FEATURED CASES

WITH LINKS TO THE OPINIONS

Prison was entitled, under the terms of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, to the termination of a 14-year-old injunction that required a prison law clinic to remain open. Preclusion of termination of injunction if needed to correct a "current and ongoing" violation of a federally protected right did not cover possible future violations.

     An injunction issued fourteen years ago requires that the "Para-Professional Law Clinic" at the State Correctional Institute at Graterford, Pennsylvania remain open in order to remedy alleged violations of the inmates' constitutional right of access to the courts. Prison officials sought to close the clinic in 1978, and were enjoined from doing so, with a permanent injunction entered in 1987, based on a conclusion that the clinic was "integral to inmates' access to the courts," particularly inmates who were functionally illiterate or housed in administrative or disciplinary custody.

     The clinic is governed by a board of directors composed largely of inmate officers elected by the clinic's inmate members. The twenty-one inmates who currently work for the clinic assist other inmates with legal matters, including post-conviction relief, habeas petitions, parole matters, and civil rights actions. They are compensated for this work as they would be for any other prison work assignment.

     Under the terms of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3626, the defendant prison officials sought to terminate the 14-year-old permanent injunction against the closure of the clinic. That provision of the statute allows the termination of injunctive relief in cases involving prison conditions upon the motion of any party, with the exception of when an injunction remains "necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation" of a federal right. Additionally, an injunction must extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the right, and be narrowly drawn, using the least intrusive means to correct the violation.

     The plaintiffs in the case conceded, in response to the defendants' motion to terminate the injunction, that there was not a "current and ongoing" violation of the right of access to the courts. "Indeed, they conceded there was not because, in their view, the clinic prevented such a violation from occurring." They argued, however, that the exception should still apply, because if the injunction were lifted, the defendants would close the clinic and would fail to replace it with an adequate substitute. The trial court rejected this argument.

     A federal appeals court has now rejected that argument also. The appeals court concluded that the plain meaning of the words "current and ongoing" as used in the statute "does not encompass future violations."

     The appeals court additionally stated that even if the defendants were eventually to close the clinic, the inmates' constitutional rights "will not be violated merely because of the closure," since they do not have a right of access to the clinic "per se." If the defendants replace the clinic with an alternative program, that program "would remain in place at least until some inmate could demonstrate that a non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded."

     Having ruled in this manner, however, the appeals court stated that, "without minimizing defendants' expressed concerns about the potential security problems posed by certain aspects of the clinic's current operations," it wanted to encourage the defendants "in the strongest possible terms to reconsider any plan they may have to close the clinic."

     The trial court's summation of the situation at the prison showed that the two law libraries there are "chronically understaffed" and that inmates in the mental health and special needs units received "virtually no legal assistance" through the prison, other than from the clinic. The clinic, therefore, "provides a valuable service both to the inmates whom it assists and to the courts before whom the inmates' cases come, including this court." The clinic pointed "with pride" to a list of 130 "favorable results" it had obtained in litigation.

If the clinic is closed and that closure serves to adversely affect the prisoners' constitutional right of access to the courts, this would likely cause more litigation and the intervention, yet again, of the federal courts. We encourage the defendants to bear this in mind as they weigh their options going forward.

     That opinion expressed, the appeals court upheld the trial court's order terminating the injunction.

     Para-Professional Law Clinic at SCI-Graterford v. Beard, No. 02-2788, 334 F.3d 301 (3rd Cir. 2003).

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Prisoner with an unstable right shoulder stated a viable claim for disability discrimination by contending that correctional personnel knew of medical instructions that he should not be handcuffed behind his back, but ignored them, refusing to accommodate his injury by cuffing him with his hands in front.

     A Virginia state prisoner sued the state Department of Corrections and a number of prison officials, claiming that he had been subjected to disability discrimination in that prison employees failed to reasonably accommodate his injured shoulder.

     The prisoner was allegedly diagnosed as suffering from a chronically unstable right shoulder due to ligament and nerve damage, and claimed that medical personnel had issued a "cuff-front" pass to him, requiring all personnel in the prison to handcuff him only with his hands in front, in order to accommodate this injury and prevent further harm or aggravation of the condition.

     The prisoner's complaint contended that prison guards failed to pay attention to this restriction and refused to accommodate his injured shoulder, handcuffing his arms behind his back The "cuff front pass" was allegedly posted on his cell door, but that guards engaging in a search of his cell took the position that the pass was "not valid," and that one of them threw it in the trash, and that he was then handcuffed with his arms behind his back, and left in that position for forty-five minutes. He subsequently complained of pain in his right shoulder, and claimed that it had been dislocated.

     The prisoner sought $7,000 in damages, asserting a claim for disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794.

     A federal trial court has rejected a motion by the defendants to dismiss the claim. It found that the facts alleged, if true, would state a prima facie claim for disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.

     The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the Rehabilitation Act was unconstitutional in imposing liabilities on state agencies in violation of the Eleventh Amendment. It noted that Congress based the obligations imposed by the Rehabilitation Act on state agencies on the acceptance of federal funds, relying on its powers under the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Congress could properly condition the acceptance of such federal funds on a waiver of state sovereign immunity for purposes of lawsuits for disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.

     The court also found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison guards' supervisor told them to handcuff him in a manner contrary to a posted medical order, knowing that such an action would cause the prisoner pain, precluding summary judgment on the prisoner's Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. There additionally was a genuine issue as to whether the plaintiff prisoner suffered serious injury.

     Bane v. Virginia Department of Corrections, 267 F. Supp. 2d 514 (W.D. Va. 2003).

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Prisoner who claimed that his sentence had been miscalculated, resulting in him being held beyond his proper release date, could not seek damages following his release when he had failed to previously have his sentence set aside. The fact that, after his release, habeas action to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence was no longer available did not alter the result.

     While a prisoner in Pennsylvania was still in prison, he filed a federal civil rights lawsuit seeking damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that his sentence had been improperly calculated so that he would remain imprisoned past his proper release date.

     His subsequent release, a federal trial judge ruled, rendered his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief moot. At the same time, in an apparent issue of first impression in the Third Circuit, the court held that the former prisoner's claim for money damages was barred based on the principles in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) even after he was released, when habeas action to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence was therefore no longer available.

     In Heck, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal civil rights lawsuit for money damages is barred when success in such a suit implies the invalidity of an underlying criminal conviction or sentence, unless the plaintiff has first obtained a "favorable termination" of their criminal case and successfully had the conviction or sentence set aside on direct appeal or via a habeas action. The appeals court noted that there was no dispute that these principles would apply if the plaintiff were still incarcerated. It was also undisputed that the plaintiff had not obtained a favorable decision regarding the calculation of his maximum release date. So the remaining issue was whether Heck's "favorable termination" requirement applied to a federal civil rights plaintiff who is no longer in custody.

     The appeals court ruled that it did apply, agreeing with one federal appeals court, Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2000) and disagreeing with another which has ruled on the issue, Nonette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2002). [PDF]

     In this case, the appeals court noted, the plaintiff prisoner could have, but did not, file a federal habeas claim to challenge the alleged miscalculation of his period of incarceration while he was still in custody, but "instead" chose to file his federal civil rights lawsuit. If his argument that his sentence was miscalculated was correct, the "only reason" he could not fulfill Heck's favorable termination requirement was that "through his own fault" he did not file the proper action while he was incarcerated.

If the court were to allow him to circumvent the limitations period and exhaustion requirements of habeas because he chose to file the wrong action while incarcerated, we would be creating a situation where a prisoner could defeat the intent and specific requirements of habeas and Heck's favorable termination requirement by waiting to file for damages just before his release.

     Mitchell v. Dept. of Corrections, 272 F. Supp. 2d 464 (M.D. Pa. 2003).

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Correctional officers accused of retaliation against prisoner for supporting another inmate's excessive force claim by pursuing disciplinary charges against prisoner would not be liable for violation of his First Amendment rights if they could demonstrate "dual motivation," showing that even without their "improper" motivation, the prisoner would have been subjected to the same actions.

     A New York prisoner claimed that two correctional officers violated his civil rights by retaliating against him for filing complaints against them. He allegedly furnished another prisoner with a witness statement supporting him in a claim that correctional officers assaulted him, and also filed a grievance against an officer for harassing him and threatening him with physical harm. Subsequent to this, two correctional officers allegedly assaulted him after singling him out for a frisk search.

     The officers then allegedly pursued disciplinary charges against the prisoner, which he contended were unfounded, and which they claimed were based on his refusal to obey direct orders during a routine frisk, refusal to submit to the frisk, and creating a disturbance. All of these actions, the plaintiff prisoner claimed, were in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights in supporting the other prisoner in his excessive force claim.

     The prisoner was found guilty of the disciplinary charges and a punishment of 30 days of confinement in keeplock and a loss of commissary, phone and package privileges was imposed, along with a $5 levy on his account for hearing costs.

     Overturning summary judgment for the defendant officers in the prisoner's federal civil rights claim, a federal appeals court noted that even if it were demonstrated that the officers had an improper retaliatory motive in bringing the disciplinary charges, they might be entitled to summary judgment if they could show that, even without this motive, the prisoner would have faced the same consequences, given his behavior.

     In the immediate case, however, there were genuine issues of fact as to whether the prisoner disobeyed the officer's order during the frisk search, as well as whether the officer harassed the inmate after he complained that the officer confiscated legal papers from his cell. These factual issues precluded summary judgment, so the appeals court ordered further proceedings.

     The appeals court also found genuine issues of fact as to whether the defendants used excessive force against the plaintiff prisoner, acting maliciously or wantonly, rather than simply using force necessary to restore order and discipline.

     Further proceedings were ordered to resolve these factual issues.

     Scott v. Coughlin, #99-0365, 344 F.3d 282 (2nd Cir. 2003).

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Federal appeals court rules that the issue of which mail is "legal mail" which should only be opened in the prisoner's presence, after they request this, should not have been submitted to a jury, but rather decided by a judge. Jury award of $13,000 is reduced to $3,000 for the improper opening of three letters from a prisoner's attorney outside his presence. While mail from courts is also found to be "legal mail," prison mail clerks were entitled to qualified immunity for the opening of such letters, since the law on the subject was not previously clearly established.

     A Michigan state prisoner filed a federal civil rights lawsuit alleging that two prison mailroom clerks violated his civil rights by unlawfully "opening, censoring, and interfering" with his legal mail, and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as money damages.

     The trial court declined to rule on the defendants' claims of qualified immunity before trial, and instead asked the jury to determine whether the correspondence referred to was in fact legal mail and whether that correspondence had been improperly opened outside of the prisoner's presence. The jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff's favor on 13 of his 20 claims, and awarded damages of $13,000, consisting of $750 in compensatory damages and $250 in punitive damages for each letter on which it found a violation of the prisoner's rights. The trial court then made an award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiff as a prevailing party.

     A federal appeals court has ruled that the trial judge should not have submitted to the jury the issue of whether the letters were "legal mail," as that is an issue of law the trial judge should have decided.

     The appeals court also found that 11 of the 20 letters did not implicate constitutionally-protected legal mail rights, that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on six of the remaining nine claims, and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on the final three claims. The appeals court accordingly reduced the jury's award to $3,000, and limited the attorneys' fees award to $4,500, since under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e((e)(2), it cannot exceed 150 percent of the judgment.

     On five of the letters, the court noted that the defendants could not be liable for having opened the mail, even if it was "legal mail," prior to the time that the prisoner made his written request to have such mail opened in his presence, under a policy that required such a request. Such "opt-in" systems, the court stated, have previously been upheld.

     General correspondence from the American Bar Association, the court found, which did not indicate that it came from a particular attorney or that it related to a currently pending legal matter, was not entitled to treatment as legal mail. Additionally, the envelope was not marked confidential, personal, or privileged. "The ABA is a professional organization designed to support attorneys in a variety of ways; it is not an organization that has the authority to take action on behalf of an inmate."

     On five letters involving correspondence from various county clerks, the court found that the communications were not entitled to treatment as legal mail. "In general, a county clerk or register of deeds is not someone who can provide legal advice about a prisoner's rights or direct legal services and is not someone with authority to take action on behalf of a prisoner." On a number of letters received from state and federal courts, however, the appeals court held that mail from a court constitutes "legal mail" and cannot be opened outside the presence of a prisoner who has specifically requested otherwise.

     The appeals court also found that it was clear that three letters from an attorney to the prisoner were clearly "legal mail" and that there was no penological or security concern that "justifies opening such mail outside of the prisoner's presence when the prisoner has specifically requested otherwise."

     The court found, however, that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the opening of the letters received from the courts, since nothing from the U.S. Supreme Court or in the precedent in the circuit previously clearly established that mail from courts should be treated as legal mail.

     The $3,000 awarded, therefore, was based only on the opening of the three letters from an attorney outside the prisoner's presence.

     Sallier v. Brooks, No. 01-12269, 343 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2003).

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Award of $108,000 for deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious hand injury overturned by appeals court. Many factors, including prisoner's own failure to seek treatment when he was not incarcerated, contributed to severity of condition, and some facts which caused a delay in surgery or the allegedly inadequacy of post-surgical care were beyond the defendants' control.

     A New York state prisoner was awarded approximately $108,000 in damages against prison officials, including a deputy superintendent, a supervising physician, a treating physician, and a correctional officer, as well as other prison employees, on a claim that they were deliberately indifferent to his need for medical treatment for a serious hand injury. During the incident which led to his arrest, he sustained multiple gunshot wounds, and for medical reasons, surgeons did not immediately remove bullet fragments embedded in his left hand.

     His lawsuit contended that there was an inordinate delay in surgery on his hand and other treatment once he was incarcerated after conviction, following a period when he was not incarcerated, and allegedly sought no treatment for the bullet wound.

     A federal appeals court overturned the award of damages to the prisoner, finding that none of the defendants could be said to have acted with deliberate indifference:

     * A supervising physician who was a defendant never examined or diagnosed the prisoner's hand, and was not directly responsible for scheduling his treatments or procedures, or for following up on continuing treatment, and there was no showing of gross negligence in supervising his subordinates.

     * A treating physician and physician's assistant were not deliberately indifferent, since most of the delay in treatment before the surgery was conducted was caused by factors beyond their control, and the prisoner was not incarcerated for almost two years, and then was temporarily at another facility for several months. Additionally, some of the delay was based on the prisoner's other medical conditions, and the surgery was a "risky" procedure. Further, the prisoner himself refused some of the recommended post-surgical treatment.

     * A nurse did not act with deliberate indifference in failing to obtain adequate physical therapy for the prisoner after his hand surgery. It was "undisputed" that she repeatedly tried to schedule visits with physical therapists from local clinics and hospitals, but those entities refused to send their therapists to the prison, and rejected her requests.

     * A correctional officer, in revoking a pass that allowed the prisoner to get his meals in his cells rather than in the prison cafeteria, did not act with deliberate indifference. The officer had received a report from another officer that the prisoner was seen walking around with packages in each hand, and the medical staff itself ordered a reevaluation of the pass, since it was reasoned that the prisoner, if he could carry packages, could also carry a food tray in the cafeteria.

     * Given that there was no violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights by prison employees, a deputy superintendent also could not be liable for "deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's serious medical needs related to his hand injury based upon his review of prison grievances.

     Hernandez v. Keane, #00-347, 341 F.3d 137 (2nd Cir. 2003).

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Federal court holds county sheriff in contempt and imposes sanctions for noncompliance with order requiring that all beds at jail be off the floor and that other conditions at facility, including medical care, food services, recreational services, cleaning, and security be improved.

     A federal trial court has held a county sheriff in contempt of prior court orders directing him to ensure that each prisoner in a Marion County, Indiana jail be provided with a bed or bunk above the floor "and that all prisoners be treated in a safe and humane manner." The court's decision contends that the sheriff, while "essentially conceding that he is in violation of" the court's prior orders, argued that contempt sanctions were inappropriate because he had showed that he "has attempted in good faith to comply with the court's orders."

     The court, in addressing this issue, agreed that the sheriff's failures to comply were not the result of "willful behavior," but rather "represent the cumulative results of derelictions of duty in every branch and at every level of county, city, and state government," implying that these entities failed to allocate needed resources. But the "fact remains that the sheriff is not in compliance with the substance of our prior orders," so the sheriff was found in civil contempt and sanctions will be imposed, including a fine of $40 per day for each bed in the lock-up found not to be in compliance with the order.

     The fines are to be made into an account established by the court which is to be used to fund compliance. Civil contempt, the court noted, requires a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the party found in contempt has violated a court order. Such a finding, and the imposition of sanctions, does not ordinarily require that the court find that the violation was "willful," and can instead be based on a party failing to be "reasonably diligent and energetic in attempting to accomplish what was ordered."

     The court found that many inmates are still sleeping in plastic, molded pallets on the floor or on "inferior and often filthy mattresses on the floor," with some on picnic tables and some directly on the floor, and the number of inmates housed in the jail frequently "far exceeds the number of beds above the floor."

     The court also ordered that the sheriff impose a ceiling on the jail population to prevent unacceptable conditions, and that he ensure that funds allocated for building improvement were used for that purpose, as well as making specified improvements in certain conditions at the jail, including medical care, food service, recreational services, the development of a cleaning schedule, and improvements in jail security, including the installation of video surveillance and a new system of audio communications to permit electronic communication between prisoners in the cellblocks and jail staff members.

     The court also issued a request to the county auditor to "provide assurance" that the money paid into the county's general fund by the U.S. Marshals Service for the housing of federal prisoners at the jail is allocated "in their entirety to the sheriff's budget for the benefit of inmates," and that these payments "shall not result in offsetting deductions" in the sheriff's budget "which would have the effect of negating the allocation of these funds."

     Marion County Jail Inmates v. Anderson, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (S.D. Ind. 2003).

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Federal appeals court finds that a prisoner can exhaust his administrative remedies by presenting his complaints to prison officials, even if they refuse to address the grievance because it was untimely under prison rules. To pursue a claim in his subsequent lawsuit, however, the grievance must have provided prison officials notice of the nature of the complaint. Plaintiff prisoner did not, in his grievance, provide notice that he was asserting a failure to protect claim against correctional officers who allegedly saw a fellow officer beat him but failed to intervene, but $70,000 in damages awarded against officer who allegedly beat him.

     Congress, in passing the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), required that inmates seeking to challenge prison conditions in federal court first exhaust any available administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e. In a recent case, a federal court found, however, that this statute "does not condition access to the federal courts on satisfying the procedures and timelines of prison administrators." It upheld an award of $70,000 against a correctional officer who allegedly beat the plaintiff prisoner.

     The appeals court ruled that as long as an inmate presents his grievance to prison officials and appeals through the available procedures, the inmate has satisfied the requirements of the statute that he exhaust his administrative remedies, "and a prison's decision not to address the grievance because it was untimely under prison rules shall not bar the federal suit."

     The appeals court also held that "when a grievance does not give prison officials notice of the nature of the inmate's complaint, the inmate has not met the PLRA's requirements."

     In the immediate case, an Ohio prisoner claimed that a corrections officer beat him and that three other officers were present, observed the allegedly unjustified beating, but failed to intervene to protect him from harm.

     The plaintiff prisoner filed and pursued a grievance over the alleged beating, but relief was denied because the grievance was not filed within the thirty-day period required by departmental policy. He also pursued appeals, but the denial of the grievance was upheld.

     When he sued, however, in addition to claims concerning the beating itself, he asserted failure to protect claims based on the alleged failure of the three observing officers to intervene. The grievance previously pursued had not advanced these additional claims.

     The trial court found that the prisoner had adequately exhausted his administrative remedies against the officer who allegedly beat him, but not against the other defendant officers. It therefore dismissed the claims against the three observing officers for failure to protect, but awarded $70,000 in damages against the officer who allegedly beat the prisoner.

     The federal appeals court rejected the argument that the prisoner did not adequately exhaust his available administrative remedies against the officer who beat him. It found that as long as he presented his grievance through one complete round of prison grievance processes, the exhaustion requirement was met, even if the prisoner failed to comply with the grievance system's procedural requirements.

     At the same time, it also found that when an inmate grievance does not provide prison officials with notice of the nature of the grievance against particular defendants, it fails to give officials the opportunity to address the prisoner's complaint, prior to litigation, which the PLRA was intended to provide. Pursuing the general grievance concerning the beating, therefore, did not constitute exhaustion of available administrative remedies concerning the "failure to protect" claim.

     The grievance the plaintiff filed did not mention the other officers or anything to suggest that anyone other than the officer directly beating him was responsible or knew anything about the incident, even though he was "indisputably aware" that other officers were present when the incident occurred. The mere fact that the inmate fully participated in the prison's own internal investigation of the incident was insufficient to make up for this deficiency in his grievance. The plaintiff therefore was properly prevented from pursuing his failure to protect claims in his lawsuit, the appeals court found.

     Thomas v. Woolum, #01-3227, 337 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2003).

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County correctional officers were grossly negligent in the manner of monitoring a detainee suffering from alcohol withdrawal and were not informed of the serious nature of his condition by jail physician, making county liable for $80,000 for detainee's death.

     A South Carolina man arrested for failing to pay his child support spent a weekend at a county detention facility, and on Monday morning was observed by a correctional officer and a paramedic as shaking, sweating, laughing, and gripping the cell bars. He did not respond to conversation. They decided that the detainee should be seen by the detention center physician.

     The doctor assessed the detainee as suffering from "d.t.'s" or alcohol withdrawal, and prescribed Librium, ordering that the detainee be re-evaluated in two days. A correctional officer placed the prisoner in a cell for medical observation, as instructed by a paramedic, but he later testified that he was not instructed what symptoms or behavior to monitor.

     The following morning when the officer returned to the jail, he saw the detainee lying on the cell floor at 6:30 a.m., and he appeared to be sleeping. He asked the prisoner to get up off the floor three hours later, and he did so and sat on a bench. Two other detainees were placed in the cell, as the prisoner now appeared to be "okay" and slumped over asleep. The cellmates later notified jail employees that he needed attention, and when officers entered the cell, he was dead on the cell bench.

     A wrongful death lawsuit was filed against the county, seeking recovery of damages. There was expert witness testimony that the detainee could have survived alcohol withdrawal if properly monitored, but that, as the officers doing the monitoring were not informed by the physician of the seriousness of the detainee's condition, or told what symptoms to monitor, they could not determine whether his condition was improving or deteriorating.

     This manner of "monitoring" by officers who did not know what to look for, but who merely periodically looked in on the detainee to see if he appeared "ok," could serve as the basis of a finding of gross negligence which proximately caused the detainee's death, the South Carolina Supreme Court held. An award of $80,000 in damages was upheld. The court also found that the plaintiff's claim was not barred by summary judgment for the defendants in a prior federal civil rights lawsuit in federal court, as the plaintiff presented other evidence of gross negligence in the lawsuit brought in state court.

     Jinks v. Richland County, No. 25690, 585 S.E.2d 281 (S.C. 2003).

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     Editor's Note: The South Carolina Supreme Court had previously overturned the award in this case, on the grounds that a federal statute, 28 U. S. C. §1367, tolling the applicable state statute of limitations violated the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Jinks v. Richland County, 563 S.E.2d 104 (2002). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the statute of limitations issue, Jinks v. Richland County, 123 S. Ct. 1667 (2003), so that the decision above is on the merits of the case, rather than the procedural statute of limitations issue.

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Federal trial judge upholds jury's finding that jail officials were negligent under Kansas state law, but not deliberately indifferent, as required for a federal civil rights claim, in failing to prevent the successful suicide of a inmate who used an electrical switchplate in his cell as a suicide aid. Jury's award of $10,002,000 in damages is reduced to $252,000 because of state statutory limit on wrongful death damage awards.

     The estate of an inmate who committed suicide at a Kansas county jail sued various jail employees and officials, contending that they had been deliberately indifferent to the risk that he would kill himself and negligent under state law in failing to prevent the suicide.

     A federal court jury rejected the deliberate indifference federal civil rights claim, but found four defendants to have been negligent. It awarded the inmate's survivors, his parents, $2,000 for funeral expenses and $10 million for non-economic damages.

      Ruling on various post-trial motions by the parties, the federal trial judge has upheld the jury's verdict, but reduced the $10 million portion of their award to $250,000, for a total award of $252,00, under a Kansas state statute placing a $250,000 limit on non-economic damages for wrongful death. The trial judge rejected the argument that this limit on such damages violated the right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or that it violated the plaintiff's right to due process of law or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

     Reviewing the evidence in the case, the trial judge found that the mere fact that the inmate's cell had an electrical switchplate did not make the jail officials deliberately indifferent to a known risk of harm, as there was no showing that there was any past experience that would have led them to believe that the presence of the switchplate posed a "substantial risk" that the decedent would use it as an aid to his suicide attempt.

     The prisoner, sentenced to serve a one-year sentence for violating a restraining order, had allegedly wrote a suicide note, and it was found in his cell after his mother alerted jail employees to his presence. The evidence showed that a number of precautions were then taken, including the removal of the prisoner from his general population cell to a "hard lockdown" cell in the jail's medical module, and the placing of the prisoner on suicide watch. There was a metal plate attached to the wall just to the left of the door of the cell, which was shaped like an electrical light-switch plate cover with a slit in the center, but no switch protruded from the slit.

     The plate served to cover the cell's thermostat. The prisoner allegedly tore his woolen blanket into strips, pried the metal plate from the wall, wrapped the blanket around the metal plate and around his neck, sat down with his back against the wall, and leaned forward, choking himself to death. The plaintiffs argued that the prisoner should have been placed into a "rubber room" which lacked the metal plate and been issued a suicide preventative blanket or no blanket at all rather than the standard-issue woolen blanket he was given.

     The court found that these actions, and the possibility that some of the defendants may have not conducted all of the required 15 minute checks on the prisoner, was sufficient to support the jury's finding of negligence, but the fact that some suicide prevention actions were also carried out was similarly sufficient to support their findings that the defendants did not act with "deliberate indifference" to a known risk of harm, as required for federal civil rights liability.

     Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (D. Kan. 2003).

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Federal statute providing enhanced protection for prisoners' religious practices struck down by appeals court as an unconstitutional establishment of religion.

     A federal appeals court has ruled that a federal law intended to enhance protection for prisoners' religious practices is an unconstitutional "establishment of religion."

     The plaintiffs in three cases consolidated and decided together by the appeals court are Ohio prisoners who argued that various Ohio corrections officials have violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2000cc-5. The correctional officials filed motions to dismiss these claims, challenging the constitutionality of the statute as it applies to prisoners. Their motions were denied by the trial court.

     The appeals court reversed the denial of the defendants' motions to dismiss, agreeing that the statute improperly advances religion in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The court stated that because it was striking down the statute on its face, the facts of the individual cases "are not particularly relevant":

The prisoners in all three cases generally allege that officials with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (ODRC) violated RLUIPA by refusing to accommodate the prisoners’ religious beliefs and practices. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that RLUIPA has allowed inmate gangs to claim “‘religious’ status in order to insulate their illicit activities from scrutiny.”

     What was relevant, the court stated, was the history of the statute.

      In 1990, the Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution does not require that government have a compelling state interest in order to enact a law of general applicability that incidentally burdens the exercise of religion. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Congress responded in 1993 by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb—2000bb-4. RFRA required that any governmental attempt to “substantially burden” the exercise of religion must be the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).

     The Supreme Court subsequently held RFRA unconstitutional insofar as it applied to states and localities because the statute exceeded Congress’s powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Congress reacted to Boerne by passing RLUIPA in 2000. RLUIPA has the same substantive standard as RFRA.

     It provides, in relevant part that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution” unless the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive means” of furthering that interest. The Act defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000-cc5(7)(A). RLUIPA’s requirement of strict scrutiny stands in sharp contrast to the Supreme Court’s previous decisions, which have held that the courts should apply a rational-relationship review to restrictions upon inmates’ fundamental rights. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (applying the rational-relationship test to prison rules regulating prisoner correspondence and marriage); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (applying the rational-relationship test to prison rules regulating prisoners’ religious exercise).

      Congress enacted RLUIPA pursuant to its powers under the Spending Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. RLUIPA applies where “the substantial burden [on religious exercise] is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). The Act is also applicable where “the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes.”

      The U. S. Supreme Court has not yet examined the constitutionality of RLUIPA. Justice Stevens, however, in his concurring opinion in Boerne, concluded that RLUIPA’s predecessor, RFRA, violated the Establishment Clause by favoring religion, stating that the "statute has provided [religious organizations] with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment."

     The appeals court applied this analysis to the RLUIPA, finding that it favored religious rights over other fundamental rights "without any showing that religious rights are at any greater risk of deprivation."

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” Neutrality is the fundamental requirement of the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government from either endorsing a particular religion or promoting religion generally.

     The Supreme Court had previously held that government interference with prisoners’ fundamental rights is not subject to strict scrutiny, as RLUIPA requires, but only to a rational-relationship review. The broad scope of RLUIPA, the court stated, suggests that its actual purpose is not to accommodate religion by removing a particular obstacle to religious exercise, but “to advance religion in prisons relative to other constitutionally protected conduct.”

     If that is the "true purpose" of the statute, the court commented, then Congress has “abandoned neutrality and acted with the purpose of furthering religion,” in violation of the Establishment Clause’s fundamental command of governmental neutrality.

     But the appeals court found it unnecessary to determine what the purpose of Congress was to strike down the statute as unconstitutional, because "it has the primary effect of advancing religion."

Under RLUIPA, prison regulations that substantially burden religious belief, including those that are generally applicable and facially neutral, are judged under a strict scrutiny standard, requiring prison officials, rather than the inmate, to bear the burden of proof that the regulation furthers a compelling penological interest and is the least restrictive means of satisfying this interest. As is well known from the history of constitutional law, the change that RLUIPA imposes is revolutionary, switching from a scheme of deference to one of presumptive unconstitutionality. Instead of rational, the penological interest under RLUIPA must be of the highest order, instead of focusing on the prison inmate’s ability to find other avenues to exercise his belief, a court is required to focus on the prison administrator’s choice among regulatory options, instead of placing the burden of proof on an inmate, RLUIPA throws the burden on prison officials, It is hard to imagine a greater reversal of fortunes for the religious rights of inmates than the one involved in the passage of RLUIPA.

     This enhanced protection for religious rights, as opposed to other rights, in a prison context, the court noted, was not based on evidence that religious rights are at "greater risk of deprivation in the prison system than other fundamental rights," which might justify the enhancement. In doing this without such evidence, Congress impermissibly favored religion, in the appeals court's view.

    Suppose, the court reasoned, that:

One inmate is a member of the Aryan Nation solely because of his fanatical belief that a secret Jewish conspiracy exists to control the world. The second inmate holds the white supremacist literature because he is a member of the Church of Jesus Christ Christian, Aryan Nation (“CJCC”). The non-religious inmate may challenge the confiscation as a violation of his rights to free expression and free association. A court would evaluate these claims under the deferential rational relationship test in Turner, placing a high burden of proof on the inmate and leaving the inmate with correspondingly dim prospects of success. However, the religious inmate, as a member of the CJCC, may assert a RLUIPA claim, arguing that the confiscation places a substantial burden on his religious exercise. The religious white supremacist now has a much better chance of success than the non-religious white supremacist, as prison officials bear the burden of proving that the prison policy satisfies a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of satisfying the interest. The difference in the level of protection provided to each claim lies not in the relative merits of the claims, but lies instead in the basis of one claim in religious belief.

     This difference in result, the court found, is improper, and a violation of the Establishment Clause.

     Cutter v. Wilkinson, #02-3270, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 22840 (6th Cir.).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet.

     Editor's Note: Two circuits have come to the opposite conclusion regarding the constitutionality of RLUIPA. See Charles v. Verhagen, No. 02-3572 (7th Cir. Oct. 30, 2003) [PDF]; Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) [PDF].

     Before the appeals court decision reported above, there have been only two decisions by trial courts finding the RLUIPA unconstitutional:  Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566 (W.D. Va. 2003) (Turk, J.) [PDF], and Kilaab Al Ghashiyah (Khan) v. Dep’t of Corrections, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (Adelman, J.), overruled by Charles v. Verhagen, No. 02-3572 (7th Cir. Oct. 30, 2003) [PDF].

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Equally divided federal appeals court upholds, by 4-4 vote, that Rhode Island prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity for conducting allegedly illegal blanket strip and visual body cavity searches of misdemeanant arrestees without particularized suspicion at a maximum-security prison. Judges disagree as to whether it was clearly established, at the time of the searches in 2000.

     A federal appeals court, acting en banc, found itself evenly split 4-4, with half of the judges believing that Rhode Island prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity for conducting allegedly illegal blanket strip and visual body cavity searches of misdemeanant arrestees. The searches were carried out without particularized suspicion that the arrestees had possession of drugs, weapons or other contraband, and were carried out at a maximum-security prison in which the arrestees were being placed because, unlike other states, Rhode Island has no regional or county detention facilities, operating only a single, all-purpose penitentiary, the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) centrally located in Cranston, Rhode Island.

     The ACI comprises seven separate maximum-security facilities. Two of those units--one for women and the other for men--receive all persons committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections regardless of the nature of their offenses. As a result, these facilities housed an array of prisoners ranging from newly sentenced felons to convicts under protective custody to arrestees.

     The plaintiffs in the lawsuit were all allegedly arrested for "non-violent, non-drug related misdemeanors," but were subjected to a required blanket policy of conducting strip searches and visual body cavity searches (of the anal and genital areas) of those entering the ACI facilities. These searches were conducted without a requirement of individualized suspicion of possession of weapons or contraband. A federal appeals court ruled that such searches were unconstitutional, upholding an injunction issued by the trial court in 2000 against the practice in Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2001).

     A class action lawsuit brought by eighteen prisoners who had been subjected to the searches then sought money damages. The trial court rejected these claims, granting qualified immunity to the defendants, and finding that prior to the court's decision in Roberts by the trial court in 2000, it had not been clearly established that prison officials needed some particularized suspicion before strip-searching misdemeanant arrestees who were about to be introduced into the general population at a maximum security prison.

    Four judges on the federal appeals court agreed with the trial court's ruling, while four disagreed. In the absence of a majority, the 4-4 split decision had the effect of leaving the trial court's ruling undisturbed.

     Those finding qualified immunity stated that "this is a close case, but we do not require public officials to foretell the course of constitutional law with absolute accuracy in order to obtain the balm of qualified immunity," which is designed to protect "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."

     The four judges who would have reversed the trial court's decision accused the other four judges of having "gone far toward granting absolute immunity under the cloak of qualified immunity," and of unduly emphasizing "deference to the judgment of government officials" without insisting that "the constitutional rights of individuals be vigilantly protected. They argued that prior cases, including Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), while not an "exact match" to the facts present in the immediate case, provided fair warning to the defendants that the policy of conducting suspicionless strip and body cavity searches of arrestees like the plaintiffs was unconstitutional. Swain held that "a strip and visual body cavity search of an arrestee must be justified, at the least, by a reasonable suspicion," and the judges reasoned that the fact that Swain and cases from other circuits relied on by the plaintiffs involved local jails rather than prisons like the ACI was not dispositive.

     Savard v. Rhode Island, No. 02-1568, 338 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2003).

     »Click here to read the text of the decision on the Internet.

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Access to Courts/Legal Info

     Prison rule limiting inmates to a monthly allotment of $10 for postage did not improperly interfere with prisoner's right of access to the courts. Rule was rationally connected to legitimate interest in permitting access, on an equal basis, for prisoners, given the limited funds available. Bronson v. Horn, 830 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Cmwlth 2003). [PDF]

Employment Issues

     A probationary employee of a community corrections center was entitled to an opportunity to be heard before being terminated and was denied due process when she was not told why she was being offered a choice between quitting or being fired. McClain v. Northwest Comm. Corrections Cent., 268 F. Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. Ohio 2003).

Home Detention, Home Release

     Removal of offender from home detention program for failure to obtain full-time employment was a deprivation of liberty, entitling him to due process, but county community corrections agency did not order him jailed, since only a court had the power to do so. The plaintiff was arrested under a warrant and spent 3 days in custody. A subsequent court hearing determined that he was mentally disabled, and therefore excused from the condition of obtaining full time employment. He was then reinstated in the home detention program. If there was any erroneous deprivation of due process, it was by the probation officer and the state court that issued the arrest warrant at the officer's request. No civil rights claim could be pursued against the community corrections agency for merely reporting to the probation officer a probable violation of a condition of probation. Paige v. Hudson, #02-4317, 341 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2003). [PDF]

Inmate Funds

     Pennsylvania prisoner had no due process right to a hearing concerning the amount that the Department of Corrections would deduct from his inmate account to pay sentenced costs, fines, and restitution. Ingram v. Newman, 830 A.2d 1099 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). [PDF]

Mail

     Lack of written authorization from prison superintendent for opening and inspection of prisoner's outgoing legal mail did not render inspections unlawful when there was a reasonable basis for the belief that the prisoner was attempting to smuggle his own mail out of the facility through the use of other prisoner's return addresses on his envelopes. Tafari v. Selsky, 764 N.Y.S.2d 149 (A.D. 3d Dept. 2003). [PDF]

Medical Care

     Prisoner's claim that he did not receive the specific medication he wanted to relieve rashes and itching from his allergies did not establish deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs when he received "extensive" medical attention for his problems. Kretchnar v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 130 M.D. 2003, 831 A.2d 793 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). [PDF]

     Prisoner who suffered a wrist injury during a prisoner assault failed to establish that warden acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, based on the fact that surgery only took place nine days after the injury. The prisoner was seen by a number of doctors and there was no evidence that the warden ever intentionally withheld medical care, ignored the prisoner's complaints, or knew that the prisoner was in need of immediate surgery or that a delay was likely to lead to serious medical consequences. Shafer v. Carmona, #02-41175, 71 Fed. Appx. 350 (5th Cir. 2003). [PDF]

Overcrowding

     Federal trial court had continuing jurisdiction over class of county inmates who brought lawsuits over detention facility overcrowding. Inmates who were moved to a new facility after settlement in the case were entitled to a preliminary injunction against restrictions which prevented their lawyer from visiting and restricted his phone calls to five minutes. McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, No. Civ. 95-23-Mv/DJS, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (D. N.M. 2003).

Parole

     Parole officer was not entitled to absolute immunity on claim that he caused prisoner to be unlawfully jailed by charging him with the use of illegal drugs without first performing a drug test. McCammon v. Youngblood, #2010193, 853 So. 2d 249 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).

Prison Litigation Reform Act: Exhaustion of Remedies

     Prisoner's claims for compensation for personal property that correctional officers allegedly destroyed were barred when prisoner failed to show that he had exhausted available administrative remedies as required under the terms of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a). Khan v. U.S., 271 F. Supp. 2d 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).

     Prisoners asserting claims against county and sheriff for alleged systemic violations of their rights as persons with "serious mental health needs" were not required to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit when there was "no available administrative remedies" that the plaintiffs could have used for relief. Shook v. Bd. of County Commissioners of the County of El Paso, 216 F.R.D. 644 (D. Colo. 2003).

Prison Litigation Reform Act: Similar State Laws

     Texas prisoner's failure to file a claim for damages to his personal property by a prison employee searching his cell before the 31st day after he received a written decision from the department's written grievance system required dismissal of his lawsuit under a state statute governing inmate litigation. V.T.C.A. Civil Practice & Remedies Code Sec. 14.005(b). Lewis v. Johnson, No. 13-01-770-CV, 97 S.W.3d 885 (Tex. App. 2003).

     New York state statute establishing a reduced filing fee for inmates granted poor person status did not discriminate against prison inmates as compared to other poor litigants, as it was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest in deterring frivolous prisoner litigation. Berrian v. Selsky, 763 N.Y.S.2d 111 (A.D. 3d Dept. 2003). [PDF]

Prisoner Assault: By Officer

     Correctional officer did not use excessive force in handcuffing a prisoner who allegedly threatened him and then escorting him to the shift commander's office. The prisoner initially said nothing to the shift commander about the handcuffs, and when he later complained that one of the handcuffs was too tight, it was loosened. Further, the officer used the handcuffs to maintain or restore discipline, rather than "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Stanton v. Furlong, #02-11336, 73 Fed. Appx. 332 (10th Cir. 2003).

Prisoner Classification

     Virginia prisoner had no right to be housed in a state correctional facility rather than a local jail, even if the facilities and opportunities for participation in programs such as work release, paid work, furlough, contact visits, additional exercise, and vocational training were not the same. This did not violate equal protection when prisoners were not classified on the basis of a suspect class, such as race, and there was a rational basis for disparate treatment. Khalig v. Angelone, #02-7365, 72 Fed. Appx. 895 (4th Cir. 2003). [PDF]

     Federal trial court enjoins U.S. Bureau of Prisons from transferring prisoner out of community corrections center into prison for service of his sentence for bank fraud previously plea-bargained for. The Bureau of Prison's new policy precluding community corrections center confinement, allowed for the previous 17 years, may well be additional punishment, the court stated, barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The court agreed that it (the new policy) was contrary to the plaintiff prisoner's expectations when he entered into the plea bargain. Ashkenazi v. Attorney General of the U.S., 246 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2003).

Prisoner Discipline

     Determination that prisoner violated rules prohibiting him from being out of place and refusing to obey direct orders was supported by substantial evidence. Hearing officer did not violate prisoner's rights by refusing to call two witnesses, when they had no direct knowledge of the events at issue, and he properly allowed certain witnesses to testify by speaker-phone. Ardale v. Keane, 760 N.Y.S. 2d 563 (A.D. 3d Dist. 2003).

     Prisoner's claim that disciplinary board failed to follow its own procedural guidelines was sufficient to support a proceeding for a common law writ of certiorari under Tennessee state law. Prisoner claimed that he was not provided with adequate notice of the charges, was not permitted to obtain and introduce relevant exculpatory evidence, and that the board failed to independently assess a confidential informant's reliability. Punishments of 30 days of punitive segregation, involuntary administrative segregation, and a five-dollar fine for an escape attempt did not violate the prisoner's protected liberty interests under the due process clauses of either the U.S. or Tennessee state constitutions. Willis v. Tennessee Department of Correction, 113 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 2003). [PDF]

     Prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability on claim that they violated detainee's procedural due process rights by denying fingerprint analysis of a shank found in his cell, which he was disciplined for possessing. Prisoner claimed that shank was planted there, but there was no clearly established due process right to have the prison "prepare evidence" for the prisoner under such circumstances. Okocci v. Klein, 270 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Pa. 2003).

Public Protection

     County sheriff's alleged non-use of handcuffs or shackles while transporting prisoner who escaped was insufficient to support a claim for damages under Texas law for escaped prisoner's subsequent alleged assault and robbery of plaintiff. Lopez v. McMillion, No. 04-03-0021-CV, 113 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. App. 2003).

Religion

     Housing a Muslim prisoner in a cell with a non-Muslim did not constitute a "substantial burden" to his exercise of his religious beliefs in violation of the Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000 cc-1 or the Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act, 51 Okl. St. Ann. Sec. 253. Prisoner could pray several times during the day outside his cell and having to pray, once a day, while locked down with this cellmate only had an "incidental" effect on his practice of his religion. Policy of randomly assigning cellmates was reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective of preventing racial or religious discrimination in cell assignments. Steele v. Guilfeyle, No. 97,997, 76 P.3d 99 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 1 2003).

     Native American prisoner's First Amendment right to exercise his religion was not violated by prison policies imposing restrictions on a "smudging" ceremony or denying him the designation of a patch of land as "Holy Ground." The prisoner failed to show that these practices were so essential to his religion that their absence would be a substantial burden on religious freedom. Wilson v. Moore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Fla. 2003).

Smoking

     Prisoner failed to show that he had serious medical needs for a smoke-free environment or that defendant officials were deliberately indifferent to his needs when he was never diagnosed with any medical condition and the correctional facility had a non-smoking policy, even though it was "imperfectly" enforced. Henderson v. Martin, #01-2463, 73 Fed. Appx. 115 (6th Cir. 2003).

Strip Search: Prisoners

     Federal trial court certifies class action of D.C. past and present detainees who were allegedly subjected to suspicionless strip searches upon returning from court hearings declaring them releasable. The defendants' alleged lack of knowledge as to the origin of the department's policy of conducting suspicionless trip searches did not entitle them to a protective order against a request for depositions of the officials "most qualified to testify on" when and why the department "began the practice." Bynum v. D.C., 217 F.R.D. 43 (D.D.C. 2003).

Visitation

     Three-year suspension of prisoner's visitation rights as punishment for attempting to introduce a weapon into the visitation room did not violate due process rights, his right to free association, or the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Hernandez v. McGinnis, 272 F. Supp. 2d 223 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).

Work Release

     Revocation of prisoner's approval to participate in work release program without a hearing did not violate his due process rights, since any such approval was conditional under New York state law until his actual work release began. Caban v. N.Y. State Department of Correctional Services, 764 N.Y.S.2d 493 (A.D. 3d Dept. 2003). [PDF]

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     AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.

     Disciplinary Confinement: "Lockdown New York: Disciplinary Confinement in New York State Prisons," a report by the Correctional Association of New York (60 pgs. October 2003). [PDF]. Executive Summary. [PDF].

     Mentally-Ill Prisoners: "Ill-Equipped U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness" by Human Rights Watch. (October 2003). According to this report, one in six U.S. prisoners is mentally ill, and many correctional facilities are ill-equipped to handle their medical and other needs. The full 215-page report is available in .PDF format or can be read on the web in .html format in different chapters, or see the Summary press release.

     Prison Conditions: State of the Prisons: Conditions of Confinement in 25 New York Correctional Facilities A report by the Prison Visiting Committee of the Correctional Association of New York. (162 pgs. June 2002) [PDF].

     Proposed Legislation: Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act [PDF], as introduced in U.S. Senate, June 5, 2003 and passed by the Senate on October 29, 2003. Introduced in the Senate by Senator Mike Dewine (R-Ohio), the bipartisan bill was cosponsored by Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Pete Domenici (R-NM), Charles Grassley (R-IA), and Orrin Hatch (R-UT). The legislation authorizes federal grants to support collaborations between mental health, criminal justice, juvenile justice, and corrections systems to reduce the number of mentally ill offenders in the criminal justice system, to improve the mental health care received by those who are incarcerated, and to increase the number of transitional and discharge programs to help reduce the rate of recidivism of mentally ill offenders discharged from prison and jail. U.S. Representative Ted Strickland (D-OH) introduced the bill in the House.

     Statistics: "Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-2001." Presents estimates of the number of living persons in the United States who have ever been to State or Federal prison. Such estimates include persons in prison and on parole, as well as those previously incarcerated but no longer under parole supervision. The report also provides updated estimates of the lifetime chances of going to prison using standard demographic life table techniques. Such techniques project the likelihood of incarceration for persons born in 2001, assuming current incarceration rates continue until their death. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 12 pages (2003). [PDF] [Text file] [.html file]

     Reference:

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted jail and prisoner law resources.