FEATURED CASES

WITH LINKS TO THE OPINIONS

U.S. Supreme Court rules that punitive damages may not be awarded in private lawsuits under provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act prohibiting disability discrimination by public entities or the recipients of federal funding. Decision overturns $1.2 million award against city for failure to provide wheelchair restraints in a vehicle in which a wheelchair-bound detainee was transported and injured.

     A wheelchair confined paraplegic was in the custody of Kansas City law enforcement authorities following his arrest for trespass at a nightclub. While waiting for a van to transport him to the station, he was denied permission to use a restroom to empty his urine bag (he lacked voluntary control over his lower torso, including his bladder, forcing him to wear a catheter attached to a urine bag around his waist). The van which arrived was not equipped to receive his wheelchair, so, over his objections, he was removed from his wheelchair and strapped to a narrow bench with a seatbelt and his own belt.

     During the ride, the detainee released his seatbelt, fearing it placed excessive pressure on his urine bag. The other belt eventually came loose and the detainee fell to the floor, rupturing his urine bag and injuring his shoulder and back. He subsequently suffered serious medical problems, including a bladder infection, serious lower back pain, and uncontrollable spasms in his paralyzed areas, that left him unable to work full time.

     He sued the city Board of Police Commissioners, the chief of police, and the officer who drove the van, alleging disability discrimination under Sec. 202 of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12132 and Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794(a) prohibiting such discrimination by public entities or the recipients of federal funds in providing programs and services to the public.

     The jury awarded over $1 million in compensatory damages and $1.2 million in punitive damages. While the trial court vacated the punitive damages award, the federal appeals court reinstated it, Gorman v. Easley, 257 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2001), relying on the decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992) stating the general rule that "absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute."

     Reversing, the U.S. Supreme Court held that punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under Sec. 202 of the ADA and Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Since Congress was relying on the Spending Clause power in the Constitution in placing conditions on the grant of federal funds, and since the Supreme Court has regularly applied a "contract-law" analogy in defining the scope of conduct for which funding recipients may be held liable in money damages, punitive damages were not an appropriate remedy.

     The Court noted that punitive damages are generally not available for breach of contract, and it could not be said that recipients of federal funds implicitly consented to a remedy which is not normally available for contract actions, and the "indeterminate magnitude" of which could produce liability "exceeding the level of federal funding." Accordingly, the Court overturned the award of punitive damages. It also stated that the manner in which it reached its decision made it unnecessary to consider the defendants' alternative argument, which was "neither raised nor passed on below," invoking the "traditional presumption against imposition of punitive damages on government entities."

     Barnes v. Gorman, #01-682, 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the internet.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Prison policy prohibiting prisoners from receiving publications, such as books and magazines, as gifts, violated their First Amendment rights, but federal appeals court rules that the law on this subject was not "clearly established" until it had upheld a similar ruling in another case on appeal, entitling defendant prison officials to qualified immunity from liability.

     In 1999, a federal trial court in the Eastern District of Washington declared unconstitutional a policy of the Washington State Penitentiary prohibiting inmates from receiving books and magazines that they did not pay for themselves from their prison accounts. That decision was subsequently upheld on appeal in Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999). Meanwhile, while the appeal in Crofton was pending, prison officials at a different Washington state prison continued to enforce a similar "no gift publication" policy and sent back two publications mailed to a prisoner as gifts.

     This prisoner then brought a lawsuit against the prison officials involved in rejecting the items. The officials defended on grounds of qualified immunity, arguing that until the federal appeals court for the 9th Circuit upheld the district court decision in Crofton, the law with respect to the "no gift publication" policy was not "clearly established." The trial court agreed, granting the defendants summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. A federal appeals court has now also agreed, upholding that result, while reaffirming that the policy violates the First Amendment.

     The case involved a complimentary copy of the book The Partner, a legal novel by John Grisham, sent to the prisoner by the publisher. The prison notified the prisoner that the book had been received, but refused to let him have it because of the "no gift publication" rule, and ultimately mailed the book to his family. The prisoner was subsequently sent a gift copy of the Georgetown Law Journal by an attorney, and the prison, in this case, rejected the journal without first notifying the prisoner. On the rejection of the journal, the prisoner also asserted a procedural due process claim in addition to another violation of the First Amendment.

     The appeals court held that the "legal landscape" in 1997 and 1998, the dates the book and journal were rejected, prior to the appeals court decision in Crofton, was such that there were grounds for disagreement as to whether or not the policy in question was violative of the First Amendment. "Either Washington's policy was unique among state prisons, or no other state's prisoners had seen fit to challenge similar policies," the court noted, "as there appear to be no published decisions on point prior to 1999 in any jurisdiction, at any level, concerning the constitutionality of a prison regulation requiring inmates to pay for publications they receive."

     Further, the policy was "not so far-fetched that its illegality was necessarily obvious to a reasonable prison official," the court found. While the court ruled that it could take the previously unpublished trial court decision in Crofton into account, rejecting the argument that unpublished decisions should never be considered on the question of whether the law on a subject was "clearly established," it found that this decision did not alter the result in this case. The defendant officials were therefore entitled to qualified immunity from liability.

     The policy in question was found to violate the prisoner's First Amendment rights to receive publications free from censorship, on the basis that the prison's former policy of rejecting gift publications for which inmates had not paid was not "rationally related to a legitimate penological interest" as required by Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).

     The appeals court rejected, however, the plaintiff prisoner's procedural due process claim on the prison officials' rejection of the law journal without providing him with notice. "If a meaningful post-deprivation remedy exists for an alleged deprivation of property, then that post-deprivation remedy is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process." The prisoner also conceded that the failure to notify him of the rejection was "unauthorized and contrary to prison policy," so that it was, at most, negligence and did not state a due process violation.

     Sorrels v. McKee, #01-35222, 287 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2002).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the internet.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Provisions of Federal Tort Claims Act do not waive the federal government's immunity from suit for a prison guard's alleged wrongful detention of prisoner property. Prisoner also could not pursue civil rights lawsuit over failure to return property, when adequate administrative post-deprivation remedies were available.

     A federal prisoner filed a lawsuit alleging that a prison guard wrongfully detained his property and failed to return it. He attempted to pursue both a federal civil rights claim and a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(c).

     A federal appeals court found that the prisoner's federal civil rights claim was "foreclosed by the existence of a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss," under the principles set forth in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). Such a remedy exists for federal prisoners in the Prison Administrative Remedy Program, 28 C.F.R. Secs. 542.10-542.16, the court ruled.

     The appeals court also ruled that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not waive the federal government's sovereign immunity from suit over claims for deprivation of property. Indeed, the statute contains specific exception for this in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(c), barring claims "arising in respect of" the "detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property" by any "law enforcement officer."

     Rendelman v. United States of America, #99-56858, 32 Fed. Appx. 804 (9th Cir. 2002).

    »Click here to read the text of the decision on the AELE website.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Arkansas prisoner with asthma and "painful knot" in his side adequately stated claims for deliberate indifference to his medical problems by prison farm doctor and nurse, based on alleged denials of treatment, and stated claim against warden and state corrections director for "abdication of policy-making and oversight" responsibilities. Appeals court also finds prisoner adequately exhausted his available administrative remedies.

     An Arkansas prisoner claimed that, while housed at a prison farm, he did not receive adequate treatment for a large painful knot in his side and for breathing difficulties from asthma. He further claimed that the prison staff forced him to work in the fields, where the heat, dust, and lack of medicine aggravated his asthma, and he became "sick and weak" as a result. Following that, he claimed that the infirmary "refused to see him" despite his sick call requests and emergency grievances. When he missed work due to illness, he further contended, he was placed in a punitive segregation unit where the temperatures exceeded 100 degrees Fahrenheit.

     Following that, he claims, a doctor canceled a scheduled biopsy surgery for the knot in his side, and told him that he had to learn to "live with the pain," and he was later forced to return to field work despite medical records showing a respiratory problem and an asthma attack suffered while in punitive segregation.

     After he sued prison officials, the trial court dismissed all his claims. An appeals court agreed with the dismissal of any claims against the prison farm's Correctional Medical Services unit, in the absence of any allegation of the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom.

     But the appeals court found that the prisoner had adequately stated claims against a doctor and nurse for deliberate indifference to his medical condition, and against the warden and the director of the state department of corrections for "abdication of their policy-making and oversight responsibilities."

     The appeals court also found that the prisoner had exhausted his available administrative remedies because his grievances had been denied by the warden and assistant director of the corrections department before the trial court ruled on a motion to dismiss.

     Leach v. Norris, #01-3315, 34 Fed. Appx. 510 (8th Cir. 2002).

    »Click here to read the text of the decision on the internet.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Alleged failure of county correctional center nurse to dispense prisoner's medication for his HIV condition in a timely manner was not sufficiently serious to constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment even if it did cause aches, pains and joint problems. Resulting symptoms were not a condition of "urgency" or one which might produce "death, degeneration or extreme pain."

     A New York federal trial court rejected the claim of an HIV-positive prisoner that a county correctional center nurse's alleged failure to provide him his medication in a timely fashion was sufficient to state a claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The prisoner claimed that the medication was supposed to be distributed every eight hours, but that it was instead sometimes distributed after greater periods of time, sometimes as much as three to four hours late. At other times, he claimed that the pills were given to him "too close together" so that they "would not work." He claimed that this caused emotional distress and that other health problems.

     The prisoner admitted that he received all his medication, and the court noted that the plaintiff failed to produce any medical evidence that the hours delay in taking the medication were a producing cause of symptoms such as nausea, pain in his joints, a stiff back and legs, etc. Unrefuted testimony established that his HIV condition "improved" by the time he left the facility.

     The court found that any alleged delay in administration of the medication was, at most, negligence, and could not be a basis for a constitutional claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Even if the delay were assumed to have caused the aches, pains and joint problems the prisoner described--which he failed to prove--such symptoms did not constitute a "condition of urgency" or one "that may produce death, degeneration or extreme pain" sufficiently serious to support a constitutional claim.

     Evans v. Bonner, 196 F. Supp. 2d 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).

    »Click here to read the text of the decision on the AELE website.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Prisoner adequately exhausted his available administrative remedies on his claim of deliberate indifference to his medical needs before filing his federal civil rights lawsuit when he received a favorable result on his grievance, even though he did not take his claim to the highest level possible. Prisoner was not required to appeal a favorable grievance decision, and a further appeal would not have given him any additional relief.

     A California prisoner filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that prison officials allowed another inmate to injure him and that prison doctors were subsequently deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in how they treated a laceration under his right eye that he suffered during the fight with the other prisoner.

     He had previously informed prison officials that he did not want to have the alleged assailant as his cell mate because he was a "gang member." The assailant was allegedly allowed into the cell despite an officer observing him carrying broken broom sticks, and then swung one of them at the plaintiff, hitting him under his eye. While the injured prisoner was seen by prison medical employees and provided with pain medications and sutures for his wound, no x-ray was taken, and his eye was allegedly still swollen and "sluggish to light" when the sutures were removed, and he complained that he could no longer see out of his right eye and felt a "sharp and throbbing" pain in the eye.

     Repeated requests to see an outside eye specialist were allegedly ignored, until the prisoner initiated a grievance. He was then seen by an outside ophthalmologist who purportedly told him that his eye was infected, that it "could not be saved" and that "his vision could not be restored." At the second administrative level, his grievance was marked "granted" after he was seen by the outside specialist, and he did not appeal the decision to the director of the Department of Corrections, the final arbiter of prison administrative appeals.

     It was at this point that the prisoner filed his lawsuit. The trial court ruled that the prisoner adequately satisfied the requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a) that he exhaust available administrative remedies.

     "Construing Sec. 1997e(a) to mandate that an inmate continue to appeal even after obtaining all the relief he can extract from the prison administrative process therefrom undercuts one of the very policies underlying it: To allow prison officials an opportunity to take corrective action so as to satisfy the inmate and perhaps prevent the filing of a lawsuit. Continuing to appeal even after winning at a lower administrative level will not give the inmate anymore than what he already has obtained. Instead it will only provide the opportunity that the corrective action taken earlier (which may have kept the inmate from later filing suit) will later be undone."

      Brady v. Attygala, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the AELE website.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Federal appeals court rejects plaintiff prisoner's argument that "any" physical injury is sufficient to support a claim for mental or emotional distress under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and also rejects the argument of defendant correctional officials that an "observable or diagnosable medical condition requiring treatment by a medical care professional" was required. Plaintiff prisoner must, court rules, show more than minimal physical injury.

     A pretrial detainee filed a federal civil rights lawsuit based on his incarceration on three occasions in temporary holding cells in a county detention center. His lawsuit sought damages for the conditions, which included overcrowding, in the cell, in which he was confined with as many as 50 other men in a cell measuring 404 square feet for 51 hours, and with 18 men in a smaller cell measuring 174 square feet for 74 hours. During his third detention he was again in temporary holding cells for approximately 50 hours.

     He claimed various deprivations, including the lack of blankets, pillows, cots, water that came from unsanitary faucets, 24 hour overhead lighting, excessive air conditioning, lack of medical attention, lack of room to sit or stand, etc. He claimed that he experienced "severe back and leg pain" from sitting and sleeping in the temporary cells, and was "chilled to the bone" by the temperature there.

     His lawsuit claimed physical and emotional injuries resulting from a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of  42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, barring claims for mental or emotional injuries without a prior showing of a physical injury.

     A federal appeals court rejected the plaintiff prisoner's argument that "any" physical injury was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute and support a claim for mental or emotional injuries, finding that such an interpretation would "ignore the intent behind the statute."

     It also rejected, however, the argument by the defendants that the prisoner should be required to show "an observable or diagnosable medical condition requiring treatment by a medical care professional" which would cause a "free world person to seek such treatment." The court concluded that the prisoner's proposed standard "requires too little," and the defendants' proposed standard "requires too much."

     Instead, the appeals court upheld the trial court's approach of requiring that the prisoner, in order to assert claims for mental or emotional distress, must show more than a "de minimis" (minimal) physical injury.

     In this case, the prisoner's alleged back and leg pain from sitting and sleeping on the cell benches and floor, any injuries he suffered in a fight with another prisoner over use of the telephone, and a "painful canker" sore he developed during one detention, even if all true, were not "more than de minimis." The canker sore was the only one of these conditions for which he sought any treatment. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed any claim for emotional injury.

     The appeals court also noted, however, that the statutory provision in question applied only to claims for mental and emotional injury. It did not, therefore, bar claims for nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages for constitutional violations not based on alleged mental or emotional injuries.

     Oliver v. Keller, #00-15849, 289 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2002).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the internet.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Prison employees were not deliberately indifferent to a risk of harm to a prisoner assaulted by another inmate after he was allowed to "wander about" unescorted in violation of prison policy. Employees' actions were, at most, negligent, but they had no basis to foresee that the assailant posed a particular risk to the injured prisoner.

     When a prisoner arrived at a state correctional facility in Illinois in May of 1994, he reported his "concerns" about two different gangs who had members there--the "Gangster Disciples" and the "Northsiders." He told prison authorities that each of these gangs had a "hit" out on him, and he gave specific names of gang members who were his enemies. All of this information was recorded in his prison file, and he served his first year there in protective custody. Later, when he was transferred to a single-person cell in another unit, he was allegedly threatened by two gang members there and asked for another move.

     He was not transferred right away. Prison policy required all inmates in the unit to be escorted individually, with their hands cuffed behind their back when they left their cells. He was allegedly left alone in the dayroom one day and went to sick call by himself. When the medical visit was finished he returned unescorted back to the dayroom. He later claimed that an officer he passed was requested to escort him back, but ignored the request. While he was waiting near his cell, he was allegedly attacked by another prisoner who hurled boiling water at him, scalding his face, arm, and back. The prisoner suffered second-degree burns on several parts of his body and sued a number of correctional employees for alleged deliberate indifference to the risk that he would be assaulted.

     Upholding summary judgment for the defendants, a federal appeals court noted that the assailant was not one of the prisoners who had previously allegedly threatened the plaintiff, and, in fact, had previously been friendly with him, He was a member of the "Gangster Disciples" but was not listed on the prison's information system as a threat to the plaintiff.

     The court rejected the argument that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the risk of harm to the plaintiff prisoner. While it may have been "negligent and rude" for an officer to have ignored the prisoner's request to escort him back to his cell, and while the court expressed its hope that "prison officials at Stateville and at other institutions in Illinois are not in the habit of having inmates wander about unescorted in violation of prison policies," there was no evidence of deliberate indifference to a known risk of harm. The defendants had no basis to foresee that the assailant posed a particular risk of harm to the plaintiff.

     Additionally, the plaintiff prisoner was "immediately responsible for the unfortunate incident," the court stated. He was the one who went near the assailant's cell and "placed himself in harm's way." It was "he who decided to move through the prison unescorted, from the dayroom to the medical unit, from the medical unit back again, and finally back to the area of his cell." Because the employees' actions were not the cause of the harm, they could not be held liable.

     Benner v. McAdory, #01-2140, 34 Fed. Appx. 483 (7th Cir. 2002).

    »Click here to read the text of the decision on the AELE website.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

City correctional officer did not use excessive force against prisoner who was uncooperative and acted "erratically" during the booking process and intake search, regardless of whether the Fourteenth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment standards were applied, federal appeals court rules.

     A man was arrested by Las Vegas, Nevada police officers on two arrest warrants issued as a result of his failure to complete a previous sentence for two misdemeanor traffic violations. He was then transported to the Las Vegas Department of Detention. He subsequently sued the city and one of its correctional officers, claiming that excessive force was used against him during the booking process and that he was improperly restrained.

     All of the conduct that furnished the basis for the plaintiff prisoner's claims was videotaped by the in-house surveillance cameras from three different positions, a federal appeals court noted in upholding summary judgment for the defendants.

     The court found that the videotape supported the trial court's findings that the officer did not "slam" the prisoner's head or body into a counter, wall or floor, and that the plaintiff refused to stand still during a frisk search. Given the plaintiff's "erratic and seemingly uncooperative behavior," the restrictions that the officer placed on him, which included the use of waist and leg restraints employed to place him in the cell, "were not unconstitutionally excessive." Rather, they were "reasonably related to the City's legitimate interest in securing his appearance before the municipal court for a status check regarding the completion of his sentence."

     The plaintiff and defendant disagreed, the appeals court noted, as to whether the prisoner's claims should be evaluated under Eighth Amendment standards or under Fourteenth Amendment standards. The court found that it did not need to resolve this dispute as the "result is the same" whether examined under the Eighth Amendment's excessive force standards applicable to prisoners or the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process standards applicable to pre-trial detainees.

     The force used, the court found, did not rise either to the 14th Amendment level of "egregious government conduct in the form of excessive and brutal use of physical force," or the 8th Amendment level of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." There was no evidence that the officer applied the restrictions to the prisoner or used the force applied "maliciously, or without a legitimate, good-faith intent to maintain discipline."

     Williams v. City of Las Vegas, #00-17487, 34 Fed. Appx. 297 (9th Cir. 2002).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the internet.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Prisoner who claimed that correctional officer assaulted him in retaliation for his prior lawsuits against correctional officers did not present an adequate claim that other prison officials or employees knew of the risk of this happening and were deliberately indifferent to it.

     A prisoner filed a federal civil rights lawsuit alleging intentional tampering with his mail, and a second lawsuit claiming retaliation, denial of access to the courts, and deprivation of his prescription drugs. Both lawsuits were dismissed because the prisoner failed either to pay the required filing fee or to submit a proper motion to proceed as a pauper. He later claimed that he was assaulted by a correctional officer in retaliation for having filed two previous law suits against correctional officers at the prison.

     The lawsuit also named other correctional officials as defendants, however, asserting that they knew or should have known that his safety was threatened and that they were deliberately indifferent to that threat.

     The trial court noted that in prison conditions cases, a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for failure to prevent an attack by a correctional officer unless the official: 1) knew of and deliberately disregarded an unreasonable risk to the inmate's safety, or 2) must have been aware of the facts from which an inference could have been drawn that an unreasonable risk of serious harm existed to the inmate's safety.

     In this case, the court held, the mere allegation that the prisoner was assaulted by the officer was "insufficient in and of itself to infer that any of the defendants knew or should have known that the prisoner's safety had been threatened and that they would have been deliberately indifferent to that threat." While the plaintiff might have been able to cure the defect in his complaint by amending it to add further allegations against correctional officials, the trial court noted that the plaintiff had received a copy of the motion to dismiss twenty eight months before and had not further explained his claims, so the court ruled that it was proper to dismiss them.

     Ribot-Carino v. Laboy, 196 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D. Puerto Rico 2002).

      »Click here to read the text of the decision on the AELE website.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Kansas correctional "incentive programs" placing prisoners in various "levels" and according them privileges accordingly based on their participation in what prisoners described as "involuntary behavioral modification" systems did not violate prisoners' due process rights.

     Four Kansas prisoners filed a lawsuit challenging statewide "incentive programs" under which they were allegedly being forced to participate in what they described as "involuntary behavioral modification systems" without an individualized showing of need. They claimed that this system conflicted with various Kansas administrative regulations, and that it improperly assigned inmates to one of four levels, assigning greater privileges to higher levels.

     They claimed that this violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, as well as their First and Eighth Amendment rights. Privileges obtained by being placed in the higher levels included such things as television ownership, handicrafts, participation in organizations, use of outside funds, canteen expenditures, incentive pay, and visitation. Prisoners seeking to be placed in higher levels had to generally remain "free of offenses" and demonstrate "a willingness to participate in recommended programs." Prisoners may lose privileges and be assigned to a lower level for a variety of reasons, including disciplinary offenses or refusal to participate in a recommended program.

     A federal appeals court rejected these claims. It noted first that the Kansas Supreme Court had previously already addressed and rejected due process challenges to the program in Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 960 P.2d 227 (Kan. 1998), holding that none of the restrictions imposed on lower level prisoners imposed an "atypical or significant hardship" in relation to the "ordinary incidents of prison life."

     While that decision concerned prisoners at Level I, the federal appeals court found its reasoning persuasive and noted that such an analysis was equally applicable to the plaintiffs in this case, at least one of which was at Level III, a higher level. The appeals court also found that a prisoner in a higher level, such as Level III, had no standing to challenge restrictions imposed on prisoners assigned to lower levels.

     The federal appeals court also stated that, even if the programs conflicted with various Kansas state administrative regulations as the prisoners claimed, that did not constitute the basis for a federal civil rights lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 "provides no basis for redressing these alleged violations of state law."

     Love v. McKune, #01-3332, 33 Fed. Appx. 369 (10th Cir. 2002).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the AELE website.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Prisoner could not sue for damages for alleged due process violations in prison disciplinary proceeding for hitting fellow inmates with a baseball bat or pursue claim that disciplinary charges were brought against him for racially discriminatory reasons. No such lawsuit was permitted unless the disciplinary conviction was first set aside. Prisoner's claim for habeas corpus was his proper avenue for restoration of lost good time credits, and his placement in punitive segregation for 30 days was not an "atypical and significant hardship" implicating a protected liberty interest.

     Following a racial disturbance in a Minnesota prison, an African-American prisoner was disciplined for allegedly hitting a white inmate with a baseball bat. He lost good time credits and also was placed in punitive segregation for thirty days. The discipline was upheld on administrative appeal. He then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against prison officials, claiming that his right to due process was violated and that the warden violated his right to equal protection by charging and convicting him on account of his race. He sought the expungement of the disciplinary conviction, restoration of his good time credits and other privileges, suspension of his administrative segregation classification and money damages.

     A federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of the prisoner's claims. The court noted first that a prisoner who makes a due process challenge to his segregated confinement "must make a threshold showing that the deprivation of which he complains imposed an 'atypical and significant hardship,'" as required by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). The court found that the prisoner made no such showing.

     Further, under the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), habeas corpus, rather than a lawsuit for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, is the "exclusive federal remedy when a state prisoner seeks restoration of good time credits taken away by a prison disciplinary proceeding."

     Additionally, under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the prisoner's due process and equal protection claims for damages were barred until he had first successfully challenged the discipline through habeas or some other proceeding and had it set aside. A successful due process or equal protection claim for damages would imply the invalidity of the disciplinary conviction and therefore circumvent the ruling in Preiser.

     Portley-El v. Brill, #00-1923, 288 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002).

    »Click here to read the text of the decision on the internet.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

U.S. Supreme Court holds that alleged use of "hitching post" to restrain prisoner outside in hot weather for seven hours without bathroom breaks and with only one or two water breaks, if true, established an Eighth Amendment violation, for which defendant prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity defense at summary judgment phase of proceedings.

     An Alabama prison inmate was allegedly handcuffed to a "hitching post" twice in 1995 for disruptive conduct. During a 2-hour period in May of that year, he was offered drinking water and a bathroom break every 15 minutes. He was handcuffed above shoulder height, and when he tried moving his arms to improve circulation, the handcuffs cut into his wrists, causing pain and discomfort.

     In the second incident, after a fight with a guard at his chain gang's worksite in June of 1995, he was subdued, handcuffed, placed in leg irons, and transported back to the prison. Once there, he was ordered to take off his shirt, thus exposing himself to the sun, and spent seven hours on the hitching post. He was given one or two water breaks, but no bathroom breaks, and he claimed that a guard taunted him about his thirst.

     He filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against three guards involved in the incidents. An appeals court ruled that the hitching post's use for punitive purposes violated the Eighth Amendment, but that the guards were entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff could not show that the law by which the guards' conduct should be evaluated was established by cases that were "materially similar" to the facts in his own case.

     The U.S. Supreme Court has reversed, ruling that the defense of qualified immunity was not available to the defendant guards at the summary judgment phase of the case.

     The Court agreed that the prisoner's allegations, if true, established an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment. The alleged conduct would be the "unnecessary and wanton" infliction of pain for reasons "totally without penological justification."

     The Court found that the Eighth Amendment violation here was "obvious" on the facts alleged. Any safety concerns had long since abated by the time the prisoner was handcuffed to the hitching post, because he had already been subdued, handcuffed, placed in leg irons, and transported back to the prison. He was separated from his work squad and not given the opportunity to return. Despite that "clear lack of emergency," the Court said, the defendants knowingly subjected him to a substantial risk of physical harm, unnecessary pain, unnecessary exposure to the sun, prolonged thirst and taunting, and a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created a risk of "particular discomfort and humiliation."

     The Court further found that a reasonable officer would have known that using a hitching post as the prisoner alleged was unlawful. The "obvious cruelty" inherent in the practice should have provided the guards with some notice that their conduct was unconstitutional. Further, binding precedent in that federal appeals court, Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974), should have given them notice of this. (Cases from the Fifth Circuit decided before 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, since the 11th was constituted by splitting the Fifth Circuit in that year). That prior case found several forms of corporal punishment impermissible, the Court noted, including handcuffing inmates to fences or cells for long periods of time. Another prior case, Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318 (11th Cir. 1987) warned that "physical abuse directed at [a] prisoner after he terminate[s] his resistance to authority would constitute an actionable Eighth Amendment violation."

     The Court found relevant an Alabama Department of Corrections regulation specifying procedures for using a hitching post issued in 1993, following the decision in Ort. That regulation included allowing an inmate to rejoin his squad when he tells an officer that he is ready to work. If regularly observed, that provision would have made the plaintiff prisoner's case less like the kind of punishment that Ort described as impermissible, and would have "effectively" given the inmate the "keys to the handcuffs that attached him to the hitching post."

     The record, the Court stated, indicated that "this important provision of the regulation was frequently ignored by corrections officers." A "course of conduct that tends to prove that the requirement was merely a sham, or that ...[guards] could ignore it with impunity, provides equally strong support for the conclusion that they were fully aware of the wrongful character of their conduct." The Supreme Court also pointed to a 1994 study of Alabama's use of the hitching post by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), following which the DOJ "specifically advised" the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) of the "unconstitutionality of its practices before the incidents in this case took place."

     Among other findings, the DOJ report "noted that ADOC's officers consistently failed to comply with the policy of immediately releasing any inmate from the hitching post who agrees to return to work," and concluded that the systematic use of the restraining bar in Alabama constituted "improper corporal punishment."

     Hope v. Pelzer, #01-309, 122 S. Ct. 2508 (2002).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the internet.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) action of housing federal prisoners who were Rastafarians or Muslims in Virginia state facilities with a grooming policy prohibiting long hair and beards violated the prisoners' rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Court orders BOP to transfer such prisoners to other facilities.

     Rastafarian and Muslim federal prisoners filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that the U.S. Bureau of Prisons' housing of them in a Virginia state correctional facility with policy prohibiting long hair and beards violated their right to religious freedom under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000bb-1(b)(1,2).

     The statute in question applies to federal officers and agencies like the Bureau of Prisons. See Henderson v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Under the test in the statute, any governmental activity which substantially burdens a plaintiff's sincerely held religious belief must further a compelling governmental interest and utilize the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.

     The court found that the plaintiff inmates' sincerely held religious beliefs forbid them from cutting their hair or shaving their beards, and these beliefs were substantially burdened by the Virginia prison's grooming policy prohibiting long hair and beards.

     The court ruled that each individual decision by the federal Bureau of Prisons to place or keep an inmate in the Virginia state facility was subject to scrutiny under the RFRA.

     The court also found that the federal Bureau of Prisons' interest in managing overcrowding in its facilities could possibly be accomplished by an alternative means of assigning inmates with religious objections to the Virginia prison's grooming policy to other facilities, including BOP facilities or other state prison facilities without similar grooming policies. The court entered an injunction against the defendants violating the plaintiffs' rights under the RFRA.

     The court ordered that the BOP "shall immediately evaluate whether the grooming policy" of the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) "burdens the religious beliefs and practices of each of its inmates housed in a VDOC institution. If a BOP inmate's religious beliefs and practices are found to be burdened by the VDOC grooming policy, BOP shall promptly transfer that inmate out of VDOC." The court additionally ordered that all disciplinary actions imposed on any of the plaintiffs as a result of their refusal to comply with the VDOC grooming policy "shall be expunged from" their records.

     Gartrell v. Ashcroft, 191 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2002).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the AELE website.

     •Return to the Contents  menu.

Attorneys' Fees

     Inmate was a "prevailing party" after he was awarded only $1 in nominal damages in his lawsuit accusing correctional officers of using excessive force against him, but an award of attorneys' fees was not warranted in view of his limited success, since a jury found in favor of one of the two officers, he had sought $790,000 in damages, the case did not involve "significant legal issues," and there was no injunctive relief granted. Ciaprazi v. County of Nassau, 195 F. Supp. 22d 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).

Defenses: Eleventh Amendment Immunity

     District of Columbia correctional officials could not assert an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense in a federal civil rights claim filed against them in their official capacity by a prisoner. Eleventh Amendment immunity only applies to states, and the District of Columbia is not a state. Jones v. Barry, #01-2092, 33 Fed. Appx. 967 (10th Cir. 2002).

Diet

     Prisoner's claim that he was negligently served a meal in custody that contained a grasshopper did not state a viable claim under Ohio law, since he did not claim that any exception to a state statute providing immunity for governmental functions applied. Blackwell v. Patten, No. C100-5364, 767 N.E.2d 310 (Ohio Com. Pl. 2001).

Employee Injury/Death

     Deputy was properly awarded damages for slip and fall on wet terrazzo floor in jail outside of her office. Evidence showed that sheriff's office was negligent in failing to address a problem with recurring condensation on the floor where the deputy slipped. Award of $250,170 for lost earning capacity, however, was excessive, because of deputy's other significant health problems so that award would be reduced to $122,085. Gorton v. Ouachita Parish Police Jury, No. 35,432-CA, 814 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 2002).

Escape

     County was not liable to parents under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for escaped prisoner's actions in killing one of their sons based on policies or customs that allegedly allowed the prisoner to escape. In shooting at the parent's sons, the prisoner did not act under color of state law, and the county was not aware that the victims of the prisoner's actions, as opposed to the public at large, faced any special danger from the escaped prisoner. Gaston v. Houston County, Texas, 196 F. Supp. 2d 445 (E.D. Tex. 2002).

Frivolous Lawsuits

     Prisoner's federal civil rights lawsuit, along with Texas state Tort Claims Act claim, over the loss of two pairs of sunglasses was properly dismissed as frivolous. Prisoner's declaration that he was able to pay the filing fee and intended to pay it, did not exempt him from the screening process for frivolous lawsuits applied to complaints filed by paupers when he did not actually ever pay the fee. Johnson v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, #08-01-00247-CV, 71 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2002).

Mail

     Prison mail room supervisor was entitled to qualified immunity from prisoner's lawsuit over his failure to send out outgoing legal mail which was sealed in violation of Michigan Department of Corrections policy which required prisoners who needed a postal loan to send out legal mail to submit it unsealed. Supervisor had no reason to believe that this violated clearly established law, and the prisoner failed to show that he was prejudiced in his court case by this action, as required to prove a claim for violation of the First Amendment right of access to the courts. Smith-El v. Steward, #01-5646, 33 Fed. Appx. 714 (6th Cir. 2002).

Medical Care

     Inmate's complaint about the denial of a chair for his cell in order to alleviate his back pain was insufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and merely pointed to a disagreement he had with medical personnel over the adequacy of his treatment. Hutton v. Wilkinson, #01-3667, 34 Fed. Appx. 463 (6th Cir. 2002).

Prison Litigation Reform Act: Exhaustion of Remedies

     Prisoner's complaint that failure of prison officials to provide him with a kosher food diet violated his right to exercise his religion should be dismissed without prejudice because of his failure to exhaust available administrative remedies provided under Tennessee state law. Watler v. Campbell, #01-5646, 33 Fed. Appx. 764 (6th Cir. 2002).

     Inmate's alleged pursuit of his grievance through informal channels under New York law was relevant to the issue of whether he had exhausted available administrative remedies before pursuing his federal lawsuit. Federal trial court allows prisoner to proceed with conducting discovery concerning his informal grievance. Perez v. Blot, 195 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

     Prisoner was required to pursue a grievance with the prison's chief medical officer before filing a federal civil rights lawsuit over the alleged denial of necessary medical treatment even if, as he claimed, it would have been futile to do so. The requirement of exhaustion of available administrative remedies in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a) does not contain a futility exception. Farrell v. Addison, #01-7094, 01-7127, 34 Fed. Appx. 650 (10th Cir. 2002).

Prisoner Discipline

     Evidence was sufficient to find prisoner guilty of violating correctional correspondence procedures when there was testimony that he had previously been notified that his cousin, to whom he mailed a letter, had been added to his "negative correspondence list." Even if prisoner was correct that the addition of the name to the list was unauthorized, he was not entitled to ignore the listing and mail the letter. Gibson v. Goord, 741 N.Y.S.2d 577 (A.D. 2002).

Prisoner Transfers

     Alleged violation of Interstate Corrections Compact in transferring prisoner from Florida state prison to one in Kansas was not a violation of federal law which could be the basis of a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Halpin v. Simmons, #01-3301, 33 Fed. Appx. 961 (10th Cir. 2002).

Religion

     Claim that prisoner was punished for fasting for religious reasons by being placed "in the hole" was sufficient to state a claim for violation of his First Amendment right to practice his religion. Lomholt v. Holder, #02-1427, 287 F.3d 683 (8th Cir. 2002).

     Self-professed Wiccan witch was not entitled to injunctive relief on his claim that prison chaplain and librarian failed to deliver to him his religious mail concerning his continuing education in the field of "metaphysical theology." Benham v. Priest, #01-2360, 34 Fed. Appx. 465 (6th Cir. 2002).

Sexual Assault

     Hospital and correctional department were not vicariously liable for therapist's alleged fondling of female prisoner and subsequently contacting her after her release and coercing her into prostitution. The therapist's alleged actions were entirely for his own interests and were not in furtherance of the defendants' interests. There was also no liability for negligent hiring and supervision since nothing indicated that the therapist's alleged actions were foreseeable. Garcia v. Montefiore Medical Center, 740 N.Y.S.2d 307 (A.D. 2002).