212750 Acrobat file (594K) | ASCII file (37K) | Spreadsheets (zip format 12K)

     Statistics: Violent Felons in Large Urban Counties Presents data collected from a representative sample of felony cases that resulted in a felony conviction for a violent offense in 40 of the Nation's 75 largest counties. The study tracks cases for up to 1 year from the date of filing through final disposition. Defendants convicted of murder, rape, robbery, assault or other violent felonies are described in terms of demographic characteristics (gender, race, Hispanic origin, age), prior arrests and convictions, criminal justice status at time of arrest, type of pretrial release or detention, type of adjudication, and sentence received. Highlights include the following: Thirty-six percent of violent felons had an active criminal justice status at the time of their arrest. This included 18% on probation, 12% on release pending disposition of a prior case, and 75% of parole. A majority (56%) of violent felons had a prior conviction record. Thirty-eight percent had prior felony conviction and 15% had a previous conviction for a violent felony. Eighty-one percent of violent felons were sentenced to incarceration with 50% going to prison and 31% to jail. Nineteen percent received a probation term without incarceration. 8/06 NCJ 205289 Press release | Acrobat file (253K) | ASCII file (22K) | Spreadsheets (zip format 18K)

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted civil liability law resources.