FEATURED CASES

WITH LINKS TO THE OPINIONS

Georgia sheriffs held to be an "arm of the State" in establishing "use-of-force" policy for county jails, and therefore entitled, in their official capacity, to Eleventh Amendment immunity from liability. Sheriff was not subject to federal civil rights lawsuit for damages for alleged assault on a detainee by deputy and a police officer after the arresting officer stated that the prisoner had previously struck him.

     A federal appeals court, acting en banc, has held by 6-5 that Georgia sheriffs are an "arm of the State" of Georgia for the function of setting "use-of-force" policy for county jails and are therefore entitled to immunity from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. That Amendment protects states and their agencies from lawsuits in federal court, with certain limited exceptions, such as state consent. As a result, a Georgia sheriff was not subject in his official capacity to a federal civil rights lawsuit for money damages by a detainee who claimed that he was attacked and repeatedly struck by a deputy and a police officer after one arresting officer mentioned at the jail that the prisoner had previously struck him. Injuries in the case were allegedly serious enough to result in a mental hospital stay, and the prisoner claimed that the officers struck his head against a wall, and that he was subsequently forced to write a statement for jail officials which said "They had to be rough with me to let me know that they mean business."

     The majority opinion did not rely on or even cite the decisions of other federal appeals courts, five of which, according to the dissenters, have previously ruled that county sheriffs were not immune under the Eleventh Amendment for civil rights violations at jails. The majority stated that "we focus on Georgia law, as opposed to how other circuits treat sheriffs under other states' laws, because states have extremely wide latitude in determining their forms of government."

     The majority opinion argued that the Georgia State Constitution provides that only the state legislature, and not the counties, can determine the powers and duties of sheriffs, despite election of sheriffs by residents of each county. It also noted that sheriffs perform a variety of functions for state government, including incarcerating prisoners convicted of some state crimes, and bringing criminal defendants to state court. The decision acknowledged that counties pay most of the budget of the county jails, but rejected the argument that this alone made the sheriff a county as opposed to state actor for purposes of the lawsuit at issue. The majority noted that the state had the ability to control the duties of the sheriff, to train sheriffs, and to discipline sheriffs, and that the state also had the ability to require counties to fund the sheriffs' budget and the jail budgets while precluding them from controlling the sheriffs.

     The majority also cautioned that it was merely deciding that the sheriff was an arm of the State for purposes of the function of setting "use of force" policy for the county jail, and was not deciding that he was an arm of the State for all purposes. The majority opinion explicitly notes that Georgia state law imposes some burdens on counties to provide medical care for inmates. The decision does not decide whether the sheriff is a county or state actor for purposes of claims concerning prisoner medical care.

     The dissenting opinion placed more emphasis on the decisions of the other federal appeals courts, and the fact that the majority opinion acknowledged that there appeared to be no Georgia law requiring that the state pay any judgment against the sheriff, so that a judgment against the sheriff in his official capacity would not "drain" the state treasury. It also argued that it was possible that the sheriff was not a policymaker for the county, but a separately suable governmental entity, and that sheriffs could be found not to act on behalf of the county, without reaching the conclusion that they acted on behalf of the state instead.

     The majority opinion rejected the argument that its decision would leave the prisoner without a remedy for the harm he allegedly suffered, noting that the Eleventh Amendment immunity would not bar a lawsuit against the sheriff in his individual capacity or against the individual deputy and officers allegedly involved in the incident.

     Manders v. Lee, #01-13606, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).

    »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet. [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Prisoner's allegations that his leg infection and urinary tract infection worsened and became more serious as a result of inadequate medical treatment was sufficient to support a claim against prison officials for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, but trial court acted erroneously by declining to rule on the merits of prison officials' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, particularly when plaintiff did not file an affidavit in opposition or show why he needed further discovery to respond.

     A former Michigan state prisoner claimed that he was denied proper medical treatment while in prison, and that he contracted a urinary tract infection and leg infection while incarcerated. He claimed that the failure to provide adequate medical treatment resulted in these conditions worsening and becoming more serious. The urinary tract infection was alleged to have caused epididymitis and an enlarged testicle, as well as a low sperm count and severe pain during intercourse. The leg infection, which allegedly began as a result of inadequate medical treatment of an injury from falling through a set of bleachers in the prison yard in 1987, "plagued him" throughout his imprisonment and required ongoing medical treatment until his death in 2002.

     The trial court rejected a motion by defendant prison officials to dismiss the lawsuit the prisoner filed charging them with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The trial judge also declined to address the merits of the defendants' motion seeking summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and instead ordered further discovery, stating that summary judgment was premature until such discovery was completed.

     A federal appeals court agreed that the prisoner's claims, if true, stated a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and that the rejection of the motion to dismiss was therefore correct.

     It also found, however, that the trial court erred in failing to rule on the merits of the defendant's motion seeking summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. It noted that the purpose of qualified immunity was to prevent the burden of proceeding with litigation--including discovery--from being unnecessarily placed on governmental defendants.

By failing to elaborate on why further discovery was necessary to properly decide the motion, the district court erroneously denied the defendants the benefits of their defense from suit (if that defense is, indeed, meritorious).

     Further, while the defendants properly presented and supported their motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff failed to file an affidavit in opposition to the motion, or to show why he required further discovery in order to properly respond.

     The appeals court ordered the trial judge to hold further proceedings to consider the motion for summary judgment on its merits.

     Wallin v. Norman, #02-1634, 317 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2003).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Federal appeals court, by 6-5 vote, upholds constitutionality of attorneys' fees limits in prisoner lawsuits imposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Trial judge's finding of an equal protection violation overturned in case where prisoner was awarded damages for alleged deliberate indifference to his need to be evaluated for a liver transplant.

     A federal appeals court, acting en banc, has upheld the constitutionality of the attorneys' fees limits in prisoner lawsuits imposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(d).

     The case at issue was one in which a Wisconsin jury found that a medical director for the state prison system had acted with deliberate indifference to the serious medical condition of a prisoner suffering from end-stage liver disease, refusing to allow him to be evaluated for a transplant operation until after he filed suit. A jury in that case awarded the prisoner $10,000 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages. The prisoner's attorneys requested almost $93,000 in attorneys' fees, but the award would have been limited to $46,452 under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The trial judge, however, ruled that the PLRA limits were unconstitutional, awarding $80,000 in attorneys' fees.

     The PLRA limits fee awards in prisoner cases to amounts reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the prisoner's rights, to an amount "proportionately related" to the court ordered relief for the violation, and, in cases involving a monetary judgment, allows the use of a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) to be used for attorneys' fees, with the remainder of any award of attorneys' fees--so long as it is not greater than 150% of the judgment--to be paid by the defendant. The statute also limits the hourly rate to be paid for attorneys' fees in such cases to no greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A for the payment of court-appointed attorneys.

     The majority ruled that Congress did not violate the equal protection rights of prisoners who are prevailing parties in their civil rights claims by treating them differently, for purposes of awards of attorneys' fees, than other civil rights litigants. A five judge plurality of the appeals court, in a decision written by Judge Easterbrook, found that Congress could have rationally decided that prisoners are different from other litigants when it comes to civil rights litigation, and therefore decided to treat them differently for purposes of awards of attorneys' fees.

     Congress could have believed, the judges noted, that prisoners have more "free time" to devote to lawsuits or may even, in some cases, view pursuing litigation as "recreation," having a "burning desire to turn the tables on the guards and other prison personnel, discomforting if not hurting or humiliating them." Congress could also have rationally believed that prisoners have a greater tendency to lie than other litigants, resulting in the filing of more frivolous litigation, which the attorneys' fee limit was designed, in part, to deter.

Prisoners are less honest than free persons and thus more likely to tell tall tails of victimization. The convictions that put them in prison establish their proclivity to violate the law when they see a personal advantage in doing so.

      As a result, Congress could determine that that any "drawbacks" connected with the caps on attorneys' fees are outweighed by the benefits.

A rational legislature could conclude that a small reduction in weak, trivial or bogus suits is worth achieving even at some potential cost to prisoners' ability to prevail in the less common meritorious suit.

     A concurrence by one additional judge turned the plurality decision into a slim majority result, with Judge Ripple agreeing that the restrictions on attorneys' fees may have been based on the desire to deter frivolous lawsuits, and commenting that restricting awards of attorneys' fees in lawsuits where prisoners prevail--focusing therefore more on nonfrivolous cases--was not likely to be the best way to address frivolous lawsuits and an overabundance of prisoner litigation. But he also stated that the court should not "second-guess" Congress and that "as long as our legislators could have had a rational basis for their actions, we must allow their judgment to stand. We have no right to demand that Congress achieve a perfect, or even a near perfect accommodation between means and ends."

     The remaining five judges on the appeals court, in a dissent written by Judge Rovner, found that the limits constituted an equal protection violation.

The only impact this provision will have is on the meritorious prisoner actions, rendering it even more difficult for prisoners to adequately present these meritorious claims to the courts, and more difficult for the court to find counsel willing to accept appointments to represent prisoners in such cases. The government does not purport to have a legitimate interest in deterring prisoners from filing meritorious suits, nor could it, and there the provision is unconstitutional.

     The court's plurality opinion states that no other federal appeals court to date has found the attorneys' fee limitations unconstitutional.

     Johnson v. Daley, #00-3981, 339 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2003).

    »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet. [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Prisoner could pursue claims against some nurses for alleged inadequate medical care and retaliation against him for filing of an earlier lawsuit, but not against one nurse against whom he had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies concerning retaliation claim. The prisoner's grievance only had to allege misconduct by the nurses and did not need to plead all the elements of a particular legal theory.

     A Michigan prisoner, acting as his own attorney, brought a federal civil rights lawsuit against a number of prison nurses claiming that they had been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and retaliated against him for filing a previous lawsuit against them.

     In particular, he claimed that one nurse was deliberately indifferent to his health care requests and also improperly charged him for health care visits he did not receive and that another failed to return his hospital records and petroleum jelly because she was named as a Defendant in his lawsuit. He also claimed that the nurses attempted to interfere with the processing of his grievances to "cover up" for their inadequate medical care of his chronic ulcerative colitis.

     A federal appeals court found that these claims were sufficient to state claims both for inadequate medical treatment and for unlawful retaliation for his prior lawsuit, and that he had exhausted available administrative remedies as to two of the nurses and a health unit manager. The grievance he filed was sufficient by alleging this misconduct, even if it did not attempt to "plead all the elements" necessary to support a particular legal theory of liability set forth in his subsequent lawsuit.

     Retaliation claims against one nurse, however, could not proceed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e, since the first time the retaliation claim was raised as to this nurse was at the second stage of the grievance, so the claim was not properly asserted at the first stage of the grievance, as required.

     Burton v. Jones, No. 01-1078, 321 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2003).

    »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Court's order requiring prisoner to be kept in a particular facility to allow him to effectively pursue pending litigation did not entitle prison officials to absolute immunity from the inmate's claim of deliberate indifference to his confinement there which allegedly resulted in his being attacked by a cellmate for being a "snitch."

     A Delaware prisoner involved in two federal civil rights lawsuits had cooperated with a drug trafficking investigation at one prison that ended with the arrest of prison officials and inmates, and was therefore known as a "snitch" by prison authorities. For purposes of convenience and economy, a state trial judge ordered that he be kept at a particular correctional facility in order to facilitate his participation in the progress of his lawsuits through the courts.

     At his new facility, a correctional officer allegedly called him a "good telling mother f----ing snitcher" in front of other prisoners, and a deputy warden subsequently made a determination that the officer did make this statement. A committee unanimously recommended that the prisoner be placed in protective custody, but this recommendation was allegedly rejected, leaving the prisoner with no additional safety precautions.

     A month later, the prisoner obtained a new cellmate, who allegedly attacked him the following day, sending him to the hospital, where he was treated for a fractured jaw. The cellmate pled guilty to the assault and stated that he had made the attack because the prisoner was a "snitcher on inmates and officers" at his prior facility.

     The injured prisoner filed a federal civil rights lawsuit seeking damages for alleged deliberate indifference to the risk of assault on him, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

     A federal appeals court rejected the argument that the defendant correctional officials were entitled to absolute immunity from liability based on the state court judge's order requiring the prisoner to be kept at a particular facility in order to facilitate his participation in the progress of his lawsuits. This order did not require the correctional officials to keep the prisoner in conditions that they knew to pose a substantial risk of serious harm to him. Indeed, to the contrary, the judge's order expressed concern that they take special precautions" to ensure the prisoner's safety, and there was even a docket entry noting that the prisoner was to be kept in "protective custody," making it clear that he was to be kept safe.

     The court did order further proceedings, however, on whether defendant members of a committee which made the final decision to take "no action" on a recommendation that the prisoner be placed in protective custody were entitled to "quasi-judicial" influential immunity since their function in making this determination was "functionally comparable" to that of a judge, as well as other issues in the case, including the possibility of qualified immunity.

     Hamilton v. Leavy, #01-3062, 322 F.3d 776 (3rd Cir. 2003).

    »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet. [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Alleged failure to grant prisoner the right to request interviews of witnesses to incident and the consideration of their testimony at disciplinary hearing violated the prisoner's due process rights.

     An Illinois prisoner filed a lawsuit in state court seeking to compel correctional officials to expunge part of his disciplinary record, arguing that the discipline had been imposed on him without due process, in violation of state statutes, and in violation of departmental regulations. In particular, he claimed that he was denied his requests that witnesses to incidents be interviewed and their testimony considered.

     The trial court dismissed the prisoner's claims. An intermediate Illinois appellate court reversed.

     It found that the prisoner's claim that discipline was imposed on him while ignoring his request to interview certain witnesses to an incident in which he allegedly cursed at a correctional officer and threatened him, was sufficient to state a due process claim. Even though the prisoner did not get the names of the requested witnesses exactly right, the court found that asking for "Officer Bowery" might be close enough as a request for "Officer Bowers" and that a request for nurse "Twala" might be sufficient as a request for nurse "Twala Walton" as witnesses. If so, and if they were available to give relevant testimony, then both due process and the department's rules required that they be called or interviewed on the prisoner's request.

     Several other complaints by the prisoner concerning other disciplinary proceedings were properly dismissed, however, the appellate court found, including a claim that he was given improper notice of the charges at one hearing because of unclarity about whether he spat on another inmate or through an ink pen. An inconsistency between two officers' report of an incident, with one stating that it occurred at 9:55 a.m. and the other saying that it happened at 10 a.m., was insubstantial and not an indication of any violation of the prisoner's rights.

     Armstrong v. Snyder, No. 4-02-0271, 783 N.E.2d 1101 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 2003).

    »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Manufacturer of paper gown allegedly marketed for use with suicidal prisoners could be held liable when it failed to tear away when detainee hanged himself with it. Claims for products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty could proceed, along with due process claims against city for alleged reckless failure to provide proper medical care for suicidal prisoner. Court dismisses Eighth Amendment claim as inapplicable for the death of a pretrial detainee, as opposed to a convicted prisoner.

     A Chicago man was arrested and placed in a detention cell at a police station. Officers are alleged to have known that he was mentally unstable and suicidal, having witnessed him attempting suicide by slitting his wrists. The officers removed his clothing and provided him with a paper isolation gown, which he used to hang himself. The man's estate contended that the officers failed to adequately monitor the cell, and failed to provide proper medical care when they found him, still alive, hanging in the cell. The estate asserted claims against the city for negligence and against the city and the officers for alleged violations of the detainee's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and for willful and wanton conduct.

     The estate also asserted claims for products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty against the company that manufactured and designed the paper gown, allegedly with the knowledge that it might be worn by a suicidal detainee. The complaint asserted that it was defectively designed because the gown did not tear when the detainee hanged himself.

     The trial court rejected a motion by the manufacturer to dismiss these claims. The manufacturer argued that the suicide and the city's alleged negligence were "independent acts that break any causal connection" between any act or omission in the manufacture and design of the gown and the death.

     But the plaintiff specifically claimed that the paper gowns were supposed to break away in the event that a person attempts to use the gown to hang himself, so that the particular gown was defective.

Are the injuries claimed something that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of producing a defective gown used by suicidal detainees? At this point, plaintiff has claimed enough of a connection between EMS' [the manufacturer] allegedly defective gown and the claimed injuries to preclude finding the injuries unforeseeable as a matter of law.

     The court also noted that there can be "multiple proximate causes of an injury," rejecting the argument that the suicide and the officers' alleged negligence were independent intervening causes of the death which precluded liability on the part of the manufacturer. The court acknowledged that the manufacturer could still argue, in proceedings to come, that these intervening acts made the allegedly defective gown "a mere condition to injury," but "at this stage of the proceedings," the court declined to dismiss these claims for "failure to plead proximate cause."

     The trial court granted the city's motion to dismiss Eighth Amendment claims, on the basis that the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment provides the standard for care of convicted prisoners, not pretrial detainees, who have been convicted of nothing and accordingly cannot be punished at all. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause--which provides rights "at least as great as the rights of a convicted prisoner" under the Eighth Amendment, would be allowed to proceed.

    Finally, the court ruled that state law negligence claims, based on alleged negligence in supervision, training, and hiring of personnel, should be dismissed as based on discretionary actions for which the city is immune under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/2-201. The claim for willful and wanton breach of a duty to summon immediate medical care, however, fell outside the scope of this immunity, and was not dismissed.

     Reed v. City of Chicago, No. 01C7865, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (N.D. Ill. 2002).

     »Click here to read the court's decision on the AELE website.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Prisoner could state a claim for retaliatory transfer for having filed a grievance against an officer based on a sequence of events from which a retaliatory motive could be inferred, without proving motivation in the complaint. Illinois prisoner had a protected liberty interest in continued participation in work release program which could not be ended without due process.

     An Illinois prisoner serving a sentence of incarceration was placed in a work-release program which allowed him to engage in outside employment. On one day, however, when he returned to the "Transition Center" detention facility from work, he was allegedly confronted by a supervisory officer who "falsely" advised him that his movement out of the facility was not approved. The officer allegedly became "agitated and verbally abusive" when the prisoner attempted to explain that he had been following proper procedure.

     The prisoner then filed a written grievance against the officer describing the confrontation. After this was submitted, the officer filed an inmate disciplinary report charging the prisoner with "giving false information to an employee," "insolence," and "unauthorized movement," charges the prisoner contended were filed even though the officer knew them to be false.

     A hearing on the disciplinary report was held and the supervisory officer was allegedly "allowed to participate in the deliberations of the hearing and dictated its result," which was that the prisoner was immediately transferred out of the Transition Center and sent to higher security facility, losing the ability to participate in the work release program. He filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that the transfer was retaliatory for his filing of grievance against the officer, an exercise of his First Amendment rights.

     Turning down motions by defendant correctional officers to dismiss the lawsuit, a federal trial court ruled that the prisoner adequately state a claim for retaliatory transfer, based on a "chronology, or sequence of events, which could support a claim of retaliation," i.e., that the supervisory officer filed the disciplinary report "solely to retaliate for plaintiff's having filed the grievance against him."

     The court noted that the plaintiff was under no obligation "to prove motivation at this pleading stage. Because of the difficulty of proving intent at the time of a complaint, it is sufficient for plaintiff to allege a sequence of events."

     The plaintiff further adequately alleged a violation of due process by two officers constituting the hearing panel, by claiming that they allowed the complaining supervisory officer to participate in the deliberations of the hearing in violation of Sec. 504.80 of the Illinois Administrative Code, and also allowed him to "dictate the result, in essence conducting a 'sham' hearing."

     The defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, as the prisoner's right to be free of retaliation for his exercise his First Amendment free speech rights in filing a grievance against the officer was "clearly established."

     Lastly, the trial court rejected the argument that the prisoner had no protected liberty interest in remaining in the detention facility where he could participate in the work-release program. The court noted that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in Montgomery v. Anderson, #00-2869, 262 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2001) that a prisoner has a statutory liberty interest in good-time credits and parole once they have been awarded pursuant to state or administrative regulations. "Each prisoner is then entitled to remain in the designation that they have been assigned to, unless he or she commits a violation, because of the significant hardship such a reduction would impose upon the prisoner," and therefore must receive due process before a reduction due to a rule violation can take place.

     Work-release, the court reasoned, which allows the inmate to participate in employment outside the institution, "is analogous to parole," since both allow "a measure of restricted, supervised liberty during period otherwise encompassed by the inmate's sentence." A prisoner's removal from work-release therefore results in an "atypical and significant hardship" in relation to the "ordinary incidents of prison life.

     An Illinois prisoner, the court ruled, has a statutory liberty interest in participation in work-release programs once it has been awarded under 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504, which cannot be terminated without due process.

     Segreti v. Gillen, 259 F. Supp. 2d 733 (N.D. Ill. 2003).

     »Click here to read the court's decision on the AELE website.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Three federal trial court decisions rule that a change in federal Bureau of Prisons' policy concerning the placement of inmates serving short terms of imprisonment into community correctional facilities violated the "notice and comment" requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Retroactive application to inmates currently in halfway houses also rejected.

     In three recent cases, federal trial courts have addressed federal prisoner's claims challenging recent changes in federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) policy concerning the placement of inmates in community corrections facilities to serve short terms of imprisonment.

     The BOP previously exercised discretion to place federal inmates serving short terms of imprisonment in community corrections facilities, such as "halfway houses." On December 13, 2002, a lawyer with the U.S. Department of Justice with the title of Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General composed an eight page legal memorandum in which he characterized this practice as unlawful. The BOP therefore informed all federal judges that it would not longer consider a judge's recommendations for such placements under any circumstances, and also announced that this rule would be retroactively applied, with individually currently at halfway houses with more than 150 days remaining in their sentences to be transferred within 30 days to more conventional federal prisons.

     In the cases reported below, prisoners with current placements in such halfway houses challenged such transfers.

     In Iacaboni v. U.S., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (D. Mass. 2003), the court held that the BOP's change in its policy was invalid because its method of adopting it failed to satisfy the requirements for notice of the change and an opportunity to comment on the proposed changes, as specified in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 551 et seq., because the policy change was a "substantive" change, rather than merely an "interpretive rule." Additionally, even if the policy were valid, it could not be applied retroactively to federal inmates already in community corrections facilities, the court held. Further, the court found, the BOP's denial that it had discretion to place inmates in community corrections facilities was based on an erroneous interpretation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3621(b) in the Justice Department legal memorandum, since the court found that this statute did not render community corrections placements unlawful.

     In Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518 (M.D. La. 2003), the court found that the plaintiff prisoner seeking to avoid a transfer from a community corrections facility to a federal prison did not have to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit as the pursuit of such remedies would be "futile," since those who would view the prisoner's claims in the administrative process had no power to alter the decision. This court also held that the change of policy was issued in violation of the notice and comment requirements of the APA, and that the prisoner was likely to prevail on the claim that the policies were inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute governing the authority of the Bureau of Prisons and was therefore entitled to immediate injunctive relief.

     In Ferguson v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 547 (M.D. La. 2003), two consolidated cases challenging the BOP new policy, the court also granted injunctive relief and found a failure to comply with the APA requirements and other defects in the new rule.

     »Click here to read the court's decision in Iacaboni on the AELE website.

      »Click here to read the court's decision in Howard on the AELE website.

      »Click here to read the court's decision in Ferguson on the AELE website.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Guards and operator of private facility with custody over only federal prisoners could not be sued under federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, since they did not act under "color of state law," but the guards at the facility were acting under color of federal law and therefore could still be sued directly for alleged violations of prisoner's constitutional rights in leaving him unprotected against assault by another prisoner. Such a claim could not, however, be asserted against the corporation which operated the prison.

     A Rhode Island statute authorizes municipalities to create public corporations that would own and operate detention facilities. Under that statute, the City of Central Falls, Rhode Island created the Central Falls Detention Facility Corporation to build and own such a facility. The corporation is not a part of the City, but rather has a "distinct legal existence." Financing to build it came from bonds issued by the Rhode Island Port Authority.

     This company subsequently contracted with the U.S. Marshals Service to house federal pretrial detainees and also contracted with a private corporation to operate the facility and employ the staff. Only federal prisoners were held at the facility. One such prisoner claimed that he reported to a guard that he had received numerous threats from black inmates and requested protective custody, but he was left in the general population and was viciously beaten by several black inmates when left unattended during a fire drill.

     The prisoner filed a lawsuit in federal court against several guards, as well as the private corporation which runs the facility, alleging violation of his constitutional rights in failing to protect him against the assault. The complaint asserted claims under both 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federally protected rights by persons acting "under color of state law," while the Bivens opinion held that a federal officer acting under "color of federal law" may be liable for damages for violating a person's constitutional rights.

     The trial court found that neither the guards nor the corporation operating the facility acted under "color of state law" for purposes of a Sec. 1983 claim, since they only maintained custody of federal prisoners, which was neither a power "possessed by virtue of state law" nor one that has been "traditionally exclusively reserved to the state." The Sec. 1983 claims therefore were dismissed.

     The trial court further noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has previously ruled, in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) that a private corporation operating a prison is not subject to a lawsuit under Bivens, and therefore dismissed the Bivens claim against the defendant corporation also. The U.S. Supreme Court had reasoned that, since Bivens actions are against individual federal officers, rather than against the U.S. government, allowing a Bivens action against a private corporation operating the facility would give the prisoner greater rights than those enjoyed by prisoners at publicly-operated prison facilities.

     The Supreme Court's decision, however, left open the issue of whether a prisoner at a privately operated prison may assert a Bivens action against individuals employed at the prison. The trial court found that the guards at the prison at issue were "federal actors" acting under "color of federal law. The defendant guards, in essence, acted as the "alter ego" of the U.S. Marshall who exercised ultimate authority and custody over the prisoners, who were awaiting the disposition of federal charges against them.

     The court also noted that the prisoner could not seek redress for his injuries through the Bureau of Prisons' Administrative Remedy Program, because it applies only to those incarcerated in BOP facilities and half-way houses operated under contract with the BOP, and does not apply to individuals confined in other facilities, or to the prison at issue, in particular.

Refusing to apply Bivens to a federal prisoner's claim for alleged constitutional violations simply because that prisoner is incarcerated at a privately-operated prison rather than a government-operated prison would deprive that prisoner of a remedy available to prisoners at government-operated facilities, thereby running counter to the desire for parity expressed in Malesko.

     Bivens claims against the individual defendant guards, therefore, were allowed to proceed.

     Sarro v. Cornell Corrections, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.R.I. 2003).

     »Click here to read the court's decision on the AELE website.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

New York federal court rules that "Five Percenter" group, widely classified by correctional institutions as a security threat group and gang, is entitled to treatment as a religion by prison officials. Injunction issued allowing prisoner to possess a copy of the group's basic text and numerological devices, with further proceedings ordered as to the possible right to possess other group materials and symbols, including its newspaper, or to engage in gatherings and fasts.

     A New York prisoner, formerly known as Rashaad Marria, who has adopted a new name of Intelligent Tarref Allah, is a member of the "Nation of Gods and Earths," which he initially joined in prison while awaiting trial, and he has remained a member since 1994. He filed a federal civil rights lawsuit challenging a policy of the state Department of Correctional Services classifying the "Nation," commonly known as the "Five Percent Nation", as an unauthorized or "security threat" group, and the resulting ban on his receipt and possession of Nation materials and literature, including the groups "central texts" and its newspaper, and a ban on formal gatherings with other members of the group.

     The "Nation," whose members are commonly referred to as "Five Percenters," or the "Five Percent" are a split off of the Nation of Islam (NOI), a group that the state correctional department classifies as a religion, and one with which the "Nation" shares some of its teachings and its central text. The term "Five Percent" comes from statements by NOI leader Elijah Muhammad, separating the world's population into three categories--the Five Percent, the Ten Percent, and the Eighty-Five Percent. Muhammad argued that the Ten Percent teach the Eighty-Five Percent to believe in the existence of a "mystery God," and thereby keep the Eighty-Five Percent enslaved by having them worship something that they cannot see, while the remaining Five Percent are the "poor, righteous teachers" who do not believe in the teachings of the Ten Percent, and instead teach the "identity of the true and living God, as well as freedom, justice, and equality to all human families of the planet earth."

     Members of the "Five Percent" Nation additionally believe that every black man is an embodiment of God with the proper name Allah and every black woman is "Earth," from which life springs, and hold to a black supremacist belief that the white man is "the devil." The group has been widely classified by prison authorities as a gang or security threat group on the basis of involvement in violent incidents and promotion of beliefs that might lead to confrontations and violence.

     The lawsuit asserted claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc et seq.

     The RLUIPA statute provides that:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person--

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

     This is a much heavier burden than is usually required to uphold correctional policies or practices which must only be rationally related to a legitimate penological interest.

     The federal trial court placed a great deal of emphasis on the sincerity of the plaintiff prisoner's beliefs. It noted that he had organized his daily life around the group's teachings, legally changed his name to "Allah," and refused to eat pork. Additionally, there was nothing in his prison record indicating involvement in disruptive conduct or violent incidents, and the prisoner had earned his GED high school certificate and participated in other programs and classes.

     The court therefore found that the inmate's beliefs were sincere, that they were religious in nature, and that his practice of his religion was being "substantially burdened" by the correctional department's policy. It additionally found that the department had failed to show that its complete ban on the group's literature and activities furthered a compelling security interest and was the least restrictive way to do so.

     The court found that the correctional officials failed to provide "any evidence" that its decision to treat "Five Percenters" as a security threat group was "either reasoned or informed." The Department allegedly had no records setting forth the basis for its decision or "even documenting its decision-making process concerning the Five Percenters." Additionally, the Department admitted that its classification of the Five Percenters as a security threat group was not based on "any guidelines or specific criteria." The court reasoned that the decision was "subjective" and that the Department "knows little about the Nation's seemingly legitimate existence outside prison," and failed to present any evidence concerning how it came to the conclusion that it is not a religion.

     The court stated that the headquarters of the group in New York City, the "Allah Youth Center in Mecca" and "Allah School in Mecca," enjoys not-for-profit tax status as a 501(c)(3) organization and a favorable ninety-nine year lease from New York City paid at the rate of $20 per month, and that the center conducts substance abuse programs, and after-school tutoring for children.

     Various incident reports concerning violent acts by individual members of the group, the court stated, were an insufficient basis for a ban on the group as a whole or a determination that it was not religious in nature.

There are prisoners who would describe themselves as Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslim, NOI, etc. who likewise violate prison regulations, and it is easy to imagine a situation where the common ethnic or religious bond shared by members of a group could serve as the impetus for some to band together and at times act cohesively, but no one would suggest that such facts preclude the classification of these recognized groups as religions deserving of First Amendment protection.

     The court granted an injunction requiring the correctional officials to allow the prisoner to possess a copy of the group's central text and its numerological devices, claimed to be important to the practice of the religion. The court also noted that the central text of the group, known as the 120 Degrees, was also a religious text for the Nation of Islam, and that members of the NOI were allowed to possess it. Based on this, the correctional officials could not reasonably argue, the court found, that the mere presence of the book in a prison, by itself, would be disruptive.

     Further proceedings and determinations were ordered to be made by correctional officials concerning his other requests for possession of the group's materials and symbols, and for participation in group gatherings and fasts.

     In doing so, the court said, "it is incumbent upon DOCS to make a determination about the feasibility of allowing sincere adherents like plaintiff to possess literature and to engage in religious practices in light of its security concerns." On remand, the court stated, because the prisoner established that his religious beliefs are "substantially burdened" by the current ban on The Five Percenter newspaper, the DOCS "bears the burden of demonstrating why his proposals are infeasible." The prisoner proposed that an existing media review committee be use to remove symbols that it views as posing a security threat, or that the prison maintain a copy of the newspaper in the prison library that the plaintiff could sign for and read individually during normal library time, without removing it.

     Prison officials are supposed to report back to the federal judge in 60 days regarding their progress on these issues.

     Marria v. Broaddus, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13329 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

     »Click here to read the court's decision on the AELE website.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

State prison may not deny treatment of prisoner's alleged gender identity disorder solely on the basis that he only initially sought such treatment after his incarceration.

     A New York federal court judge has ruled that a state prisoner serving a 50-year-to-life term for murder cannot be denied medical treatment, including possibly a sex change operation, and related procedures, solely on the basis that he only sought such treatment after he became incarcerated.

     The plaintiff prisoner claims that he became aware of his "female identity" as early as his childhood, but that he only became familiar with the medical diagnosis of "gender identity disorder" once he was imprisoned. This is a judicially and medically recognized psychiatric disorder. The prisoner, since 1998, has requested diagnostic psychotherapy for this disorder.

     The prisoner stated the belief that this psychotherapy would establish that he is entitled to further treatment, including "electrolysis, vocal chord modulation, breast implant surgery" and other operations.

     His request for the psychotherapy and other treatment, however, was denied under a policy of the New York State Department of Correctional Services which provides that therapy for prisoners suffering from gender identity disorder may continue if they began the gender reassignment process before incarceration, but that for prisoners who discover the disorder and seek to begin the procedure "during incarceration, transsexual surgical operations are not honored."

     The court rejected this as an inadequate basis for the denial of treatment.

Surely inmates with diabetes, schizophrenia, or any other serious medical need are not denied treatment simply because their conditions were not diagnosed prior to incarceration.

     In issuing his ruling, the judge emphasized that he was not at this time ordering a sex change operation or any specific course of medical treatment, but rather ordering the state to provide adequate medical and psychiatric evaluation to determine what treatment would ultimately be appropriate.

     Brooks v. Berg, No. 00-CV-1433, 2003 U.S. Dist Lexis 11911 (N.D.N.Y.).

     »Click here to read the court's decision on the AELE website.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Access to Courts/Legal Info

     Prisoner was not entitled to an appointed lawyer to pursue his claims concerning alleged violations of his right of access to the courts and counsel, since the lawsuit did not involve "difficult" legal or factual issues and the prisoner, who acted as his own lawyer, was sufficiently familiar with federal civil rights actions. Davidson v. Goord, 259 F. Supp. 2d 238 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) [See also the federal magistrate's earlier decision and recommendations, reported as Davidson v. Goord, 259 F. Supp. 2d 236 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)]

Disability Discrimination: Employees

     Policy of state correctional department requiring employees to submit general medical diagnoses as part of the medical certification procedure concerning the employee's entitlement to leave violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12112, since it constituted an inquiry into whether the employee might have a disability and was prohibited in the absence of a showing of "business necessity." Conroy v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, No. 02-7415, 333 F. 3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2003). [PDF]

DNA Tests

     North Dakota Supreme Court upholds constitutionality of state statute expanding DNA testing requirement to prisoners convicted of enumerated non-sexual violent felonies. Statute was rationally related to legitimate government purposes of apprehending and identifying perpetrators of future sex-related and violent crimes, "exonerating the innocent," and reducing costs. State of North Dakota v. Leppert, No. 20020160, 656 N.W.2d 718 (N.D. 2003).

Freedom of Information

     Inmate who succeeded in his claim that he was improperly denied access to certain public records by a state official was entitled to an award of postage, envelope, and copying costs as "reasonable costs of enforcement" under Florida statute, F.S.A. Sec. 119.12, when the prisoner acted as his own attorney, even if such costs would not be recoverable if he was represented by a lawyer, since these would be "normal office overhead expenses" for an attorney. Weeks v. Golden, 846 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 2003). [PDF]

Inmate Funds

     Pennsylvania prisoner's rights were not violated by the actions of correctional officials in deducting funds from his inmate account to pay fines and costs imposed as part of his sentence. State statute governing the collection of fines and costs was "procedural" and therefore could be applied retroactively. George v. Beard, 824 A.2d 393 (Pa. Cmwlth 2003). [PDF]

Mail

     Prison policies prohibiting the receipt of free or gift subscriptions to publications, preventing some inmates in a lower offender classification from purchasing publications, and limiting other inmates to spending no more than $30 per month to purchase publications did not violate prisoners' First Amendment or due process rights and were rationally related to legitimate interests in controlling, managing, and tracking property in order to identify prohibited activities, promote institutional order through privileges and incentives, and making sure there were sufficient assets to collect inmates' other financial obligations, such as restitution and child support. Failure to notify publishers when prisoners were denied receipt of mailed publications did not violate the publishers' constitutional due process rights. Zimmerman v. Simmons, 260 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Kan. 2003).

Marriage/Procreation

     Prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity on a claim for damages for postponing a prisoner's marriage to his fiancee for twelve months, since it was not clearly established that a delay of that length was unconstitutional. Lawsuit's claims for injunctive relief were moot, since prior restrictions on the fiancee's visits were lifted and the couple had been allowed to marry. Martin v. Snyder, No. 02-1135, 329 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2003). [PDF]

Medical Care

     Prisoner failed to show that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by allegedly forcing him to do work which caused pain or aggravated a prior medical condition when there were no medical restrictions on the prisoner in effect when he transferred to the facility, and medical restrictions placed on the prisoner at his prior institution had expired and were two to four years old. Hogan v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections, No. 02-7091, 65 Fed. Appx. 662 (10th Cir. 2003).

     Prisoner failed to show that correctional officials were deliberately indifferent to medical needs including hypoglycemia, hypertension, dental complaints, and problems with his feet, back, legs, fingers, and wrists. The record contained "abundant evidence" that he received treatment for these medical needs since 1992, and, at most, that he disagreed with his health care providers and correctional officials as to the recommended treatment programs for these problems, which was insufficient to state a constitutional claim. Baker v. Simmons, #02-3260, 65 Fed. Appx. 231 (10th Cir. 2003).

     Medical staff at county detention facility did not show deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious medical needs by denying him access to post-cancer reconstructive surgery at Veterans Administration (VA) hospital. While the prisoner did inform them that he had surgery scheduled there, he did not sign the necessary release form to obtain his VA medical records to determine the need for the surgery and the nature of the problem, nor did he show that any substantial harm resulted from the delay in the surgery. Shepard v. Sullivan, No. 02-1198, 65 Fed. Appx. 677 (10th Cir. 2003).

Parole

     Prisoner's claim that participation in parole decision by temporary Parole Board members appointed by Governor without state Senate confirmation violated state law did not establish a federal civil rights claim for violation of due process, in the absence of any evidence that their participation altered the result or denied him any procedural rights necessary to a fair decision. Sonntag v. Papparozzi, 256 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D.N.J. 2003).

Prison Litigation Reform Act: Exhaustion of Remedies

     Summary judgment was improper on prisoner's claim that correctional officers assaulted him when there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether he had exhausted his available administrative remedies prior to filing suit, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a). Evans v. Jonathan, 253 F. Supp. 2d 505 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).

Prisoner Assault: By Inmate

     Jury awards estate of inmate murdered by another prisoner $2,641 in damages on claim that a prison employee showed deliberate indifference to the risk of harm after the inmate had taken action which resulted in his assailant getting suspended from a prison print shop work assignment for improperly using the telephone. Flint v. Kentucky Department of Corrections, No. 96-CV-0591 (E.D. Ky. July 10 2003), reported in The National Law Journal, p. 14 (Aug. 11, 2003).

     Even if correctional officer was "grossly negligent" in leaving prison dorm without obtaining a replacement monitor, this was insufficient to impose civil rights liability for subsequent assault on prisoner by alleged gang member housed in the same unit, as it did not show "deliberate indifference" to a known risk of harm. Miller v. McBride, No. 02-1147, 64 Fed. Appx. 558 (7th Cir. 2003).

Prisoner Assault: By Officer

     State-established jail authority which held immigration detainees in custody under a contract with the federal government acted under "color of state law" for purposes of one such detainee's excessive force claim arising out of actions of correctional officers. Federal contract did not specify how the authority was to supervise its guards and the detainee's claim alleged failure to adequately train officers and "condonation" of their use of excessive force. Jarno v. Lewis, 256 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2003).

Prisoner Discipline

     Prisoner had no federal constitutional right not to be falsely accused of misconduct in prison disciplinary hearings, nor could a federal civil rights claim be based on the mere failure to follow all applicable state procedures in the hearing held. Jackson v. Hamlin, #02-2040, 61 Fed. Appx. 131 (6th Cir. 2003).

     There was substantial evidence to support the determination that a prisoner was guilty of violating disciplinary rules prohibiting making threats and harassment of staff members by sending a nurse a letter with derogatory and insulting language, as well as refusing direct orders from a correctional officer to step out of a recreation area. Green v. Ricks, 760 N.Y.S.2d 238 (A.D. 3d Dept. 2003). [PDF]

     Female prison guard's conduct report, stating that inmate, while naked, jumped around his cell and made sexual gestures and comments to her was a sufficient basis for a disciplinary board's decision to find the prisoner guilty of violating rules against making sexual propositions to a staff member and impose a punishment of the loss of 180 days of good-time credits. Higgason v. Hanks, No. 02-2775, 64 Fed. Appx. 556 (7th Cir. 2003).

Prisoner Suicide

     County and county sheriff reach $300,000 settlement with family of jail inmate on their claim that his needs for psychiatric counseling were ignored, leading to his successful suicide. Lawsuit contended that the jail staff had knowledge that the prisoner had suicidal tendencies and had been diagnosed as a manic-depressive schizophrenic, but failed to make arrangements to provide mental health care. Estate of Price v. Black Hawk County, No. 00-CV-2008 (N.D. Iowa March 21, 2003), reported in The National Law Journal, p. B2 (April 7, 2003).

Protective Custody

     Indiana prisoner had no constitutionally protected right to a hearing concerning his transfer from protective custody. "Classification matters should be left to prison authorities unless there are clear constitutional violations involved." Miller v. McBride, 259 F. Supp. 2d 738 (N.D. Ind. 2001).

Public Protection

     County could not be held liable for failing to protect community member against being shot and killed by a "house arrestee" who escaped after removing his home monitoring device. The county had no special relationship with the shooting victim which imposed a duty to protect him against this risk, and the county, in failing to take any action to recapture the house arrestee, did not do anything to create the danger to the victim. Kennerly v. Montgomery County Board of Commissioners, 257 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (S.D. Ohio 2003).

Religion

     Prisoner's claim that prison officials denied twelve separate requests he submitted to attend Jehovah Witness religious services was sufficient to state a claim for violation of his First Amendment right to exercise his religion, so that court declined to dismiss the claim. Gill v. Hoadley, 261 F. Supp. 2d 113 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).

Sexual Assault

     President Bush on September 4, 2003 signed into law the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 unanimously passed by Congress on July 24, 2003 (Senate) and July 25, 2003 (House of Representatives. Click here to read President Bush's statement on signing this law.

Sexual Harassment

     Female correctional officers showed that sheriff's office provided a pervasively sexually hostile work environment for female employees and that they faced unlawful retaliation for complaining about it. Officers did not show, however, that they were denied promotions and were terminated on the basis of sex discrimination. Court awards both of two plaintiffs $150,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees. Brissette v. Franklin County Sheriff's Office, 235 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D. Mass. 2003).

Visitation

     Massachusetts prisoner did not have constitutionally protected liberty interests which were infringed by his loss of visitation for six weeks as a punishment for allegedly violating prison disciplinary rules. Childers v. Maloney, 247 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D. Mass. 2003).

Work/Education Programs

     Participation in an "industrial training" leave program was not a right for a New York inmate, so that he was not entitled to a review of a decision denying his request to participate in the program. Further, the nature of the prisoner's crimes, which included his misconduct as an attorney in misappropriating over $4.7 million in funds from his clients' escrow accounts, raised "serious doubts" about whether he was trustworthy enough to participate, and whether his release for participation "posed a threat to community safety." Wallman v. Joy, 760 N.Y.S.2d 560 (A.D. 3d Dept. 2003). [PDF]

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

     AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.

     Jailhouse Informants: Article: "Jailhouse Informants," by Robert M. Bloom, Professor, Boston College School of Law. Criminal Justice Magazine Spring 2003 Volume 18 Number 1.

     Jail Design: Jail Design Review Handbook by Mark Goldman (July 2003) (125 pgs. PDF Document) National Institute of Corrections, U.S. Department of Justice.

     Search & Seizure: Probationers and Parolees: "Probationers, Parolees, and the Fourth Amendment," by Thomas D. Colbridge, 72 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, No. 7, pgs. 11-22 (July 2003)."Probationers and parolees have limited Fourth Amendment protection because of their unique status." Also available in .html format.

     Statistics: Census of State and Federal Correctional Facilities, 2000 Provides information on facilities, inmates, programs, and staff of State and Federal correctional facilities throughout the Nation, and of private correctional facilities housing State or Federal inmates. Earlier censuses in this series were conducted in 1974, 1979, 1984, 1990, and 1995. Information was collected from prisons; prison boot camps; reception, diagnosis, and classification centers; prison forestry camps and farms; prison hospitals; youthful offender facilities (except in California); facilities for alcohol and drug treatment; work release and prerelease; and State-operated local detention facilities in Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Vermont. State-level data are presented on facility, inmate, and staff characteristics, as well as facility programs. Comparisons are made, when possible, with findings from the previous census conducted in 1995. Highlights include the following: The number of adult correctional facilities increased 14%, from1,464 at midyear 1995, when the previous census was conducted, to 1,668 at midyear 2000. In 2000, 264 privately operated facilities were under contract with State or Federal authorities to house prisoners -- an increase of 140%. The number of inmates held in these facilities rose 459% (from 16,663 inmates in June 1995 to 93,077 in June 2000). A total of 430,033 correctional staff were employed in State and Federal prisons on June 30, 2000. Nearly two-thirds of these staff (270,317) were correctional officers, responsible for custody/security. (August 2003) NCJ 198272  Acrobat file (733K - PDF) | ASCII file (47K) Spreadsheets (zip format 168K)

     Youthful Prisoners: The NIC website has an online Syllabus of Supportive Literature for the video program  Youthful Offenders in Adult Corrections: Effective Interventions (September 2003), complete with downloadable .pdf files of many items listed. National Institute of Corrections, U.S. Department of Justice.

     Youthful Prisoners: Report of findings of U.S. Justice Department civil rights division investigation into conditions at Mississippi's two state-run institutions for minors deemed juvenile delinquents, the Oakley and Columbia Training Schools in Raymond and Columbia, Mississippi. (June 19, 2003). [48 pages, PDF]

     Youthful Prisoners: Report of findings of U.S. Justice Department civil rights division investigation into conditions at Los Angeles County, California Juvenile Halls. (April 9, 2003).

     Reference:

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.