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Mentally ill county jail inmates could not pursue their claims for disability discrimination against the county and county officials for alleged degrading treatment. They failed to show that they were denied the benefits of any services, program or activity of the jail, or that violent and self-destructive inmates who were mentally ill were treated any differently than violent and self-destructive inmates not suffering from a mental illness.

     Seven allegedly mentally ill inmates sued a New York county and county officials, claiming that they were subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and disability discrimination by "degrading" treatment in jail, including over-medication with psychotropic drugs, denial of timely psychiatric evaluations, denial of emergency psychiatric care, and denial of discharge planning and treatment plans. The complaint attempts to assert claims under Title II of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12132 and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 701 et seq.

     Dismissing the plaintiffs' ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, the federal trial court found that they had not showed that their placement into keeplock isolation denied them the benefits of any service, program, or activity provided by the jail. They also failed to show that mentally ill prisoners who were violent and self-destructive were treated any differently than violent and self-destructive inmates not suffering from mental illness. Accordingly, they failed to demonstrate discrimination on the basis of their disabilities.

     The purpose of these statutes, the court pointed out, is to eliminate discrimination on the basis of disability and to ensure "evenhanded treatment" between the disabled and the able-bodied. "With no allegation of disparate treatment, no claim for discrimination under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act lies."

     Atkins v. County of Orange, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

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While requiring a convicted youth offender to perform military-style exercises at a one-day "boot camp" was not cruel and unusual punishment, the claim that camp officials waited almost two hours before summoning an ambulance for the minor, who was unconscious and vomiting while suffering heat stroke, if true, was sufficient to constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

     A Texas minor was caught stealing a candy bar from a concession stand at school and was sentenced to three months' probation, a $50 fine, and a one-day "boot camp" of his choosing. He and his parents selected the "Strength Through Academics and Respect," or STAR, boot camp conducted by the county Juvenile Probation Department.

     The camp required the minor to do exercises, including push-ups, sit-ups, side straddle hops, and jogging, including carrying a ruck sack weighing between 57 and 70 pounds. By lunchtime, the youth allegedly complained that he felt sick, but was told to continue. He allegedly collapsed several times before he was taken into a building. The activities log kept by a drill instructor stated that the minor became dehydrated and "fell out" (or became unconscious) at 3:00 p.m. The instructor rendered first aid, but at some point, the minor vomited and became unconscious. An ambulance was called at 4:42 p.m.

     The minor suffered from serious conditions such as hyperpyrexia (an exceptional high fever) and acute rhabdomyolysis (the destruction of skeletal muscle cells) resulting from heat stroke, and he was admitted to a local hospital where his temperature was 107.9 degrees Fahrenheit. He was later transferred to another hospital, where he remained for over two weeks, suffering from acute renal failure, acute hepatitis, and pancreatitis.

     The minor and his parents sued the county, the camp operator, the camp director and a camp worker, alleging violation of the minor's Eighth Amendment rights.

     A federal appeals court found that the Eighth Amendment applied to the operation of the camp, as the minor had been convicted of an offense and was in the custody of the state. "Though a one-day youth offender camp can hardly be equated to incarceration in a penitentiary," the court commented, the youth was "not free to leave; he was a prisoner. Campers were threatened with jail time if they did not comply with the physical exercise regimen," and any camper who failed to comply "was loaded into an awaiting van and taken to jail," confirming the custodial nature of the punishment.

     The trial court was in error, however, the appeals court decided, in finding that the camp regimen violated the "proportionality principle of the Eighth Amendment." Requiring "youthful offenders to perform military-styled exercises for one day is neither cruel nor unusual; it is a deliberate policy choice to instill much-needed discipline." Further, "jogging and carrying a weighted sack" cannot "be cruel and unusual punishment one day and an accepted form of athletic conditioning the next."

     At the same time, the appeals court ruled, the allegation that camp officials waited nearly two hours to call an ambulance while the minor "lay unconscious and vomiting rises to the level of deliberate indifference" to serious medical needs. The appeals court rejected the defendants' argument that they were entitled to immunity because "no case has specifically proscribed the withholding of medical treatment for boot camp attendees reads the right too narrowly; officers need only have 'fair warning' that their conduct is unlawful."

     Given the "serious medical consequences of dehydration, a reasonable person would not have waited nearly two hours to call an ambulance once" the minor became unconscious.

     Austin v. Johnson, #02-41137, 328 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 2003).

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Montana Supreme Court finds that prison's practice of subjecting certain inmates to behavior modification plans, along with the living conditions in the areas where such inmates were housed, violated the state constitutional right to "human dignity" of mentally ill prisoner and represented cruel and unusual punishment, especially when used as a substitute for medical treatment for disruptive and suicidal prisoner.

     A Montana prisoner sentenced to prison for negligent arson and felony forgery had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHI) for which he was taking Ritalin. He was subsequently also diagnosed with Hebephrenic Schizophrenic Disorder, a diagnosis later changed to Bipolar Disorder. Medication including Lithium was prescribed.

     At one point, the prisoner stopped taking his Lithium, and his behavior showed a progressive decline. He began to average eleven severe disciplinary infractions a month, and transformed from a "timid and quiet inmate into an excited, belligerent, hostile, disruptive and suicidal inmate," refusing to eat and sometimes hollering for hours, sometimes for the entire length of an officer's eight-hour shift.

     The prisoner threw his food tray, kept other prisoners awake by screaming all night, and flooded his cell with water, refusing to comply with direct orders. He also made three suicide attempts. As summarized by the Montana Supreme Court, "both the guards and the inmates quickly tired" of his behavior. He accordingly was put on a series of Behavior Management Plans (BMPs). These plans use a "carrot-and-stick approach" of withdrawing and returning privileges based on conduct.

     The BMPs are only implemented in a specific cell block, a detention unit designed for disciplinary punishment, with inmates only provided with bare necessities, including a cement bed, a cement table or desk, a stainless steel sink, a stainless steel toilet and a stainless steel plate which serves as a mirror. None of these fixtures are removable, and there is no window to the outside. No recreation yard time is allowed for inmates on the unit.

     The BMPs are "not meant to be therapeutic," the court found, but are "used as a tool to manage dangerous behavior." If a BMP continues beyond a week, then prison mental health services are supposed to conduct a formal review.

     While the prisoner was there, five separate BMPs were implemented, even though prison officials conceded that he did not respond well to progressive discipline.

     Ultimately, he sued prison officials, claiming that the imposition of the BMPs violated his right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, and worsened his mental health condition.

     The Montana Supreme Court agreed.

     It found that the state prison's practice of subjecting certain inmates, such as the plaintiff, to Behavior Modification Plans, along with the living conditions in the cell unit where such inmates were housed, violated the state constitutional right to human dignity and violated the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to the extent that it worsened the prisoner's mental health condition.

     In the case of the plaintiff prisoner, the court found, rather than providing needed treatment to the inmate after his disruptive behavior and suicide attempts, the prison imposed BMPs on him, taking away his mattress, pillow and all personal items including clothing, and forcing him to sleep naked on a concrete slab in a "filthy cell," which greatly worsened his mental illness.

     The court based its ruling on the Montana state constitution, which it found provided greater protection than the U.S. Constitution against cruel and unusual punishment, and which has an express provision providing for the "right to human dignity" which is not found in the U.S. Constitution.

Our Constitution forbids correctional practices which permit prisons in the name of behavior modification to disregard the innate dignity of human beings, especially in the context where those persons suffer from serious mental illness. We cannot sanction correctional practices that ignore and exacerbate the plight of mentally ill inmates like Walker, especially when that inmate is forced to rely on the prison for his care and protection. The plain meaning of the dignity clause commands that the intrinsic worth and basic humanity of persons may not be violated. Moreover, if the particular conditions of confinement cause serious mental illness to be greatly exacerbated or if it deprives inmates of their sanity, then prison officials have deprived inmates of the basic necessity for human existence and have crossed into the realm of psychological torture.

     The court required the entry of an order by the trial court requiring the prison to conform the operations of its administrative segregation units to the requirements of the opinion and to report, in writing within 180 days as to the actions taken. "The District Court may, thereafter, order inspections or further remediation as in that court's discretion is necessary under the circumstances."

     Walker v. State of Montana, #01-528, 68 P.3d 872 (Mont. 2003).

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Prison investigative agents were not liable for injuries to prisoner placed in a cell with gang members who allegedly physically assaulted him because of his Cuban nationality. Plaintiff prisoner failed to show that the defendants were subjectively aware of the alleged risk to him resulting from placing him in the cell, thus barring a finding of deliberate indifference to a known risk of harm.

     A male Cuban national in a federal prison was placed in a special housing unit in a cell with two other inmates who were allegedly members of a gang known as the Latin Kings. He requested a transfer out in speaking to an investigative agent at the prison, and the following day gave his case manager a transfer form directed to the attention of another investigative agent at the prison, which indicated that he feared an attack from his cellmates.

     The prisoner was subsequently attacked with a razor blade by his two cellmates and as a result of the assault required hospitalization and 110 stitches in his back. He filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the two investigative agents (employed as Special Investigative Agents by the Bureau of Prisons at the facility to investigate all criminal activity there), claiming that they violated his rights by acting with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm by placing him in a cell with gang members who assaulted him because of his Cuban nationality.

     A federal appeals court found that the two defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiff prisoner claimed that the defendants should have been aware that the placement of a Cuban in a cell with two members of the Latin Kings constituted an excessive risk to his safety, and that they ignored the fact that prior to his assault there were two incidents of violence between Latin King inmates and Cuban inmates in the federal prison system.

     The defendants argued that these prior incidents were insufficient to show that they were subjectively aware of a substantial risk of harm to the prisoner. They also argued that one of the incidents, a previous stabbing at the same facility, was investigated and determined to be an "isolated, non-gang-related incident."

     The appeals court found that even if the investigators' conclusions drawn from the investigation of this past incident was erroneous or negligent, it did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation based on deliberate indifference to a known risk of harm. Further, there was no evidence that the transfer form submitted by the prisoner claiming that he was at a risk of assault got presented to the investigator to which it was directed until after the incident in question.

     There was no claim, the court stated, that the defendants subjectively knew of the risk to the prisoner or that they were deliberately indifferent to the risk. Rather, the plaintiff "appears to argue" that the two investigators "were negligent in assessing the risk."

     Indeed, as to at least one of the investigators, there was no evidence that he knew the plaintiff was Cuban or that he had been housed in a cell with members of the Latin Kings. As to the investigator that the prisoner spoke to in requesting a transfer, the court noted that there was no evidence that the prisoner explained the reasons for his requested transfer.

     The failure of the investigators to alleviate a "potential risk that should have been perceived, but was not, does not satisfy the deliberate indifference standard of the Eighth Amendment," the court summarized.

     Verdecia v. Adams, No. 01-1130, 327 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2003).

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Prisoner assaulted by gang members, and attacked yet again when he was moved to a new housing assignment after identifying his assailants, did not show that jail officials were responsible for the second assault. Prisoner failed to provide evidence of his claim that the jail had policies of segregating prisoners by race, and putting predominantly black prisoners in "gladiator cell blocks" in which staff members failed to intervene when fighting erupted.

     An African-American prisoner in a county jail was attacked by a group of inmates belonging to a gang known as the Gangster Disciples. He at first refused to reveal the names of his attackers out of fear of being labeled a "snitch," but after being assured by jail guards that he would be moved to another part of the jail for his safety, he identified them by their nicknames.

     When he was moved to another cellblock, he expressed his fear that members of the gang were in the cellblock in which he was being place, and he was allegedly given his choice about staying there or going to deadlock. While initially asking to go to deadlock, he changed his mind after being promised that if anything happened, officers would "promptly respond," and that gang members had been relocated away from the cellblock.

     In his new cellblock, he was asked if his name was "Ron" (which it was) and if he had come from the cell block where the fight with the Gangster Disciples had taken place. He denied this, was accused of lying, and then was surrounded by roughly ten inmates who accused him of being a snitch and attacked him, beating and punching him, as well as stabbing him with the sharp end of a broken broom handle. He was allegedly "stomped on" until he lost consciousness. When he came to, cardboard had allegedly been placed over the door's window to prevent correctional officers from seeing what was inside, and there was "blood everywhere." He was allegedly assaulted again, and subsequently required four days of hospitalization.

     The injured prisoner sued the county and its sheriff, claiming that his constitutional rights had been violated in the failure to protect him against the second assault. He claimed that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety by adopting a widespread practice of segregating inmates by race and failing to protect inmates from attacks.

     He contended that the jail had a "widespread practice" of placing predominantly black prisoners in cell blocks commonly referred to a "gladiator cell blocks," and that the jail's staff failed to respond to overt acts of violence in these "gladiator" areas in a timely manner, instead allowing inmates to fight each other.

     Upholding summary judgment for the defendants, the court found that the evidence was insufficient to show any "widespread" practice of either segregating prisoners by race or allowing jail inmates to fight each other without staff intervention.

     An isolated incident, the court noted, cannot be used to show the existence of a "widespread practice," and the plaintiff prisoner did not show that he had any knowledge of a pattern of similar incidents. He only claimed that in his one year at the facility, he personally knew of "two incidents" of inmate-on-inmate violence in which correctional officers failed to intervene in a timely manner. This, the court found, failed to meet the test of a widespread unconstitutional practice by the jail's staff that is "so well settled that it constitutes a custom or usage with the force of law."

     In addition to the prisoner's personal knowledge, the court noted, he could have used the discovery process to inquire into how decisions were made as to housing prisoners and whether there were other incidents which he was not aware of.

     There was no evidence that the jail segregates inmates by race.

     Since the prisoner showed nothing but "isolated incidents" of inmate-on-inmate brutality, he could not impose liability on the county, or on the sheriff in his official capacity. Claims against the sheriff individually failed because of his lack of personal involvement in the complained of incident.

     The court also found that the facts presented which were undisputed showed that, far from acting with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's safety, he was removed from his cell block immediately after the first assault, and assigned to a new cell block after identifying his assailants. When he expressed concern about his new cellblock assignment, he was provided with the alternative of deadlock and chose instead the assigned cell.

     While the "vicious beating that resulted is both tragic and unfortunate, the Constitution does not require prison and jail authorities to ensure the safety of their detainees."

     Palmer v. Marion County, #02-2267, 327 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2003).

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Mere claim that a supervisory prison official was the "maximum authority" at a prison did not serve as a basis for liability for an alleged assault on an inmate by correctional officers, in the absence of any allegation of personal involvement or other proper basis for responsibility.

     After a correctional officer had allegedly been assaulted with a knife or other object by a prisoner, a search was ordered of all cells in one area of the prison. The plaintiff prisoner was removed from his cell and temporarily taken to a shower room while his cell was searched.

     He claimed that while he was in a stairwell being escorted back to his cell, two officers grabbed him without provocation and banged his head into the wall, and then pushed him down the stairs, where several other officers were waiting. All officers then are alleged to have punched and kicked the prisoner "for some time," before carrying him to a different shower room. All of this allegedly occurred because he was friends with the other inmate who had allegedly slashed the correctional officer, and was in retaliation for that incident.

     The officers claimed that the plaintiff attempted to kick one of them and then began to struggle, and that force was then used to subdue him.

     Among the defendants in the prisoner's federal civil rights lawsuit was the prison superintendent. The trial court found that claims against him should be dismissed.

     There was no evidence that the superintendent "had any involvement in the events" giving rise to the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff prisoner himself testified that he named the superintendent simply because he "is the maximum authority in the facility." This, the court ruled, was an insufficient basis for liability, which cannot, in a federal civil rights suit, be based simply on vicarious liability for the actions of subordinates.

The personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence that: (1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation; (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong; (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom; (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts; or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.

     Since no showing of this nature was made against the superintendent, the claims against him were dismissed.

     Durran v. Selsky, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).

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Prisoner's discipline for stating in a filed grievance that a female correctional officer was rumored to be having sex with male correctional officers did not violate his First Amendment rights. The manner in which the statement was made insinuated that the statement was true and the prisoner had no actual evidence as to the truth of the rumor.

     An Illinois prisoner claimed that his First Amendment rights were violated when he received discipline for "insolence" based on his filing of a prison grievance which stated that a female correctional officer was rumored to be having sex with male correctional officers.

     The prisoner's grievance against the female officer claimed that she failed to "call chow" in the morning, dozed off during duty, talked on the phone excessively, and "slandered" the prisoner by labeling him to other inmates as a "complainer." The prisoner's grievance characterized the officer as "unethical and unprofessional," and further accused her of "fratilizing" with inmates, including himself. (The federal court subsequently assumed that the prisoner meant "fraternizing."). The grievance then said that:

Rumor goes according to inmates that have been on the unit since she came, [the officer] is screwing a lot of the Officer's on the midnight shift along with a few Sergeants and Lt's, etc.

     The prisoner subsequently allegedly admitted during an interview that the allegation about the female officer's sexual relations with male officers was just a rumor which he had included because "he wanted to put everything he knew" about the officer in the grievance. The prisoner was found guilty of insolence for including this statement in the grievance, based on a testifying officer's credibility and the prisoner's admission that his accusations of sexual misconduct were only rumors. He was demoted in grade for 15 days and received 15 days of segregation as a punishment.

     It is "well settled," the federal court noted, that prison officials "may discipline inmates for insolent and disrespectful behavior, for obvious legitimate penological concerns of security and order." It also found, however, that there were no prior cases by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, which governs Illinois, addressing whether prisoners can be punished for insolent statements in grievances.

     A decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1995) found that a prison regulation prohibiting disrespectful language, though facially valid, was unconstitutional as applied to a prison grievance because it unnecessarily burdened a prisoner's "fundamental right of access to the courts." The federal court in the immediate case "declines to adopt Bradley's blanket rule that discipline 'merely for using hostile, sexual, abusive or threatening language' in grievances is unconstitutional."

     More important here, the court implied, was the fact that the prisoner had "no evidence" to support his statements. "No doubt the rumor was scandalous, but the defendants do not argue that the plaintiff could not have reported" the officer's alleged "sexual misconduct if he had evidence that it was true. Sexual misconduct by a prison employee on the job would be a serious infraction and, the court presumes, an infraction reportable by inmates in a grievance."

     The grievance procedure, the court stated, is for the purpose of bringing issues to the attention of officials, not a forum to make disparaging, degrading, abusive comments about members of the correctional staff.

     While the plaintiff prisoner argued that his statements were not "false or insolent" because he labeled them as rumors, thus admitting up front he did not know if the rumors were true, his grievance "belies this characterization." His statements, "taken as a whole, clearly insinuate that the rumor was more than just a rumor," and that the officer "manipulated her retention in the unit by having sexual relations with officers, and referred to the rumor for corroboration."

     The defendant officials "understandably took the allegations seriously and launched an internal investigation," the court noted. The court found that the defendant officials had a legitimate penological reason for disciplining the prisoner for putting the rumor in his grievance, "even if he identified it as a rumor." They had a legitimate interest in preventing manipulation and harassment of prison employees. The grievance spawned an investigation and held the officer up to ridicule and a complete loss of respect and authority as to both inmates and other officers, the court said.

A correctional officer without authority is a threat to the security of the institution. Tolerating the plaintiff's statements, in light of the plaintiff's admissions [...] that they were only rumors, could lead to a general breakdown of the authority and effectiveness of [the accused officer] and other officers facing bogus charges of sexual misconduct. It was reasonable for the defendants to sanction the plaintiff for making such a scandalous allegation in his grievance with no evidentiary support.

     The court further commented that even if it found a constitutional violation, the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity in light of the fact that there was no binding precedent addressing discipline for false or insolent statements in grievances. "A reasonable officer could have objectively believed that disciplining the plaintiff in this instance did not offend the constitution."

     Hale v. Scott, 252 F. Supp. 2d 728 (C.D. Ill. 2003).

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Federal appeals court holds that prisoner could bring a civil rights lawsuit over prison discipline without first having the disciplinary proceeding invalidated as long as his claims challenged only the conditions of his confinement, not the fact of the confinement or its duration.

     A Spanish-speaking Cuban national in a federal prison as an INS detainee, after completing a criminal sentence on charges of killing his cellmate, was subjected to discipline for failing to obey a federal correctional officer's order that was issued in English. The prisoner asserted that it was unconstitutional to discipline him for disobeying an order that he allegedly could not understand, and filed a federal civil rights lawsuit.

     The incident involved an order, delivered in English by a correctional officer, asking the prisoner to strip as he was leaving the dinner hall. The plaintiff prisoner was housed in a unit and program designated for those who maintained "clear conduct" during their recent history and had as a reward received special privileges. As a condition for receiving these privileges, however, they were subject to random strip searches.

     The prisoner obeyed the order to strip, and the officer then ordered him, in English, to hand the officer his clothes as he removed them. The officer contended that the prisoner refused this order, placing his clothes instead on a nearby wooden bench and telling the officer "also in English" to pick them up himself. The prisoner denied this, and claimed that he only understood the order to strip, but did not understand what the officer was asking him to do with his discarded clothes.

     The trial court dismissed a claim against a supervisory officer arising out of the discipline on the basis that the claim necessarily asserted the invalidity of a disciplinary determination that had not previously been set aside, citing Heck v. Humprey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

     A federal appeals court found that this was erroneous, and that the principles of Heck requiring that an conviction be set aside before it becomes the basis for a civil rights claim for damages did not apply when the prisoner "challenges only the conditions of confinement, rather than the fact or duration of his confinement."

     The court found that the prisoner's claim against the supervisory officer, which arose out of the strip-search disciplinary proceedings which resulted in his removal from the privileged housing unit and pre-transfer programs, "challenges the conditions of his confinement and cannot be barred by Heck." 

     Alejo v. Heller, No. 01-1573, 328 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2003).

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Federal court rules that provisions of federal statute governing a Muslim prisoner's claim violated the Establishment of Religion clause of the First Amendment by applying only to religious practices and thereby providing heightened protection only to inmates seeking to exercise religious rights as opposed to other constitutional rights.

     A Muslim prisoner in Wisconsin asserted a claim against state correctional officials, contending that they violated his right to freely exercise his religion by failing to accommodate his religious dietary requirements, by denying him the use and possession of candles, incense, oils, and religious talismans, and by prohibiting him from using his Muslim name after he had his name legally changed. The prisoner asserted the claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc-1(a) et seq.

     State correctional officials moved to dismiss the lawsuit, advancing a number of arguments, including arguments for the unconstitutionality of RLUIPA. The trial judge allowed the U.S. government to intervene in defense of the constitutionality of RLUIPA.

     The statute reimposed on correctional institutions a burden of showing that restrictions on prisoners' religious freedoms are justified by a "compelling" governmental interest is unconstitutional as an "establishment of religion" under the First Amendment. It was passed by Congress in reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as unconstitutional as applied to the states because it exceeded Congress's powers under Sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

     The RLUIPA, therefore, avoided Sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the source of its authority to act, instead relying on the Spending Power and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Under RLUIPA, as under the RFRA, the test applicable to a correctional institution's attempt to take action that imposes a burden on a prisoner's exercise of religious freedom is:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person--

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

     This is a much heavier burden than is usually required to uphold correctional policies or practices which must only be rationally related to a legitimate penological interest.

      Another federal trial court recently held that Congress violated the Establishment of Religion clause of the First Amendment in enacting the statute. Madison v. Riter, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1094 (W.D. Va.) (accepting the argument that the statute "established" religion by giving it preference over other individual liberties, such as free speech, by imposing more stringent protections only for religious liberty).

     The federal trial court in Wisconsin has now joined in that ruling. The Court relied, in part, on Justice Stevens' concurrence in the Boerne case, in which he expressed his opinion that the RFRA, in giving enhanced protection to religious freedom rights, constitutes a "law respecting an establishment of religion" violating the Establishment Clause.

     The court found that the RLUIPA, by strongly prohibiting burdens on inmates' exercise of religion unless such burdens are supported by "compelling" governmental interests, has the "primary effect of advancing religion" in violation of the Establishment Clause. The RLUIPA, the court noted, applies only to religious practices, so it does not extend its heightened protection to inmates seeking to exercise other constitutional rights.

     This, the court reasoned, imposes a "substantial burden" on those non-religious inmates it does not favor, especially considering the "meager resources" available to prisoners as a whole.

Government may not, under the guise of accommodation, create incentives to undertake religious indoctrination or define the recipients of its assistance by religion.

     The court found that the statute in question also fosters an "excessive entanglement of government with religion," because it "forces the states to become involved with, knowledgeable about, and excessively sensitive to the varied religious practices of their inmates," and forces the federal courts to "become involved in prison administration, an area that the Supreme Court has admonished judges to avoid."

       [...]under RLUIPA, prison officials are placed in the business of counting the number of trinkets in each inmate's cell, dividing them into religious and non-religious tacks, then subtracting the surplus from the secular pile. While RLUIPA forces prison administrators and courts to make distinctions between religious and secular property, recall that the religious item need not even be "central" to the inmate's "system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc-5(7)(A). Moreover, the prison official must, as an initial matter, determine whether the inmate practices a "religion," entitling him to heightened protection. The legal test for determining what is a "religion" looks primarily to the subjective views of the individual seeking protection.

[...]If the inmate brings suit under RLUIPA, the court must engage in a similar analysis, second-guessing the reasoned judgment of those expert in prison administration. As the Supreme Court recognized years ago, this entanglement is not only excessive, it is unworkable.

     The court concluded that Sec. 2000cc-1 of the RLUIPA, which governs the claims of prison inmates, violates the Establishment Clause because its primary effect is to advance religion and because it fosters an excessive entanglement between government and religion.

     The court denied, however, the defendant officials' motion to dismiss the plaintiff prisoner's claims on the basis that the court should take judicial notice of the fact that oil, incense and candles are all "incendiary materials" and take judicial notice of the possibility of fire in a correctional institution. The court noted that the defendants already allow some ceremonial smoking, smudging and the use of incense consistent with the policy on the use of smoking materials. It found that, on the state of the record, it could not determine if it was reasonable to deny the plaintiff the materials he requested. The court also found that the determination of whether the defendant officials were entitled to qualified immunity was "premature."

     Kilaab Al Ghashiyah v. Department of Corrections of Wisconsin, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2003).

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Federal court finds that New York prisoner was entitled to preliminary injunction against Department of Corrections policy of putting inmates who refused an annual mandatory tuberculosis test on religious grounds into tuberculin hold for one year.

     A New York prisoner filed a federal civil rights lawsuit challenging the New York State Department of Corrections policy of requiring mandatory tuberculosis skin tests of all inmates each year and arguing that placing inmates who refuse the test on religious grounds into tuberculin hold for one year violated his rights.

     The trial court noted that the defendant correctional department put forward several rationales for the policy of placing prisoners who object to the TB skin test in tuberculin hold for a year. First, the confinement coerces prisoners into taking the test. Second, it limits the exposure of other individuals to the objector during the most critical first year. Third, it fosters better monitoring. And fourth, it allows the Department to identify and treat ill inmates early.

     The court stated that it was clear that "coercing reluctant prisoners to take the skin test does not take a year. The conditions of tuberculin hold are such that a reasonable prisoner would quickly consent to the PPD test absent a matter of conscience." Consequently, the court found that requiring inmates to serve longer than the amount of time that would allow the results of a sputum test to come back "is not reasonably related to the goal of coercing" inmates to take the skin test.

     The court also found no legitimate connection between the tuberculin hold and increased monitoring, because when on tuberculin hold, an inmate remains in his normal cell on his normal cellblock, and is identified through a tag to his chart, and not through his location in the prison. There was testimony from one doctor that there would be no greater cost or effort to monitor the prisoners if they were in the general population.

     The court found that the Department may have some legitimate reasons to consider the public health concerns that might result if an inmate is contagious with tuberculosis but shows no signs, so that a tuberculin hold on objectors "on initial entry" into the Department of Corrections "appears rational to this court." For prisoners such as the plaintiff, however, who, after having either taken the PPD test or having their tuberculosis status determined in some other way, subsequently object to the annual testing on religious grounds, the court found, the policy "appears entirely arbitrary and irrational."

     The court further noted that the plaintiff prisoner had no religious objection to alternative methods of determining tuberculosis status, such as chest x-rays or sputum tests, should the Department care to annually monitor him in that way.

     The court therefore found that the prisoner was likely to prevail on his claim concerning the lengthy tuberculin hold put on persons like himself who religiously object to a tuberculosis skin test, and that he was therefore entitled to a preliminary injunction against the tuberculin hold policy.

     The court dismissed the concern about a potential "floodgate" of religious objectors to the tuberculosis skin test, finding that the Department's failure to keep any statistics on the issue, indicates that there is "no flood of inmates seeking to claim religious objections."

     Selah v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 42 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).

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Recipients of collect calls from Ohio inmates could pursue their claim against counties and telecommunications providers that rates were so unreasonably high as to violate their equal protection right to fundamental freedom of speech and association. Claims against the State of Ohio were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, and anti-trust and telecommunications statute claims were not viable.

     A class action lawsuit was filed against the state of Ohio, Ohio counties, and telecommunications companies on behalf of persons who regularly receive collect telephone calls made by Ohio state prison inmates. The plaintiffs included inmates' family members, friends, attorneys, and bailbondsmen. The complaint alleged that the telecommunications companies had conspired with the State and certain Ohio counties to create exclusive contracts for inmate telephone service, and that these contracts restricted inmates' telephone privileges to collect calls, so that, as a result, the plaintiffs, who bear the cost of the calls, are charged excessive rates and surcharges.

     The complaint attempted to assert claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1, et. seq, the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq., and for violation of the constitutional rights to due process, equal protection and the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

     The federal court found that damage claims against the State of Ohio were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, but that a claim for injunctive relief could be pursued against the director of state corrections in his individual capacity.

     It also held that the plaintiffs could not pursue Sherman Antitrust Act claims because of the involvement of the state, under a "state action doctrine" barring claims for restraint of trade when a state has a clearly articulated policy of awarding service contracts on a monopolistic basis and actively supervises those contracts. Claims under the Telecommunications Act were also barred because the rates charged to the plaintiffs conformed to the telecommunications providers' filed rate schedules.

     The court ruled, however, that the plaintiffs could pursue claims related to whether the collect call rates being charged to persons who wished to communicate by telephone with inmates were so unreasonably high that they violated their equal protection right to fundamental rights of free speech and association.

     McGuire v. Ameritech Services, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ohio 2003).

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U.S. Supreme Court upholds Michigan prison rules limiting visits by children, non-family members, former prisoners, or for prisoners who commit two violations of substance abuse rules.

     The Michigan Department of Corrections issued new regulations limiting prison visitation because of concerns about prison security problems caused by the increasing number of visitors to the state's prisons and by substance abuse among inmates.

     A federal appeals court, Bazzetta v. McGinnis, #01-1635, 286 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2002), as previously reported in this publication, found that the regulations, at least as applied to non-contact visits, violated the prisoners' rights. The court held that the regulations violated the prisoners' First Amendment right of association as applied to non-contact visits from prisoners' minor siblings, nieces, and nephews, children of prisoners whose parental rights have been terminated, and former prisoners who are not members of prisoner's family and that regulations that ban visitors, aside from attorneys and clergy, for prisoners who have twice violated the department's drug abuse policies violates both the right of association and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.

     Under the rules, an inmate may be visited by qualified clergy and attorneys on business and by persons placed on an approved list, which may include an unlimited number of immediate family members and ten others; minor children are not permitted to visit unless they are the children, stepchildren, grandchildren, or siblings of the inmate; if the inmate's parental rights are terminated, the child may not visit; a child visitor must be accompanied by a family member of the child or inmate or the child's legal guardian; former prisoners are not permitted to visit except that a former prisoner who is an immediate family member of an inmate may visit if the warden approves. Prisoners who commit two substance-abuse violations may receive only clergy and attorneys, but may apply for reinstatement of visitation privileges after two years.

     The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court decision, upholding the Michigan prison rules.

     The Court found that the regulations had a rational relation to legitimate penological interests, and that this "suffices to sustain them," regardless of whether or not the prisoners have a constitutional right of association that has survived incarceration. The Court noted that it accords substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining a correctional system's legitimate goals and determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.

     The Court found that the regulations in question satisfy each of four factors used to decide whether a prison regulation affecting a constitutional right that survives incarceration withstands constitutional challenge as set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987).

     First, they "bear a rational relationship to a legitimate penological interest." The restrictions on children's visitation are related, the Court found, to a valid interests in maintaining internal security and protecting child visitors from exposure to sexual or other misconduct or from accidental injury. They promote internal security, perhaps the most legitimate penological goal, by reducing the total number of visitors and by limiting disruption caused by children. It is also reasonable to ensure that the visiting child is accompanied and supervised by adults charged with protecting the child's best interests. Prohibiting visitation by former inmates bears a "self-evident connection" to the State's interest in maintaining prison security and preventing future crime. Restricting visitation for inmates with two substance-abuse violations serves the legitimate goal of deterring drug and alcohol use within prison.

     Second, the plaintiffs have "alternative means of exercising their asserted right of association" with those prohibited from visiting, the Court noted. They can send messages through those who are permitted to visit, and can communicate by letter and telephone. Visitation alternatives "need not be ideal; they need only be available."

     Third, accommodating the associational right by allowing unrestricted visitation would have a considerable impact on guards, other inmates, the allocation of prison resources, and the safety of visitors by causing a significant reallocation of the prison system's financial resources and by impairing corrections officers' ability to protect all those inside a prison's walls, according to the Court.

     And finally, the plaintiffs had suggested no alternatives that fully accommodate the asserted right "while not imposing more than a de minimus cost to the valid penological goals."

     The U.S. Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the visitation restriction for inmates with two substance-abuse violations was cruel and unusual confinement condition violating the Eighth Amendment. Withdrawing visitation privileges for a limited period in order to effect prison discipline, the Court ruled, is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for confinement conditions. Nor does the regulation create inhumane prison conditions, deprive inmates of basic necessities or fail to protect their health or safety, or involve the infliction of pain or injury or deliberate indifference to their risk.

     Overton, Director, Michigan Department of Corrections v. Bazzetta, #02-94, 123 S. Ct. 2162 (2003).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet.

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Access to Courts/Legal Info

     Prisoner who filed state law medical malpractice claim against prison doctor who allegedly ordered him to return to heavy work despite a back injury was not entitled to appointed lawyer. If inmate's case had merit, court reasons, he should be able to find a lawyer to take it on a contingency fee agreement, despite his indigency. The mere fact that the claim was against an employee of a prison in which he was incarcerated was not an "exceptional circumstance" requiring the appointment of counsel. Gibson v. Tolbert, #02-0190, 102 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 2003).

Defenses: Notice of Claims

     Prisoner who claimed he was injured while opening a freezer door failed to provide county with notice of his claim within 6 months of the accident as required by the Texas Tort Claims Act, V.T.C.A. Civil Practice & Remedies Code Sec. 101.101(a, c). His claim against the county was therefore properly dismissed. Crane County v. Saults, No. 08-02-00207-CV, 101 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App. -- El Paso 2003).

Defenses: Service of Summons

     The failure of the state attorney general to provide the address of a former correctional officer to a prisoner seeking to sue him for violating his federal civil rights by retaliating against him for filing grievances was "good cause" for the inmates' delay in obtaining service of process on the former officer. Clemons v. Soeltner, #02-2005, 62 Fed. Appx. 81 (6th Cir. 2003).

Defenses: Statute of Limitations

     Under Nevada law, the "mailbox" rule, which regards notices as submitted to a court when they are placed in the hands of prison officials for delivery to postal officials did not toll (extend) the 2-year deadline for a prisoner's filing of a claim for personal injury against state correctional officials. See NRS 11.190(4).Milton v. Nevada Department of Prisons, #38251, 68 P.3d 895 (Nev. 2003).

Employment Issues

     Substantial evidence supported dismissal of corrections officer for improperly having "avoidable contact" with prisoner, when an enveloped address to him was in her handwriting as was the enclosed letter addressed "Hey Baby." Lombardi v. Dunlap, #WD 61417, 103 S.W.3d 786 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003)

First Amendment

     A prison librarian's alleged filing of an "erroneous" evaluation of a prisoner's performance in his work assignment after the prisoner filed a grievance over an earlier evaluation was not unlawful retaliation in violation of the prisoner's First Amendment rights. The librarian had submitted other negative evaluations of the prisoner's work performance before he ever filed a grievance. Keenan v. Daniel, #02-2059, 63 Fed. Appx. 180 (6th Cir. 2003).

Mail

     Prisoner failed to present any evidence that prison employees, rather than the postal system, were responsible for the failure to deliver his outgoing or incoming mail. Further, one specific incident where he allegedly did not receive the full contents of a letter from his wife was "such a random and isolated incident" that it was "insufficient to establish" a constitutional violation. Okoro v. Scibana, #02-1439, 63 Fed. Appx. 182 (6th Cir. 2003).

Medical Care

     Prisoner failed to show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his injured knee by failing to treat it for twenty months. Prison medical personnel examined knee and approved surgery, but the surgery was delayed by the timing of the prisoner's transfers and by scheduling problems with outside doctors. Forstner v. Daley, #02-1954, 62 Fed. Appx. 704 (7th Cir. 2003).

     Alleged action of prison nurse of applying the wrong eye drops to the inmate's eyes was not "deliberate indifference" to prisoner's serious medical needs, but at most, merely negligent or unprofessional conduct in failing to check the medication before administering it. Long v. Lafko, 254 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Medical Care: Dental

     Even if it were assumed that oral surgeon acted negligently in removing a piece of tissue from the plaintiff inmate's mouth while failing to extract his impacted wisdom teeth, it would merely be medical malpractice, which is not sufficient to state a federal civil rights claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Rivera v. Goord, 253 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Prison Conditions: General

     A former Illinois state statute which provided that prisoners should have at least 50 square feet of cell space each did not give an inmate a constitutionally protected right to such living space. Prison officials, therefore, did not violate prisoner's due process rights by assigning him to a cell with another inmate, resulting in each of them having less than 50 square feet each. Court also rejects the argument that the amendment of the statute, 730 ILCS 5/3-7-3, to delete any express reference to a specific per person space requirement increased prisoner's punishment retroactively. Hurst v. Snyder, #02-2891, 63 Fed. Appx. 240 (7th Cir. 2003).

Prison Litigation Reform Act: Exhaustion of Remedies

     Prisoner was barred from pursuing federal civil rights claim that he was placed in danger when prison officials identified him to the general prison population as a gang member when he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a). Labounty v. Johnson, 253 F. Supp. 2d 496 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).

     Because of a factual issue as to whether an inmate actually filed a grievance, and, if so, whether the correctional facility responded to it, the issue of whether he had exhausted available administrative remedies prior to filing suit, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a) could not be decided on a motion to dismiss. Sweet v. Wende Correctional Facility, 253 F. Supp. 2d 492 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).

Prisoner Assault: By Inmates

     Prison inspector was not deliberately indifferent to alleged threats of assault by other inmates against prisoner, when he was not involved in investigating these complaints, but rather the prisoner's claim that his food was being poisoned by prison staff putting human waste in his food. Inspector had no knowledge of alleged assault threats to prisoner prior to actual attacks on him in the dining hall. (Prisoner's claims regarding purported food poisoning were concluded to be unfounded and it was recommended that he be sent for psychological intervention). Webster v. Crowley, #02-1998, 62 Fed. Appx. 598 (6th Cir. 2003).

Prisoner Discipline

     There was substantial evidence to support a finding of guilt of a prison disciplinary offense of harassment based on the action of the prisoner, a convicted rapist, in sending an unsolicited 4-1/2 page letter to a female employee in a college registrar's office. Prisoner only knew of the employee because she had responded to his earlier letter in which he requested a copy of his transcript, and the letter he then sent contained repeated use of sexual innuendo, requests for personal information and intimate details, and a "suggestion of in-person contact in the near future." Van Bramer v. Selsky, 758 N.Y.S.2d 170 (A.D. 3d 2003). [PDF]

     Some evidence supported disciplinary finding that prisoner had used clandestine cellular telephone without authorization when one number called was only on his approved calling list and other inmates, who had admittedly used the phone, identified him as among the persons who had used it. Sinde v. Gerlinski, 252 F. Supp. 2d 144 (M.D. Pa. 2003).

Prisoner Suicide

     Parents of Mississippi inmate who committed suicide while incarcerated in county detention facility could not, under state law, pursue wrongful death lawsuit against defendant correctional officials when they were acting within the scope of their authority. State statute, A.M.C. Sec. 11-46-9(1)(m) prohibits inmate's negligence lawsuits against governmental entities and government employees acting within the scope of their authority, and the prisoner's parents "stood in the position" of the inmate in attempting to pursue a claim for wrongful death. Webb v. Desoto County, #2002-CA-00005-SCT, 843 So. 2d 682 (Miss. 2003). [PDF]

Private Prisons

     A state prisoner's incarceration in a private prison does not raise any federal constitutional claim. Florez v. Johnson, #02-2131, 63 Fed. Appx. 432 (10th Cir. 2003).

Procedural: Removal

     Prisoner failed to state a claim against government entities and public officials for conspiracy in connection with their removal of his federal civil rights lawsuits from state to federal court. The court would not inquire into the motives for such removal. "If the Rules do permit removal, then the case may be removed," whether the motivation is for strategic reasons, out of personal preference or no reason at all. Parks v. State of Indiana, #77A01-0207-CV-266, 789 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. App. 2003).

Property

     Prisoner failed to show a "reasonable factual basis" that a correctional officer had him put on strip cell status to gain access to his personal property and confiscate it. Officer's actions were within the scope of his employment and helped maintain order and discipline in the facility, so he was entitled to immunity under state statute. Higgason v. State, #77A05-02208-CV-362, 789 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. App. 2003).

Segregation: Administrative

     Michigan state prisoner had no equal protection right to be removed from administrative segregation and returned to the general prison population. Plaintiff's claim that he was "treated differently" from prisoners "with similar needs" did not show that he was a member of a constitutionally protected class and that the defendants intentionally discriminated against him because of his membership in that class. McGaughy v. Johnson, #02-1469, 63 Fed. Appx. 177 (6th Cir. 2003).

Smoking

     Prison officials did not show deliberate indifference to inmate's alleged exposure to second hand tobacco smoke. Prison medical personnel gave inmate medications for symptoms and issued a medical directive that he should be housed with non-smokers. The prisoner presented no evidence that other defendant officials had knowledge of his allegedly smoking related ailments. Garcia v. Maddock, #02-15540, 64 Fed. Appx. 10 (9th Cir. 2003).

Terrorism/National Security Issues

     Two Wisconsin inmates did not have standing to sue Middle Eastern nations such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, the Sudan, and Libya, and terrorist groups such as Al Qaida and the Taliban for millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages in a lawsuit filed with the purported intention of "lending a hand" in the war on terrorism. They had personally never been victims of terrorism and were "no more likely than the average American citizen to be victims of future attacks." George v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 02-3195, 63 Fed. Appx. 917 (7th Cir. 2003).

Visitation

     Former correctional officer at Tennessee state prison did not have a due process or equal protection right to visit inmates. Policy of state Department of Corrections restricting former employees' visitation with inmates did not violate the due process rights of former employee to pursue her new profession as paralegal. Former officer could not assert inmates' rights in order to challenge department's policy of restricting former employees from visits, written communication and telephone calls with inmates on the basis that it prevented the inmates from receiving paralegal assistance from the former officer. Engle v. Tennessee Dept. of Corrections, #02-5970, 63 Fed. Appx. 860 (6th Cir. 2003).

Work/Education Programs

     Indiana prisoner was entitled to the benefit of amendments to an educational credit time statute passed after his sentence, allowing him to receive the maximum credit towards his release date for post-amendment educational credits. Cotton v. Ellsworth, #48A04-0204-CV-185, 788 N.E.2d 867 (Ind. App. 2003).

     AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.

     Address lists: List of all federal prison facilities.

     Address lists: State prisons and other correctional facilities, arranged by state.

     Address lists: County sheriff's departments and jails.

     Publication: "Factories with Fences: A history of the Federal Prison Industries," Federal Bureau of Prisons, 49 pgs. [PDF]

     Publication: Gender-Responsive Strategies: Research, Practice, and Guiding Principles for Women Offenders. Summary: In September 1999, the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) began a 3-year project to create a foundational body of work on gender-relevant approaches to managing and intervening effectively with women offenders in adult corrections. An NIC-wide team on women offenders saw the need to summarize current evidence regarding what is known and not known about gender-responsive policy and practice. NIC Accession Number 018017 (June 2003) [PDF].

     Publication: Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision. (May 2003). Summary: More than 40 states have now enacted legislation to amend the 1937 interstate compact for supervision of adults on parole or probation The compact governs the travel, movement, and supervision of adult probationers or parolees from a sending state, where they have been convicted of crimes, to a receiving state. This on-line publication (.html format) contains links to useful documents and resources concerning the existing Interstate Compact and amendments to it, as well as a sourcebook for states on compact issues with "tips" for compliance with compact requirements, prepared by the National Institute of Corrections and the Council of State Governments in 2002.

     Publication: Proceedings of the Large Jail Network Meeting, February 2003. Summary: National Institute of Corrections, 2003. Meeting topics included the future of jail legislation, resources, and funding; handling legislation and dealing effectively with funding authorities; the role of professional standards and internal affairs; and a legal issues update. Accession no. 018479. [PDF]

     Publication: Defining and Measuring Corrections Performance. (123 pages, February 2003). Published by the Association of State Correctional Administrators. [PDF]

     Videotape: Children of Prisoners: Children of Promise Summary: This 3-hour videoconference, broadcast on June 18, 2003, was intended to identify the problems and greatest needs of incarcerated parents and caretakers with regard to their children, identify the problems and issues that children of prisoners or former prisoners face that put them at risk, identify and describe evidence-based and promising approaches to support these children and build on their strengths, and describe the benefits of the criminal justice system becoming more family-friendly. Web links are pending for viewing the recorded program online. A videotape of the program will be available through the NIC Information Center. Call Toll-free 1 (800) 877-1461. (June 2003).

     Videotape: Youthful Offenders in Adult Corrections: Effective Interventions Program Description: The 32-hour program in September 2003 will present a research-based, practical curriculum that teaches principles and implementation of effective interventions ("what works") within the context of managing youthful offenders in an adult correctional environment. This highly interactive approach to training both security and treatment staff uses modeled behaviors and guided practice for developing skills needed to work with this unique offender population. The training program combines all of the elements of effective interventions to help agencies build programs that effect offender behavior change and reduce recidivism. Contact the NIC Information Center at (800) 877-1461 to request the taped program.

     Website: American Association for Correctional Psychology. (Free registration required for use).

     Website: HIV & Hepatitis Education Prison Project Publishes a ten times a year report on prison HIV, Hepatitis and other related health issues, available at the website in PDF format. Brown Medical School Office of Continuing Medical Education, Brown University, Providence, RI.

     Website: North American Association of Wardens and Superintendents.

     Website: National Association of Probation Executives.

     Reference:

• Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.
• AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.